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    Response Processors: CSRF Processor: Incident - CSRF Remote Script Inclusion

    Complexity: Informational (0.0)

    Default Response: None.

    Cause: WebApp Secure protects against CSRF attacks by using a special interception technique. When a request comes in to WebApp Secure, the referer is checked. In the event that there is a third party referer (the user was following a link from another site), the interception mechanism kicks in. This involves returning a special page to the user that validates that the user is intentionally requesting the resource. If the validation is successful, the user is transparently redirected to the original resource they requested. If the validation fails, the user is then instructed to manually confirm their intentions, or return to the page they came from (to prevent the CSRF attack from working). In most cases, a valid CSRF attack would function in such a way as to hide this manual confirmation step, so the user would probably never see it (for example if the URL was loaded using an image HTML tag, then the resulting HTML confirmation step would not render, because its HTML, not an image). This incident is triggered when a user accesses a page on a third party website which contains a Javascript tag that loads content from the protected site. This would normally represent a victim of a CSRF attack, but because CSRF attacks are blocked, an attacker is unlikely to execute such an attack. Therefore, it is more probable that the attacker is testing a possible vector to see if it will work and encountering this incident.

    Behavior: CSRF attacks are generally two-phase. The first phase involves the attacker establishing a functional CSRF attack. This could take quite a while and involves the attacker making requests to the protected site, trying all different types of CSRF techniques. The second phase is when the attacker injects the successful CSRF vector into a public website. In the second phase, legitimate users are visiting the public website and unknowingly executing the CSRF attack in the background. It is not useful to flag the victims of the CSRF attack as hackers, because they might not even know what is going on. However it is useful to flag the original attack vector establishment, because it can shed light on who created the "CSRF" attack. While this incident would potentially be fired for any victims of a CSRF attack, CSRF attacks are blocked by this processor, so it is unlikely that an attacker would ever actually try to use the vector against legitimate users. As such, it is far more likely that the attacker is still in the first phase and trying to uncover a successful CSRF vector. Because of this, careful attention should be paid to the URL that is being requested (this will help identify what the user is trying to exploit).

    Published: 2015-02-04