

Junos<sup>®</sup> OS

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# FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600 Devices

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*Junos<sup>®</sup> OS FIPS Evaluated Configuration Guide for SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600 Devices*  
19.2R1

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# About the Documentation

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Use this guide to operate SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600 devices in Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 Level 2 environment. FIPS 140-2 defines security levels for hardware and software that perform cryptographic functions.

## Documentation and Release Notes

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## Documentation Conventions

Table 1 on page vi defines notice icons used in this guide.

Table 1: Notice Icons

Icon	Meaning	Description
	Informational note	Indicates important features or instructions.
	Caution	Indicates a situation that might result in loss of data or hardware damage.
	Warning	Alerts you to the risk of personal injury or death.
	Laser warning	Alerts you to the risk of personal injury from a laser.
	Tip	Indicates helpful information.
	Best practice	Alerts you to a recommended use or implementation.

Table 2 on page vi defines the text and syntax conventions used in this guide.

Table 2: Text and Syntax Conventions

Convention	Description	Examples
<b>Bold text like this</b>	Represents text that you type.	To enter configuration mode, type the <b>configure</b> command:  user@host> <b>configure</b>
Fixed-width text like this	Represents output that appears on the terminal screen.	user@host> <b>show chassis alarms</b>  No alarms currently active
<i>Italic text like this</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Introduces or emphasizes important new terms.</li> <li>Identifies guide names.</li> <li>Identifies RFC and Internet draft titles.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A policy <i>term</i> is a named structure that defines match conditions and actions.</li> <li><i>Junos OS CLI User Guide</i></li> <li>RFC 1997, <i>BGP Communities Attribute</i></li> </ul>

Table 2: Text and Syntax Conventions (*continued*)

Convention	Description	Examples
<i>Italic text like this</i>	Represents variables (options for which you substitute a value) in commands or configuration statements.	Configure the machine's domain name:  [edit] root@# <b>set system domain-name</b> <i>domain-name</i>
<b>Text like this</b>	Represents names of configuration statements, commands, files, and directories; configuration hierarchy levels; or labels on routing platform components.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To configure a stub area, include the <b>stub</b> statement at the [edit <b>protocols ospf area area-id</b>] hierarchy level.</li> <li>The console port is labeled <b>CONSOLE</b>.</li> </ul>
< > (angle brackets)	Encloses optional keywords or variables.	<b>stub</b> <default-metric <i>metric</i> >;
(pipe symbol)	Indicates a choice between the mutually exclusive keywords or variables on either side of the symbol. The set of choices is often enclosed in parentheses for clarity.	<b>broadcast   multicast</b>  ( <i>string1</i>   <i>string2</i>   <i>string3</i> )
# (pound sign)	Indicates a comment specified on the same line as the configuration statement to which it applies.	<b>rsvp { # Required for dynamic MPLS only</b>
[ ] (square brackets)	Encloses a variable for which you can substitute one or more values.	<b>community name members [ <i>community-ids</i> ]</b>
Indentation and braces ( { } )	Identifies a level in the configuration hierarchy.	[edit] routing-options { static { route default { nexthop <i>address</i> ; retain; } } }
; (semicolon)	Identifies a leaf statement at a configuration hierarchy level.	

## GUI Conventions

Table 2: Text and Syntax Conventions (*continued*)

Convention	Description	Examples
<b>Bold text like this</b>	Represents graphical user interface (GUI) items you click or select.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In the Logical Interfaces box, select <b>All Interfaces</b>.</li> <li>To cancel the configuration, click <b>Cancel</b>.</li> </ul>
> (bold right angle bracket)	Separates levels in a hierarchy of menu selections.	In the configuration editor hierarchy, select <b>Protocols&gt;Ospf</b> .

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We encourage you to provide feedback so that we can improve our documentation. You can use either of the following methods:

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- Download the latest versions of software and review release notes: <https://www.juniper.net/customers/csc/software/>
- Search technical bulletins for relevant hardware and software notifications: <https://kb.juniper.net/InfoCenter/>
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For international or direct-dial options in countries without toll-free numbers, see <https://support.juniper.net/support/requesting-support/>.

# 1

CHAPTER

## Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation for SRX Series Security Devices

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# Understanding Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation

## IN THIS SECTION

- [About the Cryptographic Boundary on Your Device | 11](#)
- [How FIPS Mode of Operation Differs from Non-FIPS Mode of Operation | 12](#)
- [Validated Version of Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 13](#)

Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 defines security levels for hardware and software that perform cryptographic functions. Junos-FIPS is a version of the Junos operating system (Junos OS) that complies with Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2.

Operating SRX Series devices in a FIPS 140-2 Level 2 environment requires enabling and configuring FIPS mode of operation on the device from the Junos OS command-line interface (CLI).

The *Cryptographic Officer* enables FIPS mode of operation in Junos OS Release 19.2R1 and sets up keys and passwords for the system and other *FIPS users* who can view the configuration. Both user types can also perform normal configuration tasks on the device (such as modify interface types) as individual user configuration allows.

**BEST PRACTICE:** Be sure to verify the secure delivery of your device and apply tamper-evident seals to its vulnerable ports.

## About the Cryptographic Boundary on Your Device

FIPS 140-2 compliance requires a defined *cryptographic boundary* around each *cryptographic module* on a device. Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation prevents the cryptographic module from running any software that is not part of the FIPS-certified distribution, and allows only FIPS-approved cryptographic algorithms to be used. No critical security parameters (CSPs), such as passwords and keys, can cross the cryptographic boundary of the module by, for example, being displayed on a console or written to an external log file.



**CAUTION:** Virtual Chassis features are not supported in FIPS mode of operation. Do not configure a Virtual Chassis in FIPS mode of operation.

To physically secure the cryptographic module, all Juniper Networks devices require a tamper-evident seal on the USB and mini-USB ports.

## How FIPS Mode of Operation Differs from Non-FIPS Mode of Operation

Unlike Junos OS in non-FIPS mode of operation, Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation is a *nonmodifiable operational environment*. In addition, Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation differs in the following ways from Junos OS in non-FIPS mode of operation:

- Self-tests of all cryptographic algorithms are performed at startup in both FIPS mode and non FIPS mode. But the results are displayed on console only in FIPS mode.
- Self-tests of random number and key generation are performed continuously.
- Weak cryptographic algorithms such as Data Encryption Standard (DES) and MD5 are disabled.
- FIPS Mode uses the HMAC-DRBG Random Number Generator, while Non-FIPS mode uses the Junos default Fortuna Random Number Generator.
- Pairwise consistency test when a module generates a public and private key pair is performed only in FIPS Mode.
- DH and ECDH public key validation during generation is performed only in FIPS Mode
- Weak or unencrypted management connections must not be configured.
- Junos-FIPS administrator passwords must be at least 10 characters long.
- Cryptographic keys must be encrypted before transmission.
- FIPS mode disables the ability to form HA clusters.

**NOTE:** For situations where HA Cluster is required, it is possible to closely replicate the functionality of FIPS mode in non-FIPS mode. Configuration options to restrict weak cryptographic algorithms, implement the FIPS approved HMAC-DRBG Random Number Generator, do not configure weak or unencrypted management connections, and implement MACsec HA Cluster links.

The FIPS 140-2 standard is available for download from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) at <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-2/fips1402.pdf>.

