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Understanding IDS on an MS-MPC

 

Intrusion Detection Services

Intrusion detection services (IDS) rules on an MS-MPC give you a way to identify and drop traffic that is part of a network attack.

IDS rules provide a more granular level of filtering than firewall filters and policers, which can stop illegal TCP flags and other bad flag combinations, and can enforce general rate limiting (see the Routing Policies, Firewall Filters, and Traffic Policers User Guide). You can use firewall filters and policers along with IDS to reduce the traffic that needs to be processed by an IDS rule.

In an IDS rule, you can specify:

  • Limits on the sessions that originate from individual sources or that terminate at individual destinations. This protects against network probing and flooding attacks.

  • Types of suspicious packets to drop.

To protect against header anomaly attacks, a header integrity check is automatically performed if you configure an IDS rule, stateful firewall rule, or a NAT rule and apply it to the service set. You can also explicitly configure a header integrity check for the service set if you do not assign the service set an IDS rule, stateful firewall rule, or a NAT rule.

Benefits

  • Provides protection against several types of network attacks.

Session Limits

You can use IDS rules to set session limits for traffic from an individual source or to an individual destination. This protects against network probing and flooding attacks. Traffic that exceeds the session limits is dropped. You can specify session limits either for traffic with a particular IP protocol, such as ICMP, or for traffic in general.

You decide whether the limits apply to individual addresses or to an aggregation of traffic from individual subnets of a particular prefix length. For example, if you aggregate limits for IPv4 subnets with a prefix length of 24, traffic from 192.0.2.2 and 192.0.2.3 is counted against the limits for the 192.0.2.0/24 subnet.

Some common network probing and flooding attacks that session limits protect against include:

ICMP Address SweepThe attacker sends ICMP request probes (pings) to multiple targets. If a target machine replies, the attacker receives the IP address of the target.
ICMP FloodThe attacker floods a target machine by sending a large number of ICMP packets from one or more source IP addresses. The target machine uses up its resources as it attempts to process those ICMP packets, and can no longer process valid traffic.
TCP Port ScanThe attacker sends TCP SYN packets from one source to multiple destination ports of the target machine. If the target replies with a SYN-ACK from one or more destination ports, the attacker learns which ports are open on the target.
TCP SYN FloodThe attacker floods a target machine by sending a large number of TCP SYN packets from one or more source IP addresses. The attacker might use real source IP addresses, which results in a completed TCP connection, or might use fake source IP addresses, resulting in the TCP connection not being completed. The target creates states for all the completed and uncompleted TCP connections. The target uses up its resources as it attempts to manage the connection states, and can no longer process valid traffic.
UDP FloodThe attacker floods a target machine by sending a large number of UDP packets from one or more source IP addresses. The target machine uses up its resources as it attempts to process those UDP packets, and can no longer process valid traffic.

Session limits for traffic from a source or to a destination include:

  • maximum number of concurrent sessions

  • maximum number of packets per second

  • maximum number of connections per second

IDS also installs a dynamic filter on the PFEs of line cards for suspicious activity when the following conditions occur:

  • Either the packets per second or the number of connections per second for an individual source or destination address (not for a subnet) exceeds four times the session limit in the IDS rule. This session limit is the general source or destination limit for the IDS rule, not the limit specified for a particular protocol.

  • The services card CPU utilization percentage exceeds a configured value (default value is 90 percent).

The dynamic filter drops the suspicious traffic at the PFE, and the traffic is not sent to the MS-MPC to be processed by the IDS rule. When the packet or connection rate no longer exceeds four times the limit in the IDS rule, the dynamic filter is removed.

Suspicious Packet Patterns

You can use IDS rules to identify and drop traffic with a suspicious packet pattern. This protects against attackers that craft unusual packets to launch denial-of-service attacks.

