A problem that sometimes occurs with DHCP is DHCP spoofing. With DHCP spoofing, an untrusted client floods a network with DHCP messages. Often these attacks utilize source IP address spoofing to conceal the true source of the attack.
DHCP snooping helps prevent DHCP spoofing by copying DHCP messages to the control plane and using the information in the packets to create anti-spoofing filters. The anti-spoofing filters bind a client’s MAC address to its DHCP-assigned IP address and use this information to filter spoofed DHCP messages. In a typical topology, a carrier edge router (in this function also referred to as the broadband services router [BSR]) connects the DHCP server and the MX-series router (or broadband services aggregator [BSA]) performing the snooping. The MX-series router connects to the client and the BSR.
DHCP snooping works as follows in the network topology mentioned above:
You configure DHCP snooping by including within a DHCP group the appropriate interfaces of the BSA:
- [forwarding-options dhcp-relay groupgroup-name]
-
interface interface-name;
In a VPLS environment, DHCP requests are forwarded over pseudowires. You can configure DHCP snooping over VPLS at the [edit routing-instances routing-instance-name ] hierarchy level.
DHCP snooping works on a per learning bridge basis in bridge domains. Each learning domain must have an upstream interface configured. This interface acts as the flood port for DHCP requests coming from the client side. DHCP requests will not be forwarded across learning domains in a bridge domain. You can configure DHCP snooping on bridge domains at the [edit routing-instances routing-instance-name bridge-domain bridge-domain-name] hierarchy level. For an example of DHCP snooping on the MX-series router, see the JUNOS MX-series Solutions Guide.