## Validated Version of Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation

To determine whether a Junos OS release is NIST-validated, see the software download page on the Juniper Networks Web site (<https://www.juniper.net/>) or the National Institute of Standards and Technology site at <http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/140-1/1401val.htm>.

### RELATED DOCUMENTATION

| [Identifying Secure Delivery](#) | 13

## Identifying Secure Delivery

There are several mechanisms provided in the delivery process to ensure that a customer receives a product that has not been tampered with. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of an appliance to verify the integrity of the platform:

- Shipping label—Ensure that the shipping label correctly identifies the correct customer name and address as well as the device.
- Outside packaging—Inspect the outside shipping box and tape. Ensure that the shipping tape has not been cut or otherwise compromised. Ensure that the box has not been cut or damaged to allow access to the device.
- Inside packaging—Inspect the plastic bag and seal. Ensure that the bag is not cut or removed. Ensure that the seal remains intact.

If the customer identifies a problem during the inspection, he or she should immediately contact the supplier. Provide the order number, tracking number, and a description of the identified problem to the supplier.

Additionally, there are several checks that can be performed to ensure that the customer has received a box sent by Juniper Networks and not a different company masquerading as Juniper Networks. The customer should perform the following checks upon receipt of a device to verify the authenticity of the device:

- Verify that the device was ordered using a purchase order. Juniper Networks devices are never shipped without a purchase order.
- When a device is shipped, a shipment notification is sent to the e-mail address provided by the customer when the order is taken. Verify that this e-mail notification was received. Verify that the e-mail contains the following information:

- Purchase order number
- Juniper Networks order number used to track the shipment
- Carrier tracking number used to track the shipment
- List of items shipped including serial numbers
- Address and contacts of both the supplier and the customer
- Verify that the shipment was initiated by Juniper Networks. To verify that a shipment was initiated by Juniper Networks, perform the following tasks:
  - Compare the carrier tracking number of the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks shipping notification with the tracking number on the package received.
  - Log in to the Juniper Networks online customer support portal at <https://www.juniper.net/customers/csc/management> to view the order status. Compare the carrier tracking number or the Juniper Networks order number listed in the Juniper Networks shipment notification with the tracking number on the package received.

#### RELATED DOCUMENTATION

| *Understanding Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation*

## Understanding FIPS Mode of Operation Terminology and Supported Cryptographic Algorithms

### IN THIS SECTION

- [FIPS Terminology | 15](#)
- [Supported Cryptographic Algorithms | 16](#)

Use the definitions of FIPS terms and supported algorithms to help you understand Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation.

## FIPS Terminology

**Critical security parameter (CSP)**—Security-related information—for example, secret and private cryptographic keys and authentication data such as passwords and personal identification numbers (PINs)—whose disclosure or modification can compromise the security of a cryptographic module or the information it protects.

**Cryptographic module**—The set of hardware, software, and firmware that implements approved security functions (including cryptographic algorithms and key generation) and is contained within the cryptographic boundary. SRX Series devices are certified at FIPS 140-2 Level 1.

**Cryptographic Officer**—Person with appropriate permissions who is responsible for securely enabling, configuring, monitoring, and maintaining Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation on a device. For details, see [“Understanding Roles and Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation” on page 34](#).

**ESP**—Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol. The part of the IPsec protocol that guarantees the confidentiality of packets through encryption. The protocol ensures that if an ESP packet is successfully decrypted, and no other party knows the secret key the peers share, the packet was not wiretapped in transit.

**FIPS**—Federal Information Processing Standards. FIPS 140-2 specifies requirements for security and cryptographic modules. Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation complies with FIPS 140-2 Level 2.

**IKE**—The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is part of IPsec and provides ways to securely negotiate the shared private keys that the authentication header (AH) and ESP portions of IPsec need to function properly. IKE employs Diffie-Hellman key-exchange methods and is optional in IPsec. (The shared keys can be entered manually at the endpoints.)

**IPsec**—The IP Security (IPsec) protocol. A standard way to add security to Internet communications. An IPsec security association (SA) establishes secure communication with another FIPS cryptographic module by means of mutual authentication and encryption.

**KATs**—Known answer tests. System self-tests that validate the output of cryptographic algorithms approved for FIPS and test the integrity of some Junos OS modules. For details, see [“Understanding FIPS Self-Tests” on page 19](#).

**SA**—Security association (SA). A connection between hosts that allows them to communicate securely by defining, for example, how they exchange private keys. As Cryptographic Officer, you must manually configure an internal SA on devices running Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation. All values, including the keys, must be statically specified in the configuration.

**SPI**—Security parameter index (SPI). A numeric identifier used with the destination address and security protocol in IPsec to identify an SA. Because you manually configure the SA for Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation, the SPI must be entered as a parameter rather than derived randomly.

**SSH**—A protocol that uses strong authentication and encryption for remote access across a nonsecure network. SSH provides remote login, remote program execution, file copy, and other functions. It is intended as a secure replacement for **rlogin**, **rsh**, and **rcp** in a UNIX environment. To secure the information sent over administrative connections, use SSHv2 for CLI configuration. In Junos OS, SSHv2 is enabled by default, and SSHv1, which is not considered secure, is disabled.

**Zeroization**—Erasure of all CSPs and other user-created data on a device before its operation as a FIPS cryptographic module—or in preparation for repurposing the device for non-FIPS operation. The Cryptographic Officer can zeroize the system with a CLI operational command. For details, see [“Understanding Zeroization to Clear System Data for FIPS Mode of Operation” on page 17](#).

## Supported Cryptographic Algorithms

Each implementation of an algorithm is checked by a series of known answer test (KAT) self-tests. Any self-test failure results in a FIPS error state.

The following cryptographic algorithms are supported in FIPS mode of operation. Symmetric methods use the same key for encryption and decryption, while asymmetric methods (preferred) use different keys for encryption and decryption.

**AES**—The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), defined in FIPS PUB 197. The AES algorithm uses keys of 128, 192, or 256 bits to encrypt and decrypt data in blocks of 128 bits.

**Diffie-Hellman**—A method of key exchange across a nonsecure environment (such as the Internet). The Diffie-Hellman algorithm negotiates a session key without sending the key itself across the network by allowing each party to pick a partial key independently and send part of that key to the other. Each side then calculates a common key value. This is a symmetrical method, and keys are typically used only for a short time, discarded, and regenerated.

**ECDH**—Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman. A variant of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm that uses cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. ECDH allows two parties, each having an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared secret over an insecure channel. The shared secret can be used either as a key or to derive another key for encrypting subsequent communications using a symmetric key cipher.

**ECDSA**—Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm. A variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) that uses cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. The bit size of the elliptic curve determines the difficulty of decrypting the key. The public key for ECDSA is twice the size of the security strength in bits.

**HMAC**—Defined as Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication in RFC 2104, HMAC combines hashing algorithms with cryptographic keys for message authentication.



**3DES (3des-cbc)**—Encryption standard based on the original Data Encryption Standard (DES) from the 1970s that used a 56-bit key and was cracked in 1997. The more secure 3DES is DES enhanced with three multiple stages and effective key lengths of about 112 bits. For Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation, 3DES is implemented with cipher block chaining (CBC).