Suspicious packet patterns and attacks that you can specify in an IDS rule are:

ICMP fragmentation attackThe attacker sends the target ICMP packets that are IP fragments. These are considered suspicious packets because ICMP packets are usually short. When the target receives these packets, the results can range from processing packets incorrectly to crashing the entire system.
ICMP large packet attackThe attacker sends the target ICMP frames with an IP length greater than 1024 bytes. These are considered suspicious packets because most ICMP messages are small.
ICMP Ping of death attackThe attacker sends the target ICMP ping packets whose IP datagram length (ip_len) exceeds the maximum legal length (65,535 bytes) for IP packets, and the packet is fragmented. When the target attempts to reassemble the IP packets, a buffer overflow might occur, resulting in a system crashing, freezing, and restarting.
IP Bad option attackThe attacker sends the target packets with incorrectly formatted IPv4 options or IPv6 extension headers. This can cause unpredictable issues, depending on the IP stack implementation of routers and the target.
IPv4 optionsAttackers can maliciously use IPv4 options for denial-of-service attacks.
IPv6 extension headersAttackers can maliciously use extension headers for denial-of-service attacks or to bypass filters.
IP teardrop attackThe attacker sends the target fragmented IP packets that overlap. The target machine uses up its resources as it attempts to reassemble the packets, and can no longer process valid traffic.
IP unknown protocol attackThe attacker sends the target packets with protocol numbers greater than 137 for IPv4 and 139 for IPv6. An unknown protocol might be malicious.
Land attackThe attacker sends the target spoofed SYN packets that contain the target’s IP address as both the destination and the source IP address. The target uses up its resources as it repeatedly replies to itself. In another variation of the land attack, the SYN packets also contain the same source and destination ports.
SYN fragment attackThe attacker sends the target SYN packet fragments. The target caches SYN fragments, waiting for the remaining fragments to arrive so it can reassemble them and complete the connection. A flood of SYN fragments eventually fills the host’s memory buffer, preventing valid traffic connections.
TCP FIN No ACK attackThe attacker sends the target TCP packets that have the FIN bit set but have the ACK bit unset. This can allow the attacker to identify the operating system of the target or to identify open ports on the target.
TCP no flag attackThe attacker sends the target TCP packets containing no flags. This can cause unpredictable behavior on the target, depending on its TCP stack implementation.
TCP SYN FIN attackThe attacker sends the target TCP packets that have both the SYN and the FIN bits set. This can cause unpredictable behavior on the target, depending on its TCP stack implementation.
TCP WinNuke attackThe attacker sends a TCP segment with the urgent (URG) flag set and destined for port 139 of a target running Windows. This might cause the target machine to crash.

Header Anomaly Attacks

To protect against header anomaly attacks, a header integrity check is automatically performed if you configure an IDS rule, a stateful firewall rule, or a NAT rule and apply it to the service set. You can also explicitly configure a header integrity check for the service set if you do not assign the service set an IDS rule, stateful firewall rule, or a NAT rule.

The header integrity check provides protection against the following header anomaly attacks:

ICMP Ping of death attackThe attacker sends the target ICMP ping packets whose IP datagram length (ip_len) exceeds the maximum legal length (65,535 bytes) for IP packets, and the packet is fragmented. When the target attempts to reassemble the IP packets, a buffer overflow might occur, resulting in a system crashing, freezing, and restarting.
IP unknown protocol attackThe attacker sends the target packets with protocol numbers greater than 137 for IPv4 and 139 for IPv6. An unknown protocol might be malicious.
TCP no flag attackThe attacker sends the target TCP packets containing no flags. This can cause unpredictable behavior on the target, depending on its TCP stack implementation.
TCP SYN FIN attackThe attacker sends the target TCP packets that have both the SYN and the FIN bits set. This can cause unpredictable behavior on the target, depending on its TCP stack implementation.
TCP FIN No ACK attackThe attacker sends the target TCP packets that have the FIN bit set but have the ACK bit unset. This can allow the attacker to identify the operating system of the target or to identify open ports on the target.