#### RELATED DOCUMENTATION

[Understanding Zeroization to Clear System Data for FIPS Mode of Operation | 17](#)

[Understanding FIPS Self-Tests | 19](#)

## Understanding Zeroization to Clear System Data for FIPS Mode of Operation

#### IN THIS SECTION

- [Why Zeroize? | 18](#)
- [When to Zeroize? | 18](#)

Zeroization completely erases all configuration information on the device, including all plaintext passwords, secrets, and private keys for SSH, local encryption, local authentication, and IPsec. To exit the FIPS mode you need to zeroize the device.

The cryptographic module provides a non-approved mode of operation in which non-approved cryptographic algorithms are supported. When moving from the non-approved mode of operation to the approved mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer must zeroize the non-approved mode critical security parameters (CSPs). The Cryptographic Officer initiates the zeroization process by entering the **request system zeroize hypervisor** operational command from the CLI after enabling FIPS mode of operation. Use of this command is restricted to the Cryptographic Officer.



**CAUTION:** Perform system zeroization with care. After the zeroization process is complete, no data is left on the device. This command erases all the CSPs, configurations, and the hard disk partitions containing the device image. Hence, the device does not boot up on zeroization and USB reimage is required to recover the device.

Zeroization can be time-consuming. Although all configurations are removed in a few seconds, the zeroization process goes on to overwrite all media, which can take considerable time depending on the size of the media.

## Why Zeroize?

Your device is not considered a valid FIPS cryptographic module until all CSPs have been entered—or reentered—while the device is in FIPS mode of operation.

**BEST PRACTICE:** For FIPS 140-2 compliance, we recommend that you zeroize the device to exit the FIPS mode.

## When to Zeroize?

As a Cryptographic Officer, perform zeroization in the following situations:

- **Before FIPS operation**—To prepare your device for operation as a FIPS cryptographic module, perform zeroization to remove the non-approved mode critical security parameters (CSPs) and enable FIPS mode on the device.
- **Before non-FIPS operation**—To begin repurposing your device for non-FIPS operation, perform zeroization before disabling FIPS mode of operation on the device or loading Junos OS packages that do not include FIPS mode of operation.

**NOTE:** Juniper Networks does not support installing non-FIPS software in a FIPS mode of operation, but doing so might be necessary in certain test environments. Be sure to zeroize the system first.

- **When a tamper-evident seal is disturbed**—If the seal on an insecure port has been tampered with, the system is considered to be compromised. After applying new tamper-evident seals to the appropriate locations, zeroize the system and set up new passwords and CSPs.

## RELATED DOCUMENTATION

| *Applying Tamper-Evident Seals to the Cryptographic Module*

# Understanding FIPS Self-Tests

The cryptographic module enforces security rules to ensure that a device running the Juniper Networks Junos operating system (Junos OS) in FIPS mode of operation meets the security requirements of FIPS 140-2 Level 2. To validate the output of cryptographic algorithms approved for FIPS and test the integrity of some system modules, the device performs the following series of known answer test (KAT) self-tests:

- **md\_kats**—KAT for libmd and libc
- **quicksec\_7\_0\_kats**—KAT for Quicksec\_7\_0 Toolkit cryptographic implementation
- **openssl\_kats**—KAT for OpenSSL cryptographic implementation
- **kernel\_kats**—KAT for kernel cryptographic routines
- **srxpfe\_kats**—KAT for SRX packet forwarding engine

The KAT self-tests are performed automatically at startup and reboot when FIPS mode of operation is enabled on the device. Conditional self-tests are also performed automatically to verify digitally signed software packages, generated random numbers, RSA and DSA key pairs, and manually entered keys.

If the KATs are completed successfully, the system log (syslog) file is updated to display the tests that were executed.

If the device fails a KAT, the device writes the details to a system log file, enters FIPS error state (panic), and reboots.

The **file show /var/log/messages** command displays the system log.

## Example: Configuring FIPS Self-Tests

### IN THIS SECTION

- [Hardware and Software Requirements | 20](#)
- [Overview | 20](#)
- [Configuration | 21](#)

This example shows how to configure FIPS self-tests to run periodically.

### Hardware and Software Requirements

- You must have administrative privileges to configure FIPS self-tests.
- The device must be running the evaluated version of Junos OS in FIPS mode software.

### Overview

The FIPS self-test consists of the following suites of known answer tests (KATs):

- **md\_kats**—KAT for libmd and libc
- **quicksec\_7\_0\_kats**—KAT for Quicksec\_7\_0 Toolkit cryptographic implementation
- **openssl\_kats**—KAT for OpenSSL cryptographic implementation
- **kernel\_kats**—KAT for kernel cryptographic routines
- **srxpfe\_kats**—KAT for SRX packet forwarding engine

In this example, the FIPS self-test is executed at 9:00 AM in New York City, USA, every Wednesday.

**NOTE:** Instead of weekly tests, you can configure monthly tests by including the **month** and **day-of-month** statements.

When a KAT self-test fails, a log message is written to the system log messages file with details of the test failure. Then the system panics and reboots.

## Configuration

### CLI Quick Configuration

To quickly configure this example, copy the following commands into a text file, remove any line breaks, and then paste the commands into the CLI at the **[edit]** hierarchy level.

```
set system fips self-test periodic start-time 09:00
set system fips self-test periodic day-of-week 3
```

### Step-by-Step Procedure

To configure the FIPS self-test:

1. Configure the FIPS self-test to execute at 9:00 AM every Wednesday.

```
[edit system fips self-test]
user@host# set periodic start-time 09:00
user@host# set periodic day-of-week 3
```

2. If you are done configuring the device, commit the configuration.

```
[edit system fips self-test]
user@host# commit
```

### Results

From configuration mode, confirm your configuration by issuing the **show system** command. If the output does not display the intended configuration, repeat the instructions in this example to correct the configuration.

```
user@host# show system
fips {
  self-test {
    periodic {
      start-time "09:00";
      day-of-week 3;
    }
  }
}
```

## Performing Power-On Self-Tests on the Device

Each time the cryptographic module is powered on, the module tests that the cryptographic algorithms still operate correctly and that sensitive data has not been damaged. Power-on self-tests are performed on demand by power cycling the module.

On powering on or resetting the device, the module performs the following self-tests. All KATs must be completed successfully prior to any other use of cryptography by the module. If one of the KATs fail, the module enters the Critical Failure error state.

The module displays the following status output for SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600 devices while running the power-on self-tests:

```
Verified jail-runtime-x86-32-20190517 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified fips-mode-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified jdocs-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified jinsight-x86-32-19.8 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified jmrt-base-x86-64-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified jphone-home-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified jsd-x86-32-19.8-jet-1 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-appsecure-he-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-daemons-srx-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-appsecure-tvp-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-daemons-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-dp-crypto-support-srx-x86-32-20190621 signed by
PackageProductionEc_2019 method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-libs-compat32-srx-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-libs-compat32-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-libs-srx-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-modules-srxtvp-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
```

```
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-modules-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-libs-srxtvp-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-libs-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-platform-srx-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-net-mtx-prd-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-openconfig-x86-32-19.8 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-platform-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-pppoe-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-runtime-srxtvp-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-runtime-srx-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-runtime-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified jweb-srxtvp-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified junos-net-prd-x86-64-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified na-telemetry-x86-32-19.8 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified os-compatible32-x86-64-20190517 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified os-kernel-prd-x86-64-20190517 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified os-crypto-x86-64-20190517 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified os-libs-compatible32-11-x86-64-20190517 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019
method ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified os-libs-11-x86-64-20190517 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified py-base-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified os-runtime-x86-64-20190517 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified py-extensions-x86-32-20190621 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
```

```

ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified os-vmguest-x86-64-20190517 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
Verified os-zoneinfo-x86-64-20190517 signed by PackageProductionEc_2019 method
ECDSA256+SHA256
@ 1562127016 [2019-07-03 04:10:16 UTC] verify done
@ 1562127016 [2019-07-03 04:10:16 UTC] mount start
Mounting os-zoneinfo-x86-64-20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11
Mounting os-libs-compat32-11-x86-64-20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11
Mounting os-compat32-x86-64-20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11
Mounting py-extensions-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting py-base-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting os-vmguest-x86-64-20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11
Mounting os-crypto-x86-64-20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11
Mounting junos-net-prd-x86-64-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-libs-x86-64-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-libs-compat32-x86-64-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-runtime-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Starting watchdog daemon ...
Mounting na-telemetry-x86-32-19.2R1.8
Mounting junos-libs-compat32-srx-x86-64-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-runtime-srx-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-platform-srx-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-platform-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-runtime-srxtvp-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-pppoe-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-openconfig-x86-32-19.2R1.8
Mounting junos-modules-x86-64-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-modules-srxtvp-x86-64-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-libs-srxtvp-x86-64-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-libs-srx-x86-64-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-dp-crypto-support-srx-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-daemons-x86-64-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-daemons-srx-x86-64-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-appsecure-tvp-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting junos-appsecure-he-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting jsd-x86-32-19.2R1.8-jet-1
Mounting jphone-home-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
mount_nullfs: /mfs/var: No such file or directory
mount_nullfs: /mfs/var: No such file or directory
Mounting jmrt-base-x86-64-x86-64-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting jinsight-x86-32-19.2R1.8
Mounting jdocs-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1
Mounting fips-mode-x86-32-20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1

```





```

pci-hgcomdev module loaded bcmsdk_5_9_x kld
  Loading BCMSDK module.....
Junosprocfs mounted on /junosproc.
@ 1562127050 [2019-07-03 04:10:50 UTC] mgd start
Creating initial configuration: ...
mgd: Running FIPS Self-tests
mgd: Testing kernel KATS:
mgd:   NIST 800-90 HMAC DRBG Known Answer Test:           Passed
mgd:   DES3-CBC Known Answer Test:                         Passed
mgd:   HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test:                         Passed
mgd:   HMAC-SHA2-256 Known Answer Test:                     Passed
mgd:   SHA-2-384 Known Answer Test:                         Passed
mgd:   SHA-2-512 Known Answer Test:                         Passed
mgd:   AES128-CMAC Known Answer Test:                       Passed
mgd:   AES-CBC Known Answer Test:                           Passed
mgd: Testing MACSec KATS:
mgd:   AES128-CMAC Known Answer Test:                       Passed
mgd:   AES256-CMAC Known Answer Test:                       Passed
mgd:   AES-ECB Known Answer Test:                           Passed
mgd:   AES-KEYWRAP Known Answer Test:                       Passed
mgd: Testing libmd KATS:
mgd:   HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test:                         Passed
mgd:   HMAC-SHA2-256 Known Answer Test:                     Passed
mgd:   SHA-2-512 Known Answer Test:                         Passed
mgd: Testing OpenSSL KATS:
mgd:   NIST 800-90 HMAC DRBG Known Answer Test:           Passed
mgd:   FIPS ECDSA Known Answer Test:                         Passed
mgd:   FIPS ECDH Known Answer Test:                         Passed
mgd:   FIPS RSA Known Answer Test:                           Passed
mgd:   DES3-CBC Known Answer Test:                         Passed
mgd:   HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test:                         Passed
mgd:   HMAC-SHA2-224 Known Answer Test:                     Passed
mgd:   HMAC-SHA2-256 Known Answer Test:                     Passed
mgd:   HMAC-SHA2-384 Known Answer Test:                     Passed
mgd:   HMAC-SHA2-512 Known Answer Test:                     Passed
mgd:   AES-CBC Known Answer Test:                           Passed
mgd:   AES-GCM Known Answer Test:                           Passed
mgd:   ECDSA-SIGN Known Answer Test:                       Passed
mgd:   KDF-IKE-V1 Known Answer Test:                       Passed
mgd:   KDF-SSH-SHA256 Known Answer Test:                   Passed
mgd:   KAS-ECC-EPHEM-UNIFIED-NOKC Known Answer Test:       Passed
mgd:   KAS-FFC-EPHEM-NOKC Known Answer Test:               Passed
mgd: Testing QuickSec 7.0 KATS:

```

```

mgd: NIST 800-90 HMAC DRBG Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: DES3-CBC Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA2-224 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA2-256 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA2-384 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA2-512 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: AES-CBC Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: AES-GCM Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: SSH-RSA-ENC Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: SSH-RSA-SIGN Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: SSH-ECDSA-SIGN Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: KDF-IKE-V1 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: KDF-IKE-V2 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: Testing QuickSec KATS:
mgd: NIST 800-90 HMAC DRBG Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: DES3-CBC Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA2-224 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA2-256 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA2-384 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA2-512 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: AES-CBC Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: AES-GCM Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: SSH-RSA-ENC Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: SSH-RSA-SIGN Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: KDF-IKE-V1 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: KDF-IKE-V2 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: Testing SSH IPsec KATS:
mgd: NIST 800-90 HMAC DRBG Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: DES3-CBC Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA1 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: HMAC-SHA2-256 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: AES-CBC Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: SSH-RSA-ENC Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: SSH-RSA-SIGN Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: KDF-IKE-V1 Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: Testing file integrity:
mgd: File integrity Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: Testing crypto integrity:
mgd: Crypto integrity Known Answer Test: Passed
mgd: Expect an exec Authentication error...
verifix: no fingerprint for file='/sbin/kats/cannot-exec' fsid=202 fileid=49356
gen=1 uid=0 pid=6411

```

```
mgd: /sbin/kats/run-tests: /sbin/kats/cannot-exec: Authentication error
mgd: FIPS Self-tests Passed
```

**NOTE:** The module implements cryptographic libraries and algorithms that are not utilized in the approved mode of operation.

#### RELATED DOCUMENTATION

| [How to Enable and Configure Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 50](#)

## Applying Tamper-Evident Seals to the Cryptographic Module

#### IN THIS SECTION

- [General Tamper-Evident Seal Instructions | 29](#)
- [Applying Tamper-Evident Seals on the SRX1500 Device | 29](#)
- [Applying Tamper-Evident Seals on the SRX4100 and SRX4200 Device | 30](#)
- [Applying Tamper-Evident Seals on SRX4600 Device | 31](#)

The cryptographic modules physical embodiment is that of a multi-chip standalone device that meets Level 2 physical security requirements. The module is completely enclosed in a rectangular nickel or clear zinc coated, cold rolled steel, plated steel, and brushed aluminum enclosure. There are no ventilation holes, gaps, slits, cracks, slots, or crevices that would allow for any sort of observation of any component contained within the cryptographic boundary. Tamper-evident seals allow the operator to verify if the enclosure has been breached. These seals are not factory-installed and must be applied by the Cryptographic Officer.

**NOTE:** Seals are available for order from Juniper Networks using part number JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS.

As a Cryptographic Officer, you are responsible for:

- Applying seals to secure the cryptographic module
- Controlling any unused seals
- Controlling and observing any changes, such as repairs or booting from an external USB drive to the cryptographic module, that require removing or replacing the seals to maintain the security of the module

As per the security inspection guidelines, upon receipt of the cryptographic module, the Cryptographic Officer must check that the labels are free of any tamper evidence.

## General Tamper-Evident Seal Instructions

All FIPS-certified switches require a tamper-evident seal on the USB ports. While applying seals, follow these general instructions:

- Handle the seals with care. Do not touch the adhesive side. Do not cut or otherwise resize a seal to make it fit.
- Make sure all surfaces to which the seals are applied are clean and dry and clear of any residue.
- Apply the seals with firm pressure across the seal to ensure adhesion. Allow at least 24 hours for the adhesive to cure.

## Applying Tamper-Evident Seals on the SRX1500 Device

On SRX1500 devices, apply 10 tamper-evident seals at the following locations:

- **Front pane:**

- The front of the SRX1500 has two slot covers. The slot covers should be secured with two screws each and then two tamper-evident labels must be applied to the slots. The tamper-evident labels go from the front of the SRX1500 to the top.
- Apply two tamper labels to cover the USB port and two tamper labels to cover the High Availability port.
- **Rear pane:**
  - The rear of the SRX1500 has two tamper-evident seals, the tamper-evident seal at top of the rear-view wraps to the top of the device and covers the fourth screw from the side containing the power supply.
  - Apply one tamper label on the rear of the SRX1500, on the SSD slot cover, to the bottom of the SRX1500.
  - Apply two tamper labels to cover the indicated screw on the left and right side of the SRX1500 and wrap to the bottom of the SRX1500.

## Applying Tamper-Evident Seals on the SRX4100 and SRX4200 Device

**NOTE:** The placement of the tamper evident labels for the SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600 devices is exactly the same.

Apply 11 tamper-evident seals at the following locations:

- Apply two tamper-evident labels at the top of the chassis, covering one screw on the top-back left and one screw on the top-back right. The tamper evident labels cover the screws on the top of the chassis and wrap down each side of the chassis.
- Apply three tamper-evident labels at the bottom of the chassis, covering three screws that secure the faceplates on the front of the chassis. The three screws are entirely on the bottom of the chassis, they do not wrap around to any other portion of the chassis.
- Apply two tamper-evident labels covering the two USB ports on the front of the SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600 devices.
- Apply two tamper-evident labels covering the two HA ports and two tamper-evident labels covering the second HA port.

## Applying Tamper-Evident Seals on SRX4600 Device

For the front and rear view:

- The front of the device has four HA ports, one USB port and two SSD slots that require tamper-evident label application. Four tamper-evident labels are placed over the HA ports. Two tamper-evident labels are placed over the USB port so that the port and the screw are covered. The SSD will each have one tamper-evident label.
- The module contains two PSUs that can be swapped. Apply two tamper-evident labels on the two swappable PSUs.

For the left and right view:

- On the left side of the device, apply one tamper-evident label over the fourth screw from the front.
- The right side of the device, apply one tamper-evident label over the fourth screw from the front.

### RELATED DOCUMENTATION

| [How to Enable and Configure Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation](#) | 50

# 2

CHAPTER

## Configuring Roles and Authentication Methods

---

Downloading Software Packages from Juniper Networks (FIPS Mode) | 33

Downloading and Installing Junos Software Packages (FIPS Mode) | 33

Understanding Roles and Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 34

Understanding the Associated Password Rules for an Authorized Administrator | 37

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Understanding Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 40

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## Downloading Software Packages from Juniper Networks (FIPS Mode)

You can download the following Junos OS software packages from the Juniper Networks website:

- Junos OS for SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600, Release 19.2R1
- Junos FIPS mode, Release 19.2R1

Before you begin to download the software, ensure that you have a Juniper Networks Web account and a valid support contract. To obtain an account, complete the registration form at the Juniper Networks website: <https://www.juniper.net/registration/Register.jsp>.

To download software packages from Juniper Networks:

1. Using a Web browser, follow the links to the download URL on the Juniper Networks webpage.  
<https://www.juniper.net/support/downloads/junos.html>
2. Log in to the Juniper Networks authentication system using the username (generally your e-mail address) and password supplied by Juniper Networks representatives.
3. Download the software. See [Downloading Software](#)

### RELATED DOCUMENTATION

| [Installation and Upgrade Guide](#)

## Downloading and Installing Junos Software Packages (FIPS Mode)

SRX Series devices can provide the security defined by Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 140-2 Level 2 if these devices are operated in the Junos OS in FIPS mode. To operate in Junos OS in FIPS mode, the device must have the following software packages installed:

- Junos OS for SRX1500, SRX4100, SRX4200, and SRX4600, Release 19.2R1
- Junos FIPS mode, Release 19.2R1

To install these software packages, perform the following tasks:

1. Download the Junos OS package and the Junos FIPS mode package from <https://www.juniper.net/>. See [Downloading Software](#).
2. Install the Junos OS on your device using a TFTP server, see [Installing Junos OS on SRX Series Devices from the Boot Loader Using a TFTP Server](#) or install Junos OS on your device using the following CLI command: `request system software add /<image-path>/<junos package> no-copy no-validate reboot`.

## RELATED DOCUMENTATION

| [Installation and Upgrade Guide](#)

# Understanding Roles and Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation

## IN THIS SECTION

- [Cryptographic Officer Role and Responsibilities | 35](#)
- [FIPS User Role and Responsibilities | 36](#)
- [What Is Expected of All FIPS Users | 36](#)

The Juniper Networks Junos operating system (Junos OS) running in non-FIPS mode of operation allows a wide range of capabilities for users, and authentication is identity-based. In contrast, the FIPS 140-2 standard defines two user roles: *Cryptographic Officer* and *FIPS user*. These roles are defined in terms of Junos OS user capabilities.

All other user types defined for Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation (operator, administrative user, and so on) must fall into one of the two categories: Cryptographic Officer or FIPS user. For this reason, user authentication in FIPS mode of operation is role-based rather than identity-based.

In addition to their FIPS roles, both user types can perform normal configuration tasks on the device as individual user configuration allows.

Cryptographic Officers and FIPS users perform all FIPS-related configuration tasks and issue all statements and commands for Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation. Cryptographic Officer and FIPS user configurations must follow the guidelines for Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation.

For details, see:

## Cryptographic Officer Role and Responsibilities

The Cryptographic Officer is the person responsible for enabling, configuring, monitoring, and maintaining Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation on a device. The Cryptographic Officer securely installs Junos OS on the device, enables FIPS mode of operation, establishes keys and passwords for other users and software modules, and initializes the device before network connection. The Cryptographic Officer can configure and monitor the module through a console or SSH connection.

**BEST PRACTICE:** We recommend that the Cryptographic Officer administer the system in a secure manner by keeping passwords secure and checking audit files.

The permissions that distinguish the Cryptographic Officer from other FIPS users are **secret**, **security**, **maintenance**, and **control**. For FIPS compliance, assign the Cryptographic Officer to a login class that contains all of these permissions. A user with the Junos OS maintenance permission can read files containing critical security parameters (CSPs).

**NOTE:** Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation does not support the *FIPS 140-2 maintenance role*, which is different from the Junos OS maintenance permission.

Among the tasks related to Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation, the Cryptographic Officer is expected to:

- Set the initial root password.
- Reset user passwords for FIPS-approved algorithms during upgrades from Junos OS.
- Set up manual IPsec SAs for configuration with dual Routing Engines.
- Examine log and audit files for events of interest.
- Erase user-generated files and data on (zeroize) the device.

## FIPS User Role and Responsibilities

All FIPS users, including the Cryptographic Officer, can view the configuration. Only the user assigned as the Cryptographic Officer can modify the configuration.

The permissions that distinguish Cryptographic Officers from other FIPS users are **secret**, **security**, **maintenance**, and **control**. For FIPS compliance, assign the FIPS user to a class that contains *none* of these permissions.

FIPS users configure networking features on the device and perform other tasks that are not specific to FIPS mode of operation. FIPS users who are not Cryptographic Officers can perform reboots and view status output.

## What Is Expected of All FIPS Users

All FIPS users, including the Cryptographic Officer, must observe security guidelines at all times.

All FIPS users must:

- Keep all passwords confidential.
- Store devices and documentation in a secure area.
- Deploy devices in secure areas.
- Check audit files periodically.
- Conform to all other FIPS 140-2 security rules.
- Follow these guidelines:
  - Users are trusted.
  - Users abide by all security guidelines.
  - Users do not deliberately compromise security.
  - Users behave responsibly at all times.

### RELATED DOCUMENTATION

[Understanding FIPS Mode of Operation Terminology and Supported Cryptographic Algorithms | 14](#)

[Understanding Zeroization to Clear System Data for FIPS Mode of Operation | 17](#)

# Understanding the Associated Password Rules for an Authorized Administrator

The authorized administrator is associated with a defined login class, and the administrator is assigned with all permissions. Data is stored locally for fixed password authentication.

**NOTE:** We recommend that you not use control characters in passwords.

Use the following guidelines and configuration options for passwords and when selecting passwords for authorized administrator accounts. Passwords should be:

- Easy to remember so that users are not tempted to write it down.
- Changed periodically.
- Private and not shared with anyone.
- Contain a minimum of 10 characters. The minimum password length is 10 characters.

[ edit ]

```
administrator@host# set system login password minimum-length 10
```

- Include both alphanumeric and punctuation characters, composed of any combination of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters such as, "!", "@", "#", "\$", "%", "^", "&", "\*", "(", and ")". There should be at least a change in one case, one or more digits, and one or more punctuation marks.
- Contain character sets. Valid character sets include uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, punctuation, and other special characters.

[ edit ]

```
administrator@host# set system login password change-type character-sets
```

- Contain the minimum number of character sets or character set changes. The minimum number of character sets required in plain-text passwords in Junos FIPS is 2.

[ edit ]

```
administrator@host# set system login password minimum-changes 2
```

**NOTE:** The authentication algorithm for plain-text passwords must be configured as sha256.

[ edit ]

```
administrator@host# set system login password format sha256
```

Weak passwords are:

- Words that might be found in or exist as a permuted form in a system file such as `/etc/passwd`.
- The hostname of the system (always a first guess).
- Any words appearing in a dictionary. This includes dictionaries other than English, and words found in works such as Shakespeare, Lewis Carroll, Roget's Thesaurus, and so on. This prohibition includes common words and phrases from sports, sayings, movies, and television shows.
- Permutations on any of the above. For example, a dictionary word with vowels replaced with digits (for example f00t) or with digits added to the end.
- Any machine-generated passwords. Algorithms reduce the search space of password-guessing programs and so should not be used.

Strong reusable passwords can be based on letters from a favorite phrase or word, and then concatenated with other, unrelated words, along with additional digits and punctuation.

**NOTE:** Passwords should be changed periodically.

## RELATED DOCUMENTATION

*Understanding Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation*

Identifying Secure Delivery | 13

# Understanding FIPS Authentication Methods

The Juniper Networks Junos operating system (Junos OS) running in FIPS mode of operation allows a wide range of capabilities for users, and authentication is identity-based. The following types of identity-based authentication are supported in the FIPS mode of operation:

- [Username and Password Authentication over the Console and SSH on page 39](#)
- [Username and Public Key Authentication over SSH on page 39](#)

## Username and Password Authentication over the Console and SSH

In this authentication method, the user is requested to enter the username and password. The device enforces the user to enter a minimum of 10 characters password that is chosen from the 96 human-readable ASCII characters.

**NOTE:** The maximum password length is 20 characters.

In this method, the device enforces a timed access mechanism—for example, first two failed attempts to enter the correct password (assuming 0 time to process), no timed access is enforced. When the user enters the password for the third time, the module enforces a 5 second delay. Each failed attempt thereafter results in an additional 5 second delay above the previous failed attempt. For example, if the fourth failed attempt is a 10 second delay, then the fifth failed attempt is a 15 second delay, the sixth failed attempt is a 20 second delay, and the seventh failed attempt is a 25 second delay.

Therefore, this leads to a maximum of seven possible attempts in a 1 minute period for each getty active terminal. So, the best approach for the attacker would be to disconnect after 4 failed attempts, and wait for a new getty to be spawned. This would allow the attacker to perform roughly 9.6 attempts per minute (576 attempts per hour or 60 minutes). This would be rounded off to 9 attempts per minute, because there is no such thing as 0.6 attempts. Thus the probability of a successful random attempt is  $1/9610$ , which is less than 1/1 million. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a 1 minute period is  $9/(9610)$ , which is less than 1/100,000.

## Username and Public Key Authentication over SSH

In SSH public key authentication, you provide the username and validate the ownership of the private key corresponding to the public key stored on the server. The device supports ECDSA (P-256, P-384, and P-521) and RSA (2048, 3072, and 4092 modulus bit length) key-types. The probability of a success with multiple consecutive attempts in a 1-minute period is  $5.6e7/(2^{128})$ .

### RELATED DOCUMENTATION

# Understanding Services for Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation

All services implemented by the module are listed in the tables that follow.

## Understanding Authenticated Services

Table 3 on page 40 lists the authenticated services on the device running Junos OS.

Table 3: Authenticated services

Authenticated Services	Description	Cryptographic Officer	User (read-only)	User (network)
Configure security	Security relevant configuration	x	–	–
Configure	Non-security relevant configuration	x	–	–
Secure traffic	IPsec protected routing	–	–	x
Status	Display the status	x	x	–
Zeroize	Destroy all critical security parameters (CSPs)	x	–	–
SSH connect	Initiate SSH connection for SSH monitoring and control (CLI)	x	x	–
IPsec connect	Initiate IPsec connection (IKE)	x	–	x
Console access	Console monitoring and control (CLI)	x	x	–
Remote reset	Software-initiated reset	x	–	–



Table 4: Unauthenticated traffic

Service	Description
Local reset	Hardware reset or power cycle
Traffic	Traffic requiring no cryptographic services

## Critical Security Parameters

Critical security parameters (CSPs) are security-related information such as cryptographic keys and passwords that can compromise the security of the cryptographic module or the security of the information protected by the module if they are disclosed or modified.

*Zeroization* of the system erases all traces of CSPs in preparation for operating the device as a cryptographic module.

[Table 5 on page 41](#) lists the CSP access rights within services.

Table 5: CSP Access Rights Within Services

Service	CSPs					
	DRBG_Seed	DRBG_State	SSH PHK	SSH DH	SSH-SEK	ESP-SEK
Configure security	-	E	G, W	-	-	-
Configure	-	-	-	-	-	-
Secure Traffic	-	-	-	-	-	E
Status	-	-	-	-	-	-
Zeroize	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z
SSH connect	-	E	E	G, E	G, E	-
IPSec connect	-	E	-	-	-	G
Console access	-	-	-	-	-	-
Remote reset	G, E	G	-	Z	Z	Z

Table 5: CSP Access Rights Within Services (continued)

Service	CSPs					
	DRBG_Seed	DRBG_State	SSH PHK	SSH DH	SSH-SEK	ESP-SEK
Local Reset	G, E	G	-	Z	Z	Z
Traffic	-	-	-	-	-	-

Service	CSPs				
	IKE-PSK	IKE-Priv	IKE-SKEYI	IKE-SKE	IKE-DH-PRI
Configure security	W	G, W	-	-	-
Configure	-	-	-	-	-
Secure Traffic	-	-	-	E	-
Status	-	-	-	-	-
Zeroize	Z	Z	-	-	-
SSH connect	-	-	-	-	-
IPSec connect	E	E	G	G	G
Console access	-	-	-	-	-
Remote reset	-	-	Z	Z	Z
Local Reset	-	-	Z	Z	Z
Traffic	-	-	-	-	-

Here:

- G = Generate: The device generates the CSP.
- E = Execute: The device runs using the CSP.
- W = Write: The CSP is updated or written to the device.
- Z = Zeroize: The device zeroizes the CSP.

## RELATED DOCUMENTATION

[Understanding Zeroization to Clear System Data for FIPS Mode of Operation | 17](#)

[Understanding FIPS Authentication Methods | 38](#)

# 3

CHAPTER

## Configuring SSH and Console Connection

---

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Limiting the Number of User Login Attempts for SSH Sessions | 46

Configuring SSH on the Evaluated Configuration | 47

---

# Configuring a System Login Message and Announcement

A system login message appears before the user logs in and a system login announcement appears after the user logs in. By default, no login message or announcement is displayed on the device.

To configure a system login message, use the following command:

```
[edit]  
user@host# set system login message login-message-banner-text
```

To configure system announcement, use the following command:

```
[edit]  
user@host# set system login announcement system-announcement-text
```

## NOTE:

- If the message text contains any spaces, enclose it in quotation marks.
- You can format the message using the following special characters:
  - \n—New line
  - \t—Horizontal tab
  - \'—Single quotation mark
  - \"—Double quotation mark
  - \\—Backslash

## RELATED DOCUMENTATION

| [Configuring SSH on the Evaluated Configuration](#) | 47

# Limiting the Number of User Login Attempts for SSH Sessions

A remote administrator may login to a device through SSH. Administrator credentials are stored locally on the device. If the remote administrator presents a valid username and password, access to the TOE is granted. If the credentials are invalid, the TOE allows the authentication to be retried after an interval that starts after 1 second and increases exponentially. If the number of authentication attempts exceed the configured maximum, no authentication attempts are accepted for a configured time interval. When the interval expires, authentication attempts are again accepted.

You can configure the device to limit the number of attempts to enter a password while logging through SSH. Using the following command, the connection can be terminated if a user fails to login after a specified number of attempts:

```
[edit system login]
user@host# set retry-options tries-before-disconnect <number>
```

Here, **tries-before-disconnect** is the number of times a user can attempt to enter a password when logging in. The connection closes if a user fails to log in after the number specified. The range is from 1 through 10, and the default value is 10.

You can also configure a delay, in seconds, before a user can try to enter a password after a failed attempt.

```
[edit system login]
user@host# set retry-options backoff-threshold <number>
```

Here, **backoff-threshold** is the threshold for the number of failed login attempts before the user experiences a delay in being able to enter a password again. Use the **backoff-factor** option to specify the length of the delay in seconds. The range is from 1 through 3, and the default value is 2 seconds.

In addition, the device can be configured to specify the threshold for the number of failed attempts before the user experiences a delay in entering the password again.

```
[edit system login]
user@host# set retry-options backoff-factor <number>
```

Here, **backoff-factor** is the length of time, in seconds, before a user can attempt to log in after a failed attempt. The delay increases by the value specified for each subsequent attempt after the threshold. The range is from 5 through 10, and the default value is 5 seconds.

## RELATED DOCUMENTATION

[Configuring SSH on the Evaluated Configuration](#) | 47

## Configuring SSH on the Evaluated Configuration

SSH is an allowed remote management interface in the evaluated configuration. This topic describes how to configure SSH on the device.

Before you begin, log in with your root account on the device running Junos OS Release 19.2R1 and edit the configuration.

**NOTE:** The commands shown configure SSH to use all of the allowed cryptographic algorithms. You can enter the configuration commands in any order and commit all the commands at once. You may decide to leave some of the algorithms out.

**NOTE:** You can enter the configuration commands in any order and commit all the commands at once.

To configure SSH on the TOE:

1. Specify the permissible SSH host-key algorithms.

```
[edit system services ssh]
user@host# set hostkey-algorithm ssh-ecdsa
user@host# set hostkey-algorithm ssh-rsa
```

2. Specify the SSH key-exchange algorithms.

```
[edit system services ssh]
user@host# set key-exchange [ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdh-sha2-nistp521 ]
```

3. Specify all the permissible message authentication code algorithms.

```
[edit system services ssh]
```

```
user@host#set macs [ hmac-sha1 hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512 ]
```

4. Specify the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2.

```
[edit system services ssh]
```

```
user@host#set ciphers [ 3des-cbc aes128-cbc aes128-ctr aes192-cbc aes192-ctr aes256-cbc aes256-ctr ]
```

## RELATED DOCUMENTATION

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[Understanding FIPS Authentication Methods | 38](#)

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[How to Enable and Configure Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 50](#)

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[Limiting the Number of User Login Attempts for SSH Sessions | 46](#)



# 4

CHAPTER

## Configuring Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation

---

Loading Firmware on the Device | 50

How to Enable and Configure Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation | 50

---

# Loading Firmware on the Device

The Junos OS 19.2R1 FIPS images only accept the firmware signed with ECDSA and rejects any firmware signed with RSA+SHA1. You cannot downgrade to images that are signed with RSA+SHA1 from "ECDSA signed only" images. In this scenario, the SRX Series device does not load the firmware.

## RELATED DOCUMENTATION

| [How to Enable and Configure Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation](#) | 50

## How to Enable and Configure Junos OS in FIPS Mode of Operation

You, as Cryptographic Officer, can enable and configure Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation on your device. Before you begin enabling and configuring FIPS mode of operation on the device:

- Verify the secure delivery of your device. See [“Identifying Secure Delivery” on page 13](#).
- Apply tamper-evident seals. See *Applying Tamper-Evident Seals to the Cryptographic Module*.

To enable the Junos OS in FIPS mode of operation, perform the following steps:

1. Zeroize the device before enabling FIPS mode of operation

```
user@host> request system zeroize hypervisor
```

2. Enable the FIPS mode on the device.

```
user@host# set system fips level 2
```

3. Remove the CSPs on commit check and reboot the device.

```
user@host# commit
```

4. Run integrity and self-tests on powering on the device when the module is operating in FIPS mode.

5. Configure IKEv2 when AES-GCM is used for encryption of IKE and/or IPSec.

```
user@host# set security ike proposal <ike_proposal_name> encryption-algorithm ?
```

Possible completions:

3des-cbc 3DES-CBC encryption algorithm

aes-128-cbc AES-CBC 128-bit encryption algorithm

aes-128-gcm AES-GCM 128-bit encryption algorithm

aes-192-cbc AES-CBC 192-bit encryption algorithm

aes-256-cbc AES-CBC 256-bit encryption algorithm

aes-256-gcm AES-GCM 256-bit encryption algorithm

user@host# set security ike proposal <ike\_proposal\_name> encryption-algorithm aes-256-gcm

user@host# set security ipsec proposal <ipsec\_proposal\_name> encryption-algorithm ?

Possible completions:

3des-cbc 3DES-CBC encryption algorithm

aes-128-cbc AES-CBC 128-bit encryption algorithm

aes-128-gcm AES-GCM 128-bit encryption algorithm

aes-192-cbc AES-CBC 192-bit encryption algorithm

aes-192-gcm AES-GCM 192-bit encryption algorithm

aes-256-cbc AES-CBC 256-bit encryption algorithm

aes-256-gcm AES-GCM 256-bit encryption algorithm

user@host# set security ipsec proposal <ipsec\_proposal\_name> encryption-algorithm aes-128-gcm

user@host# set security ike gateway <gateway\_name> version ?

Possible completions:

v1-only The connection must be initiated using IKE version 1

v2-only The connection must be initiated using IKE version 2

user@host# set security ike gateway <gateway\_name> version v2-only

user@host# commit

commit complete

6. Ensure that the backup image of the firmware is also a JUNOS-FIPS image by issuing the **request system snapshot** command.



**NOTE:** The **show configuration security ike** and **show configuration security ipsec** commands display the approved and configured IKE/IPsec configuration for the device operating in FIPS-approved mode.

```

user@host-srx4200:fips> show version
Hostname: host-srx4200
Model: srx4200
Junos: 19.2R1.8
JUNOS OS Kernel 64-bit [20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11]
JUNOS OS libs [20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11]
JUNOS OS runtime [20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11]
JUNOS OS time zone information [20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11]
JUNOS OS libs compat32 [20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11]
JUNOS OS 32-bit compatibility [20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11]
JUNOS py extensions [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS py base [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS OS vmguest [20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11]
JUNOS OS crypto [20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11]
JUNOS network stack and utilities [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS libs [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS libs compat32 [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS runtime [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS na telemetry [19.2R1.8]
JUNOS Web Management Platform Package [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS srx libs compat32 [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS srx runtime [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS srx platform support [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS common platform support [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS srxtvp runtime [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS pppoe [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS Openconfig [19.2R1.8]
JUNOS mtx network modules [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS modules [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS srxtvp modules [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS srxtvp libs [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS srx libs [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS srx Data Plane Crypto Support [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS daemons [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS srx daemons [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS SRX TVP AppQos Daemon [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS High End AppQos Daemon [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS Extension Toolkit [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]

```

```

JUNOS Phone-home [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS Juniper Malware Removal Tool (JMRT)
[1.0.0+20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS J-Insight [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS Online Documentation [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]
JUNOS jail runtime [20190517.f0321c3_builder_stable_11]
JUNOS FIPS mode utilities [20190621.152752_builder_junos_192_r1]

```

The **fips** keyword next to the **hostname** in the output indicates that the module is operating in FIPS mode for Junos Software Release 19.2R1.

```

user@host-srx1500:fips> show configuration security ike
proposal ike-proposal1 {
    authentication-method pre-shared-keys;
    dh-group group14;
    encryption-algorithm aes-256-gcm;
}
policy ike-policy1 {
    mode main;
    proposals ike-proposal1;
    pre-shared-key ascii-text "$9$Hq.5zF/tpBUj9Au0IRdbwsaZ"; ## SECRET-DATA
}
gateway gw1 {
    ike-policy ike-policy1;
    address 198.51.100.0;
    local-identity inet 203.0.113.0;
    external-interface ge-0/0/3;
    version v2-only;
}

```

```
user@host-srx1500:fips> show configuration security ipsec
proposal ipsec-proposal1 {
    protocol esp;
    encryption-algorithm aes-128-gcm;
}
policy ipsec-policy1 {
    perfect-forward-secrecy {
        keys group14;
    }
    proposals ipsec-proposal1;
}
vpn vpn1 {
    bind-interface st0.0;
    ike {
        gateway gw1;
        ipsec-policy ipsec-policy1;
    }
}
```

## RELATED DOCUMENTATION

| [Loading Firmware on the Device](#) | 50

# 5

CHAPTER

## Junos-FIPS Configuration Restrictions

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Unsupported Junos-FIPS Configuration Statements | 57

Unsupported Junos-FIPS Operational Commands | 58

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# Unsupported Junos-FIPS Configuration Statements

The following configuration statements are not supported on Junos-FIPS:

Statement	Description
<b>set system services { ftp   finger   telnet   web-management   xnm-clear-text   tftp }</b>	Junos-FIPS does not allow an unencrypted or weakly encrypted or a connection that relies on a vulnerable key establishment protocol.
<b>set system services ssh protocol-version</b>	Junos-FIPS allows the SSHv2 setting only.
<b>set system login password format { des   md5 }</b>	You must encrypt administrator passwords using strong algorithms, such as Secure Hash Algorithm (sha-256 and sha-512).
<b>set system ike policy <i>policy name</i> proposal-set</b>	Junos-FIPS does not support preconfigured proposal sets. You must configure an IKE proposal explicitly.
<b>set system ike proposal <i>proposal name</i> authentication-algorithm md5</b>  <b>set system ipsec proposal <i>proposal name</i> authentication-algorithm hmac-md5-96</b>	Junos-FIPS does not support Message Digest 5 (MD5). However it does support (sha-256 and sha-384).
<b>set system ike proposal <i>proposal name</i> encryption-algorithm des-cbc</b>  <b>set system ipsec proposal <i>proposal name</i> encryption-algorithm des-cbc</b>	Junos-FIPS does not support Data Encryption Standard (DES). However it does support Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) or 3DES.
<b>set system ike proposal <i>proposal name</i> protocol ah</b>	Authentication Header (AH) protocol provides authentication but not encryption. Enhanced Security Protocol (ESP) is required.
<b>set system ike proposal <i>proposal name</i> dh-group {group1   group2}</b>	Junos-FIPS does not support Diffie-Hellman (DH) groups 1 and 2. However, DH-group 14 and higher are supported on Junos-FIPS.

## RELATED DOCUMENTATION

[Unsupported Junos-FIPS Operational Commands](#) | 58

# Unsupported Junos-FIPS Operational Commands

The following operating commands are not supported on Junos-FIPS:

Command	Description
<b>request system software reboot <i>at time in minutes usb</i></b>	You must load the firmware image directly from the internal flash memory. Junos-FIPS does not support loading from an external source.
<b>set wlan</b>	Junos-FIPS does not support wireless configuration.
<b>request system software rollback</b>	You must upload a new version of the firmware explicitly. Junos-FIPS does not support the rollback to a previously saved version.
<b>request security pki ca-certificate enroll</b>	You must enroll the certificate authority enrollment manually. Simple Certificate Enrollment Protocol (SCEP) is disabled.

RELATED DOCUMENTATION

| [Unsupported Junos-FIPS Configuration Statements](#) | 57